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ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re:	)	BAP No.	CC-12-1061-KiDMk
	)		
FANDA HEZAM FADEL,	)	Bk. No.	RS 11-33453-MJ
	)		
Debtor.	)		
	)		
_____	)		
	)		
FANDA HEZAM FADEL,	)		
	)		
Appellant,	)		
	)		
v.	)	<b>O P I N I O N</b>	
	)		
DCB UNITED LLC, TRUSTEE OF	)		
THE EISENHOWER UDT 7-22-11,	)		
	)		
	)		
Appellee.	)		
_____	)		

Argued and Submitted on July 19, 2012,  
at Pasadena, California

Filed - May 31, 2013

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court  
for the Central District of California

Honorable Meredith A. Jury, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

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Appearances: Jenny L. Doling, Esq. of the Law Offices of Jenny L. Doling argued for appellant, Fanda Hezam Fadel; Jeannette Marsala, Esq. of Prober & Raphael ALC argued for appellee, DCB United LLC, Trustee of the Eisenhower UDT 7-22-11.

Before: KIRSCHER, DUNN, and MARKELL, Bankruptcy Judges.

1 KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judge:

2  
3 Appellee, DCB United, LLC, Trustee of the Eisenhower UDT 7-  
4 22-11 ("DCB"), purchased a single family residence located in La  
5 Quinta, California (the "Property") at a foreclosure sale on July  
6 22, 2011, two days after appellant, debtor Fanda Hezam Fadel  
7 ("Mrs. Fadel"), filed her chapter 13<sup>1</sup> bankruptcy petition. At the  
8 time of the foreclosure sale, Mrs. Fadel resided in the Property  
9 with her husband, Mohamed Fadel ("Mr. Fadel"), and their seven  
10 children. Despite Mrs. Fadel's claims to the contrary, the  
11 bankruptcy court ultimately determined that she did not hold an  
12 ownership interest in the Property, the foreclosure sale was not  
13 void, and thus DCB was entitled to relief from the automatic stay  
14 to proceed with an unlawful detainer action against Mrs. Fadel in  
15 state court.

16 Because Mrs. Fadel conveyed any interest she had in the  
17 Property in 2001 to Mr. Fadel, and because she did not  
18 subsequently acquire an interest in the Property vis-à-viz  
19 California's community property law, we AFFIRM.

20 **I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

21 Mrs. Fadel has been married to Mr. Fadel since 1988.  
22 Throughout their marriage, Mr. Fadel has been employed outside of  
23 the home while Mrs. Fadel, with the exception of intermittent  
24 employment, has stayed at home to care for their seven children.  
25 Mr. Fadel purchased the Property in 2001. The grant deed,

26  
27 <sup>1</sup> Unless specified otherwise, all chapter, code, and rule  
28 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and  
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. The  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are referred to as "Civil Rules."

1 recorded on March 7, 2001, granted the Property to "Mohamed Fadel,  
2 a married man, as his sole and separate property." On that same  
3 date, an interspousal transfer grant deed (the "Interspousal  
4 Deed") was recorded from Mrs Fadel conveying all of her interests,  
5 whether community or otherwise, to Mr. Fadel, who continued to  
6 hold the Property as his sole and separate property.

7 In August 2003, Mr. Fadel obtained a loan for \$275,000 from  
8 Pacific Republic Mortgage Corporation. In exchange for the loan,  
9 Mr. Fadel executed a deed of trust against the Property in favor  
10 of the lender. The deed of trust lists the borrower as "Mohamed  
11 Fadel, a married man, as his sole and separate property."

12 Mr. Fadel eventually defaulted on the loan. To fend off  
13 foreclosure by Bank of America ("B of A"),<sup>2</sup> on January 31, 2011,  
14 Mr. Fadel filed his own chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Although his  
15 Schedule A identified the Property, it did not identify how title  
16 to the Property was held (i.e., husband, wife, joint, or  
17 community). Mr. Fadel's Schedule D identified B of A as the first  
18 lienholder on the Property. Although many codebtors were listed  
19 in Mr. Fadel's Schedule H, Mrs. Fadel was not listed as a codebtor  
20 on the deed of trust note, nor was the debt to B of A even  
21 mentioned. Mr. Fadel received his discharge on May 26, 2011, and  
22 his case was closed on June 17, 2011.

23 Still faced with a pending foreclosure sale of the Property  
24 on July 22, 2011, Mrs. Fadel filed her own chapter 13 bankruptcy  
25 case on July 20, 2011. Mrs. Fadel's Schedule A identified the  
26 Property, and it too did not identify how title to the Property

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27  
28 <sup>2</sup> It is not clear in the record how B of A became the first  
lienholder on the Property, but this fact is not in dispute.

1 was held. In Mrs. Fadel's Schedule H, the box "none" was checked,  
2 indicating that no codebtors were liable on any of her debts.  
3 Mrs. Fadel's counsel notified B of A of the bankruptcy when she  
4 filed her petition on July 20, 2011. B of A proceeded with the  
5 foreclosure sale of the Property on July 22, 2011, as planned.  
6 DCB was the successful bidder. DCB recorded its trustee's deed on  
7 August 8, 2011.

8 On August 3, 2011, Mrs. Fadel filed a chapter 13 plan, which  
9 purported to cure all prepetition arrearages owed on the Property  
10 and to make monthly deed of trust note payments to B of A and the  
11 second lienholder. DCB opposed confirmation of the plan because  
12 Mrs. Fadel had no debt to reorganize with DCB, and because she had  
13 no income to fund a plan. The managing member of DCB stated in  
14 his declaration in support that DCB was unaware of any bankruptcy  
15 at the time it purchased the Property. The bankruptcy court  
16 overruled DCB's objection and confirmed the plan.

