# **FILED**

JUN 08 2011

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

1 2

3

## UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

5	In re:	) BAP No. AZ-10-1386-DMkMa
6	NHIEM TIN NGUYEN,	) Bk. No. 07-06989-GBN
7	Debtor.	) Adv. Proc. No. 10-00238-GBN
8	MILTEM TENI MCHATENI	)
9	NHIEM TIN NGUYEN,	) )
10	Appellant,	) )
11	v.	) MEMORANDUM <sup>1</sup>
12	JILL H. FORD,	) )
	Appellee.	) )
13		)
14	Argued and Submitted on May 13, 2011 at Phoenix, Arizona	
15		
16	Filed - June 8, 2011	
17	Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona	
18	Honorable George B. Nielsen, J:	r., Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
19	Appearances: Nhiem Tin Nguyen argued pro se.	
20	No appearance for t	the Appellee.
21	Before: DUNN, MARKELL, and MANN <sup>2</sup> Bankruptcy Judges	
22		

23

24

This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have ( $\underline{\text{see}}$  Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.  $\underline{\text{See}}$  9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

Hon. Margaret M. Mann, Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

The bankruptcy court entered a default money judgment against the pro se debtor and revoked the debtor's Chapter 7<sup>3</sup> discharge. The debtor appealed, asserting that the default judgment should be vacated. Because the debtor did not seek relief from entry of the default judgment before the bankruptcy court in the first instance, we DISMISS this appeal.

#### I. FACTS<sup>4</sup>

With the assistance of a Bankruptcy Petition Preparer, Nhiem Tin Nguyen filed his voluntary Chapter 7 petition in the Phoenix Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona on December 20, 2007. Jill H. Ford ("Trustee") was appointed the Chapter 7 trustee in the case. The bankruptcy court set the § 341(a) Meeting of Creditors for February 1, 2008, and notified parties in interest that April 1, 2008, was the deadline for filing complaints objecting to Mr. Nguyen's discharge. No objection to Mr. Nguyen's discharge was filed within the time allowed. The bankruptcy court entered Mr. Nguyen's discharge on May 12, 2008, after Mr. Nguyen had certified his completion of the instructional course concerning personal financial management ("Financial Counseling Certificate") mandated by § 727(a)(11).

On April 29, 2008, on the Trustee's application, the bankruptcy

Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all rule references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 1-86.

Pursuant to the Panel's December 16, 2010, "Order re Appellant's Informal Brief," these facts are taken from the bankruptcy court's publicly available electronic record.

court entered an order, which required Mr. Nguyen to appear for a Rule 2004 Examination "on a date and time agreed to by the parties or if upon notice, after not less than twenty (20) days notice." On September 2, 2008, for the purpose of enabling the Trustee to evaluate Mr. Nguyen's interest in two businesses, the bankruptcy court entered orders requiring H. The Manh to produce records to the Trustee for Morgan's Hair and Nails Spa ("Spa") and ABACUS Services Accounting and Taxes to produce to the Trustee records for Pacific Seafood & Market, Inc. ("Pacific").<sup>5</sup>

On August 17, 2009, the Trustee filed a motion ("Turnover Motion") to compel Mr. Nguyen, as the sole owner of the Spa, to cooperate with the Trustee and to "surrender to the trustee all books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate" as required by §§ 521(a)(3) and (4)<sup>6</sup> and by § 542(e).<sup>7</sup> The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Mr. Nguyen disclosed only his interest in the Spa in his bankruptcy schedules.

Section 521(a)(3) provides: "The debtor shall . . . if a trustee is serving in the case . . . cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title[.]"

Section 521(a)(4) provides: "The debtor shall . . . if a trustee is serving in the case . . ., surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate, whether or not immunity is granted under section 344 of this title[.]"

Section 542(e) provides: "Subject to any applicable privilege, after notice and a hearing, the court may order an attorney, accountant, or other person that holds recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, (continued...)

Turnover Motion also alleged that the Trustee had determined that as of the petition date (1) the value of Mr. Nguyen's ownership interest in the Spa was \$2,948.00, (2) the value Mr. Nguyen's onethird ownership interest in Pacific was \$5,823.33, and (3) the value of these ownership interests constituted property of Mr. Nguyen's bankruptcy estate which the bankruptcy court should compel Mr. Nguyen to turn over to the Trustee as required by § 542(a).8 The bankruptcy court entered an order ("Turnover Order") granting the Turnover Motion on September 16, 2009. As requested in the Turnover Motion, the Turnover Order contained a provision which imposed a \$100 per day sanction if Mr. Nguyen failed to comply with the Turnover Order within ten days of its entry. Despite numerous demands from the Trustee, Mr. Nguyen failed to comply with the Turnover Order. On February 8, 2010, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding (1) to enforce the Turnover Order and (2) to revoke Mr. Nguyen's discharge based on his failure to comply with the

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

5

6

10

11

12

13

14

15

<sup>1718</sup> 

<sup>7(...</sup>continued)
relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs, to turn over or disclose such recorded information to the trustee."

