

MAR 26 2012

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U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

5	In re:	)	BAP No. AZ-11-1376-DJuPa
6	AUGUST K. RISTOW, JR. and	)	Bk. No. 10-06491-EWH
7	VICTORIA REI RISTOW,	)	Adv. No. 10-01141-EWH
8	Debtors.	)	
9	EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT	)	
10	CORPORATION,	)	
11	Appellant,	)	
12	v.	)	<b>M E M O R A N D U M<sup>1</sup></b>
13	AUGUST K. RISTOW;	)	
14	VICTORIA REI RISTOW,	)	
15	Appellees.	)	

Argued and Submitted on February 24, 2012  
at Phoenix, Arizona

Filed - March 26, 2012

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court  
for the District of Arizona

Honorable Eileen W. Hollowell, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Appearances: Adam Clinton Trampe, Esq. argued for Appellant;  
Terry Lee Goddard, Jr., Esq. for Appellees.

Before: DUNN, JURY and PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judges.

<sup>1</sup> This disposition is not appropriate for publication.  
Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may  
have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.  
See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

1 Victoria and August Ristow (collectively, the "Ristows")  
2 sought discharge of the student loan debt owed to Educational  
3 Credit Management Corporation ("ECMC") as an undue hardship under  
4 § 523(a)(8).<sup>2</sup> The bankruptcy court granted partial discharge of  
5 the student loan debt. ECMC appeals, contending that the  
6 bankruptcy court erred in finding that the Ristows met all three  
7 prongs of the test for undue hardship set forth in Brunner v.  
8 N.Y. State Higher Educ. Svcs. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752  
9 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). We REVERSE.

#### 10 **FACTS**

##### 11 A. The Ristows' employment circumstances

12 The Ristows are in their early sixties with no dependents.  
13 August is an interim Lutheran minister who works with parishes  
14 that are "in between" more permanent ministers. His pay varies  
15 by the size of the parish he serves; he earns less at smaller  
16 parishes. August currently works at a large parish in Las Vegas,  
17 Nevada, where he expects to work until mid to late 2012. He  
18 stays in Las Vegas whenever he works at the parish; the parish  
19 provides his housing and pays certain expenses.

20 Several years ago, August worked as a furniture repairman  
21 and restorer, but he stopped such work due to back problems.  
22 Aside from his work at the parish, he has no other source of  
23 income.

24 Victoria has a master's degree in education and an MBA.  
25 However, she is unemployed. For thirty years, she worked as a

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26  
27 <sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule  
28 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and  
to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

1 disability case manager in state-funded vocational rehabilitation  
2 programs, providing re-employment assistance to people with  
3 disabilities or work-related injuries. She also worked as an  
4 international business development consultant.

5 Because of cutbacks in funding for state vocational  
6 rehabilitation programs, Victoria decided to obtain an MBA from  
7 the Thunderbird School of Global Management ("Thunderbird") in  
8 hopes of developing another career with higher income. She  
9 believed that her experience in international business  
10 development, as well as Thunderbird's prestigious reputation,  
11 would help her transition into a career in international  
12 business. Victoria further reasoned that she could use her MBA  
13 in other endeavors if she was unable to obtain employment in  
14 international business.

15 Victoria attended Thunderbird from 2006 to 2008, completing  
16 the MBA program with a 3.4 GPA. She funded her education with  
17 student loans from various lenders. Victoria also continued to  
18 work as a disability case manager while attending Thunderbird.  
19 However, she was laid off shortly before graduating from  
20 Thunderbird.

