

FILED

JUN 29 2009

HAROLD S. MARENUS, CLERK
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ORDERED PUBLISHED

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

In re:)	BAP No.	NV-08-1314-JuHMo
)		
CRYSTAL CASCADES CIVIL, LLC,)	Bk. No.	05-20550
)		
Debtor,)	Adv. No.	06-01082
)		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)		
)		
Appellant,)		
)		
v.)	O P I N I O N	
)		
RICHARD H. BUENTING; ROAD &)		
HIGHWAY BUILDERS, LLC,)		
)		
Appellees.)		

Argued and Submitted on May 19, 2009
at Seattle, Washington

Filed - June 18, 2009
Ordered Published - June 29, 2009

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Nevada

Honorable Bruce A. Markell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: JURY, HOLLOWELL, and MONTALI, Bankruptcy Judges.

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1 JURY, Bankruptcy Judge:

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3 Appellees Richard H. Buenting ("Buenting") and Road &
4 Highway Builders, LLC, ("Road & Highway") (collectively,
5 "Appellees") filed an adversary complaint against appellant
6 United States of America ("IRS") seeking a judicial declaration
7 that their later-in-time recorded liens against Crystal Cascades
8 Civil, LLC's real property were superior to the IRS's two
9 notices of federal tax lien (variously, "NFTLs" and "liens")
10 recorded against the same property.¹

11 The validity of the IRS's tax liens against Appellees is
12 governed by 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f).² The statute requires the IRS
13 to record its tax lien in a manner that allows third parties to
14 discover the lien through a reasonable inspection of the public
15 index of deeds. IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A).

16 Here, the NFTLs identified the taxpayer as "Crystal
17 Cascades, LLC, a corporation" instead of "Crystal Cascades
18 Civil, LLC", which was debtor's name registered with the Nevada
19 Secretary of State. Therefore, Appellees contended the tax

21 ¹ The IRS recorded its tax liens on August 11, 2004 and
22 January 28, 2005, as a result of debtor's failure to pay its
23 employment taxes for the last two quarters of 2003 and the first
24 two quarters of 2004, respectively. Buenting recorded a deed of
25 trust which secured a \$125,256 note on February 4, 2005. Road &
26 Highway recorded a deed of trust which secured a \$455,000 note on
27 the same date. It recorded a corrected deed of trust for this
28 loan on February 8, 2005. This corrected deed of trust also
secured a \$3,174,960.13 debt owed under an indemnification
agreement executed by debtor's principals.

² Hereinafter citations to the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. are referred to as "IRC".

1 liens were outside the chain of title and could not be
2 discovered by a reasonable inspection of the public index of
3 real property records in Clark County, Nevada where the property
4 was located.

5 After a trial, the bankruptcy court issued its ruling in a
6 written opinion entered on November 12, 2008, which was amended
7 on December 3, 2008 and published as Buenting v. Crystal
8 Cascades Civil, LLC (In re Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC), 398
9 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008). The bankruptcy court held that a
10 search of the real property records in Clark County, Nevada
11 using debtor's exact legal name constituted a reasonable
12 inspection within the meaning of IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A). In so
13 deciding, the court concluded that the standard for a reasonable
14 inspection under the statute should be tested against how a
15 nonprofessional person³ would search the public records index,
16 which would be an exact name search. Crystal Cascades Civil,
17 LLC, 398 B.R. at 34. The court also considered the nature of
18 the public index and search methods that were available in Clark
19 County, Nevada. Id. at 36-37. Because an exact-name search
20 would not have revealed the tax liens, the court awarded
21 Appellees \$321,000 in surplus proceeds that remained after the
22 foreclosure sale of debtor's property.

23 The IRS timely filed this appeal, contending that the
24 bankruptcy court applied the incorrect legal standard when

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26 ³ The court uses the terminology "average nonprofessional"
27 or "nonprofessional searcher" in its written opinion. At times
28 in trial, reference was made to the "person off the street."
Other times reference was made to the "average user". We use the
term "ordinary prudent person" as synonymous with
"nonprofessional", "person off the street" or "average user".

1 making its ruling on what constituted a reasonable inspection
2 under the circumstances here.