Section 542(a) provides:

Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.

Turnover Order. As authorized by Rule 7004, the Trustee served the summons and complaint on Mr. Nguyen by first class mail at his address of record in the bankruptcy case.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Default was entered in the adversary proceeding by the bankruptcy court clerk on March 19, 2010, based on the Trustee's application and affidavit. On September 2, 2010, the Trustee moved for entry of a default judgment without a hearing and advised Mr. Nguyen that the proposed default judgment had been lodged with the bankruptcy court. The form of judgment entered September 13, 2010, awarded the Trustee judgment in the amount of \$8,771.33, postjudgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, attorneys' fees in the amount of \$947.50, and costs in the amount of \$250.00. September 16, 2010, the Trustee provided notice to Mr. Nguyen that he had lodged an amended default judgment with the bankruptcy court. The amended default judgment was entered September 21, 2010, adding to the relief previously granted the revocation of Mr. Nguyen's discharge. On the same date, the amended default judgment was docketed in the main case as an order revoking Mr. Nguyen's discharge. Mr. Nguyen filed a timely Notice of Appeal ("2010 Appeal") from the amended default judgment and the order revoking his discharge.

In the 2010 Appeal, Mr. Nguyen asserts that the amended default judgment should be vacated because (1) he was sick and unable to travel from California to Arizona to participate in the adversary proceeding which resulted in revocation of his discharge,

(2) telling the Chapter 7 trustee to get missing documents from

debtor's accountant was sufficient to satisfy debtor's obligation to provide the documents to the Chapter 7 trustee, and (3) he is Vietnamese and did not understand the legal documents or proceedings.

After the discharge was revoked in Mr. Nguyen's bankruptcy case, the Trustee filed a no asset report on September 28, 2010. The bankruptcy court closed the estate December 28, 2010, as having been fully administered. On the same date, the bankruptcy court sent a notice to Mr. Nguyen ("Notice of Case Closing"), which stated that the case had been closed without entry of a discharge, and which erroneously cited as cause Mr. Nguyen's alleged failure to file a Financial Counseling Certificate as required by § 727(a)(11). The Notice of Case Closing should instead have informed Mr. Nguyen that the case had been closed without entry of a discharge as a consequence of the order revoking Mr. Nguyen's discharge which resulted from entry of the amended default judgment in the adversary proceeding.

In response to the Notice of Case Closing, Mr. Nguyen refiled his Financial Counseling Certificate on January 19, 2011. On January 21, 2011, the bankruptcy court noted on the docket that the Notice of Case Closing had been entered in error. The Notice of Case Closing itself was not corrected, withdrawn, or otherwise vacated. The bankruptcy case remains closed, without entry of a discharge for the benefit of Mr. Nguyen.

On January 24, 2011, Mr. Nguyen filed a second notice of appeal ("2011 Appeal") with respect to the "December 28, 2010 decision and

all previous decisions." On March 22, 2011, our motions panel dismissed the 2011 Appeal as untimely. The dismissal order clarified that Mr. Nguyen's rights in the 2010 Appeal, in which Mr. Nguyen challenges the revocation of his discharge, were not harmed by the dismissal of the 2011 Appeal.

Nevertheless, Mr. Nguyen was confused about the status of each of his appeals. On April 7, 2011, Mr. Nguyen filed with the Panel a document ("April 2011 Document") which contained the case numbers for both the 2010 Appeal and the 2011 Appeal. The April 2011 Document was docketed in the 2011 Appeal as a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit; as such we are divested of jurisdiction over the 2011 Appeal. The April 2011 Document also was docketed in the 2010 Appeal as a motion for reconsideration and a request to consolidate the two appeals before the Panel. Because no dispositive action had yet been taken in the 2010 Appeal, and because the Panel no longer had jurisdiction over the 2011 Appeal, we entered an order on April 27, 2011, which denied the relief sought in the April 2011 Document with respect to the 2010 Appeal. We clarified for Mr. Nguyen that we would be addressing at the oral argument scheduled for May 13, 2011, only the issues presented in the 2010 Appeal.

