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This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or the rules of res judicata, including issue and claim preclusion. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

# HAROLD S. MARENUS, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

## OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

BAP Nos. In re: EC-05-1377-PaAB EC-05-1491-PaAB LESLIE ANN TOLAND, (Consolidated) 04-33742-D-13 Bk. No. Debtor, LESLIE ANN TOLAND, Appellant, MEMORANDUM<sup>1</sup> v. SPARTAN MORTGAGE SERVICES; DANTE TROLIO; LAWRENCE MARION;) LAWRENCE J. LOHEIT, Chapter 13) Trustee, Appellees.

Submitted Without Argument on May 17, 2006<sup>2</sup>

Filed - June 15, 2006

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California

Honorable Robert S. Bardwil, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding.

Before: PAPPAS, ALBERT<sup>3</sup> and BRANDT Bankruptcy Judges.

At the request of the parties, and with the Panel's approval, this appeal was submitted without oral argument. Rule 8012-1.

The Honorable Theodor C. Albert, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

This is an appeal from orders entered by the bankruptcy court denying confirmation of a chapter 13 plan and dismissing the bankruptcy case. We AFFIRM.

#### **FACTS**

Appellant Leslie Ann Toland ("Toland" or "Debtor") filed a petition under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code<sup>4</sup> on December 2, 2004. At the same time, Toland filed her proposed chapter 13 plan (the "Original Plan"). According to her bankruptcy schedules, as later amended, Toland had estimated living expenses of \$2,941 per month, estimated income of \$3,300 per month and excess income available to be paid into the plan of \$360 per month. Toland also claimed an exemption of \$50,000 on the cash proceeds from the sale of her residence pursuant to CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 704.703(a)(1).

Appellees Spartan Mortgage Services, Dante Trolio and Lawrence Marion (together, the "Creditors"), objected to confirmation of the Original Plan because it was not filed in good faith. The chapter 13 trustee, Lawrence J. Loheit ("Loheit"),

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Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section, and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 and to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9036, in effect prior to the effective date of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (Apr. 20, 2005).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Creditors allege that they were victims of a series of fraudulent real estate transactions engineered by Toland and others; that their claims against Toland would be nondischargable under § 523(a); and that the primary, if not sole, purpose of the chapter 13 filing was Toland's attempt to secure a discharge of their claims under § 1328(a). Although the bankruptcy court never ruled on the good faith objection, and it is thus not directly implicated in this appeal, the Panel takes note of the legal and practical consequences of Toland's alleged participation in these alleged schemes, and the effect on her employment and income.

Toland does not dispute that her real estate appraisers and sales licenses were revoked and that she was convicted of a felony (continued...)

joined in the Creditors' objection. He also alleged that Toland was no longer employed because her real estate salesperson's license was revoked by the State of California and she could not show that she would be able to make the payments under the proposed plan as required by § 1325(a)(6). And according to Loheit, Toland's plan might also fail the "best interests of creditors test" of § 1325(a)(4) because there was no indication in her plan or schedules that Toland would meet the requirements of the California homestead law requiring her to reinvest the home sale proceeds in a new homestead within six months. Therefore, Loheit argued, the exemption on the proceeds would expire and creditors could receive more under a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation than through her plan.

At the hearing on plan confirmation and Loheit's objection to exemption on June 7, 2005, the bankruptcy court agreed with Loheit that Toland had not carried her burden of proof in showing that

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for which she is still on probation. In her Reply Brief to the Creditors' Opposition to Chapter 13 Plan, she states: "Ms. Toland was criminally prosecuted; lost her real estate appraisal business; lost her appraisal license; lost her real estate license; and incurred thousands of dollars in legal fees." Attached to that Reply Brief and incorporated therein was the Decision of the Real Estate Commissioner of California, No. H-4021 SAC OAH No. N-2004070138, dated November 18, 2004, which, <u>inter</u> alia, documented the following events: 1) The California Office of Real Estate Appraisers accused Toland of completing real estate appraisals that violated the Ethics Provisions of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 2) As part of a criminal plea agreement, Toland stipulated to surrendering her residential real estate appraisers license, effective August 12, 2003. 3) Toland pled guilty to one felony count of Misprision of Felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4. She was sentenced to a period of 60 months probation which will not expire until October 2008. U.S. v. George, et al., Case No. 02-CR-325-4, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California (Shubb, J.) October 1, 2003. 4) The Department of Real Estate of the State of California revoked her real estate salesperson's license, effective December 20, 2004.