3 There is no precise legal standard for what constitutes a
4 reasonable inspection under all circumstances. We hold that
5 what constitutes a reasonable inspection within the meaning of
6 IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) is properly analyzed from the perspective of
7 an ordinary prudent person and will vary by locality. This was
8 the approach followed by the bankruptcy court.

9 Accordingly, for the reasons more fully explained below, WE
10 AFFIRM.

11 **I. FACTS**

12 The initial Articles of Organization filed with the Nevada
13 Secretary of State on November 20, 2000 reflected debtor's legal
14 name as "Crystal Cascades, LLC". Debtor also used this name to
15 obtain an Employment Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS.

16 On May 31, 2001, amended Articles of Organization changed
17 debtor's name from Crystal Cascades, LLC to Crystal Cascades
18 Civil, LLC. Crystal Cascades, LLC transferred the real property
19 at issue in this appeal to Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC at some
20 time after this May 31, 2001 name change. Debtor did not
21 provide the IRS with a formal notice of the name change. But it
22 used both its old name and new name on its tax returns that led
23 to the IRS's tax liens at issue in this appeal.

24 Debtor filed its chapter 11 petition on September 28, 2005.
25 On January 30, 2006 the bankruptcy court entered a stipulation
26 and order vacating the automatic stay with respect to the real
27 property at issue in this appeal in favor of Business Bank of
28 Nevada ("Business Bank"). Business Bank held the first and

1 second deeds of trust on the property, the underlying notes were
2 in default and the bank sought to complete its foreclosure sale.
3 Debtor entered into the stipulation with Business Bank after
4 concluding that the property's value was less than the amount of
5 liens encumbering it.

6 Appellees did not receive notice of the stipulation, but
7 they discovered it on February 6, 2006, during a routine search
8 of the docket. Due to their lack of notice, Appellees filed
9 their adversary complaint⁴ on February 21, 2006, seeking to
10 reimpose the automatic stay and to obtain a judicial declaration
11 regarding the priority of their liens over the government's tax
12 liens. In conjunction with filing the complaint, Appellees
13 moved for a preliminary injunction against the pending
14 foreclosure sale. At the February 27, 2006 hearing on this
15 motion, the court denied the relief, authorized the foreclosure
16 sale to go forward on February 28, 2006, and ordered that any
17 excess proceeds be deposited in an interest-bearing account
18 pending resolution of Appellees' adversary proceeding.⁵

19 Stewart Title Company ("Stewart Title") conducted the
20

21 ⁴ Appellees also named Debtor, Business Bank and the Gore
22 Family Trust ("Gore") as defendants.

23 ⁵ Because the priority of Business Bank's lien was
24 uncontested, it was permitted to keep the portion of the
25 foreclosure proceeds which satisfied its debt and was thereafter
26 dismissed from the proceeding on March 3, 2006. Appellees
27 entered into a settlement agreement with Gore on October 18,
28 2007, which provided that Appellees would pay one third of all
amounts recovered to Gore, up to a maximum of \$100,000. In
return, Gore agreed to dismiss, with prejudice, its counterclaim
against Appellees. Appellees dismissed Gore from the adversary
proceeding on November 1, 2007.

1 nonjudicial foreclosure sale on Business Bank's behalf. The
2 title officer responsible for conducting the sale performed a
3 title search that determined who would receive notice of the
4 foreclosure sale. The title officer did not find the NFTLs.
5 Consequently, the IRS did not receive notice of the sale.

6 Road & Highway purchased the property at the foreclosure
7 sale for \$1.5 million.⁶ Thereafter, the IRS notified Road &
8 Highway that it was exercising its statutory right of redemption
9 under IRC § 7425. Appellees negotiated a release of the IRS's
10 claim to a right of redemption in exchange for \$100,000.⁷ The
11 trial regarding the priority of the IRS's NFTLs over Appellees'
12 liens occurred in November 2007. The bankruptcy court ruled
13 against the IRS and in favor of Appellees. The IRS timely filed
14 this appeal.

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17 ⁶ Buenting owned 50% of Road & Highway Builders, LLC.
18 Fisher Sand and Gravel Corporation, a North Dakota C Corporation
19 owned the other 50%.

