

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NOV 26 2008

2

1

HAROLD S. MARENUS, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NC-08-1117-DJuMk NC-08-1148-DJuMk

08-41065

MEMORANDUM¹

3

4

5

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BAP Nos.

Bk. No.

6

7

In re:

ADELINA B. WILLIAMS and

ADELINA B. WILLIAMS and ANTHONY L. WILLIAMS,

MARTHA G. BRONITSKY, Chapter

13 Trustee; U.S. TRUSTEE,

Debtors.

Appellants,

Appellees.²

ANTHONY L. WILLIAMS,

8

9

10

1112

13

14

15

16

17

18

1920

2122

24

25

28

23

26 27 ¹This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (<u>see</u> Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

Argued and Submitted on November 20, 2008

at San Francisco, California

Filed - November 26, 2008

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California

Honorable Leslie J. Tchaikovsky, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: DUNN, JURY and MARKELL, Bankruptcy Judges.

²Appellees did not participate in this appeal.

Chapter 13^3 debtors appeal both the dismissal of their case for failure to comply with the credit counseling requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) and the order discharging the chapter 13 trustee. We AFFIRM both of the bankruptcy court's decisions.

I. FACTS4

Adelina B. Williams and Anthony L. Williams ("the Williams"), without the assistance of counsel, filed a joint chapter 13 petition ("Petition") on March 7, 2008, in order to prevent the scheduled foreclosure sale of their residence.

Attached to the Petition was an "Exhibit D⁵ - Individual Debtor's Statement of Compliance With Credit Counseling Requirement"

³Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

⁵Exhibit D is an official form. The instructions are explicit on the face of Exhibit D and warn debtors of their failure to check truthfully one of the five statements concerning credit counseling. The form also states, "Every individual debtor must file this Exhibit D. If a joint petition is filed, each spouse must complete and file a separate Exhibit D. Check one of the five statements below and attach any documents directed."

⁴On August 7, 2008, a motions panel issued an order waiving as to Appellants both formal briefing and the filing of an appendix and/or excerpts of the record. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(b) and 8019. Because no record was supplied by Appellants, we have reviewed and rely on the bankruptcy court docket. Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Co.(In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 (9th Cir. BAP 2003) (the BAP may supplement incomplete excerpts of record with information obtained from the bankruptcy court docket).

signed by Mrs. Williams and dated February 19, 2008.⁶ Although Mrs. Williams did not check any of the five boxes included on Exhibit D, she did insert text after the form statement in paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 provides:

I certify that I requested credit counseling services from an approved agency but was unable to obtain the services during the five days from the time I made my request, and the following exigent circumstances merit a temporary waiver of the credit counseling requirement so I can file my bankruptcy case now. [Must be accompanied by a motion for determination by the court.] [Summarize exigent circumstances here.]

Mrs. Williams summarized her exigent circumstances as follows: "By Motion: Waver [sic] of Need. Case against former employer (Whistleblower Statutes)."

Also attached to the Petition was a document titled "Debtor's Motion to Bankruptcy Court for Waver [sic] of Credit Counseling." This motion was signed by Mrs. Williams, purportedly on behalf of herself and Mr. Williams. The content of the motion in its entirety reads:

In that Debtors have never abused their credit privileges and are in trouble only due to exigent circumstances beyond their control. In that nearly five years ago, Husband was fired from his job of 13 years as a mechanic at United Airlines, due to Whistleblower Retaliation (Williams v. United Airlines C-04-3787-CW). An appeal from this judge's decision was handed down by the Ninth Circuit Court on September 12, 2007, wherein the judges sent the case to the United States Dept. of Labor. (Williams v. United Airlines 2008-AIR-0003) scheduled for trial on March 12, 2008. (Exhibit-A).

During the course of this 4-year-long legal proceeding, Husband was unable to obtain employment due to an open case against United, and stringent employment

⁶No Exhibit D signed by Mr. Williams is in the bankruptcy court records.

background requirements of local employers. After numerous attempts of Injunctive Relief have been denied by United, Debtors have had to rely on equity cash-outs from their home, and Husband wife's credit merely to survive. Now Debtor's home is in foreclosure, with an impending sale of April 22, 2008 (Exhibit-B); and this Bankruptcy filing is needed to prevent this from happening, until final Case disposition by Administrative Law Judge Gerald M. Etchingham, U.S. Department of Labor. (See: Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 519 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century; Sub. C, Miscellaneous Provisions Standard No: 1979.114).