her plan complied with the requirements of § 1325(a) (4) and (6). 6 Specifically, the court found that more than six months had elapsed since Toland sold the house, that she had not reinvested the house sale proceeds in another homestead as required by CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 704.720(b) 7 and, thus, the proceeds were non-exempt. Since the plan did not account for these funds, the court concluded that the plan was not feasible. As a result, the bankruptcy court denied Toland's motion to confirm the Original Plan.

On June 20, 2005, Toland filed an amended plan ("Amended Plan") along with amended schedules B and C. The Amended Plan provided for payments to creditors over a 60-month period, at the rate of \$360 for the first six months and \$660 for the remaining 54 months. According to Toland's motion to confirm the Amended Plan, these payments would provide a 7.5 percent payment to the unsecured creditors. In Section IV of the Amended Plan, Toland stated that "Debtor will use proceeds from the sale of her residence in part to fund the plan as necessary."

In amended schedules B and C, Toland disclosed that, as of the petition date, she had \$35,977.75 in proceeds of the sale of her residence in her bank account. She claimed an exemption in these funds of \$19,670.00, pursuant to CAL. CODE CIV. PRO.

 $<sup>^6</sup>$  Since the court determined that the plan could not be confirmed because Toland did not satisfy the requirements of \$ 1325(a)(4) and (6), the court did not decide whether the plan was submitted in good faith as required under \$ 1325(a)(3).

The court observed that "the debtor's response [to the objection to her exemption] incorrectly states that there is no requirement that Ms. Toland use the funds to acquire another homestead. . . . There is a reinvestment requirement for entitlement to the exemption, pursuant to CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 704.720(b)."

§ 703.140(b)(5). Thus, the remaining approximately \$16,000 constituted nonexempt cash.

Creditors objected to the Amended Plan.<sup>8</sup> In addition to repeating their good faith objection, Creditors pointed out that Toland's estimated monthly income of \$3,300 in her amended Schedule I was inaccurate. According to Creditors, Toland testified at the § 341 creditors meeting that she was no longer employed and only receiving disability income.

On July 26, 2005, Toland replied to Creditors' objection. In addition to addressing the good faith issue, Toland acknowledged that she was no longer employed in the real estate business because her real estate sales license had been revoked. She indicated, however, that she truthfully scheduled her employment and income as of the petition date. Since February 15, 2005, Toland stated that she had been receiving disability benefits. She alleged that with this income and "more than sufficient funds in the bank to fund the plan, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. Section 1325(a)(6)."

Toland filed a Supplemental Reply in Support of Motion to Confirm First Amended Chapter 13 Plan on August 16, 2005. In it, she attempted to justify funding the Amended Plan with the nonexempt house sale proceeds:

The Court previously suggested a reluctance to confirm a plan funded in part from the use of nonexempt funds held by the Debtor. Having now researched the issue, it is clear that a plan may be funded by the liquidation of nonexempt assets. See <u>In re Tomasso</u>, 98 B.R. 513; <u>In re Hagel</u>, 1844 B.R. 793 and <u>In re Burgie</u>, 239 B.R. 406. Furthermore, opposing

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> There is no indication in the Excerpts of Record or the docket that Loheit filed an objection to the Amended Plan.

counsel has cited no authority for their contention that the funding of a plan using nonexempt assets is not permissible. Finally, it only seems fair that the Debtor should be permitted to use the nonexempt funds when she is paying the creditor the value of these funds.<sup>9</sup>

Also on August 16, 2005, Toland filed a Supplemental Declaration in which she indicated, <u>inter alia</u>, that: (a) she had \$9,000 of the nonexempt funds remaining from the sale of her residence; (b) she was using the nonexempt funds to pay living expenses; (c) "I was not aware that I was not permitted to use the funds for day to day living costs"; (d) she was receiving \$1,809.16 in worker's compensation payments per month; (e) because she could not return to work until January 2006, she was relying on the nonexempt funds to make ends meet during the interim period; and (f) she expects that she will be able to earn "close to \$3,000" per month when she returns to work.