21 After graduation, for nearly three years, she tried to find  
22 employment in business development, business management and case  
23 management. As part of her job-hunting efforts, she joined  
24 networking groups, used a private career placement service, and  
25 conducted online and phone searches. She managed to obtain a few  
26 interviews, but no job offers. Subsequently, she continued to  
27 search for employment, though not with the "same intensity,"  
28

1 believing that her MBA had lost some of its value over time.<sup>3</sup>

2 While searching for jobs, Victoria found short-term  
3 employment as a consultant in capital investment; for a  
4 contingent finder's fee, she introduced venture capitalists to  
5 small start-up companies. She was unable to develop this  
6 endeavor into permanent employment due to the poor economy.  
7 Victoria also managed to find some employment as an independent  
8 contractor in case management, which supplied her one to four  
9 cases a year. She supplemented the family income with  
10 unemployment benefits.

11 Like August, Victoria has health problems. Because of a car  
12 accident, she needs double-knee replacement surgery, left foot  
13 metatarsal fusion surgery and thumb surgery. She has not  
14 undergone the double-knee replacement surgery, because she needs  
15 to lose weight before doing so. Victoria also has no funds with  
16 which to pay for the surgeries. Due to her health, she believes  
17 that she only may work jobs that are sedentary or involve light  
18 exertion and do not involve high levels of stress or long hours.

19 B. The Ristows' chapter 7 bankruptcy filing

20 The Ristows filed their chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on  
21 March 10, 2010. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the  
22 Ristows had \$4,675 in monthly net income and \$7,011 in monthly  
23 expenses.<sup>4</sup> Their monthly net income decreased to \$3,614,  
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25 <sup>3</sup> Victoria testified that her MBA carried "the most weight  
26 and [was] the most effective for about two years after  
27 graduation." Tr. of March 29, 2011 trial, 47:15-19.

28 <sup>4</sup> Per their amended Schedule J, the Ristows' monthly  
expenses were \$7,006, before they reduced them.

1 however, when Victoria's unemployment benefits expired sometime  
2 postpetition.<sup>5</sup> Their monthly expenses also decreased to \$3,704,  
3 after the Ristows surrendered timeshares and a recreational  
4 vehicle postpetition and lowered the monthly mortgage payments on  
5 their home through a loan modification.

6 Among their expenses, the Ristows pay approximately \$1,210  
7 per month for their home mortgage and \$415 per month for  
8 utilities. They also pay \$50 per month for laundry, \$120 per  
9 month for medical expenses and \$140 per month for miscellaneous  
10 expenses.<sup>6</sup>

11 The Ristows also make monthly payments of \$516 on a 2007  
12 Honda Civic Hybrid and \$392 on a 2005 Honda Element. They report  
13 \$300 per month in transportation expenses and \$96 per month for  
14 car insurance.

15 As of the bankruptcy petition date, the Honda Civic had  
16 53,618 miles on it and the Honda Element had 74,313 miles on it.  
17 The Ristows reaffirmed the debts on the Honda Civic and the Honda  
18 Element. Under the reaffirmation agreement for the Honda Civic,  
19 they agreed to pay \$516.06 per month for 55 months, beginning  
20 April 13, 2010. Under the reaffirmation agreement for the Honda  
21 Element, the Ristows agreed to pay \$390.65 per month for 20  
22 months, beginning May 30, 2010.

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23  
24 <sup>5</sup> Victoria testified that at the time of trial, the Ristows  
had a monthly net income as high as \$3,800.

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26 <sup>6</sup> According to their original and amended Schedule J, the  
Ristows made payments of \$1,000 per month on student loan debt.  
27 According to an expense sheet (which appears to have been  
28 supplied in answer to ECMC's discovery request), the Ristows  
apparently no longer make such payments.

1 C. The Ristow's § 523(a)(8) complaint

2 The Ristows filed a complaint to discharge student loan  
3 debts totaling \$204,764 under § 523(a)(8). They asked that the  
4 student loans be discharged because repayment of the student  
5 loans would impose an undue hardship on them. Although the  
6 Ristows named several lenders as defendants, only ECMC answered  
7 the complaint.<sup>7</sup> The Ristows later obtained a default judgment  
8 against the other lenders.

9 Victoria owed ECMC \$88,966.30 in student loan debt as of  
10 July 29, 2010. ECMC contended that the entire amount of the  
11 student loan debt was excepted from discharge.

