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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK  
U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

5	In re:	)	BAP Nos. CC-14-1185-PaTaD
		)	CC-14-1258-PaTaD
6	MARK JENKINS and	)	(Cross-Appeals)
	ROXANNA RAMEY,	)	
7		)	Bankr. No. 11-59152-ER
	Debtors.	)	
8		)	Adv. Proc. 12-01365-ER
9	MARK JENKINS,	)	
		)	
10	Appellant and	)	
	Cross-appellee,	)	
11		)	
	v.	)	<b>MEMORANDUM<sup>1</sup></b>
12		)	
	ROBERT MITELHAUS,	)	
13		)	
	Appellee and	)	
14	Cross-appellant.	)	
15		)	

Argued and Submitted on January 22, 2015  
at Pasadena, California

Filed - February 20, 2015

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court  
for the Central District of California

Honorable Ernest M. Robles, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Appearances: David Brian Lally argued for appellant/cross-appellee Mark Jenkins; Mark T. Young of Donahoe & Young LLP argued for appellee/cross-appellant Robert Mitelhaus.

Before: PAPPAS, TAYLOR and DUNN, Bankruptcy Judges.

<sup>1</sup> This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

1 Chapter 7<sup>2</sup> debtors Mark Jenkins ("Jenkins") and Roxanna  
2 Ramey ("Ramey" and together, "Debtors") appeal the judgment and  
3 amended judgment of the bankruptcy court determining that  
4 Jenkins' debt owed to creditor Robert Mitelhaus ("Mitelhaus") is  
5 excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6). Mitelhaus  
6 cross-appeals the amount of judgments and whether Ramey is also  
7 liable for the debt that is excepted from discharge. We REVERSE  
8 that portion of the judgments determining that Debtors' debt to  
9 Mitelhaus is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4), AFFIRM  
10 the judgments' determination that the debt is excepted from  
11 Jenkins' discharge under § 523(a)(6), and AFFIRM the bankruptcy  
12 court's determination of the amount of the nondischargeable debt  
13 in the judgments and that Ramey is not liable for that exception  
14 to discharge.

#### 15 **FACTS**

16 Nutec Enterprises, Inc. ("Nutec") is a Nevada corporation  
17 doing business as a real estate brokerage in California. Ramey  
18 is its president, owns 100 percent of the shares of Nutec, and  
19 acts as a real estate salesperson. Jenkins, her spouse, is vice-  
20 president of Nutec and serves as its real estate broker.

21 On June 11, 2003, Nutec and Mitelhaus, a real estate  
22 salesperson, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement  
23 (the "Contract"). Mitelhaus agreed to work for Nutec in exchange  
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26 <sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section  
27 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all  
28 Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,  
Rules 1001-9037, and all Civil Rule references are to the Federal  
Rules of Civil Procedure 1-86.

1 for payment of commissions for any real estate sold or leased  
2 when he acted as agent for the buyer or seller. Mitelhaus worked  
3 with Nutec from June 2003 through July 19, 2005, when Nutec  
4 terminated the Contract.

5         Shortly after Nutec terminated its relationship with  
6 Mitelhaus, KS Management, LLC ("KS") sued Nutec, Jenkins, and  
7 Mitelhaus in connection with a lease transaction (the "KS  
8 Lawsuit"). Mitelhaus alleges that he made a demand on Nutec to  
9 defend him based on Nutec's errors and omissions insurance policy  
10 but Nutec refused. In November 2005, Nutec tendered the defense  
11 of the KS Lawsuit claim to its insurance carrier, which refused  
12 the claim because it arose during a period when Nutec had allowed  
13 the policy to lapse for failure to pay premiums. As a result,  
14 Mitelhaus alleges that he was required to defend the KS Lawsuit  
15 with his own resources, expending \$77,284.50 in attorney's fees  
16 and costs in the process. KS ultimately dropped the lawsuit.

17         On December 21, 2007, Mitelhaus filed a complaint in state  
18 court against Nutec, Jenkins, and Ramey for breach of contract,  
19 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, common  
20 counts, and fraud. Mitelhaus v. Nutec Enters., Inc., case no.  
21 BC382703 (Los Angeles Superior Court). Among the damages sought  
22 by Mitelhaus were withheld commissions in the amount of  
23 \$71,202.38 for four commissions (the "Four Commissions") that he  
24 alleged became payable to him after he was terminated; for other  
25 withheld commissions of approximately \$66,000 relating to leases  
26 regarding the Nasr property (the "Nasr Commissions"); for  
27 Mitelhaus' costs of defending the KS Lawsuit ("KS Lawsuit Fees");  
28 for a commission on the Nutec Office Lease ("Office Lease"); for

1 violation of labor laws; and for reimbursement of the insurance  
2 premiums he paid to Nutec.