On September 6, 2005, the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing on Toland's motion to confirm the Amended Plan. The court denied confirmation, noting, "Based on the pleadings filed and oral argument presented at the hearing, and on the Debtor's use, to cover personal expenses, of non-exempt funds which were to be used for her Chapter 13 plan payments; and good cause appearing,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Our review of the Excerpts of Record and the bankruptcy case docket does not show that either the bankruptcy court, Creditors or Loheit ever suggested that a plan could not be funded with the nonexempt cash assets. The court made this clear to Toland's counsel at the confirmation hearing, as described below. Far from arguing that Toland could not use nonexempt assets to fund the plan, in their objection to confirmation of the Amended Plan, Creditors argue that Toland should use <u>all</u> of the nonexempt cash to fund the plan: "The debtor's proposed plan is in violation of § 1322(a) of the Code. The debtor does not satisfactorily explain why she cannot use all of her non-exempt cash to help fund the plan in addition to the proposed monthly payments set forth in the plan."

it is ORDERED that the motion is denied." At the hearing, the court explained to Toland's counsel that, while nonexempt assets could be used to fund a plan, that was not the reason the court was denying confirmation:

THE COURT: I do understand that a plan can be funded by nonexempt assets. My concern here was that you had a nonexempt bank account and the amount in the account was approximately 16,000 plus something, and the debtor was proposing to use that over time to make her payments, but in the interim she was also dipping into that covering her living expenses, and that is the aspect of the plan that makes it unconfirmable.

And, in fact, it's not before the Court, but it appears that there were use of nonexempt funds without court approval, and to the extent - I mean, from the Court's view, that is going to have to be accounted for. So what I have before the Court today is an objection to the plan, and the Court will sustain the objection.

. . .

MR. FONG [Toland's counsel]: Can I make one last? I should point out that although Mr. Isley [Creditors' counsel]'s objection raised the fact that the creditors are not getting everything they would get in the Chapter 7, that's not precisely accurate. The debtor's plan proposes to pay that amount throughout the life of the plan.

THE COURT: Mr. Fong, what we have here is a situation where she's saying at least a couple of months ago there was 16,000 plus dollars of nonexempt assets, going to use that to pay the plan but she's using that for living expenses.

MR. FONG: Right.

THE COURT: So what happens at the end of the day when the rest of that 9,000 - the 16 has dwindled to 9,000 and she converts the case?

MR. FONG: I understand the Court's concern on that one. And yet, I guess it is a little bit speculative and at the same time I understand the Court's -

THE COURT: It's not speculative from the standpoint she's utilizing nonexempt assets postpetition without court approval.

MR. FONG: Right, I understand that.

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THE COURT: So, I just think that it leads itself to nothing but problems and the Court won't approve the confirmation under the circumstances.

Hr'g Tr. 3:21 - 6:18 (September 6, 2005).

In addition to denying confirmation of the Amended Plan, the court ordered that Toland was prohibited from using the nonexempt assets to pay living expenses until further order of the court.

Toland appealed the court's order denying confirmation of the Amended Plan on September 12, 2005.

On September 23, 2005, Loheit moved to dismiss or convert the bankruptcy case for cause pursuant to § 1307(c), arguing that Toland had engaged in unreasonable delay that was prejudicial to creditors, that confirmation of Toland's Amended Plan had been denied and that Toland had filed no further plan and may not be able to do so.

In response to this motion, on November 16, 2005, Toland filed a Declaration stating that as of the date of the hearing on the Amended Plan (September 6), she had \$7,500 in the bank. As of November 16, 2005, Toland represented she had \$3,500 in the bank.