20 ⁷ Appellees asserted for the first time in their October
21 18, 2007, trial brief that the IRS's election to redeem the
22 property operated to extinguish its liens. The court addressed
23 this issue in its final ruling, finding that a precondition of
24 the IRS's right of redemption was the proper filing of the tax
25 liens. Because the court found the tax liens were not properly
26 filed and ineffective against third parties, the court concluded
27 that the IRS had no legal right of redemption which arose when
28 the property was foreclosed upon. The court further held that if
the tax liens were valid, the IRS's acceptance of \$100,000 was
not itself a redemption and, therefore, was not an election of
remedies. Thus, the court concluded that the IRS was not
estopped from asserting a claim to the surplus proceeds. Crystal
Cascades Civil, LLC, 398 B.R. at 37-38. Since the court's ruling
on the election of remedies issue does not depend upon whether
the NFTLs were valid against third parties, we need not address
these issues to reach our determination.

1 **II. JURISDICTION**

2 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this core
3 proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157(b) (2) (K) and (O).
4 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.⁸

5 **III. ISSUE**

6 Whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal
7 standard in reaching its decision that a reasonable inspection
8 of the relevant property records in Clark County, Nevada would
9 not have revealed the tax liens.

10 **IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

11 Whether a reasonable inspection of the relevant property
12 records within the meaning of IRC § 6323(f) (4) (A) would have
13 revealed the IRS's NFTLs is a mixed question of law and fact
14 that we review de novo. TKB Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 995
15 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Kivel v. United States,
16 878 F.2d 301, 304 (9th Cir. 1989)). Because our review is de
17 novo, we consider whether a reasonable inspection of the public
18 index occurred as if no decision had been rendered by the
19 bankruptcy court. United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 576
20 (9th Cir. 1988).

21 **V. DISCUSSION**

22 The priority of a federal tax lien is governed by federal
23 law. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 384 U.S.
24 323, 328 (1966). When a taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay a
25

26 ⁸ When Appellees filed the adversary proceeding, the estate
27 owned the real property. Subject matter jurisdiction is
28 determined as of the date the complaint is filed. Fietz v. Great
W. Sav. (In re Fietz), 852 F.2d 455, 457 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).

1 tax liability after assessment, notice, and demand, the amount
2 due becomes "a lien in favor of the United States upon all
3 property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
4 belonging to such person." IRC § 6321.

5 Once the IRS files a proper notice of a tax lien, the lien
6 is valid against a subsequent purchaser of the property,
7 provided that the purchaser is given notice of the encumbrance.
8 IRC § 6323(a).⁹ The filing requirements for the notice are set
9 forth in IRC § 6323(f).¹⁰ The notice itself must be on Form 668

11 ⁹ This subsection provides:

12 Purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic's
13 lienors, and judgment lien creditors.--The lien imposed
14 by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any
15 purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's
16 lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof
17 which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been
18 filed by the Secretary.

19 ¹⁰ Subsection (f) titled "Place for filing notice; form"
20 provides in relevant part:

21 (1) Place for filing.--The notice referred to in
22 subsection (a) shall be filed--(A) Under State laws.--
23 (i) Real property.--In the case of real property, in
24 one office within the State (or the county, or other
25 governmental subdivision), as designated by the laws of
26 such State, in which the property subject to the lien
27 is situated; (3) Form.--The form and content of
28 the notice referred to in subsection (a) shall be
prescribed by the Secretary. Such notice shall be valid
notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding
the form or content of a notice of lien. (4) Indexing
required with respect to certain real property.--In the
case of real property, if--(A) under the laws of the
State in which the real property is located, a deed is
not valid as against a purchaser of the property who
(at the time of purchase) does not have actual notice
or knowledge of the existence of such deed unless the
(continued...)

1 and its contents are dictated by the Secretary of the Treasury.
2 IRC § 6323(f)(3). Treasury Regulation ("Treas. Reg.")
3 § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) requires that the NFTL "must identify the
4 taxpayer, the tax liability giving rise to the lien, and the
5 date the assessment arose...."

