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1 2	NOT FOR PU	JBLICATION	НАБ	JUN 17 200 COLD S. MARENU U.S. BKCY. APP. P OF THE NINTH CIR	5, CLERK
3	UNITED STATES BANK	RUPTCY APPELLA	TE PANEL		
4	OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT				
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6	In re:) BAP No.	AK-04-1373-	-SBK	
7	KING FISCHER FISHERIES, LLC,	Bk.No.	00-00695		
8	Debtor.	Adv. No.	03-90051		
9 10 11	CHERRIER & KING PARTNERSHIP) CHERRIER KING CHERRIER FISHERY) PARTNERSHIP, and DRAGNET) FISHERIES COMPANY, INC.,))))			
12	Appellant,)			
13	v.	MEMOR	ANDUM ¹		
14 15	LARRY COMPTON, CHAPTER 11) TRUSTEE; OFFICIAL FISHER) CREDITORS COMMITTEE,)))			
16	Appellees.)			
17	/)			
18 19	Argued and Submitted on March 23, 2005 at Pasadena, California				
20	Filed - June 17, 2005				
21	Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska				
22 23	Honorable Donald MacDonald IV,			Presiding	
24 25 26	Before: SMITH, BRANDT, AND KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judges				
27 28	¹ This disposition is not may not be cited except when re of the case, res judicata, or o BAP Rule 8013-1.	elevant under	the doctrine	es of law	

This appeal is from a final order denying Cherrier & King Partnership, Cherrier King Cherrier Fishery Partnership, and Dragnet Fisheries Company, Inc.'s ("CK Group" or "Appellant") motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the trustee, Larry Compton ("Trustee"). We affirm.

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FACTS

7 The relevant facts of this case, which involves a failed sales transaction, are uncontested. Intending to set up a new 8 fish processing company in the Bristol Bay region of Alaska, 9 10 Chris Fischer ("Fischer") formed Triton Fisheries, LLC, which 11 later became King Fischer Fisheries, LLC ("KFF" or "Debtor"). In 12 early March of 2000, Fischer and CK Group entered into several agreements for the purchase of real and personal property 13 14 including two fish processing plants, two fish buying stations, a barge and the M/V Dragnet ("the Properties"). The purchase price 15 16 for all assets was \$3,351,000. Fischer paid \$50,000 in earnest money. The closing was scheduled for May 1, 2000. Debtor hired 17 18 E&E Foods of Seattle Washington ("E&E") as its agent for 19 directing and overseeing inventory, marketing, sales, collection, 20 and administrative costs related to the marketing of Debtor's 21 fish product.

To address CK Group's concerns about Fischer's ability to obtain financing, the parties executed a Second Addendum to the Purchase Agreements on April 14, wherein Fischer agreed to provide proof of financing within 10 days and to surrender the Properties if the purchase did not close within 45 days. On April 28, Fischer provided a financing commitment letter. CK Group, however, was not satisfied with the letter and wanted

1 additional time to verify the prospective lender's
2 qualifications.

With the fishing season fast approaching, Fischer needed to 3 4 take possession of the Properties immediately. Consequently, he and CK Group entered into a Third Addendum on May 2. Under this 5 arrangement, Fischer agreed to provide additional security for 6 the purchase in the event the closing did not occur by June 13. 7 If Fischer could not obtain sufficient financing by June 13, the 8 Third Addendum directed E&E to deposit the first \$1.7 million in 9 10 fish proceeds from the 2000 fishing season, payable to KFF, into 11 an escrow account as "additional security" for the purchase of 12 the Properties. If the sale closed after June 13 but before July 13 18, these proceeds were to be applied to the sale price. If the sale did not close before July 18, the parties agreed that the 14 money would serve as reasonable rent for the facilities. 15

16 On May 22, in a letter to Fischer and representatives for CK 17 Group, E&E acknowledged its obligation to deposit fish sale 18 proceeds collected before June 13 into escrow for the benefit of 19 CK Group as requested by the parties. As of June 14, however, 20 the parties were still negotiating the terms of the escrow 21 instructions. In fact, the parties never agreed on or signed any 22 escrow instructions, never deposited any sale proceeds into the 23 escrow account, and failed to abide by numerous provisions of the 24 Third Addendum. In short, the Third Addendum was never 25 implemented.