On a November 29, 2005 hearing, to dismiss or convert, the bankruptcy court granted Loheit's motion and dismissed the case. The court's order provides: "Findings of fact and/or conclusions of law having been stated orally on the record and good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is dismissed." 10

Appellant did not provide a copy of the transcript of the hearing on November 29, 2005, and the bankruptcy case docket does not contain the transcript. Neither the Excerpts of Record nor the docket contain any pleadings that discuss the court's findings of fact or conclusions of law upon which it based its decision to dismiss the case.

Toland timely filed an appeal of the dismissal order on December 13, 2005. The appeals of the denial of confirmation and dismissal of the case were consolidated by Clerk's Order on January 3, 2006.

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#### JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction of this action under 28 U.S.C. \$ 1334 and \$ 157(b)(2). Our jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. \$ 158(b)(1).

#### ISSUES ON APPEAL

The appellant designated the following as the issues on appeal:

- 1. Did the court err in finding that the Debtor can not fund the plan using nonexempt funds held in the bank?
- 2. Did the court err in dismissing Debtor's case after finding that the Debtor can not fund the plan using nonexempt funds held in the bank?

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

The confirmation of a chapter 13 plan involves mixed questions of fact and law. Factual determinations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while determinations of law are reviewed de novo. Andrews v. Loheit (In re Andrews), 155 B.R. 769, 770 (9th Cir. BAP 1993).

The Panel reviews orders of dismissal for an abuse of discretion. In re Loya, 123 B.R. 338, 340 (9th Cir. BAP 1991). In reviewing an order under an abuse of discretion standard, the Panel cannot reverse unless it has a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.

<u>Solomon v. N. Am. Life and Cas. Ins. Co.,</u> 151 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1998).

**DISCUSSION** 

1. The court did not err in denying confirmation of the Amended Plan.

As a preliminary matter, the Panel notes that Toland persists in this appeal in misinterpreting the findings of the bankruptcy court and its reasons for denying confirmation of the Amended Plan. Toland's opening brief focuses on why it was error for the bankruptcy court to decide that it was "impermissible to confirm a plan because it is being funded by nonexempt property." As discussed above, an examination of the record reveals no indication that the bankruptcy court denied confirmation because the plan was to be funded with the nonexempt house sale proceeds. On the contrary, the bankruptcy court unambiguously informed Toland's attorney at the hearing on confirmation that:

I do understand that a plan can be funded by nonexempt assets. My concern here was that you had a nonexempt bank account and the amount in the account was approximately 16,000 plus something, and the debtor was proposing to use that over time to make her payments, but in the interim she was also dipping into that covering her living expenses, and that is the aspect of the plan that makes it unconfirmable.

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Hr'g Tr. 3:21 - 4:3 (September 6, 2005) (emphasis added). The bankruptcy court did not deny confirmation of the Amended Plan because it was funded by nonexempt assets. Instead, the court denied confirmation because Toland did not carry her burden of proving that she would be able to make all of the payments proposed in the Amended Plan.

Confirmation of a chapter 13 plan may be denied if the debtor fails to satisfy one or more of the prerequisites of § 1325(a).

In re Padilla, 312 B.R. 349, 352 (9th Cir. BAP 1997); Keith M.

Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 3d ed. ¶ 217.1 (2000 & Supp. 2004).

Here, the court had clear evidence that Toland would not "be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan" as required by § 1325(a)(6).

Toland's amended Schedule J showed total estimated living expenses of \$2,941 per month. Her amended Schedule I showed projected income of \$3,300 per month. This left \$360 for monthly payments under the plan. Toland's Amended Plan did indeed provide for payments of \$360 per month for the first six months.