3 The parties jointly moved to submit the dispute to  
4 arbitration, which the state court approved. An arbitration  
5 hearing took place in July 2009 over three days. Nutec, Jenkins,  
6 and Ramey were represented by counsel, as was Mitelhaus. Six  
7 witnesses testified at the hearing. On July 20, 2009, the  
8 arbitrator issued an Award of Arbitrator (the "Award"). Among  
9 other things, the Award found and concluded that:

10 - Nutec had breached the Contract by withholding the Four  
11 Commissions that were due to Mitelhaus. Mitelhaus was awarded  
12 \$71,202.18 in damages for this breach.

13 - Mitelhaus did not present evidence on violations of the  
14 Labor Code. No damages were awarded on this claim.

15 - Nutec did not commit fraud in withholding the insurance  
16 premiums from Mitelhaus' compensation. The Award opined,  
17 however, that "the Arbitrator finds the conduct [of Jenkins and  
18 Ramey] to be deplorable, but not actionable." Mitelhaus was  
19 awarded \$3,197 as a flat fee for reimbursement of his payments  
20 (the "Flat Fee").

21 - Mitelhaus was awarded \$62,001.95 and \$15,282.55 for the  
22 KS Lawsuit Fees.

23 - Mitelhaus was not entitled to a commission for the Office  
24 Lease.

25 - Jenkins was personally liable for damages in the Award.

26 - Ramey was not the alter ego of Nutec as alleged by  
27 Mitelhaus and, thus, was not liable for damages under the Award.

28 - Mitelhaus was the prevailing party and was entitled to

1 recover his attorney's fees and costs.

2 - Mitelhaus had waived his right to seek compensation for  
3 the Nasr Commissions.

4 In sum, the arbitrator awarded Mitelhaus actual damages of  
5 \$151,683.88,<sup>3</sup> prejudgment interest of \$49,184.80, costs of  
6 arbitration of \$12,750.00, and attorney's fees and costs of  
7 \$80,742.94 against both Nutec and Jenkins.

8 On August 5, 2009, Mitelhaus filed an unopposed motion in  
9 the Superior Court to confirm the Award. In a September 23, 2009  
10 order granting this motion (the "State Court Judgment"), the  
11 state court adjudged Jenkins and Nutec liable to Mitelhaus for  
12 \$289,526.62.<sup>4</sup> The State Court Judgment was not appealed.

13 On November 10, 2009, Nutec filed a petition for relief  
14 under chapter 11. Its reorganization plan was confirmed on  
15 September 10, 2010, and the bankruptcy case was closed on  
16 March 25, 2011. Mitelhaus was scheduled as Nutec's largest  
17 unsecured creditor for \$314,393.96, and the confirmed plan  
18 proposed to pay him \$34,583.33. Apparently, no payments have  
19 been received by Mitelhaus under the Nutec plan.

20 Debtors filed a petition under chapter 7 on November 30,  
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23 <sup>3</sup> The \$151,683.88 (the "Award") is composed of \$71,202.38  
24 (Four Commissions) + \$3197.00 (Flat Fee) + \$62,001.95/\$15,282.55  
(KS Lawsuit Fees).

25 <sup>4</sup> The \$289,526.62 awarded in the State Court Judgment is  
26 composed of \$151,683.88 (the "Award") + \$49,184.80 (prejudgment  
27 interest) + \$12,750 (arbitration fees) + \$80,742.94 (attorney  
28 fees for arbitration) + \$1,540.00 (attorney fees for  
confirmation) - \$6,375.00 (arbitration fees that Nutec reimbursed  
to Mitelhaus before entry of the State Court Judgment).

1 2011. Their schedule F listed a debt of \$289,526.62 to Mitelhaus  
2 arising from the State Court Judgment.

3 Mitelhaus filed an adversary complaint against Debtors on  
4 March 8, 2012, asking the bankruptcy court to determine that the  
5 State Court Judgment was excepted from discharge under  
6 § 523(a) (4) and (a) (6).