Instead, on July 10, counsel for Fischer and KFF wrote to CK Group seeking to modify the terms of the Third Addendum because KFF was facing a "cash crunch." Fischer requested that KFF be

allowed to retain \$300,000 of immediately available funds for 1 2 operating expenses and that the next \$500,000 be paid to CK Group 3 as a lease payment for the 2000 season with the proviso that the 4 full payment could be used as part of a down payment should KFF 5 close the sale. This new agreement was memorialized in the July 10 letter to E&E and provides in part: 6 7 [CK Group and Debtor] have agreed to a modification of the instructions with regard to the initial payments 8 you are to make. By this letter, which is signed by the attorneys for the parties, you are directed to make 9 distributions as follows: 10 1. The first \$300,000 of net proceeds shall be distributed to or at the direction of Chris 11 Fischer or Triton Fisheries. 12 The next \$500,000 of net proceeds shall be 2. distributed to [CK Group] as a minimum rental for 13 all facilities based on current production. . . 14 3. Unless and until you are otherwise directed in writing signed on behalf of the [CK Group and 15 Debtor], you shall then continue to make payments into the National Bank of Alaska account pursuant 16 to the instructions you previously acknowledged until such time as an additional \$1.2 million has 17 been paid into the account or you are advised that the sale of the properties contemplated by the 18 transaction among the parties has closed. 19 As instructed, on July 13 and 14, E&E transferred 20 approximately \$377,000 and \$93,120, respectively, to a non-escrow 21 CK Group partnership account. To satisfy the remaining \$29,381, 22 KFF assigned three containers of fish to CK Group worth about 23 \$122,500. 24 On July 18, KFF filed for chapter 11² protection. 25 Thereafter, between July 20 and July 25, E&E transferred an additional \$29,380 to CK Group. 26 27 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330, and 28 to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9036.

Debtor's liabilities exceed \$3.4 million and include 1 2 fishermen's liens of \$1,572,785, packers and processors' liens of 3 \$837,516,³ priority wage claims in the amount of \$143,000, and 4 general unsecured claims of \$893,000. Under Alaska law, 5 fisherman have statutory liens in all property of the processor, while packers have statutory liens in the fish product or output 6 7 of the processing plant for which material or labor was 8 furnished, and the plant itself, for the value of labor and material. 9

10 On August 25, 2000, the bankruptcy court appointed Larry 11 Compton as the chapter 11 trustee for the estate of KFF. The 12 Trustee filed this adversary proceeding claiming that the two pre-petition transfers and the transfer of the interest in \$1.7 13 million were avoidable as preferences under \$ 547(b) and 550. 14 The Trustee also alleged that CK Group's asserted interest in the 15 net proceeds is avoidable under \$\$ 544 and 550 because they 16 17 failed to perfect their interest in the \$1.7 million. Next, the 18 Trustee claimed that the net proceeds are avoidable under §§ 548 19 and 550 as fraudulent conveyances, i.e., transfers made for less 20 than a reasonably equivalent value and without fair 21 consideration. The post-petition transfers, the Trustee argued, are avoidable pursuant to §§ 549 and 550.4 CK Group cross-22 23 claimed against the Fisher Committee.

³ Fishermen, packers and processors are represented by the Official Fisher Creditors Committee ("the Fisher Committee").

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⁴ The Trustee also sought declaratory relief that his rights were superior and paramount to those of the Fisher Committee but that issue has been settled and is not part of this appeal.