However, in her Supplementary Declaration, Toland informed the court that she was not earning \$3,300 per month, but in fact was receiving disability payments of \$1,809.16 per month. That amount of income was insufficient to meet her scheduled living expenses and required Toland to draw on the nonexempt house sale proceeds both to meet the \$1,100 per month shortfall in living expenses and to make plan payments. The court noted that the nonexempt cash had declined from \$16,000 in February 2005 to \$9,000 at the time of the confirmation hearing. In his exchange with Toland's counsel at the September 6 hearing, the court noted the acceleration in depletion of the nonexempt assets and asked Toland's counsel, "So what happens at the end of the day when the

<sup>11</sup> Of course, the court was unaware at the September 6 hearing that, according to Toland's Declaration filed later, the remaining nonexempt funds at the time of the hearing was actually \$7,500, rather than \$9,000, resulting in deficiency in amounts needed to fund the Amended Plan.

rest of that 9,000 - the 16 has dwindled to 9,000 and she converts the case?" Hr'q Tr. 6:5-7 (September 6, 2005).

Simple math shows that the bankruptcy court was justified in not confirming the Amended Plan and enjoining further use of the nonexempt funds. 12 Toland had used over \$7,000 (and while unknown to the court, actually over \$9,000) of the \$16,000 in nonexempt funds since filing her bankruptcy petition. Even viewing Toland's arguments in a favorable light, she would continue to draw down the nonexempt assets for at least another five months until she could return to work. At that rate, the nonexempt funds would be depleted before she could return to work.

Finally, even assuming that Toland was able to return to work in February 2006 at the \$3,000 per month income level she expected (an assumption highly suspect in light of Toland's loss of her appraisal and real estate sales licenses and her continuing felony probation through 2008), she would still not have had sufficient income to make the increased monthly payments proposed in the Amended Plan of \$668.

The Panel concludes that the bankruptcy court did not err in deciding that the Amended Plan could not be confirmed. Toland's loss of her employment and on-going use of the nonexempt house sale proceeds to pay personal living expenses made it increasingly unlikely that she would be able to make all payments proposed in

At the September 6 hearing, the court prohibited Toland's use of the nonexempt funds for any purpose. However, from the court's earlier statements, it would appear that the court did not object to use of the nonexempt funds to make plan payments. It is also possible that the court may have used the blanket prohibition as a means to encourage Toland to promptly file a second amended plan.

the Amended Plan, and thus the plan did not comply with § 1325(a)(6). In addition, the Panel rejects as unsupported by the record Toland's contention that the bankruptcy court based its decision on Toland's use of nonexempt funds to make plan payments.

# 2. The court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case.

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Toland's characterization of the second issue on appeal ("Did the court err in dismissing Debtor's case after finding that the Debtor cannot fund the plan using nonexempt funds held in the bank?") misconstrues the bankruptcy court's reasons for dismissal. The bankruptcy court did not decide that Toland could not fund the plan through use of nonexempt funds. Rather, we will consider the more general question whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in deciding that cause existed to dismiss the case.

In this respect, Toland has not provided an adequate record on appeal. The court dismissed the case after a hearing conducted on November 29, 2005. The only information in the record concerning the bankruptcy court's decision on dismissal is a civil minute order entered December 1, 2005, which recites: "Findings of fact and/or conclusions of law having been stated orally on the record and good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is dismissed."

Toland has not included a transcript of the hearing on appeal so that the bankruptcy court's findings and conclusions may be reviewed by the Panel. A review of the docket shows no evidence

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28</sup>BAP Rule 8006-1 provides that "The excerpts of the record shall include the transcripts necessary for adequate review in light of the standard of review to be applied to the issues by the Panel."

that a transcript was ever ordered or prepared. In addition, none of the briefs filed by Toland or Creditors include the details of what occurred at the November 29, 2005, hearing, nor do they recite the court's specific findings or conclusions. In short, because Toland did not provide an adequate record on appeal, this Panel can not effectively review the bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss the bankruptcy case. In re McCarthy, 230 B.R. 414, 416 (9th Cir. BAP 1999).