7 Debtors answered the complaint and on November 13, 2012,  
8 Mitelhaus filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the  
9 Award was preclusive as to all of the required elements for an  
10 exception to discharge under both § 523(a) (4) and (a) (6). The  
11 bankruptcy court denied the motion without a hearing on  
12 February 4, 2013, principally because the arbitrator had not made  
13 the findings concerning Debtors' intent required to establish an  
14 exception to discharge under either § 523(a) (4) or (a) (6).

15 A three-day trial in the adversary proceeding was held in  
16 October 2013. After taking the matter under advisement, the  
17 bankruptcy court entered a Memorandum of Decision ("First  
18 Memorandum") and Judgment ("First Judgment") on April 2, 2014.  
19 Among the rulings made by the bankruptcy court were:

20 - Mitelhaus' debt was excepted from discharge as to Jenkins  
21 under § 523(a) (4) based on larceny. In particular, the  
22 bankruptcy court determined that Jenkins' withholding of the Four  
23 Commissions from Mitelhaus constituted a felonious taking done  
24 with the intent to deprive Mitelhaus of the commissions and,  
25 therefore, was larceny.

26 - Mitelhaus' debt was also excepted from discharge pursuant  
27 to § 523(a) (6) because Jenkins' had willfully and maliciously  
28 withheld the Four Commissions.

1       - The attorney's fees and costs awarded in the arbitration  
2 were also excepted from Jenkins' discharge.

3       - The State Court Judgment was dischargeable as to Ramey.

4       The First Judgment determined that \$163,057.32<sup>5</sup> of the debt  
5 evidenced by the State Court Judgment was excepted from Jenkins'  
6 discharge under § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6).

7       On April 16, 2014, Mitelhaus filed a motion for  
8 reconsideration under Civil Rule 59(e), incorporated in  
9 Rule 9023. The motion asked the bankruptcy court to reconsider:  
10 (1) whether the bankruptcy court was bound to deem the full  
11 amount of the debt in the State Court Judgment nondischargeable;  
12 (2) whether the attorney's fees awarded to Mitelhaus for the KS  
13 Lawsuit were excepted from discharge; (3) whether the Nasr  
14 Commissions should also be included in the debt excepted from  
15 discharge; (4) whether Mitelhaus should recover prejudgment  
16 interest on the State Court Judgment; and (5) whether Ramey  
17 should also be liable on the debt.

18       Later that same day, Jenkins filed a notice of appeal of the  
19 First Judgment. Under the rules, Jenkins' appeal was tolled  
20 until entry of the bankruptcy court's decision on the  
21 reconsideration motion. See Rule 8002(b).

22       The bankruptcy court entered a decision disposing of  
23 Mitelhaus' reconsideration motion without a hearing on May 5,  
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25       <sup>5</sup> The \$163,057.32 is composed of \$71,202.38 (Four  
26 Commissions) + \$6,375.00 (one-half of the arbitration fees) +  
27 \$3,197 (Flat Fee) + \$80,742.94 (attorney fees for arbitration) +  
28 \$1,540.00 (attorney fees for confirmation). The First Judgment  
did not include any pre- or post-judgment interest on the State  
Court Judgment.

1 2014 (the "Amended Memorandum"). The Amended Memorandum declined  
2 to reconsider the amounts excepted from Jenkins' discharge in the  
3 First Judgment under § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) because, contrary to  
4 the requirements of Civil Rule 59(e), the motion merely restated  
5 arguments previously made by Mitelhaus and neither presented  
6 newly discovered evidence nor established that any manifest error  
7 of fact or law had been made. The court also denied the request  
8 to reconsider its findings regarding the liability of Ramey. The  
9 court, however, granted the request in the reconsideration motion  
10 to add prejudgment interest of \$24,124.48 to the First Judgment  
11 Award and, on its own initiative, added \$84,667.75 in post-  
12 judgment interest as of April 2, 2014, with additional interest  
13 to accrue at \$51.28 per day. In an Amended Judgment, the  
14 bankruptcy court determined that a debt of \$271,849.55<sup>6</sup> was  
15 excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) against  
16 Jenkins only.

17 The reconsideration motion having thus been resolved by the  
18 bankruptcy court, Mitelhaus filed a timely notice of cross-appeal  
19 of the First Judgment and Amended Judgment on May 19, 2014.