1 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In 2 granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustee, the court found that the Third Addendum assigned an interest in accounts to 3 4 CK Group which had to be perfected, but was not, under Article 9 of Alaska's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). Accordingly, CK 5 Group's unperfected security interest was determined to be 6 subordinate to the statutory liens of the fishermen and packers, 7 as well as to the interest of the Trustee as a lien creditor 8 under § 544. The court also found that the post-petition 9 10 payments made to CK Group were either preferences or unauthorized 11 transfers. The court granted the Fisher Committee's motion for 12 summary judgment as to the fishermen lien claims and awarded 13 attorney's fees to the Fisher Committee pursuant to Alaska law, which provides for fees in cases where a committee is acting to 14 enforce the statutory lien rights of fishermen. 15

CK Group appeals.

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JURISDICTION

18 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334
19 and § 157(b)(1) and (b)(2). This Panel has jurisdiction under 28
20 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1).

ISSUES

- Whether CK Group's interest in the \$500,000 in fish proceeds and fish containers was subordinate to the interest of the Trustee under § 544 and to the statutory liens of the fishermen and packers;
- 2. Whether the transfers of fish proceeds from E&E to CK Group before and following the bankruptcy filing were either preferential transfers avoidable under § 547 or

unauthorized post-petition transfers under § 549; and3. Whether the Official Committee of Fisher Creditors was entitled to attorney's fees under Alaska law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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The Panel reviews summary judgment orders de novo. <u>Paine v.</u> <u>Griffin (In re Paine)</u>, 283 B.R. 33, 36 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).

DISCUSSION

8 The legal issues presented by this appeal revolve 9 fundamentally around the applicability of Article 9 of the UCC to 10 CK Group's interest in the fish proceeds. We agree with the 11 bankruptcy court's well-reasoned memorandum, including its 12 findings that 1) the transaction at issue was subject to the perfection provisions of Article 9, whether characterized as a 13 security interest or an assignment; 2) CK Group's unperfected 14 security interest is subordinate to the interest of the Trustee 15 16 and the statutory lien rights of the fishermen and packers; and 17 3) the transfers CK Group received prior to and after the 18 bankruptcy filing were avoidable under §§ 547 and 549.

19 A. <u>The Third Addendum Conveyed a Security Interest Governed by</u> 20 <u>Article 9 to CK Group.</u>

21 Appellant contends that Third Addendum conveyed to it an 22 absolute present assignment of property rights to the proceeds 23 from Debtor's fish sales. It argues that, as such, those funds 24 are not subject to avoidance because the transfers were made 25 pursuant to E&E's independent contractual obligation owed to CK Group and did not involve property of Debtor's estate. 26 Therefore, CK Group asserts, the perfection provisions of Article 27 28 9 do not apply and the transfers are not avoidable under §§ 547,

549, or 544. Additionally, the argument continues, because the
 assignment was made irrevocable on June 13, a full eight days
 before operations began, it preceded any statutory lien rights
 claimed by the fishermen. We disagree with Appellant's analysis.

5 Generally speaking, a security interest is implicated where the assignee retains the right to a deficiency claim if the 6 7 assignment does not provide sufficient funds to satisfy the 8 debt. See Dewhirst v. Citibank (Arizona) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1988) citing In re 9 Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc. 23 B.R. 659, 661-62 (D. Maine 10 11 1982) (identifying factors relevant to determination whether 12 security interest or absolute assignment is involved). A 13 security interest is also indicated when the assignee 14 acknowledges that his rights in the assigned property would be extinguished if the debt owed were to be paid from some other 15 16 source. 23 B.R. at 659, 661-62. By contrast, assignments have 17 been found to be absolute transfers where the assignment operates 18 to discharge the underlying debt. Id.