6 With respect to real property, the notice requirement under
7 the statute requires proper filing of the tax lien under the
8 laws of the state "in which the property subject to the lien is
9 situated." IRC § 6323(f)(1)(A)(i). Where, as here, the
10 property is situated in a state that invalidates a deed against
11 a bona fide purchaser unless the filing of that deed has been
12 recorded, the NFTL "shall not be treated as meeting the ...
13 requirements" with respect to such a purchaser "unless the fact
14 of filing [the tax lien] has been entered and recorded in [an]
15 index ... in such a manner that a reasonable inspection of the
16 index will reveal the existence of the [lien]."¹¹ IRC
17 § 6323(f)(4)(A).

18 IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) thus defines the rights of the
19 subsequent purchaser of real property vis-a-vis the IRS's NFTLs
20 and fixes a standard by which such rights are to be measured.

21 _____
22 ¹⁰(...continued)
23 fact of filing of such deed has been entered and
24 recorded in a public index at the place of filing in
25 such a manner that a reasonable inspection of the index
26 will reveal the existence of the deed....

27 ¹¹ Under Nevada law, a subsequent purchaser without notice
28 of a prior interest takes free and clear of that interest. Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 111.320. Clark County maintains grantor-grantee
indices pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. § 247.190.1. The indexing is
supplemented by an Internet-based search engine that allows
searching by entity name. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 247.150.9(b).

1 However, there is no precise legal test for determining what
2 constitutes a "reasonable inspection" within the meaning of the
3 statute. The term is defined neither in the statute nor in the
4 regulations. Central to this case, therefore, is the
5 interpretation of the word "reasonable".

6 The IRS's various assignments of error in this appeal
7 demonstrate that the word "reasonable" raises numerous questions
8 which we must address: Should the reasonableness of an
9 inspection of the public records be tested against the conduct
10 of an ordinary prudent person? Or, as the IRS argues, should
11 reasonableness be tested against the type of search conducted by
12 a professional title officer? Should the reasonableness of the
13 search depend at all on local idiosyncracies with respect to the
14 organization of the public index and electronic search methods
15 available? Or, as the IRS argues, does consideration of local
16 practice impose too strict a burden on the IRS?

17 Additionally, should a subsequent purchaser who has reason
18 to know that an encumbrance exists be held to inquiry notice to
19 search the grantor/grantee index not only under the name of the
20 record owner, but also under other names the record owner might
21 possibly have used? The final question for our consideration is
22 whether it is necessary for us to reconcile the bankruptcy
23 court's holding that an exact-name search constitutes a
24 reasonable inspection under IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) with Treas. Reg.
25 § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2), which incorporates a federal common law
26 substantial compliance test regarding the taxpayer's identity.

27 **A. The Reasonable Inspection Test Under IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A)**

28 Our analysis for application of the reasonable inspection

1 test to the facts before us starts with the plain language of
2 the statute. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235,
3 240-41 (1989). Unlike other definitions of terms for tax
4 purposes which often bear little resemblance to their
5 definitions in everyday life,¹² we can rely on the dictionary
6 definition of the word "reasonable" to guide us in evaluating
7 the conduct to which it refers. United States v. McNab, 331
8 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) ("To determine the common usage
9 or ordinary meaning of a term, courts often turn to dictionary
10 definitions for guidance."). Reasonable is defined as "what is
11 fair, proper and moderate" under the circumstances. Black's Law
12 Dictionary (8th ed. 2009). The word connotes use of an
13 objective standard by which to measure the conduct of an index
14 searcher - a common sense, nontechnical concept that deals with
15 practical considerations on which a reasonable and prudent
16 person would act under similar circumstances.

17 The word inspection means a "careful examination". Black's
18 Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2009). However, when preceded by the
19 word "reasonable", it implies that an inspection cannot be
20 expected to completely eliminate the possibility that a material
21 error on the NFTL will be uncovered. See generally Sum of

22
23 ¹² For example, "the term 'basis,'...which in tax parlance
24 means very roughly the cost of an asset adjusted for depreciation
25 and other expenses, has a dictionary definition that is
26 essentially useless for tax purposes. 'Basis' therefore means as
27 much (or as little) as the statutory context, regulations, and
28 previous judicial decisions provides. The term 'gift' has
different meanings for income, estate, and gift tax purposes,
none of them really consistent with the nontax definition." 2A
Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 77A:1 (7th ed.
2008).