In the end, it is certain that the Dept. of Labor shall rule in Debtor's favor.

Attached to this motion were the trial notice and the foreclosure notice.

The docket entry for the Petition includes the following comment: "EXHIBIT D FILED BUT NO OPTION WAS SELECTED. NO CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT COUNSELING FILED."

On March 24, 2008, the chapter 13 Trustee ("Trustee") filed her motion to dismiss the Petition based on the Williams' failure to file required case documents, including (a) either a certification of prefiling consumer credit counseling or a declaration of exigent circumstances regarding prefiling consumer credit counseling, (b) the balance of their schedules, (c) a chapter 13 plan, (d) a matrix, and (e) Form B22C. The motion advised the Williams that they had twenty days from March 24 to file a written request for hearing on the proposed dismissal. The twenty days expired on April 14, 2008.

On April 8, 2008, the Williams filed their Form B22C, and on April 15, 2008, the Williams filed both their chapter 13 plan and their objection ("Objection") to the Trustee's proposed dismissal. Earlier on April 15, 2008, however, the Trustee had

(1) filed her declaration stating that the Williams had made no response to the motion to dismiss and (2) submitted an order for the dismissal of the case. The bankruptcy court entered the dismissal order on the same date, before the Williams' Objection was docketed. In the Objection, the Williams state that they "filed" the motion for waiver of the credit counseling requirement on February 19, 2008, but that no "response was given by Bankruptcy Court;" that they filed the motion for waiver again on April 4, 2008; and that they filed their Form B22C on April 5, 2008. The bankruptcy court took no action on the Objection after the Dismissal Order was entered.

The Williams promptly filed a motion for reconsideration of the Dismissal Order and a motion for stay pending appeal. The bankruptcy court denied both motions on April 29, 2008. In its memorandum and order, the bankruptcy court stated:

The Court writes this memorandum to explain better to the Debtors why their motions must be denied. Aside from other inadequacies with their handling of their case, as noted above, the Debtors are simply ineligible to be debtors in this case due to their failure to obtain pre-petition credit counseling or to establish a basis for either permanently excusing them from obtaining such counseling or for extending the time within which they may obtain such counseling postpetition and then obtaining the counseling postpetition. For that reason alone, the motions must be denied.

23 The Williams filed

The Williams filed their notice of appeal (NC-08-1117) on the same day.

⁷The bankruptcy court docket reflects that no document was filed on April 4, 2008; nor is there a docket entry for the motion for waiver of the credit counseling requirement on any date after April 4, 2008.

On May 20, 2008, the Trustee filed her final account. Thereafter, an order discharging the Trustee was entered May 28, 2008. The Williams filed their notice of appeal (NC-08-1148) with respect to that order on June 3, 2008.

On August 12, 2008, the Williams' mortgage creditor filed a motion for relief from stay ("362 Motion"), which the bankruptcy court heard on August 29, 2008. The Williams filed no response to the 362 Motion. At the hearing, the bankruptcy court ruled that the case had been dismissed and that if no order staying the dismissal had been entered, the case remains dismissed. The bankruptcy court agreed to enter a "comfort order" granting the creditor relief from the automatic stay. The order was entered September 17, 2008.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \$\$ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A).

We cannot exercise jurisdiction over a moot appeal. <u>I.R.S.</u>
<u>v. Patullo (In re Patullo)</u>, 271 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001).

The test for mootness is whether we still can grant effective relief to the appealing party if we decide the merits in his or her favor. <u>Pilate v. Burrell (In re Burrell)</u>, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). If a case becomes moot while an appeal is pending, we must dismiss the appeal. <u>Patullo</u>, 271 F.3d at 900.

Examples of situations where we cannot grant effective relief to an appealing party are when funds have been disbursed to nonparties or when subject property has been sold to a good faith purchaser. See Beatty v. Traub (In re Beatty), 162 B.R. 853, 856 (9th Cir. BAP 1994).

In this case, our review of the bankruptcy court docket and the Williams' October 31, 2008, motion for stay pending appeal alerted us to the fact that a foreclosure sale of the Williams' residence was scheduled for November 18, 2008. However, at oral argument, Mr. Williams advised us that the foreclosure sale had been postponed. In addition, the Trustee reported in her final account that priority and unsecured claims totaling \$24,539.31 had been filed in the Williams' chapter 13 case that could be subject to discharge in bankruptcy. Based on the record before us at this time, it is unclear whether we would be precluded from granting any effective relief to the Williams if they prevailed in this appeal. Accordingly, we will proceed to consider the merits of the Williams' appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

III. ISSUES

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing the Williams' case.