17 On September 15, 2011, DCB moved for relief from stay under  
18 § 362(d)(1) to proceed with an unlawful detainer action against  
19 Mrs. Fadel in state court ("Stay Relief Motion"). DCB asserted  
20 that it had acquired title to the Property at the foreclosure sale  
21 on July 22, 2011. In support, DCB attached copies of the grant  
22 deed and the Interspousal Deed. Through these deeds, DCB asserted  
23 that Mrs. Fadel had relinquished her community interest in the  
24 Property.

25 Mrs. Fadel opposed the Stay Relief Motion, contending that:  
26 (1) because the sale occurred postpetition and violated the  
27 automatic stay, it was void and DCB lacked standing to seek  
28 relief; and (2) because B of A had accepted her postpetition deed

1 of trust note payments, thereby substantially consummating the  
2 plan, DCB was bound by the provisions of the confirmed plan.<sup>3</sup>

3 The first hearing on DCB's Stay Relief Motion took place on  
4 November 2, 2011. The bankruptcy court noted that at the time of  
5 plan confirmation, it did not recognize the issue of whether Mrs.  
6 Fadel held an interest in the Property, but, rather, assumed that  
7 she did, and that DCB's purchase of the Property violated the  
8 stay. However, with Mrs. Fadel's interest in the Property in  
9 question, for which the bankruptcy filing may or may not have  
10 imposed an automatic stay, the court was not certain whether the  
11 sale was void. The bankruptcy court noted that the Interspousal  
12 Deed indicated that the Property, which would otherwise be  
13 community property, did not belong to Mrs. Fadel.

14 After further discussion, the bankruptcy court ordered  
15 additional briefing on the issue of whether Mrs. Fadel held an  
16 interest in the Property at the time she filed her chapter 13  
17 petition, which would determine whether an automatic stay existed  
18 or not with respect to the Property. In her supplemental brief,  
19 Mrs. Fadel raised a multitude of arguments to establish an  
20 interest in the Property, despite her name not appearing on the  
21 title. Mrs. Fadel first argued that she held a possessory  
22 interest in the Property at the time of her bankruptcy filing,  
23 which constituted property of the estate protected by the  
24 automatic stay. Next, Mrs. Fadel, who is of Arab descent, argued  
25 that even though her cultural belief is that real property should  
26 be titled in the name of the husband, California's community

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28 <sup>3</sup> The parties indicate in the record that B of A  
subsequently returned all plan payments submitted by Mrs. Fadel.

1 property law nonetheless gave her an interest in the Property  
2 protected by the automatic stay. Specifically, Mrs. Fadel argued  
3 that she had acquired a "pro tanto" community property interest in  
4 the Property since community funds were used to reduce the debt on  
5 the Property and fund improvements to it. Finally, Mrs. Fadel  
6 argued that, based on the Fifth Circuit case of Brown v. Chesnut  
7 (In re Chesnut), 422 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter  
8 "Chesnut"], she held at least an "arguable" interest in the  
9 Property on the petition date due to her community interest, and B  
10 of A violated the automatic stay when it conducted the foreclosure  
11 sale without first obtaining relief under § 362(d). Mrs. Fadel  
12 asked the bankruptcy court to adopt Chesnut and hold that the  
13 automatic stay applied to the Property, even if it was later  
14 determined that she had no interest in it. In her declaration in  
15 support, Mrs. Fadel stated that even though title to the Property  
16 was in Mr. Fadel's name only, she always believed that she and her  
17 husband owned the Property jointly.

18 DCB countered Mrs. Fadel's arguments, contending that since  
19 the Property was never part of her bankruptcy estate, it was not  
20 protected by the automatic stay, and thus the foreclosure sale was  
21 not void. DCB noted that Mrs. Fadel was not on the title or an  
22 obligor on the note secured by the deed of trust. As for any  
23 possible community interest, DCB contended that although under  
24 CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 the presumption is that all property acquired  
25 during a marriage is community property, CAL. EVID. CODE § 662  
26 provides a conflicting presumption that the owner of the legal  
27 title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full  
28 beneficial title. Thus, argued DCB, legal title, which may be

1 rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence, trumps the  
2 community property presumption." According to DCB, evidence of  
3 community funds being used to improve the Property could not rebut  
4 Mrs. Fadel's admitted and clear intent to have the Property titled  
5 in Mr. Fadel's name as his sole and separate property, despite her  
6 claim that she always believed it was community property.

7 DCB also countered the cases cited by Mrs. Fadel, contending  
8 that they concerned the division of property upon dissolution, not  
9 the characteristics of property during marriage and, in any event,  
10 no writing evidencing the Fadels' intent to transmute the Property  
11 into community property, such as the recording of a quitclaim  
12 deed, existed as of the petition date. At best, argued DCB, even  
13 if Mrs. Fadel had a right to reimbursement for community  
14 contributions, that right is a monetary right; it does not change  
15 legal title to the Property. Finally, argued DCB, Mrs. Fadel's  
16 claimed possessory interest only protected her from loss of  
17 possession through eviction proceedings, which is why DCB sought  
18 relief from stay to commence its unlawful detainer action.

19 After carefully considering the issue, the bankruptcy court  
20 granted the Stay Relief Motion at the continued hearing on  
21 December 5, 2011. The court first determined that the  
22 confirmation order had no preclusive effect as to DCB's Stay  
23 Relief Motion because DCB was never a creditor of Mrs. Fadel and  
24 because the plan attempted to reorganize a debt for which Mrs.  
25 Fadel was not obligated.

26 In reaching its decision that the Property was not property  
27 of Mrs. Fadel's estate on the petition date and therefore no stay  
28 violation occurred rendering the sale void, the bankruptcy court

1 determined that legal title trumped any community interest she  
2 held in the Property, unless Mrs. Fadel was unaware she was giving  
3 away her interest in it. On that issue, the court found that Mrs.  
4 Fadel, for cultural reasons, knowingly and knowledgeably granted  
5 any interest she may have had in the Property to Mr. Fadel as his  
6 sole and separate property, and no subsequent writing existed  
7 transmuting it to community property. The court rejected Mrs.  
8 Fadel's argument that community contributions to the Property gave  
9 her a pro tanto community property interest in it, as that issue  
10 was relevant only between spouses upon dissolution; it was not  
11 relevant as to third parties where title controls.