1 \$66,839.59 v. IRS, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
2 Along the same vein, a third party cannot be required to search
3 every possible variation of a taxpayer's name. See generally
4 Assocs. Fin. Serv. Co. v. Brown, 258 Wis. 2d 915, 656 N.W. 2d 56
5 (2002).

6
7 **1. Title Officer Versus Ordinary Prudent Person**

8 With these definitions and principles to guide us, we
9 consider the government's argument that the reasonableness of
10 the inspection should be tested against the search methods used
11 by a professional title officer. The IRS urges us to utilize
12 this standard in our analysis for essentially two reasons.
13 First, the IRS maintains that the vast majority of title
14 searches are conducted by professionals. Second, title officers
15 use a "less is more" approach with their search. As the moniker
16 denotes, a lesser version of the taxpayer's name is used. Under
17 that scenario, the government contends that a reasonable search
18 would use the term "Crystal Cascades" only, which would have
19 located the tax liens.

20 The plain wording of IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A), however, requires
21 the IRS to provide notice of its tax liens through the public
22 index. Title officers use private title plants which provide
23 information above and beyond what is available at the local
24 state recorder's office. Such title plants are not accessible
25 to the public. It follows then that, although a tax lien may be
26 discovered through a search in a title plant, it may still be
27 outside the chain of title if it cannot be found by the
28 appropriate method of examining the public records.

1 In addition, title officers have extensive training in
2 searching land records. Underwriting standards dictate the
3 extent of their search techniques depending on the stakes
4 involved. With high stakes, the title officer may perform
5 searches using numerous variations of the debtor's name.¹³
6 However, it is irrelevant what types of searches title companies
7 do, as the issue is whether a subsequent purchaser has
8 constructive notice of the tax liens through inspection of the
9 public records. What a title company should have or would have
10 done to discover the liens does not control. See Kivel, 878
11 F.2d at 304.

12 In sum, to accommodate its error, the IRS essentially seeks
13 to change the law of constructive notice to require that future
14 title searches be performed only by trained individuals with
15 elaborate and expensive equipment at their disposal. This
16 result cannot be what Congress intended when mandating the IRS's
17 NFTLs to impart notice through a public recording system.
18 Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that the reasonableness
19 of a search should be tested against the conduct of an ordinary
20 prudent person.

21 2. Locality And The Exact-Name Search

22 Although we are dealing with a federal tax statute, the
23 standard for what constitutes a reasonable search of the public
24 index will necessarily vary because of the nature of the
25

26 ¹³ The IRS's witness, Betty Waters, testified that the
27 underwriting guidelines for a company would dictate the type of
28 search required by the title officer. She further testified that
among title companies, the search would vary depending upon each
company's guidelines.

1 particular state's indexing system. As the bankruptcy court
2 noted, a person might use different searches in different
3 localities, even when presented with the same name. "A searcher
4 would construct different searches, for example, in
5 jurisdictions that maintain only grantor-grantee indexes than he
6 or she would if the jurisdiction permits full-name searching by
7 computer, with the added function of 'wildcards.'" Crystal
8 Cascades Civil, LLC, 398 B.R. at 31.

9 That leads us to the question of what constitutes a
10 reasonable search of the public records in Clark County, Nevada.
11 The parties' witnesses, both of whom were title officers, agreed
12 that an ordinary prudent person would use an exact-name search
13 only. Common sense dictates that an exact-name search is a
14 logical starting point under circumstances where the public is
15 offered a computerized database in which grantors and grantees
16 may be searched by name, such as we have here. See generally
17 United States v. Polk, 822 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1987) (government's
18 lien against third party valid when NFTL used taxpayer's full
19 legal name, but third party conducted search only with
20 taxpayer's middle and last name).

21 Moreover, even though the index had a "wild card" feature
22 (when the name is searched, the search results will not only
23 contain documents with that name, but also documents that have
24 the name searched as a root), the IRS's witness Ms. Waters
25 testified that an index searcher of the public records would
26 input the legal name of the entity and not use the "less is
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28

1 more" approach.¹⁴ While the witnesses' opinions are not
2 dispositive, the bankruptcy court found their testimony credible
3 and we have no reason to question that an exact-name search is
4 reasonable even when a "wildcard" search feature was available.