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In general, if the appellant does not provide a sufficient record to support informed review of trial court determinations, the Panel may, but need not, either dismiss the appeal or affirm the trial court based upon the appellant's inability to demonstrate error. Kyle v. Dye (In re Kyle), 317 B.R. 390 (9th Cir. BAP 2004) (citing Cmty. Commerce Bank v. O'Brien (In re O'Brien), 312 F.3d 1135, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2002) and others). However, as we observed in Kyle, the Court of Appeals expects us "to consider whether informed review is possible in light of what record has been provided." Kyle, 317 B.R. at 394.

In this instance, a review of the facts available to the bankruptcy court at the time it reached its decision to dismiss the case allows us to conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the chapter 13 case. Indeed, it would appear that, under these circumstances, the court was likely compelled to dismiss the case.

By November 29, the court had already expressed its concern that depletion of the nonexempt assets would prevent Toland from completing payments under the Amended Plan. Further, the court had enjoined Toland from any further use of nonexempt funds without leave of the court. In support of her motion for a stay of the denial of confirmation pending appeal, Toland submitted a Declaration on November 16, 2005, two weeks before the hearing on dismissal, in which she informed the court that the balance of the nonexempt funds on September 6 was \$7,500, not the \$9,000 that the court had assumed was correct on that date. Further, Toland declared to the court that the balance on November 16 was \$3,500, which represented a further depletion of the funds. 14 Since there is no indication in the record that the court ever authorized Toland's use of the nonexempt funds after the entry of its order prohibiting Toland from doing so, the use of \$2,000 of those funds in only two months is an apparent violation of the court's order. Given Toland's apparent unwillingness to abide by lawful orders of the court, the likelihood that the nonexempt funds would soon be exhausted, and the significant questions concerning Toland's ability to fund a plan through employment, the bankruptcy court reasonably concluded that Toland could not propose a confirmable chapter 13 plan.

The willful disobedience of a lawful court order can itself constitute good cause for dismissal of a case. In her appeal of the confirmation order, Toland's Statement of Issues on Appeal, number 2, states "Did the court err in finding that the Debtor cannot use nonexempt funds held in the bank without obtaining

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In their Brief, Creditors brought to the Panel's attention that on December 8, 2005, after the court dismissed the chapter 13 case, Toland filed a chapter 7 petition. Her schedules in that case show that Toland had substantially exhausted the nonexempt funds as of that date. The Panel takes judicial notice of the docket in Toland's chapter 7 bankruptcy case, No. 05-40863, Eastern District of California. Schedule C lists total cash assets of \$980, all of which Toland claims exempt under CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 703.140(b)(5).

court permission?" But Toland did not include this issue in her opening brief, so we deem it waived. Law Offices of Neil Vincent Wake v. Sedona Inst. (In re Sedona Inst.), 220 B.R.74, 76 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (holding that arguments not specifically and distinctly made in an appellant's opening brief are deemed waived). We also note that Toland's motion for stay pending appeal was denied by the court. Consequently, we conclude that Toland acted in violation of the court's order prohibiting her from using nonexempt funds and that the court was aware of this conduct at the time the court entered the order dismissing the case. The Ninth Circuit considers dismissal of the bankruptcy case as one appropriate sanction that may be imposed for violation of a court's lawful order. Thompson v. Housing Authority, 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Loheit premised the motion to dismiss or convert on \$ 1307(c)(1), alleging that Toland caused unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to creditors; on \$ 1307(c)(5), in that her first amended plan was denied confirmation; and on \$ 1307(c)(3), in that she had failed to file a second plan and may not be able to propose a plan. The facts in the record available to the bankruptcy court at the time it ordered dismissal of the chapter 13 case show that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting Loheit's motion. And in her Opposition to Trustee's Motion to Dismiss or Convert Case to Chapter 7, Toland suggests that dismissal, rather than conversion, would be in the best interests of Toland and Creditors: "If the court is inclined to grant the motion [to dismiss or convert], Debtor requests the case be dismissed which would give Debtor the opportunity to

prosecute the appeal without compromising creditors' efforts to prosecute their alleged claims." Therefore, the bankruptcy court acted properly in dismissing the case, rather than converting it to a chapter 7 case.

### CONCLUSION

The decision of the bankruptcy court is AFFIRMED.