12 The bankruptcy court distinguished Chesnut from the instant  
13 case, reasoning that Texas law controlled the Chesnut decision,  
14 which is different from California law. Under California law,  
15 legal title trumps the presumption that property acquired during  
16 the marriage is community property. The court agreed that Mrs.  
17 Fadel had a possessory interest in the Property on the petition  
18 date, but determined that the act of selling the Property at  
19 foreclosure affected title, not possession alone. Finally,  
20 although the court agreed with Mrs. Fadel that perhaps the better  
21 course of action would have been for B of A to obtain a comfort  
22 order before conducting the foreclosure sale, that did not change  
23 the outcome - Mrs. Fadel had no interest in the Property. The  
24 order granting the Stay Relief Motion was entered on December 15,  
25 2011 ("Stay Relief Order").

26 Mrs. Fadel filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the  
27 Stay Relief Order (the "Reconsideration Motion"). She again asked  
28 the bankruptcy court to adopt the holding in Chesnut. Mrs. Fadel

1 also contended that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that she  
2 did not have an interest in the Property as of the petition date.  
3 She argued, for the first time, that the Property was protected by  
4 the codebtor stay under § 1301(a) because, pursuant to CAL. FAM.  
5 CODE §§ 910 and 914, she was liable on the deed of trust debt  
6 incurred by Mr. Fadel during their marriage.

7 Mrs. Fadel further asserted, for the first time, that because  
8 she does not speak, read, or write in English, she did not know  
9 what she was signing when Mr. Fadel requested that she sign the  
10 Interspousal Deed, and therefore the presumption of "undue  
11 influence" trumped the title presumption in CAL. EVID. CODE § 662.  
12 In her declaration, Mrs. Fadel claimed she had no intention of  
13 granting away her interest in the Property. Mr. Fadel stated in  
14 his declaration that Mrs. Fadel did not understand that signing  
15 the Interspousal Deed meant she was relinquishing her interest in  
16 the Property.

17 Finally, Mrs. Fadel raised two of her previous arguments that  
18 (1) CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 914 and 920 gave her a pro tanto community  
19 property interest in the Property on the petition date due to her  
20 right to reimbursement, which she argued could be determined  
21 outside of dissolution, and (2) because DCB voluntarily submitted  
22 itself to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction by opposing  
23 confirmation, it was bound by the confirmation order even if it  
24 was not a creditor. DCB opposed the Reconsideration Motion.

25 The bankruptcy court denied the Reconsideration Motion. It  
26 determined that no codebtor stay existed because all documentary  
27 evidence indicated that Mrs. Fadel was not an obligor on the deed  
28 of trust note. The court also expressed its reluctance to give

1 any weight to Mrs. Fadel's undue influence claim, as it would only  
2 provide the Fadels, who were not disputing an interest in  
3 property, the opportunity to conspire to create undue influence  
4 and manipulate the system for their benefit. The court noted that  
5 even if Mrs. Fadel's assertion were true, it would only render the  
6 Interspousal Deed voidable, not void. The court also rejected  
7 Mrs. Fadel's argument that she had acquired a pro tanto community  
8 property interest in the Property due to a right of reimbursement  
9 because reimbursement is a monetary right, not a property  
10 interest, and such right arises only between spouses upon  
11 dissolution.

12 Finally, the bankruptcy court again declined to adopt  
13 Chesnut. Noting that the Ninth Circuit has not yet considered the  
14 "arguable property" principle, the bankruptcy court reasoned that  
15 Chesnut is contrary to California's record notice policy, which  
16 allows parties to determine title to real property and to rely on  
17 that information. Here, the grant deed and the Interspousal Deed  
18 notified the world that Mr. Fadel held title to the Property as  
19 his sole and separate property, and that Mrs. Fadel had no  
20 interest in it. However, the bankruptcy court recognized that  
21 Chesnut raised a serious question of law and informed Mrs. Fadel  
22 that it would grant her a stay pending appeal, if requested.

23 An order denying the Reconsideration Motion was entered on  
24 February 3, 2012. Mrs. Fadel timely appealed the Stay Relief  
25 Order and the Reconsideration Order on that same date. The  
26 bankruptcy court entered an order granting a stay of the Stay  
27 Relief Order pending appeal on February 16, 2012.

28



1 correct legal rule, we then determine whether its "application of  
2 the correct legal standard [to the facts] was (1) illogical, (2)  
3 implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be  
4 drawn from the facts in the record." Id. (internal quotation  
5 marks omitted).

## 6 V. DISCUSSION

### 7 A. The bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the 8 confirmation order was not binding on DCB.

9 Section 1327(a) provides that "[t]he provisions of a  
10 confirmed plan bind the Debtor and each creditor, whether or not  
11 the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and  
12 whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has  
13 rejected the plan."

14 As the bona fide purchaser of the Property at the foreclosure  
15 sale two days after Mrs. Fadel filed her chapter 13 bankruptcy  
16 case, we agree with the bankruptcy court that DCB was not a  
17 "creditor" of Mrs. Fadel bound by the confirmation order. Section  
18 101(10)(A) defines a creditor as an "entity that has a claim  
19 against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order  
20 for relief concerning the debtor."<sup>4</sup> Section 101(5), in pertinent  
21 part, defines a claim as a "right to payment, . . . ." See Blue  
22 v. Town of Lake Bldg. Corp. (In re Blue), 247 B.R. 748, 751-52  
23 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000)(party not a creditor of the debtor is not  
24 bound by debtor's confirmed chapter 13 plan). As such, DCB was  
25 not precluded from moving for relief from the automatic stay.

26 While Mrs. Fadel concedes that DCB was not a creditor, she

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27 <sup>4</sup> Section 101(10)(B) and (C) provide additional definitions  
28 not relevant to this discussion.