By its very terms, the Third Addendum can only be characterized as a security assignment.⁵ As stated in the body

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The Third Addendum provides, in relevant part:

Because Buyer needs immediate possession, and cannot wait until additional documentation is available to verify the financing commitments he has submitted, Buyer has proposed providing **additional security** for the sale in the event the closing does not occur on or before June 13, as required under the existing documents. The **additional security** for closing of the purchase will be a deposit in escrow of the first \$1.7 million in proceeds payable to [Debtor] from its seafood sales, which are anticipated to be received not (continued...) 1 of the agreement, "[Debtor] has proposed providing <u>additional</u> 2 <u>security</u> for the sale . . ." and "The <u>additional security</u> for 3 closing of the purchase will be". (emphasis added). 4 Appellant's attempt to minimize the significance of this language 5 by arguing that these references appear *only* in the "preamble" to 6 the agreement is unavailing. Nothing in the agreement suggests 7 that the assignment was intended to discharge the underlying

⁵(...continued)

later than the last week of June and first week of July. Those proceeds, less a payment in lieu of interest, will be applied to a closing of the sale of the properties on or before July 18, 2000. If closing does not occur on or before July 18, the deposit shall be paid to Sellers as compensation, and all property shall be returned to Sellers.

* * *

- 1. Assignment and Escrow of the Sale Proceeds: If closing of the purchase of the properties pursuant to the underlying agreements does not occur on or before June 13, [Debtor] hereby irrevocably assigns to [CK Group] the first \$1.7 million in net proceeds from seafood sales. E&E . . . which will be the sole Sale Agent for sales of processed seafood by Fischer and/or Triton Fisheries, shall deposit the first \$1.7 million in net proceeds payable to Fischer and/or Triton in an interest bearing escrow that [CK Group] will establish with Pacific Northwest Title of Alaska, or such other escrow holder as may be designated unanimously by [CK Group]. Only E&E sales commissions and any reimbursements that may be due to E&E for marketing or shipping costs may be deducted from sale proceeds prior to making the Escrow deposit.
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2. <u>Ownership of Escrow Account</u>: All funds deposited in the Escrow account shall, upon receipt, become the sole property of the [CK Group] free and clear of any claim, lien or right of the [Debtor] or [Debtor's] creditors .

28 Emphasis added.

debt, which would have been an indication that it was "absolute" under the <u>Evergreen</u> analysis. Further, as the Trustee correctly points out, Fischer conditionally, not absolutely, agreed that funds would be deposited into escrow <u>if</u> the sale did not close on or before June 13. Had Fischer obtained financing and closed the sale, Appellant would no longer have an interest in Debtor's fish sale proceeds, indicating that the assignment was for security.

8 As the court noted, CK Group's own characterization of its interest - "the right to receive payment from E&E," "E&E's 9 10 independent contractual obligation to make payment to CK," an 11 "assignment of revenue," and "a property right, the contractual 12 right to receive payment from E & E, " - is more consistent with a 13 security interest in accounts than an absolute present interest. 14 Therefore, we agree with the court's analysis and conclude that Appellant held a security interest in accounts which is governed 15 16 by Article 9.6

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¹⁸ 6 Former Article 9 applies with respect to CK Group's 19 interest because the relative priorities of the parties were established when Debtor filed bankruptcy in July 2000, before 20 Revised Article 9 became effective (July 2001). Under § 544, the Trustee's rights as a judicial lien creditor and the relative 21 rights and priorities of the parties become fixed as of the commencement of the case, even though they had not been finally 22 determined by the court. See e.g., In re Chorney, 277 B.R. 477, 23 486 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Wiersma, 283 B.R. 294, 299 (Bankr. D. Ida. 2002) (interpreting Idaho's savings clause, which 24 is similar to Alaska's (codified at AS § 45.29.702 (2004)), and noting that courts consistently apply former Article 9 when a 25 debtor files for bankruptcy before the effective date of Revised Article 9); see also, AS §45.29.709(a) (2004) which provides that 26 Revised Article 9 determines the priority of conflicting claims 27 to collateral unless the relative priorities of the claims were established before July 1, 2001, in which case Former Article 9 28 determines priority.