5 Inherent in the application of the reasonable inspection
6 test are judgment calls about what constitutes a reasonable
7 search, especially in today's electronic age. If a "balance
8 must be struck between exactitude in searching – searching under
9 the debtor's precise name, and only that name, – and latitude in
10 searching – searching under some variant of the debtor's exact
11 name," Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC, 398 B.R. at 35, we think the
12 balance must tip in favor of subsequent purchasers, whom the
13 statute is designed to protect. Requiring an ordinary prudent
14 person to use variants of the debtor's exact name would not only
15 be time intensive, but also unfair in relation to the IRS who
16 need only check the accuracy of its tax liens.

17 Moreover, this approach provides a simpler rule that has
18 general application, eliminating nuances regarding one word, two
19 word, or three-word searches versus exact-name searches. Common
20 sense tells us that some index searchers will be more computer
21 savvy than others, but on the whole we cannot expect them to do
22 the work of trained title officers. What we can expect is that
23 all searchers would uniformly be able to come up with an exact-
24

25 ¹⁴ At trial, the government's lawyer asked Ms. Waters: "If
26 you were given the name Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC, and know
27 that the [title insurance] policy is only for \$10,000, is a
28 reasonable and diligent search then to use only the exact name?"
Ms. Waters: "Yes." She also testified that she would probably
not do a "less is more" search unless there was a lot at stake.

1 name search on their own.¹⁵

2 In short, after consideration of local practices and
3 testimony by witnesses who were familiar with Clark County's
4 system and searching capabilities, we conclude that under the
5 circumstances here, an ordinary prudent person would use an
6 exact-name search only when searching the land records in Clark
7 County Nevada. We hold that the bankruptcy court did not err in
8 deciding that such a search was reasonable as a matter of law.
9 Such a search would not have revealed the tax liens.

10 **3. Inquiry Notice**

11 The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the
12 search revealed facts which would have put the subsequent
13 purchaser on notice to inquire further. Kivel, 878 F.2d at 304
14 (index searcher has a duty to investigate the documents that
15 underlie the search). The IRS argues that the exact-name search
16 would have put the searcher on notice that the property could be
17 affected by liens that were filed against other entities listed
18 on the result of the search.

19 According to the IRS, the second entry of the search
20 reveals a judgment lien against numerous entities including
21 Crystal Cascades, Crystal Cascades Inc., Crystal Cascades Civil
22 LLC and Crystal Cascades Pools & Spas LLC. This information,
23 the government explains, should have tipped off the searcher to
24 conduct a second search using the two-word search of "Crystal
25 Cascades".

26
27 ¹⁵ Appellees' witness, Mr. Kiernan, testified that the
28 clerk at the Recorder's Office would tell the public to go to the
computer and input the name exactly as it is on the title
document.

1 That two-word search revealed the following entities, with
2 the number of documents for each entity represented by the
3 number in parentheses after the name: Crystal Cascades
4 Construction (2); Crystal Cascades Inc (7); Crystal Cascades Inc
5 Pool Division (1); Crystal Cascades LLC (2); Crystal Cascades
6 LLC,' (1) (with the ending apostrophe distinguishing this entry
7 from the prior entry); Crystal Cascades Pools & Spas (2);
8 Crystal Cascades Pools & Spas LLC (10); Crystal Cascades Pools
9 and Spas LLC (1). Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC, 398 B.R. at 33
10 n.10.

11 As noted by the bankruptcy court, "there were some twenty-
12 six documents that a shortened search of 'Crystal Cascades'
13 would have revealed, and to connect any of those documents back
14 to the debtor would have required an extensive search of not
15 only the records indexed and filed at the Clark County
16 Recorder's Office, but also at the Nevada Secretary of State's
17 office." The court concluded that this kind of extensive search
18 could not be considered "reasonable" within the meaning of the
19 statute. Id. at 35-36.

20 Our own assessment is that the two-word search the IRS
21 proposes produces results which are unwieldy for the ordinary
22 prudent person. We conclude that the facts which the IRS
23 maintains put the searcher on inquiry notice were insufficient
24 to impose a duty on the searcher to investigate over twenty-six
25 entries and search the Nevada Secretary of State's records to
26 find the tax liens. We hold that a reasonable inspection of the
27 public index simply cannot encompass the kind of extensive
28 search the IRS proposes, as that is neither fair nor a moderate

1 approach.