1 contends DCB was still bound by the confirmation order, which was  
2 final and not appealed, because DCB voluntarily subjected itself  
3 to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction when it objected to her  
4 plan as a party in interest. Mrs. Fadel cites no authority to  
5 support her assertion. We also reject Mrs. Fadel's argument that  
6 the bankruptcy court erred by "vacating" the confirmation order  
7 under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). Nothing in the record reflects that  
8 the order was vacated. The bankruptcy court did not err when it  
9 determined that DCB was not bound by the confirmation order.

10 **B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it**  
11 **granted the Stay Relief Motion.**

12 **1. Applicable law.**

13 Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an estate is  
14 created comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the  
15 debtor in property," "wherever located or by whomever held," "as  
16 of the commencement of the case." § 541(a)(1). According to  
17 § 541(a)(2), property of the bankruptcy estate includes:

18 All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in  
19 community property as of the commencement of the  
[bankruptcy] case that is-

20 (A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and  
21 control of the debtor; or

22 (B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or  
23 for both an allowable claim against the debtor and an  
allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to the  
extent that such interest is so liable.

24 While this provision defines what interests of the debtor are  
25 included in the bankruptcy estate, it does not address "the  
26 threshold questions of the existence and scope of the debtor's  
27 interest in a given asset.'" Dumas v. Mantle (In re Mantle), 153  
28 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998)(quoting State of Cal. v. Farmers

1 Mkts., Inc. (In re Farmers Mkts., Inc.), 792 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th  
2 Cir. 1986)). Rather, the bankruptcy court must look to state  
3 property law to determine whether, and to what extent, the debtor  
4 has any legal or equitable interests in property as of the  
5 commencement of the case. Id. (citing Butner v. United States,  
6 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).<sup>5</sup>

7 The filing of the bankruptcy petition creates an automatic  
8 stay under § 362(a), which operates to enjoin specific acts  
9 against the debtor, property of the debtor and property of the  
10 estate. § 362(a)(3), (4), (5) and (6). However, under § 362(d),  
11 a "party in interest" may request relief from the stay. Upon  
12 request, § 362(d) requires the bankruptcy court to grant relief  
13 from the automatic stay upon the showing of "cause," or when no  
14 equity exists in a property and the property is not necessary to  
15 debtor's effective reorganization. See § 362(d)(1) and (d)(2).  
16 What constitutes "cause" to terminate the stay is determined on a  
17 case-by-case basis. Delaney-Morin v. Day (In re Delaney-Morin),  
18 304 B.R. 365, 369 (9th Cir. BAP 2003)(citing MacDonald v.  
19 MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985)).

## 20 **2. Analysis.**

21 Mrs. Fadel assigns several errors to the bankruptcy court's  
22 decision to grant DCB relief from stay to proceed with its  
23

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24 <sup>5</sup> Rule 7001(2) and Ninth Circuit law require an adversary  
25 proceeding to determine "an interest in property." Brady v.  
26 Andrew (In re Commercial W. Fin. Corp.), 761 F.2d 1329, 1336-38  
27 (9th Cir. 1985). Neither of the parties raised any issue as to  
28 whether Mrs. Fadel could allege a property interest as a defense  
to a contested matter or if she needed to initiate an adversary  
proceeding. As the issue has not been raised, the Panel takes no  
position on whether any waiver has occurred. Unq. v Boni (In re  
Boni), 240 B.R. 381, 386(9th Cir. BAP 1999).

1 unlawful detainer action against her in state court. We address  
2 each argument in turn.

3           **a. Legal title presumption trumps the community**  
4           **property presumption.**

5           Under the "form of title" presumption, the description in a  
6 deed as to how title is held presumptively reflects the actual  
7 ownership status of the property. In re Marriage of Brooks, 169  
8 Cal.App.4th 176, 184-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)(citing In re Marriage  
9 of Haines, 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). This  
10 common law presumption has been codified in CAL. EVID. CODE § 662,  
11 which states, "The owner of the legal title to property is  
12 presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This  
13 presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof."  
14 California's form of title presumption "is based on promoting the  
15 public policy in favor of the stability of titles to property,"  
16 and "allegations that legal title does not represent beneficial  
17 ownership have been historically disfavored because society and  
18 the courts have a reluctance to tamper with duly executed  
19 instruments and documents of legal title." In re Marriage of  
20 Brooks, 169 Cal.App.4th at 184-85 (citations and quotation marks  
21 omitted). Absent a showing to the contrary, the characterization  
22 of the Property in the title will control.

23           It is undisputed that the Fadels acquired the Property during  
24 marriage. Under CAL. FAM. CODE § 760, a general presumption exists  
25 that property acquired during the marriage is community property.  
26 However, "the affirmative act of specifying a form of ownership in  
27 the conveyance of title . . . removes such property from the more  
28 general presumption." In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.3d 808,

1 814-15 (Cal. 1980), rev'd on other grounds by CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581  
2 (citing Socol v. King, 36 Cal.2d 342, 346 (Cal. 1950)). The "act  
3 of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during  
4 marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes  
5 that property from the general community property presumption. In  
6 that situation, the property is presumably the separate property  
7 of the spouse in whose name title is taken." In re Marriage of  
8 Brooks, 169 Cal.App.4th at 186-87 (citing 5 Miller & Starr, Cal.  
9 Real Estate § 12:41, p. 12-110 (3d ed. 2006)). See Wolfe v.  
10 Jacobson (In re Jacobson), 676 F.3d 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2012)(in  
11 California no community property presumption exists where a spouse  
12 acquires property in his name alone with the other spouse's  
13 consent). Here, the recorded grant deed, the recorded  
14 Interspousal Deed and all other documents related to the purchase  
15 of the Property confirm that the owner (and the person responsible  
16 for repayment of the deed of trust note) was only Mr. Fadel. These  
17 documents, showing clear title to the Property in Mr. Fadel as his  
18 "sole and separate property," displace any community property  
19 presumption.