B. Even if the Third Addendum is Characterized as an "Absolute Assignment," it is Still Subject to the Provisions of Article 9.

4 The Third Addendum purported to assign to CK Group "the 5 first \$1.7 million in net proceeds from seafood sales." The Alaska Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions, defines 6 7 "goods" to include "all things that are movable at the time the 8 security interest attaches." AS § 45.09.105(a)(8)(repealed 2001).⁷ Seafood is a good, the sale of seafood creates a right 9 10 to payment, and the net proceeds from seafood sales constitute "accounts" under the UCC. <u>See e.g.</u>, <u>Bank of Stockton v. Diamond</u> 11 12 Walnut Growers, Inc., 244 Cal.Rptr. 744, 747-48 (Cal. Court. App. 13 1988) (farmer's walnuts were "goods" and right to receive proceeds from their sale was an "account" under California UCC); Matter of 14 Bindl, 13 B.R. 148, 149 (Bankr. D. Wis. 1981) (milk is a "good" 15 16 and farmer's right to payment for proceeds from milk sales is an 17 "account" under Wisconsin UCC). An "account" is a "right to 18 payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered that is 19 not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not 20 it has been earned by performance." AS § 45.09.106 (repealed 21 2001).

The assignment of accounts, whether absolute or for security, is governed by Article 9, which requires that such

AS 45.09.105(a) (8) defines "goods" as including all things that are movable at the time the security interest attaches or that are fixtures but does not include money, documents, instruments, investment property, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals or the like (including oil and gas) before extraction; "goods" also includes the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and standing timber that is to be cut and removed under conveyance or contract for sale; . . .

assignments be perfected by filing a UCC-1 statement.⁸ 1 In re 2 Contractors Equip. Supply Co. Inc., 861 F.2d at 245. Failure to perfect as required by Article 9 may leave the transferee's 3 4 ownership of the receivables subject to the claims of third parties, such as the seller's lien creditors or a trustee in 5 bankruptcy. PEB Commentary No. 14 to UCC 9-102, as printed in 8A 6 7 Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code (3d ed. Cum. Supp. June 2003) § 9-102:1.5. 8

9 CK Group does not dispute that its interest was never 10 perfected, but insists that because the assignment was absolute, 11 and not one for security, the filing requirements of Article 9 12 are not implicated. As the bankruptcy court correctly determined, however, whether the fish proceeds were assigned for 13 14 security purposes or were assigned as an absolute present transfer, the assignment is governed by Article 9 and had to be 15 16 perfected by filing to be effective against statutory and 17 judgment lien creditors. See Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer 18 (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948, 955 (10th Cir. 19 1993).

20 None of Appellants' remaining arguments lead us to a 21 different result.

22 C. <u>E&E was Acting as Debtor's Agent and Did Not Have an</u>
23 <u>Independent Obligation to Pay CK Group.</u>

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CK Group also claims that its assignment was absolute

^{25 &}lt;u>* See AS § 45.09.102(a)</u>, in effect at the relevant time, 26 which provides that the perfection rules of Article 9 apply to transactions intended to create a security interest in personal 27 property or fixtures, including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, or accounts; as well as the sale of accounts or chattel paper.

1 because under the May 22 letter agreement from E&E, Debtor had no 2 right to receive payment from E&E, while E&E had an absolute, 3 independent contractual duty to pay CK Group. The letter states, 4 in relevant part:

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Please find enclosed and attached hereto a copy of the THIRD ADDENDUM TO EARNEST MONEY RECEIPTS AND AGREEMENTS TO PURCHASE AND AGREEMENTS TO SELL. Please note my signature on said document in acknowledgment of the provisions for E&E's obligation to remit 100 percent of net proceeds . . . directly into escrow for the benefit of sellers at Pacific Northwest Title of Alaska, Anchorage pursuant to the provisions of the agreement.