#### II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(J). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

#### III. ISSUE

Whether the Panel may consider the appeal from a default

judgment<sup>9</sup> where no motion to set aside either the entry of default or the entry of the default judgment was first brought before the bankruptcy court.

#### IV. DISCUSSION

In her complaint, the Trustee asserted that Mr. Nguyen failed to obey the Turnover Order. Section 727(d)(3) provides that the court shall revoke a debtor's discharge upon the trustee's request if the debtor committed an act enumerated in § 727(a)(6). Section 727(a)(6)(A) provides that a debtor is not entitled to a discharge if he "has refused . . . to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an order to respond to a material question or to testify." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A).

When Mr. Nguyen failed to appear in the adversary proceeding within the prescribed time after he had been served with the summons and complaint, the Trustee requested and obtained entry of Mr. Nguyen's default in the adversary proceeding. Nearly six months later, with Mr. Nguyen still having made no appearance in the adversary proceeding, the Trustee moved first for entry of the default judgment, and then for entry of the amended default judgment, all with notice to Mr. Nguyen.

In light of Mr. Nguyen's default, the bankruptcy court was entitled to assume as true the facts alleged in the Trustee's complaint, except as to the amount of damages when it ruled on the

<sup>9</sup> Mr. Nguyen's ability to challenge the entry in the main case of the order revoking his discharge is derivative of his success on appeal from the amended default judgment.

motion for entry of default judgment. <u>Geddes v. United Fin. Group</u>, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). The amended default judgment entered against Mr. Nguyen not only granted the Trustee a money judgment in the amounts set forth in the Turnover Order, it also revoked Mr. Nguyen's discharge.

Only after the amended default judgment was entered did Mr. Nguyen take any action in connection with the Trustee's complaint. Unfortunately, that action, the filing of the 2010 Appeal, was insufficient to entitle Mr. Nguyen to relief from the amended default judgment.

Whether Mr. Nguyen was entitled to relief from the amended default judgment was a matter within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge in the first instance. Madsen v. Bumb, 419 F.2d 4, 6 (9th Cir. 1969). Under Rule 55(c), applicable in adversary proceedings pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055, the bankruptcy court has discretion (1) to set aside an entry of default "for good cause" and (2) to set aside the amended default judgment under Rule 60(b). "Relief from a default judgment must be requested by a formal

The bankruptcy court did not conduct a hearing prior to entry of the default judgment, nor was it required to, where the money judgment sought by the Trustee was for a sum certain. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed. Practice and Proc. 2d § 2688 (2010) ("Once the court determines that a judgment by default should be entered, it will determine the amount and character of the recovery that should be awarded . . . If defendant does not contest the amount prayed for in the complaint and the claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation, the judgment generally will be entered for that amount without any further hearing.").

application as required by Rule 60(b)." 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed. Practice and Proc. 2d § 2692 (2010). "Relief under Rule 60(b) ordinarily is obtained by motion in the court that rendered the judgment." 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Fed. Practice and Proc. 2d § 2865 (2010) (emphasis added). "Motions to vacate default judgments . . . are addressed to the broad equitable discretion of the court where the default was taken." State Bank of India v. Chalasani (In re Chalasani), 92 F.3d 1300, 1307 (2d Cir. 1996), cited by Investors Thrift v. Lam (In re Lam), 192 F.3d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1999).

Mr. Nguyen did not seek relief from the amended default judgment in the bankruptcy court. As an appellate body, our role with regard to a Rule 60(b) motion is limited to reviewing the bankruptcy court's decision to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 1980). "An appeal to this court cannot be used as a substitute for the timely procedure set forth by Rule 60(b)." Rohauer v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1962).

The Ninth Circuit, when faced with a defaulted party who appealed a default judgment rather than seek relief from the trial court under Rule 60(b), dismissed the appeal, stating:

Federal courts are not run like a casino game in which players may enter and exit on pure whim. A defaulted party may not re-enter litigation, particularly on appeal, on sheer caprice. It must follow proper procedure to set aside the default.

In re Lam, 192 F.3d at 1311. Accord Consorzio del Prosciutto v.

Domain Name Clearing, 346 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003)(appeal of default judgment dismissed where defaulting party had not first moved the trial court to set aside entry of default or relief from the default judgment).

#### V. CONCLUSION

Consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent, we DISMISS this appeal.

\_ ,