#### 20 **JURISDICTION**

21 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
22 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  
23 § 158.

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26 <sup>6</sup> The \$271,849.55 is composed of \$71,202.38 (Four  
27 Commissions) + \$3,197.00 (Flat Fee) + \$24,124.48 (prejudgment  
28 interest) + \$6,375.00 (one-half of arbitration fees) + \$80,742.94  
(attorney fees for arbitration) + \$1,540.00 (attorney fees for  
confirmation) + \$84,667.75 (post-judgment interest).



1 may apply in one of three circumstances: when a debtor engages  
2 in fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity, or when a debtor  
3 commits an embezzlement or larceny.

4 In Mitelhaus' complaint in the adversary proceeding and in  
5 his arguments to the bankruptcy court, he sought an exception to  
6 discharge solely because, he alleged, Jenkins had committed  
7 larceny for purposes of § 523(a)(4). In its decision, the  
8 bankruptcy court explained the legal standard required to  
9 establish larceny:

10 The Ninth Circuit has established that "[f]or purposes  
11 of section 523(a)(4), a bankruptcy court is not bound  
12 by the state law definition of larceny, but, rather,  
13 may follow federal common law, which defines larceny as  
14 a 'felonious taking of another's personal property with  
15 intent to convert it or deprive the owner of the  
16 same.'" In re Ormsby, 591 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir.  
2010), citing 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.10[2] (15th  
ed. 2008). "Felonious" for purposes of ¶ 523(a)(4) is  
defined as "wrongful; . . . without excuse [or] color  
of right." Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1205 (citations  
omitted).

17 First Memorandum at 5. Applying this standard, the bankruptcy  
18 court reasoned that, by withholding the Four Commissions from  
19 Mitelhaus, Jenkins had committed a "felonious taking" for  
20 purposes of § 523(a)(4). We conclude that the bankruptcy court  
21 incorrectly applied the Ormsby standard.

22 The full text of the discussion in In re Ormsby cited by  
23 the bankruptcy court is as follows:

24 Section 523(a)(4) prevents discharge "for fraud or  
25 defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,  
26 embezzlement, or larceny." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).  
27 "For purposes of section 523(a)(4), a bankruptcy court  
28 is not bound by the state law definition of larceny  
but, rather, may follow federal common law, which  
defines larceny as a 'felonious taking of another's  
personal property with intent to convert it or deprive  
the owner of the same.'" 4 Collier on Bankruptcy

1 ¶ 523.10[2] (15th ed. rev. 2008).<sup>4</sup> [Note 4:] Felonious  
2 is defined as "'proceeding from an evil heart or  
3 purpose; malicious; villainous . . . Wrongful; (of an  
4 act) done without excuse of color of right.'" Elliott  
v. Kieseletter (In re Kieseletter), 391 B.R. 740, 748  
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary  
(8th ed. 2004)).

5 In re Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1205 & n.4. As can be seen from this  
6 excerpt, a "felonious taking" refers to a situation in which a  
7 debtor comes into possession of property of another by unlawful  
8 means; it does not refer to the subsequent withholding of  
9 property from its alleged owner. This is made clear in the  
10 Ormsby court's citation to Collier on this topic, which explains:

11 Larceny is the fraudulent and wrongful taking and  
12 carrying away of the property of another with intent to  
13 convert the property to the taker's use without the  
14 consent of the owner. **As distinguished from**  
15 **embezzlement, the original taking of the property must**  
16 **be unlawful. . . .** Section 523(a)(4) excepts from  
17 discharge debts resulting from the fraudulent  
18 appropriation of another's property, whether the  
19 appropriation was unlawful at the outset, and therefore  
20 a larceny, or whether the appropriation took place  
21 unlawfully after the property was entrusted to the  
22 debtor's care, and therefore was an embezzlement.

23 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.10[2] (Lawrence P. King, 15th ed. rev.  
24 2008) (emphasis added).<sup>7</sup> Simply put, for purposes of  
25 § 523(a)(4), larceny only occurs when the debtor first comes into  
26 unlawful possession of the property of another. Werner v.  
Hoffman, 5 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 1993); Kaye v. Rose  
(In re Rose), 934 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1991).

27 The facts in Ormsby demonstrate that a larceny must be based  
28 on the debtor's unlawful initial possession of property. Ormsby

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27 <sup>7</sup> This text was retained intact in the most recent version  
28 of this authority. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.10[2] (Alan N.  
Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds. 16th ed. 2009).