In reading the agreement, I do not find any provision for notice to E&E as to the status of our role on June 14. In simple language, we will be looking for Mr. Mahoney, together will Mr. Davis [counsel for CK Group and Fischer/KFF], to provide nonconflicting instructions as to the disposition of sales funds post June 13, as well as notice of satisfaction, in the event of escrow.

15 Because E&E had a duty to pay CK Group rather than Debtor, Appellant argues, CK Group is entitled to retain the payment 16 17 without the need for a UCC filing or other perfection of its 18 interest because the property did not belong to Debtor at the 19 time of its transfer. This argument is difficult to follow because it requires transformation of the relationship between 20 21 Debtor and E&E from one of principal-agent to one of debtor-22 That did not occur. Debtor's contract with E&E is an creditor. 23 unambiguous agency agreement that does not create a debtor-24 creditor relationship. Under the contract, E&E held any fish 25 proceeds it received from the sale of Debtor's fish for the 26 benefit of Debtor. E&E did not purchase fish from Debtor with a 27 resulting E&E account debt that was assigned to CK Group and paid 28 from E&E's own funds. Indeed, E&E never held an ownership

1 interest in the funds. E&E was simply Debtor's agent, not an 2 account debtor.

Most of Appellant's argument is focused on the applicability of UCC § 9-318(a)(1)(codified as AS § 45.09.318(a)) which governs rights between an account debtor and an assignee. We conclude, however, that § 9-318(a)(1) is inapplicable here. It provides

Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in AS § 45.09.206, the rights of an assignee as subject to (1) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and (2) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the account debtor received notification of the assignment.

12 AS § 45.09.318(a).

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13 The section does not address competing claims to the right 14 of payment from the account debtor asserted by competing 15 assignees and lien creditors. Those rights are determined by the 16 priority rule of Article 9 which are a function of the perfection 17 provisions.

18 Appellant's earmarking doctrine argument is also unavailing. 19 That doctrine applies when a third party lends money to a debtor 20 for the specific purpose of paying a selected creditor. E&E was 21 not a co-debtor or guarantor of the obligation to Debtor's 22 obligation to Appellant; it simply disbursed Debtor's fish 23 proceeds to one of Debtor's creditors in accordance with 24 instructions from its principal, the Debtor. Further, E&E was 25 not independently obligated to pay CK Group from any source of 26 revenue other than that belonging to Debtor.

27 We agree with the bankruptcy court and the Trustee that the
28 two cases on which Appellant primarily relies, <u>Broadcast Music</u>,

Inc. v. Hirsch, 104 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 1997) and Commerce Bank 1 v. Chrysler Realty, 244 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 2001), are not 2 Broadcast Music is distinguishable because it 3 relevant. 4 involves an assignment of royalties that are governed by 5 recording rules established under the Copyright Act, which is clearly not applicable here. In Commerce Bank, the Tenth Circuit 6 held that an account debtor's contractual right to offset amounts 7 due under a contract is a valid defense that, by statute, is 8 enforceable against the assignee who held a perfected security 9 10 interest in the accounts receivable, because the contractual 11 right to offset was in the original account debtor's agreement. 12 Id. at 781. The case before us does not involve an assignment to a third party, nor is the discussion of the offset instructive as 13 there is no offset issue here. 14

15 D. <u>Preferential Transfers</u>

16 Consistent with its earmarking argument, CK Group maintains that because the transfer of the fish proceeds was "controlled" 17 18 by E&E, and because E&E contractually agreed to remit the funds directly to CK Group, the proceeds never became property of the 19 estate and, therefore, no interest in property of Debtor was 20 21 transferred within the meaning of § 547(b). This argument fails, 22 however, because E&E, as Debtor's agent, did not hold an 23 ownership interest in the funds. Notwithstanding the agreement 24 regarding their disbursement, title to the funds were, at all 25 relevant times, held by Debtor.