20 The only way Mrs. Fadel could overcome the form of title  
21 presumption was to show "undue influence" by Mr. Fadel. Under  
22 California's community property law, the presumption of undue  
23 influence, based on the confidential relationship between spouses,  
24 arises when an interspousal transaction advantages one spouse over  
25 the other. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 721. In that circumstance, title  
26 presumption and application of CAL. EVID. CODE § 662 are improper.  
27 In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal.App.4th at 301-02. In other  
28 words, the rebuttable presumption of undue influence, if proven,

1 trumps the title presumption. Id. "When a presumption of undue  
2 influence applies to a transaction, the spouse who was advantaged  
3 by the transaction must establish that the disadvantaged spouse's  
4 action was freely and voluntarily made, with a full knowledge of  
5 all the facts, and with a complete understanding of the effect of  
6 the transaction." In re Marriage of Fossum, 192 Cal.App.4th 336,  
7 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)(citations and quotation marks omitted).  
8 The question of "whether the spouse gaining an advantage has  
9 overcome the presumption of undue influence is a question for the  
10 trier of fact, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal if  
11 supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citations and quotation  
12 marks omitted).

13 In her declaration in support of the Reconsideration Motion,  
14 Mrs. Fadel stated, for the first time, that she did not know what  
15 the Interspousal Deed was when she signed it and that it was not  
16 her intention to give up her community interest in the Property by  
17 signing the document. The bankruptcy court rejected Mrs. Fadel's  
18 testimony as self-serving, and it contradicted her earlier  
19 statement that, based on her cultural beliefs, all property should  
20 be titled in the name of her husband. The court further concluded  
21 that even if undue influence existed, the Interspousal Deed would  
22 merely be voidable, not void.

23 Although Mrs. Fadel raised undue influence before the  
24 bankruptcy court, she appears to raise it only in passing on  
25 appeal. To the extent she assigns error to the bankruptcy court's  
26 finding of no undue influence, we disagree. First, Mrs. Fadel  
27 raised this defense for the first time in her Reconsideration  
28 Motion, so the bankruptcy court did not have to consider it. See

1 In re Greco, 113 B.R. 658, 664 (D. Haw. 1990), aff'd and remanded,  
2 Greco v. Troy Corp., 952 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1991)(a motion for  
3 reconsideration is not for asserting new legal theories or new  
4 facts that could have been raised at the initial hearing);  
5 Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001)  
6 (court does not abuse its discretion when it disregards legal  
7 arguments made for the first time in a motion to amend)(citing  
8 Rosenfeld v. U. S. Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir.  
9 1995)). To the extent the bankruptcy court did consider her undue  
10 influence argument, we agree that Mrs. Fadel knowingly and  
11 knowledgeably signed the Interspousal Deed to effectuate her  
12 intent and cultural belief that Mr. Fadel would hold title to the  
13 Property as his separate property. If she was ignorant of its  
14 legal ramifications, even assuming she could assert such a claim  
15 now, at best this would only render the Interspousal Deed  
16 voidable, not void. Fallon v. Triangle Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 169  
17 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)("[A] deed [is]  
18 voidable, not void, if obtained as a result of undue influence . .  
19 . . [A] deed . . . procured by duress cannot be set aside as  
20 against a party purchasing in ignorance of the facts constituting  
21 the duress, that is to say as against a purchaser for a valuable  
22 consideration and without notice of the duress.")(citing Conn.  
23 Life Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 45 Cal. 580 (Cal. 1873)). See also  
24 Camacho v. Camacho, 1994 WL 424429, at \*4 (E.D. Cal. 1994)(citing  
25 Fallon and holding same). Moreover, because the Fadels are not  
26 disputing ownership of the Property, and because they are still  
27 married, whether the defense of undue influence applies is  
28 doubtful, especially since Mrs. Fadel undertook no action to

1 rescind the Interspousal Deed prior to DCB's purchase of the  
2 Property. See Fallon, 169 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1106. Mr. Fadel's  
3 attempt to testify as to what Mrs. Fadel knew or did not know  
4 about the legal ramifications of signing the Interspousal Deed was  
5 inappropriate, and the bankruptcy court was free to reject it.  
6 FED. R. EVID. 602. Notably, Mr. Fadel never testified that he  
7 intended anything other than that he would solely and separately  
8 hold title to the Property.

9 **b. CAL. FAM. CODE § 920 does not give Mrs. Fadel an**  
10 **ownership interest in the Property.**

11 Nonetheless, Mrs. Fadel contends the bankruptcy court erred  
12 in determining that she did not acquire an interest in the  
13 Property by virtue of California's community property law.  
14 Specifically, Mrs. Fadel argues that CAL. FAM. CODE § 920<sup>6</sup> provides

15 \_\_\_\_\_  
16 <sup>6</sup> A right of reimbursement provided by this part is subject  
17 to the following provisions:

18 (a) The right arises regardless of which spouse applies the  
19 property to the satisfaction of the debt, regardless of  
20 whether the property is applied to the satisfaction of the  
21 debt voluntarily or involuntarily, and regardless of whether  
22 the debt to which the property is applied is satisfied in  
23 whole or in part. The right is subject to an express written  
24 waiver of the right by the spouse in whose favor the right  
25 arises.

26 (b) The measure of reimbursement is the value of the property  
27 or interest in property at the time the right arises.

28 (c) The right shall be exercised not later than the earlier  
of the following times:

(1) Within three years after the spouse in whose favor the  
right arises has actual knowledge of the application of the  
property to the satisfaction of the debt.

(2) In proceedings for division of community and  
quasi-community property pursuant to Division 7 (commencing  
with Section 2500) or in proceedings upon the death of a  
spouse.