12 At the March 29, 2011 trial, Victoria testified that she  
13 made nominal monthly payments of \$150 to \$160 on her student loan  
14 debt for a few months after the loan repayment deferment period  
15 ended.<sup>8</sup> She admitted that she had been advised of her student  
16 loan repayment options, which were the William D. Ford Income-  
17 Based repayment plan ("Income Based Plan") and the William D.  
18 Ford Income Contingent repayment plan ("Income Contingent  
19 Plan")(collectively, "Repayment Plans"). Under the Income Based  
20 Plan, Victoria's monthly payment would be \$268.91. Under the  
21 Income Contingent Plan, her monthly payment would be \$479.97.

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23 <sup>7</sup> The Ristows named in their amended complaint National  
24 Collegiate Trust/The Education Resources Institute (collectively,  
25 "National Collegiate Trust"), Great Lakes Educational Loan  
26 Services ("Great Lakes Loan") and Xpress Loan Services/Student  
27 Loan Xpress, Inc. ("Xpress Loan") as defendants. ECMC is the  
28 successor in interest to Xpress Loan and Great Lakes Loan.

<sup>8</sup> Victoria later testified that she made a total of \$600 to  
\$800 in payments on her student loan debt.

1 Victoria explained that she decided not to make payments  
2 under either the Income Based Plan or the Income Contingent Plan  
3 because: (1) she did not want August to be liable for any  
4 payments; (2) she and August did not have any extra disposable  
5 income to make even the minimum payments; and (3) she would have  
6 to make payments until she was 85 or 90 years old, given the 25  
7 to 30-year repayment term.

8 Victoria testified that "the dual income that [they] . . .  
9 had at one time when both of [them were] working and getting the  
10 kind of professional incomes [they] should be getting, [was]  
11 about [\$]150 to \$180,000." Tr. of March 29, 2011 trial, 49:9-12.  
12 She did not anticipate that she and August would return to their  
13 former level of income, however, based on her experiences over  
14 the last three years. Victoria testified that, after one  
15 interview with a company, she was informed that she did not  
16 advance past the first interview because she "was too old and  
17 [she] wouldn't make it with the technology." Tr. of March 29,  
18 2011 trial, 59:8-10. Moreover, she pointed out, their additional  
19 sources of income (namely, August's furniture repair and  
20 restoration work) were no longer viable due to the economy and  
21 their health.

22 Victoria explained that, with their current income and  
23 expenses, she and August either "broke even" or had approximately  
24 \$100 in disposable income left over. Tr. of March 29, 2011  
25 trial, 74:16-19. She explained that, based on their current  
26 financial circumstances, she did not see how she and August could  
27 cut their expenses; they were "just, you know, scraping by as it  
28 [was], so." Tr. of March 29, 2011 trial, 57:12-13.

1 Victoria testified that she initially sought jobs with  
2 salaries between \$101,000 to \$150,000, though "she didn't  
3 stipulate to that criteria." Tr. of March 29, 2011 trial,  
4 81:11-15. She admitted that, in her search for employment, a  
5 \$90,000 salary was the minimum salary she would consider.  
6 Victoria explained that she had been told that "six figures and  
7 above [salary was] what MBA people [got]." Tr. of March 29, 2011  
8 trial, 42:24-25.

9 Victoria further testified that she believed that she would  
10 repay the student loans either with the income she earned through  
11 employment with her MBA or by consolidating the student loans  
12 and/or using the equity in the Ristows' home. She asserted that  
13 before she applied to Thunderbird, she had been told that she  
14 would very likely get a job within six months of graduation.