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in discharging the Trustee.

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review an order dismissing a chapter 13 bankruptcy case for abuse of discretion. Brown v. Sobczak (In re Sobczak), 369 B.R. 512, 516 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we must affirm the decision of the bankruptcy court unless (1) we have a definite and firm conviction that the bankruptcy court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing the relevant factors, (2) the bankruptcy court applied the wrong law, or (3) the bankruptcy

court rested its decision on clearly erroneous findings of material fact. <u>Delay v. Gordon</u>, 475 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007).

We review issues of statutory construction and conclusions of law, including interpretation of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, de novo. <u>Einstein/Noah Bagel Corp. v. Smith (In re BCE W.,</u> L.P.), 319 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003).

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Dismissal Order Appeal (NC-08-1117).

This case involves application of the credit counseling requirement contained in § 109(h). We previously have discussed § 109(h)'s purposes and parameters.

The new § 109(h) requires, as a condition to eligibility for bankruptcy relief, that within 180 days prior to an individual debtor's bankruptcy filing, the debtor receive (1) a briefing as to available opportunities for credit counseling, and (2) assistance in performing a budget analysis from a nonprofit credit counseling agency, approved ordinarily by the United States Trustee (collectively, "credit counseling"). The purpose of these provisions is to require debtors at least to explore the utility of credit counseling as an option before throwing in the towel and seeking a discharge of their debts in bankruptcy.

Mendez v. Salven (In re Mendez), 367 B.R. 109, 114 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). In order to be eligible for chapter 13 relief, the Williams, like other debtors, were required to obtain credit counseling.

The Williams do not dispute that they did not obtain credit counseling either before or after they filed their Petition.

Instead, they assert that the bankruptcy court erred when it

failed to waive⁸ the credit counseling requirement based on the "exigent" circumstances of Mr. Williams's litigation with his former employer and the economic impact that litigation has had on the Williams. We agree with the bankruptcy court that the grounds stated by the Williams in support of their request to be excused permanently from satisfying the credit counseling requirement were inadequate. Section 109(h)(4) explicitly establishes the only circumstances under which the credit counseling requirement can be waived:

The requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor whom the court determines, after notice and hearing, is unable to complete those requirements because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone. For the purposes of this paragraph, incapacity means that the debtor is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his financial responsibilities; and 'disability' means that the debtor is so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing required under paragraph (1).

The Williams did not assert before the bankruptcy court, and do not assert on appeal, that they suffer from an incapacity or disability as defined in \S 109(h)(4), or that they were serving on active military duty in a combat zone.

The language of § 109(h)(1) provides that unless an individual has obtained the credit counseling mandated by

⁸Although Mrs. Williams inserted her comments in the Exhibit D paragraph relating to a temporary waiver, it is clear from the pleadings both in the bankruptcy court and on appeal that the Williams did not obtain credit counseling at any time. Mr. Williams confirmed at oral argument that he and Mrs. Williams had not obtained the required credit counseling.

statute, he "may not be a debtor under this title." Because the Williams failed to obtain credit counseling, they were not eligible to be debtors. The bankruptcy court did not err when it dismissed the case.

B. Appeal of Order Discharging Trustee (NC-08-1148)

The Williams have not articulated any basis for contending that the bankruptcy court erred in entering the order discharging the Trustee. Once the Trustee filed her final account certifying that the estate had been fully administered, there was nothing more for the Trustee to do. Although the bankruptcy case remains open, presumably because of these pending appeals, that is a matter of court administration only. The bankruptcy court did not err when it discharged the Trustee.

VI. CONCLUSION

NC-08-1117. We do not have a definite and firm conviction that the bankruptcy court committed a clear error of judgment when it dismissed the Williams' case for failing to meet the credit counseling requirement of § 109(h). The bankruptcy court neither applied the wrong law nor committed clear error in its factual findings. The Williams were not eligible for chapter 13 relief as a result of their failure to comply with § 109(h).

NC-08-1148. Further, the Williams did not address the basis for their appeal of the order discharging the Trustee, and we have found no error in entry of that purely administrative order. We AFFIRM.