2 Finally, we comment on the IRS's argument made in passing
3 that Buenting's knowledge of debtor's various d/b/a's, including
4 Crystal Cascades, LLC, put him on inquiry notice to search the
5 public index under other names debtor may have used. As noted,
6 however, in TKB, IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) is concerned only with the
7 notice imparted through the public indexing system and does not
8 concern the actual or subjective knowledge of the subsequent
9 purchaser. TKB Int'l, 995 F.2d at 1465 (finding that whether
10 subsequent purchaser had actual notice of the tax liens was
11 unimportant). This is consistent with the purpose of the
12 statute which was "to keep the federal tax lien in line with
13 other recorded instruments in the state recording
14 system....[and] to serve as notice to subsequent purchasers
15 wherever possible." Davis v. United States, 705 F.Supp. 446,
16 453 (C.D. Ill. 1989). We conclude as a matter of law that the
17 plain language of the statute does not contemplate any type of
18 subjective analysis. Rather, the focus is on whether an
19 ordinary prudent person could discover the tax liens in the
20 public indexing system.

21
22 **B. The Substantial Compliance Test Is Distinct From the
Reasonable Inspection Test Under § 6323(f)(4)(A)**

23 Finally, we answer the last question as to whether the
24 result in this case needs to be reconciled with Treas. Reg.
25 § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) which requires that the NFTL "must
26 identify the taxpayer."¹⁶ The IRS devotes a significant portion
27

28 ¹⁶ In a sense, the IRS back peddles into this argument.
(continued...)

1 of its brief and argument to the substantial compliance test,¹⁷
2 which arose from circumstances similar to those here -
3 discrepancies in the taxpayer's name on the NFTL.

4 The seminal and oft-cited case is United States v. Sirico,
5 247 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) where the issue in the case was
6 whether a valid and properly recorded NFTL was subordinated as
7 against a subsequent mortgagee solely by reason of the fact that
8 the taxpayer's initial instead of her full name was set forth.

9 The court stated:

10 The mere fact that a full name is not given or that
11 there is an addition, omission or substitution of
12 letters in a name, or even errors, does not, in and of
13 itself, invalidate the notice. The essential purpose
14 of the filing of the lien is to give constructive
15 notice of its existence. The test is not absolute
16 perfection in compliance with the statutory
17 requirement for filing the tax lien, but whether there
18 is substantial compliance sufficient to give
19 constructive notice and to alert one of the

16 ¹⁶(...continued)

17 According to the IRS, since the bankruptcy court held that an
18 exact-name search standing alone was reasonable under the
19 circumstances here, then that must mean that the IRS must put the
20 exact name of the taxpayer on the NFTL. The IRS argues that this
21 is inconsistent with the federal common law standard that has
22 evolved regarding discrepancies in the taxpayer's name on the
23 notice. The IRS maintains that its NFTLs adequately identified
24 the taxpayer when they were filed with the name debtor used on
25 its EIN application. However, our inquiry in this appeal turns
26 on whether a reasonable inspection would reveal the lien, not
27 whether the IRS complied with its own regulation.

24 ¹⁷ Internal Revenue Manual ("IRM") § 5.17.2.3.5
25 (12-14-2007) states: "A number of controversies concern errors
26 in the name of the taxpayer as it appears on the NFTL. The
27 general rule is that if the name on the notice is not identical
28 to the correct name of the taxpayer, then the NFTL is still valid
if the NFTL is sufficient to put a third party on notice of a
lien outstanding against the taxpayer. This is known as the
substantial compliance test. United States v. Sirico, 247 F.
Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)."

1 government's claim.