In addition, both the \$1.7 million in fish sale proceeds assigned to Appellant under the Third Addendum, and the \$500,000 in transfers paid as minimum rental under the July 10 letter

1	agreement, were ultimately to be applied against the purchase				
2	price for the assets, an obligation which was an antecedent debt.				
3	Finally, the \$29,380 post-petition payment to CK Group was made				
4	from funds belonging to the bankruptcy estate and was made				
5	without authority of the court. Accordingly, we agree with the				
6	Trustee and the court, that the transfers are recoverable under				
7	§§ 547 and 549. ⁹				
8	E. <u>Attorney Fees</u>				
9	CK Group appeals the court's order awarding the fishermen				
10	\$54,611 in attorney fees, arguing that because there is not				
11	⁹ Section 547 (b) provides				
12	(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor				
13	<pre>in property (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the</pre>				
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22	extent provided by the provisions of this title.				
23	And Section 549 provides, in relevant part				
24	§ 549. Postpetition transaction. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this				
25	section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the				
26	estate (1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and				
27	 (2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title [11 USCS § 303(f) or 542(c)]; or (B) that is not authorized under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq] or by the court. 				
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1 enough money to pay the principal amount of the lien, such an 2 award acts as a deficiency judgment for personal liability. 3 Because CK Group had no contractual relationship with any of the 4 lien claimants, Appellant argues, there is nothing to support an 5 in personam judgment against it because this is an in rem 6 priority dispute over fish proceeds.

7 In certain cases, an award of attorney's fees is authorized 8 under AS § 34.34.005(b) which provides

In an action to enforce a lien, the court shall allow as part of the costs all money paid for drawing the lien and for filing and recording the lien claim, and a reasonable attorney fee for the foreclosure of the lien.

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12 Alaska courts interpret AS § 34.35.005(b) as providing for a 13 mandatory award of attorney's fees whenever a party is successful 14 in enforcing a lien created by AS § 34.35.005 to AS 34.35.425. 15 D.H. Blattner & Sons, Inc. v. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd., 55 P.3d 16 37, 56 (Alaska 2002).

17 The judgment here was decided in favor of the Fisher 18 Committee as an entity enforcing its lien rights under AS 19 §§ 34.35.320 and 34.35.391, part of the statutory scheme designed 20 to protect the interests of those who contribute labor or 21 materials to the value of the processed fish products.

Appellant does not dispute that the Fisher Committee was enforcing the fishermen's statutory lien rights under Title 34, or that AS § 34.34.005(b) mandates a full fee award, but claims that while the "foreclosure of the lien" is an *in rem* proceeding, the award here is an *in personam* award not within the scope of AS § 34.34.005(b). There is no legal basis for CK Group's argument. As acknowledged in Alaska Civil Rule 82, Alaska

follows the English rule of awarding Attorneys' Fees to the 1 prevailing party in litigation, whether the matter is one in rem 2 Moody-Herrera v. State Dep't of Nat. Res., 967 3 or in personam. 4 P.2d 79, 89 (Alaska 1998); <u>State v. Johnson</u>, 958 P.2d 440, 443 (Alaska 1998). Further, the party against whom Attorney Fees are 5 awarded does not have to be in contractual privity with the lien 6 7 claimant. All that is required under AS § 34.34.005(b) is that the party against whom fees are awarded must simply have lost a 8 lien priority dispute to a party enforcing statutory lien rights. 9 55 P.3d at 56. 10

11 Appellant's argument that the statute is unconstitutional is 12 equally without merit. Appellant cites no authority supporting its position that the Alaska legislature is constitutionally 13 prohibited from enacting fee-shifting statutes to provide 14 remedial protections for a protected class of people. As the 15 16 Trustee properly asserts, the remedial purpose behind the 17 statutory lien statutes alone is sufficient to find a rational or 18 compelling basis for AS § 34.34.005.

CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.