15 At the end of the trial, the bankruptcy court concluded  
16 that, based on the evidence the Ristows presented, the Income  
17 Based Plan and the Income Contingent Plan "would be a stretch  
18 because [Victoria] was unemployed and the economy [was] very  
19 difficult right now." Tr. of March 29, 2011 trial, 89:1-3. It  
20 acknowledged, however, that because the Ristows would be paying  
21 off the Honda Element in December 2011, they might have some  
22 excess income with which to pay off some of the student loan  
23 debt. The bankruptcy court pointed out that neither the Ristows  
24 nor ECMC addressed the issue of a partial discharge of the  
25 student loan debt. The bankruptcy court then gave the Ristows  
26 and ECMC the opportunity to present post-trial briefs on the  
27 issue.

28 The bankruptcy court issued a memorandum decision

1 ("Memorandum Decision") after the parties submitted their post-  
2 trial briefs. It applied the three-prong test established in  
3 Brunner, which was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in United Student  
4 Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th  
5 Cir. 1998), to determine undue hardship under § 523(a)(8).

6 The bankruptcy court found that the Ristows met all of the  
7 elements of the Brunner test. Although it determined that the  
8 Ristows satisfied the Brunner test, the bankruptcy court refused  
9 to discharge all of Victoria's student loan debt.

10 The bankruptcy court recognized that the Ristows would never  
11 have sufficient income with which to pay the student loan debt in  
12 full. It found, however, that once they paid off the Honda  
13 Element in December 2011, the Ristows would have some surplus  
14 income with which to pay off some of the student loan debt. It  
15 figured that the Ristows would have approximately \$100 per month  
16 surplus income, after taking \$300 in transportation expenses into  
17 account under the chapter 13 trustee guidelines.

18 The bankruptcy court determined that, as there was no  
19 statute of limitations on student loan debt, the repayment period  
20 should be 25 years. It determined that the interest rate should  
21 be 8%, as applied to federal consolidated loans. The bankruptcy  
22 court calculated that the total amount of the student loan debt  
23 excepted from discharge was \$13,000, based on a payment of  
24 \$100.34 per month over 25 years at 8% interest.

25 On July 7, 2011, the bankruptcy court entered a judgment  
26 consistent with its rulings. ECMC timely appealed.

#### 27 **JURISDICTION**

28 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

1 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under  
2 28 U.S.C. § 158.

3 **ISSUE**

4 Did the bankruptcy court err in granting the Ristows a  
5 partial discharge of the student loan debt?

6 **STANDARDS OF REVIEW**

7 We review the bankruptcy court's factual findings for clear  
8 error and its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code de novo.  
9 ECMC v. Mason (In re Mason), 464 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2006),  
10 quoting Miller v. Cardinale (In re DeVille), 361 F.3d 539, 547  
11 (9th Cir. 2004). We review mixed questions of law and fact de  
12 novo. Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 788, 792 (9th  
13 Cir. 1997). A mixed question of law and fact exists when the  
14 facts are established, the law is undisputed, and the issue is  
15 whether the facts satisfy the legal standard. Id. Such mixed  
16 questions require consideration of legal concepts and the  
17 exercise of judgment regarding the values that animate legal  
18 principles. Id.

19 The question as to whether student loan debt imposes an  
20 undue hardship on a bankrupt debtor is such a mixed question,  
21 reviewed de novo. Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino),  
22 245 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2001); Pa. Higher Educ.  
23 Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 493  
24 (9th Cir. BAP 2002).

25 **DISCUSSION**

26 In this appeal, we must deal with the consequences of  
27 several arguably poor decisions: It was imprudent of Victoria to  
28 incur student loan debt exceeding \$150,000 to pursue her MBA at

1 her advanced age, and it was imprudent of her lenders to lend it  
2 to her. As acknowledged by ECMC in its opening brief, "In 2006,  
3 Victoria Ristow decided to finance an MBA with student loans  
4 despite several factors suggesting she'd never be able to fully  
5 repay them." Appellant's Opening Brief at 2 (emphasis added).  
6 Now, the Ristows are in bankruptcy, and we consider whether the  
7 bankruptcy court erred in partially discharging Victoria's  
8 approximately \$90,000 obligation to ECMC, leaving a balance owing  
9 of \$13,000 payable at 8% interest.