2 The Sirico court found that under the facts, it was difficult to
3 understand how one searching the public land records could have
4 missed the notice of tax lien. The court noted that not only
5 was the correct surname of the taxpayer listed, but her
6 residence address corresponded with the premises, which was the
7 subject of the title search. The court concluded that the
8 filing of the lien under the circumstances was adequate to give
9 constructive notice to interested persons.¹⁸

10 The government's reliance on the substantial compliance
11 test to set the legal standard under IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) is
12 misplaced. The IRS understates the test by omitting that the
13 essential purpose of the NFTL was to give constructive notice of
14 the government's claim. At the same time, the IRS overstates
15 the test's precedential importance because the substantial
16 compliance test evolved prior to November 6, 1978 when IRC
17 § 6323(f) was amended to include subsection (4)(A) to read as it
18 does today.¹⁹

19 _____
20 ¹⁸ The "substantial compliance test" is an anglicized
21 version of the common law rule of "idem sonans" where "given a
22 variance in the spelling of two names, if the correct
23 pronunciation of the two names results in practically identical
24 sounds, the names are held to designate the same person." 57 Am.
25 Jur. 2d Name § 60 (2008). At common law, a party typically
26 invoked the doctrine of idem sonas to avoid the invalidation of a
document, despite a variance in the spelling of a particular name
in the document, when the document had already been exchanged
between, or acknowledged by, people who knew each other. Tibbets
v. Kiah, 2 N.H. 557-58 (1823). This is not the situation we are
confronted with here.

27 ¹⁹ Prior to amendment, paragraph (f)(4) read as follows:
28 "(4) Index. The notice of lien referred to in subsection (a)
(continued...)

1 The amended statute does not mention "substantial
2 compliance" in conjunction with the validity of the NFTL against
3 a subsequent purchaser without actual notice. Rather, the
4 statute requires that the NFTL be "entered and recorded in a
5 public index ... in such a manner that a reasonable inspection
6 of the index will reveal the [lien]." Thus, the plain language
7 of the statute applies a reasonable inspection test when the
8 priority of the IRS's lien is at issue.

9 It is questionable whether we need to consider the extent
10 of the IRS's compliance with identifying the taxpayer on its
11 notice in this context.²⁰ Our hesitation occurs because the
12 Ninth Circuit analysis of IRS lien priority has focused on the
13 reasonable inspection test even when the NFTL uses the
14 taxpayer's correct legal name. See Kivel, 878 F.2d 302 (court
15 determined that it need not decide whether the NFTL filed under
16 the taxpayer's full legal name was valid against a subsequent
17 purchaser, but whether the way the notices were filed complied
18 with 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), as that was the statute which

19 _____
20 ¹⁹(...continued)
21 shall not be treated as meeting the filing requirements under
22 paragraph (1) unless the fact of filing is entered and recorded
23 in a public index at the district office of the Internal Revenue
24 Service for the district in which the property subject to the
25 lien is situated."

24 ²⁰ In actuality, the substantial compliance test and the
25 reasonable inspection test are but opposite sides of one coin.
26 The substantial compliance test focuses on the notice itself and
27 whether the IRS substantially complied with Treas. Reg.
28 § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) by identifying the taxpayer so as to give
constructive notice of the government's claim. In contrast, the
reasonable inspection test focuses on whether the filing is
recorded in such a manner that a searcher could find the NFTL in
the public records.

1 governed the validity of liens in California); TKB Int'l, 995
2 F.2d 1460 (tax liens filed in exact name of taxpayer held
3 invalid against subsequent purchaser who acquired property that
4 was subject to fraudulent conveyance and fraudulent nature of
5 transaction was not apparent on face of deed); cf. Walsh v.
6 United States (In re Focht), 243 B.R. 263, 267 (W.D. Pa.
7 1999) (stating that first step in determining whether tax lien
8 was valid was to evaluate whether the Form 668 notice
9 substantially complied with the statutory requirement of
10 identifying the taxpayer).

11 Lastly, we perceive no conflict between the bankruptcy
12 court's holding that an exact-name search constitutes a
13 reasonable search within the meaning of IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) and
14 the IRS's Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2) which requires that
15 the NFTL "must identify the taxpayer."

16 VI. CONCLUSION

17 The IRS suggests that the bankruptcy court essentially
18 allowed the government's fortunes to rise and fall based on
19 whether or not a person off the street could retrieve the
20 government's liens when a search was performed using only the
21 debtor's exact name. But it is Congress which has provided
22 specific rights to subsequent purchasers and the statute at
23 issue here implements a strong policy against secret liens.
24 Notice is the key and IRC § 6323(f)(4)(A) adheres to the notice
25 systems implemented by the states. The tax liens here were
26 outside the chain of title and, therefore, did not provide the
27 notice contemplated under the statute, since a reasonable
28 inspection would not have uncovered them.

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For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.