1 owned a small real estate title company. A much larger title  
2 company, FATCO, had developed extensive databases and  
3 organization of title records that greatly simplified title  
4 searches such as those Ormsby conducted. Ormsby contracted to  
5 access the databases ("plants") developed for the period after  
6 2000, but did not subscribe to access the plants for earlier  
7 years. Ormsby hired McCaffrey, who had access to the earlier  
8 plants and, through McCaffrey, obtained copies of the earlier  
9 plants that Ormsby then wrongfully used in his title search  
10 business. In characterizing the debtor's conduct, the Ormsby  
11 court concluded,

12       When he started Inter-County, [Ormsby] purchased the  
13       rights to use the title plant for 2000 until the  
14       present, demonstrating that he was aware of the lawful  
15       means of obtaining access to them. Rather than  
16       purchasing the rights to the title plants for the  
17       1900s, he hired McCaffrey away from a competing title  
18       company and discussed with him the importance of the  
19       title plants to a new title company. While McCaffrey  
20       still had access to the plants that FATCO possessed,  
21       Ormsby encouraged, cooperated, and assisted McCaffrey's  
22       removal of the plants and their reproduction. Of  
23       particular note, Ormsby sent the microfiche containing  
24       the plants to a non-local copying service, likely to  
25       avoid detection. Based on these facts found by the  
26       state court, Ormsby's conduct constituted larceny  
27       within the federal meaning of the term; accordingly  
28       under section 523(a)(4), his debt cannot be discharged.

21 In re Ormsby, 591 F.3d at 1205-06.

22       Here, in contrast to Ormsby, the bankruptcy court determined  
23       that Nutec had come into possession of the Four Commissions  
24       lawfully:

25       Both Jenkins and Ramey testified that when a file for a  
26       transaction was complete and reviewed, a commission  
27       disbursement or CDA would be issued to escrow, which  
28       would allow the agent to be paid directly by the escrow  
29       company. . . . Ramey further testified that although  
30       rare, some escrow companies did not accept CDAs. []  
31       Consequently, in those circumstances, the escrow

1 company would pay all of the commissions directly to  
2 Nutec, which presumably would then disburse the agent's  
share.

3 This apparently is what happened with respect to  
4 the [Four Commissions], because both Jenkins and Ramey  
testified that Nutec received checks for these  
transactions from escrow.

5 First Memorandum at 6 (emphasis added). Because the bankruptcy  
6 court determined that the Four Commissions were paid to Nutec by  
7 the escrow company apparently in compliance with that company's  
8 policies, Nutec came into lawful possession of those commissions.  
9 As a result, that Jenkins decided to withhold payment of the Four  
10 Commissions to Mitelhaus, while perhaps wrongful, was not a  
11 felonious taking for purposes of the federal standard for larceny  
12 under § 523(a)(4).<sup>8</sup> On this record, we conclude that the  
13 bankruptcy court erred in determining that the \$71,202.38 debt  
14 represented by the Four Commissions was excepted from discharge  
15 as a larceny pursuant to § 523(a)(4).<sup>9</sup>

16 \_\_\_\_\_  
17 <sup>8</sup> We need not speculate whether, on these facts, some other  
18 basis than larceny would support an exception to discharge under  
19 § 523(a)(4). Mitelhaus' complaint only sought exception to  
20 discharge under the larceny provision of § 523(a)(4). Consistent  
21 with this, the parties jointly stipulated in the Pre-trial  
22 Stipulation that the bankruptcy court should consider an  
23 exception to discharge under "11 U.S.C. §523(a)(4) because the  
debt arose through larceny pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)."  
24 In short, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the  
25 bankruptcy court considered another ground for an exception under  
26 § 523(a)(4), nor do we.

27 <sup>9</sup> For similar reasons, we conclude that the bankruptcy court  
28 erred in excepting from discharge under § 523(a)(4) the Flat Fee  
of \$3,197. These premiums were paid by Mitelhaus to Nutec via  
twenty-three deductions of \$139 from his commission earnings.  
Mitelhaus has not argued, and there is nothing in the record  
before us to establish, that Nutec came into unlawful possession  
(continued...)

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II.