1 her with a right to reimbursement, which she contends created a  
2 pro tanto community property interest in the Property protected by  
3 the automatic stay. Mrs. Fadel argues that, under California law,  
4 when community funds are used to reduce the principal of a deed of  
5 trust debt on one spouse's separate property, the community  
6 acquires a pro tanto interest in the property, citing In re  
7 Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal.3d 366, 371-72 (Cal. 1980)(en  
8 banc)["Moore"], and In re Marriage of Marsden, 130 Cal.App.3d 426,  
9 436-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)["Marsden"], otherwise known as the  
10 "Moore/Marsden rule." Mrs. Fadel notes that the Moore/Marsden  
11 rule was extended to include community expenditures for  
12 improvements to one spouse's separate property in Bono v. Clark,  
13 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

14 Contrary to Mrs. Fadel's contentions, however, the form of  
15 title presumption is not rebutted merely because the property is  
16 acquired during marriage. "[T]he act of taking title to property  
17 in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the  
18 other spouse effectively removes that property from the general  
19 community property presumption. . . . [T]he property is presumably  
20 the separate property of the spouse in whose name title is taken."  
21 In re Brooks, 169 Cal.App.4th at 186-87. Mrs. Fadel, given the  
22 rebuttable form of title presumption, had the burden to prove by  
23 clear and convincing evidence that an agreement or understanding  
24 existed between the parties "that the title reflected in the deed  
25 is not what the parties intended." Id. at 189. This presumption  
26 cannot be rebutted by: "tracing the funds used to purchase the  
27 property;" "testimony of an intention not disclosed to the grantee  
28 at the time of the execution of the conveyance;" or "evidence that

1 title was taken in a particular manner merely to obtain a loan."  
2 Id. at 190 (citations omitted). The clear and convincing evidence  
3 standard "requires evidence that is 'so clear as to leave no  
4 substantial doubt' [and] 'sufficiently strong to command the  
5 unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.'" Id.

6 The record in this case establishes that the form of title  
7 presumption prevails over the community property presumption and  
8 the application of the Moore/Marsden rule. Mr. Fadel acquired  
9 title to the Property from a third party through a grant deed,  
10 during his marriage to Mrs. Fadel, on March 7, 2001. Mrs. Fadel,  
11 through a grant deed, conveyed all of her right, title, and  
12 interest, including community or otherwise, to Mr. Fadel on March  
13 7, 2001. In 2003, Mr. Fadel obtained a loan in his own name  
14 secured by the Property. The recorded deed of trust states that  
15 the Property used to secure the loan, is "his sole and separate  
16 property." Subsequently, Mr. Fadel defaulted on the loan; a  
17 foreclosure was initiated, and Mr. Fadel filed a chapter 7  
18 bankruptcy. He listed the Property and the secured debt on the  
19 Property without any reference to any alleged interest held by  
20 Mrs. Fadel. After his discharge and the closure of his case,  
21 Mrs. Fadel filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy. She listed the Property  
22 and the corresponding secured debt without stating any alleged  
23 interest held by Mr. Fadel.

24 The grant deeds through which Mr. Fadel acquired the Property  
25 from the third party and from Mrs. Fadel conveyed their entire  
26 interests in the Property including any after-acquired interest  
27 and any community property interest. See 3 Miller & Starr, Cal.  
28 Real Estate § 8.5 (3d ed. 2012). On this record, we conclude that

1 Mrs. Fadel has not rebutted, with clear and convincing evidence,  
2 the form of title presumption that Mr. Fadel held the Property as  
3 his sole and separate property. Consequently the Moore/Marsden  
4 rule never became applicable.

5 Mrs. Fadel contends In re Boyd, 410 B.R. 95, 99 (Bankr. N.D.  
6 Cal. 2009), held that a pro tanto community property interest  
7 arises even where the other spouse's separate property at issue  
8 was purchased during the marriage. In that case, the non-debtor  
9 spouse purchased a home with his separate funds during the  
10 marriage. The non-debtor spouse held title in his name alone, and  
11 the debtor executed multiple interspousal transfer deeds  
12 disclaiming any interest in the home. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy  
13 court, in In re Boyd, citing Moore/Marsden, stated that the  
14 community (and thus debtor's bankruptcy estate) acquired an  
15 interest in the home because the debtor's husband's income, which  
16 was allegedly community property, was used to reduce the principal  
17 on the deed of trust debt.

18 The Panel concludes that In re Boyd is distinguishable, and  
19 we reject the application of its conclusions in this appeal for  
20 the following reasons: (1) the form of title presumption  
21 discussed in In re Brooks, 169 Cal.App.4th at 189-91, was not  
22 addressed in In re Boyd; (2) the types of the deeds were not  
23 discussed, i.e., grant versus quitclaim deeds; and (3) the  
24 application of the Moore/Marsden rule apparently was not contested  
25 in In re Boyd but was vigorously argued in this case.

26 **c. The codebtor stay does not apply.**

27 The codebtor stay of § 1301(a) enjoins a creditor from taking  
28 legal action to "collect any part of a consumer debt of the debtor

1 from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor,  
2 or that secured such debt."<sup>7</sup> Thus, three elements must be  
3 satisfied for the codebtor stay to apply: (1) the debt must be a  
4 consumer debt; (2) the consumer debt at issue must be a debt of  
5 the debtor; and (3) the codebtor must be liable on the debt with  
6 the debtor.

7 Under § 101(8), a consumer debt is one incurred for  
8 "personal, family, or household purposes." A deed of trust debt,  
9 which consists of debt incurred to purchase the debtor's principal  
10 residence or to improve it, is a "consumer debt" under § 101(8).  
11 Zolq v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1988).  
12 Thus, the debt on the Property is a consumer debt.

13 Section § 1301(a) further requires that the consumer debt at  
14 issue be a debt of the debtor and the codebtor must be liable on  
15 the debt with the debtor. Thus, the codebtor must be both "liable  
16 on" such debt and "liable with" the debtor to some third party.  
17 Meyer v. Hill (In re Hill), 268 B.R. 548, 553 (9th Cir. BAP  
18 2001)(applying same language appearing in § 1322(b)(1)). The  
19 phrase "such debt" refers to the consumer debt that the creditor  
20 is trying to collect. As such, not only must both the debtor and  
21 codebtor be liable to some third party, they must also both be  
22 liable on the particular debt the creditor is trying to collect.