10 Under the Bankruptcy Code, student loan debt generally is  
11 presumed excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(8)<sup>9</sup> unless the  
12 debtor establishes that requiring repayment would impose an undue  
13 hardship. The Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship."  
14 ECMC v. Nys (In re Nys), 446 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2006). But  
15 using the adjective, "undue," indicates that Congress viewed  
16 garden-variety hardship as an insufficient justification for  
17 discharging student loan debt. In re Pena, 155 F.3d at 1111.

18 What separates a "garden-variety debtor" from a debtor  
19 who can show "undue hardship" is the realistic  
20 possibility that a "garden-variety debtor" could  
21 improve her financial situation in the future. With  
22 increased financial stability, a debtor can make  
23 payments on her student loans and maintain a minimal

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22 <sup>9</sup> Section 523(a)(8) provides, in relevant part:  
23

24 A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does  
25 not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . .  
26 unless excepting such debt from discharge under this  
27 paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor  
28 . . . for . . . an education benefit overpayment or  
loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a government unit,  
or made under any program funded in whole or in part by  
a governmental unit or nonprofit institution . . . .

1 standard of living. In comparison, forcing debtors who  
2 cannot reasonably be expected to increase their future  
3 income to make payments on their student loans when it  
4 causes them to fall below a minimal standard of living  
5 constitutes an "undue hardship."

6 In re Nys, 446 F.3d at 944.

7 To meet the "undue hardship" test of § 523(a)(8), the debtor  
8 must demonstrate that: (1) she cannot maintain, based on current  
9 income and expenses, a minimum standard of living for herself if  
10 forced to repay her student loans; (2) additional circumstances  
11 exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist  
12 for a significant portion of the student loan repayment period;  
13 and (3) she has made a good faith effort to repay the student  
14 loans. In re Pena, 155 F.3d at 1111-12, adopting the test  
15 ("Brunner test") from Brunner, 46 B.R. at 753. The debtor bears  
16 the burden of proof to establish all three elements of the  
17 Brunner test. Rifino v. U.S. (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083,  
18 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2001). If the debtor fails to meet her burden  
19 as to any one of these elements, the inquiry ends with a finding  
20 that the student loan debt is not excepted from discharge. Id.  
21 at 1088. Accordingly, the path to a discharge of student loan  
22 debt is not easy.

23 On appeal, ECMC argues that the Ristows failed to meet their  
24 burden as to all three of the Brunner test elements. We agree  
25 with ECMC as to one element, the "good faith" effort to repay,  
26 but that conclusion is enough to require reversal of the  
27 bankruptcy court's decision.

28 The third element of the Brunner test requires that the  
debtor establish that she made a good faith effort to repay the  
subject student loan(s). See In re Pena, 155 F.3d at 1114.

1 "Good faith is measured by the debtor's efforts to obtain  
2 employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses." In re  
3 Mason, 464 F.3d at 884, quoting In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at 499.  
4 In addition, courts will consider the debtor's record of making  
5 payments on the student loan debt and the debtor's efforts, if  
6 any, to negotiate a repayment plan. Id. However, the debtor's  
7 history of making or not making student loan payments is not  
8 dispositive. Id. at 499-500.

9 In considering the good faith effort element, the bankruptcy  
10 court noted that Victoria "timely sought forbearance and made  
11 some minimal payments from her unemployment benefits" on the ECMC  
12 loans. Memorandum Decision at 11. As noted above, Victoria  
13 testified that she made a total of \$600 to \$800 in payments on  
14 her student loan debt.

15 ECMC focuses on two portions of the evidentiary record that  
16 we agree are critical in light of Ninth Circuit authorities.  
17 First, Victoria's testimony indicates that following her receipt  
18 of her MBA, during the intensive period of her job search, she  
19 focused on jobs with compensation ranging from \$101,000 to  
20 \$150,000, and the minimum compensation she would consider was  
21 \$90,000 with incentive bonuses. Her career placement firm  
22 advised her that in any given week, only about 0.05% of the  
23 available employment positions provided compensation in her  
24 preferred range. She never sought employment in lower paying  
25 positions.