23 It is undisputed that the only obligor on the deed of trust  
24 note was Mr. Fadel. However, Mrs. Fadel contends that she is  
25 nonetheless personally liable for the debt under CAL. FAM. CODE  
26 § 914, which provides in relevant part:

27

28 <sup>7</sup> Section 1301(a) provides for two exceptions to the  
codebtor stay, neither of which apply here.

1 (a) a married person is personally liable for the  
2 following debts incurred by the person's spouse during  
marriage:

3 (1) A debt incurred for necessities of life of the  
4 person's spouse while the spouses are living together.

5 . . . .

6 The "necessaries of life" include food, clothing, and shelter.  
7 Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group  
8 2012) ¶ 8:753 ["Cal. Practice Guide"].

9 The bankruptcy court determined that the codebtor stay did  
10 not apply because Mrs. Fadel was not an obligor on the note. This  
11 conclusion does not appear to address the specific issue she  
12 raises. We begin our review by noting that Mrs. Fadel improperly  
13 asserted the codebtor stay argument for the first time in the  
14 Reconsideration Motion. Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 740. We further  
15 observe that neither Mr. Fadel nor Mrs. Fadel listed each other in  
16 their respective Schedule H's as a codebtor on any debt. In any  
17 event, we reject Mrs. Fadel's theory.

18 First, CAL. FAM. CODE § 914(a) cannot be read in a vacuum; it  
19 must be read in conjunction with CAL. FAM. CODE § 914(b) and (c).  
20 Importantly, CAL. FAM. CODE § 914(b) states:

21 (b) The separate property of a married person may be  
22 applied to the satisfaction of a debt for which the  
23 person is personally liable pursuant to this section. If  
24 separate property is so applied at a time when nonexempt  
25 property in the community estate or separate property of  
the person's spouse is available but is not applied to  
the satisfaction of the debt, the married person is  
entitled to reimbursement to the extent such property was  
available. (Emphasis added).

26 In other words, Mrs. Fadel's "separate" property can be used to  
27 satisfy a debt incurred by Mr. Fadel during the marriage and while  
28 they are living together. However, by its very language, CAL. FAM.

1 CODE § 914 applies only in the case where the married person's  
2 separate property was used to satisfy a debt of his or her spouse,  
3 and it sets forth the married person's reimbursement rights. See  
4 Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey, 24 Cal.4th 301, 312 (Cal.  
5 2000). Because Mr. Fadel was in default on the deed of trust  
6 note, B of A, pursuant to the deed of trust, foreclosed on the  
7 Property in an attempt to collect on the collateral securing the  
8 debt. The collateral (i.e., the Property) was never Mrs. Fadel's  
9 separate property and she did not use any separate property to  
10 satisfy Mr. Fadel's debt. Therefore, no reimbursement rights have  
11 been triggered under CAL. FAM. CODE § 914, and that statute does not  
12 apply. In addition, contrary to Mrs. Fadel's assertion, CAL. FAM.  
13 CODE § 910<sup>8</sup> does not apply here either because the Property was not  
14 part of the community estate; it was Mr. Fadel's sole and separate  
15 property. Mrs. Fadel was not liable on the deed of trust note by  
16 virtue of CAL. FAM. CODE § 914, and the note was not a "debt of the  
17 debtor." Consequently, the codebtor stay does not apply.

18 **d. We decline to adopt Chesnut.**

19 The bankruptcy court declined to adopt Chesnut, but, because  
20 it viewed the issue as one having potentially great legal  
21 significance, it granted Mrs. Fadel a stay pending appeal of the  
22 Stay Relief Order while we considered it.

23 In Chesnut, a stay violation case, the creditor conducted a  
24

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25 <sup>8</sup> CAL. FAM. CODE § 910 states, in relevant part, that:

26 (a) the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by  
27 either spouse before or during marriage, regardless of which  
28 spouse has the management and control of the property and  
regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the  
debt or to a judgment for the debt.  
. . . .

1 postpetition foreclosure on real property in which the debtor  
2 claimed a community-ownership interest without first obtaining  
3 relief from stay. Title to the property was characterized as the  
4 non-filing wife's separate property, but the debtor listed the  
5 property in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, contending that it  
6 was a community asset since it was purchased during the marriage  
7 and with community funds. The debtor sued the creditor for  
8 allegedly violating the automatic stay. Without deciding the  
9 substantive issue of whether the property was a community asset  
10 belonging to the debtor or his bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy  
11 court determined that the debtor at least held an equitable  
12 interest in the property that was adversely affected by the  
13 foreclosure sale. Chesnut v. Brown, 300 B.R. 880, 883 (Bankr.  
14 N.D. Tex. 2004).

15 The district court reversed, holding that no violation of the  
16 stay occurred because the debtor had no interest in his wife's  
17 separate property. Chesnut v. Brown, 311 B.R. 446, 449 (N.D. Tex.  
18 2004). In reaching its decision, the district court noted:

19 The bankruptcy court determined, without citing any  
20 authority, that the mere fact that debtor gave notice of  
21 his bankruptcy filing and said that he claimed an  
22 interest in the Property was enough to stop the  
23 foreclosure sale. If that were the law, no one would be  
24 able to rely on chain of title to deal with real property  
25 in Texas. The bankruptcy court in effect ruled that  
26 property acquired during marriage is community property  
27 despite how it is titled. The inception of title rule is  
28 to the contrary: 'Property acquired during marriage  
acquires its status of separate or community at the time  
of its acquisition.' Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452  
S.W. 2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1970). As the Texas Supreme Court  
has noted, '[t]he act of the spouses in taking a  
conveyance of property in the name of the wife, limiting  
the title to her separate use, unmistakably evidences an  
intention that the same shall belong to her separate  
estate.' Id. Moreover, extrinsic evidence cannot be  
offered to contradict the express recitals in a deed

1 without first tendering competent evidence that there was  
2 fraud, accident, or mistake in the insertion of the  
3 recitals in the deed. Id. at 431. There is no such  
evidence here.

4 At best, reasoned the district court, the debtor maybe had a claim  
5 for economic contribution (i.e., a right to reimbursement), but  
6 such a claim did not create an ownership interest in the real  
7 property. Id.

8 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that  
9 the automatic stay applies to all property "arguably" owned by the  
10 debtor, even if it is later determined that the debtor did not own  
11 the property. Chesnut v. Brown, 422 F.3d at 304-05. In other  
12 words, the stay applies regardless of the ultimate merits of the  
13 debtor's ownership interest claim.

14 We decline to adopt such a rule. As the district court in  
15 Chesnut so insightfully put it: "If that were the law, no one  
16 would be able to rely on chain of title to deal with real property  
17 in Texas." Chesnut, 311 B.R. at 449. The same would be true in  
18 California, a state that has decided for public policy reasons  
19 that "form of title" prevails, unless a spouse's undue influence  
20 can be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Adopting Chesnut  
21 would essentially render the recording system in California (and  
22 many other Ninth Circuit states) nugatory, and it conflicts with  
23 California's policy that creditors and other interested parties  
24 can rely on title. In re Marriage of Brooks, 169 Cal.App.4th at  
25 185.

26 In In re Pettit, a stay violation case, the debtors asked the  
27 Ninth Circuit to conclude that, where there is a bona fide dispute  
28 as to whether property is part of the bankruptcy estate, the

1 burden should be on the creditor to seek a determination from the  
2 bankruptcy court before obtaining the disputed property. In re  
3 Pettit, 217 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court declined  
4 to extend Ninth Circuit precedent "to craft a novel rule on this  
5 issue." Id. Here, we have less than a "bona fide" dispute over  
6 property interests; we have merely a debtor claiming what she  
7 contends is an arguable interest in a property she consciously  
8 chose to relinquish to her husband.

9 The facts in this case certainly do not warrant any change in  
10 Ninth Circuit law. "We decline to follow Chesnut because we are  
11 convinced that its expansive reading of the term 'property of the  
12 estate' is inconsistent with the plain language of that term's  
13 statutory definition. See § 541(a)(1); see also Moody v. Amoco  
14 Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that  
15 property of the estate under § 541(a) consists of the debtor's  
16 property rights as of the date of the bankruptcy filing - 'no  
17 more, no less'); Frazer v. Drummond (In re Frazer), 377 B.R. 621,  
18 626-27 (9th Cir. BAP 2007)(same)." Jahr v. Frank (In re Jahr),  
19 2012 WL 3205417, at \*7 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 1, 2012).

20 Since Mrs. Fadel had no community interest in the Property as  
21 of the bankruptcy petition date, which would be protected by the  
22 automatic stay, and DCB showed sufficient "cause" for relief under  
23 § 362(d)(1) to pursue its unlawful detainer action, the bankruptcy  
24 court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Stay Relief  
25 Motion.

26 **C. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying**  
27 **the Reconsideration Motion.**

28 Although Mrs. Fadel did not cite under which rule she was

1 bringing her Reconsideration Motion, the bankruptcy court opted to  
2 treat it as a timely motion to alter or amend judgment under Civil  
3 Rule 59(e), made applicable here by Rule 9023, which thereby  
4 tolled the appeal time of the Stay Relief Order. We agree with  
5 the bankruptcy court's characterization. A motion for  
6 reconsideration filed within 14 days of the underlying order is  
7 treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Civil Rule  
8 59(e) and tolls the time within which to file a notice of appeal  
9 of the underlying order until the order on reconsideration is  
10 entered. Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp.,  
11 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001)(applying the former 10-day  
12 rule).

13 Amendment or alteration of a judgment is appropriate under  
14 Civil Rule 59(e) only if the court (1) is presented with newly  
15 discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the  
16 original hearing, (2) committed clear error or made an initial  
17 decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an  
18 intervening change in controlling law. Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 740  
19 (citing School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5  
20 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). Although Mrs. Fadel appealed  
21 the Reconsideration Order, she fails to argue how the bankruptcy  
22 court abused its discretion in denying the Reconsideration Motion.  
23 As such, she has waived this issue for purposes of appeal. See  
24 Wake v. Sedona Inst. (In re Sedona Inst.), 220 B.R. 74, 76 (9th  
25 Cir. 1998)(an issue not briefed is deemed waived). Even if we  
26 considered it, the Reconsideration Motion improperly raised legal  
27 arguments and/or alleged new facts that Mrs. Fadel could have  
28 raised at the initial hearing, and it improperly rehashed

1 arguments she had already presented. In re Greco, 113 B.R. at  
2 664. Therefore, she asserted no appropriate grounds for granting  
3 the Reconsideration Motion. Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 740. The  
4 bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the  
5 Reconsideration Motion.

6 **VI. CONCLUSION**

7 Under California law, DCB took free and clear title to the  
8 Property upon completion of the foreclosure sale. See 4 Miller &  
9 Starr, Cal. Real Estate § 10:208 (3d ed. 2009)(under California  
10 law, "[t]he purchaser at the foreclosure sale receives title free  
11 and clear of any right, title, or interest of the trustor or any  
12 grantee or successor of the trustor."). Mrs. Fadel was not on the  
13 title to the Property and she did not acquire an ownership  
14 interest in the Property vis-à-viz California's community property  
15 law prior to the sale. After the foreclosure sale, Mrs. Fadel was  
16 simply a tenant at sufferance claiming a possessory interest in  
17 the Property through Mr. Fadel. Seeing no error here by the  
18 bankruptcy court in granting DCB relief to pursue its unlawful  
19 detainer action, we AFFIRM.

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