26 The bankruptcy court noted that Victoria's testimony "did  
27 not indicate that she was unwilling to work for less than six  
28 figures" (Memorandum Decision at 8), but that determination does

1 not meet the Ristows' burden to establish that they sufficiently  
2 exerted themselves to maximize their income. As ECMC emphasizes,  
3 there is nothing in the record to indicate that Victoria  
4 attempted to secure any "minimum-wage part-time jobs" to pay her  
5 student loan debts. In fact, as ECMC further notes, "If  
6 [Victoria] worked at a [Lowe's] customer service desk like the  
7 debtor in [ECMC v. Blackbird (In re Blackbird), 2008 WL 8444793  
8 (9th Cir. BAP July 11, 2008)]-or in any other 'light sedentary'  
9 job-for minimum wage, ten hours a week, she'd be able to make her  
10 loan payments."<sup>10</sup> Appellant's Reply Brief at 8-9.

11 We do not share ECMC's blithe assumptions about the  
12 increased net income that may result for the Ristows from part-  
13 time, minimum wage jobs once the expenses associated with such  
14 employment are considered. See B. Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed:  
15 On (Not) Getting By in America (2001). However, we recognize  
16 that the lack of any evidence that Victoria considered employment  
17 for compensation at any amount less than \$90,000 is telling in  
18 this context.

19 Second, Victoria testified that she was aware of the Income  
20 Based Plan and Income Contingent Plan for payment of her student  
21 loan debts and would not apply for them. Under the Income Based  
22 Plan, her initial monthly payment would be \$268.91, and after a  
23 term of twenty-five years, any unpaid balance would be forgiven.  
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26 <sup>10</sup> We note that in light of his "doctorate education," the  
27 fact that the debtor in In re Blackbird had obtained a job as a  
28 customer service representative at Lowe's did not satisfy the  
good faith effort to repay element of the Brunner test. In re  
Blackbird, 2008 WL 8444793 at \*7.

1           Where income contingent repayment programs are available, a  
2 failure to pursue such options is considered in determining  
3 whether a debtor has met her burden to establish a good faith  
4 effort to repay student loan debt. See, e.g., In re Mason,  
5 464 F.3d at 884 (the debtor failed to pursue an income contingent  
6 repayment plan option with diligence); In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at  
7 500 (concluding lack of good faith where debtor made some effort  
8 to renegotiate payment of student loan debt but failed to pursue  
9 an income contingent repayment plan option when it became  
10 available).

11           As the bankruptcy court noted, Victoria testified that she  
12 rejected applying for either of the Repayment Plans because:  
13 1) she did not want her husband to become obligated for the  
14 payments, 2) the Ristows could not afford the Income Based Plan  
15 payments currently, and 3) the twenty-five year payment term  
16 meant that the Ristows would be obligated to make payments under  
17 the Income Based Plan through their mid-eighties. The bankruptcy  
18 court concluded that the Ristows' reasons for not pursuing the  
19 Repayment Plans did not demonstrate good faith, and we agree.  
20 However, the bankruptcy court's remedy for the Ristows'  
21 deficiency in evidencing a good faith effort to repay was to  
22 grant a partial discharge, discharging approximately \$77,000 of  
23 Victoria's student loan debt to ECMC, on top of the \$100,000+ of  
24 student loan debt already discharged by default in the Ristows'  
25 adversary proceeding. As noted above, Ninth Circuit authorities  
26 are clear that if the debtor does not meet the burden of proof on  
27 any element of the Brunner test to discharge student loan debt,  
28 the debt is not discharged.

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Ristows did  
3 not meet their burden of proof under the Brunner test to  
4 establish that they are entitled to a discharge of their student  
5 loan debt to ECMC as an undue hardship. Accordingly, we REVERSE.  
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