**The bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the withholding of the Four Commissions was a debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).**

A creditor bears the burden of proving that its claim is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) by a preponderance of the evidence. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991). Section 523(a)(6) provides: "(a) A discharge under 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt - . . . (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." Whether a particular debt is for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another, or to the property of another, requires application of a two-pronged test: the creditor must prove that the debtor's conduct in causing the injuries was both willful and malicious. Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring the application of a separate analysis for each prong of "willful" and "malicious").

To show that a debtor's conduct is willful requires proof that the debtor deliberately or intentionally injured the

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<sup>9</sup>(...continued)  
of the commissions from which these amounts were withheld. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that, to constitute larceny, federal common law larceny requires a taking of property without the consent of a party. United States v. Sellers, 670 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1982); Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2252, at \*2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2011), aff'd, 484 B.R. 344 (9th Cir. BAP 2012). Mitelhaus apparently consented to these deductions, and that Nutec failed to honor its commitment to use them to pay for insurance, even if intentional, was not a larceny under § 523(a)(4). See In re Mubunda, at \*3.

1 creditor or the creditor's property, and that in doing so, the  
2 debtor intended the consequences of his act, not just the act  
3 itself. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1998). The  
4 debtor must act with a subjective motive to inflict injury, or  
5 with a belief that injury is substantially certain to result from  
6 the conduct. Id. For conduct to be malicious, the creditor must  
7 prove that the debtor: (1) committed a wrongful act, (2) done  
8 intentionally, (3) which necessarily causes injury, and (4) was  
9 done without just cause or excuse. Id.

10 Whether a debtor's conduct is willful and malicious under  
11 § 523(a)(6) is a question of fact reviewed for clear  
12 error. Banks v. Gill Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. (In re Banks),  
13 263 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).

14 Finally, and importantly for our review in this case, "to be  
15 excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) for breach of contract,  
16 the breach of contract must be accompanied by some form of  
17 'tortious conduct' that gives rise to 'willful and malicious  
18 injury.'" In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at 1206.

19 The bankruptcy court found that Nutec, acting through  
20 Jenkins, withheld the Four Commissions from Mitelhaus willfully  
21 and maliciously. To satisfy the willfulness prong, the court  
22 found that withholding the Four Commissions was not authorized  
23 under Paragraph 8(E)(5) of the Contract, which permitted Nutec to  
24 withhold payments from Mitelhaus solely to offset expenses  
25 incurred related to those commissions. In this case, the offsets  
26 that Nutec and Jenkins argued should be applied against the Four  
27 Commissions were allegedly incurred as a result of the KS Lawsuit  
28 and the Nasr Commissions leases; they did not arise out of the

1 deals that generated the Four Commissions. The bankruptcy court  
2 concluded that this breach of contract evidenced Jenkins' belief  
3 that, as a result of his actions, injury was substantially  
4 certain to occur to Mitelhaus from the withholding of the Four  
5 Commissions.

6 As to the malicious prong, the bankruptcy court found that  
7 "the withholding of the Commissions was wrongful and intentional,  
8 because it was not authorized by contract or otherwise." First  
9 Memorandum at 8. In short, the bankruptcy court determined that  
10 the debt arising from the Four Commissions was excepted from  
11 discharge because Jenkins engaged in an intentional breach of  
12 contract.

13 As noted above, for a breach of contract to constitute a  
14 willful and malicious injury for purposes of § 523(a)(6), it must  
15 be accompanied by some form of "tortious conduct" that gives rise  
16 to "willful and malicious injury." In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at  
17 1206. To determine if conduct is tortious, state law must be  
18 consulted. In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 1999).

19 In California, tort recovery for breach of contract is  
20 permitted only when "a defendant's conduct 'violates a  
21 fundamental public policy of the state.'" Rattan v. United  
22 Servs. Auto. Assoc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 715, 720 (2000). In an  
23 analogous context, the California Court of Appeals has held that  
24 "the prompt payment of wages due an employee is a fundamental  
25 public policy" in California. Gould v. Md. Sound Indus., Inc.,  
26 31 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1142 (1995). The court observed,

27 Public policy has long favored the full and prompt  
28 payment of wages due an employee. Wages are not  
ordinary debts. Because of the economic position of

1 the average worker and, in particular, his family, it  
2 is essential to the public welfare that he receive his  
3 pay promptly. Thus, the prompt payment of wages serves  
4 society's interest through a more stable job market, in  
5 which its most important policies are safeguarded.

6 Id.

7 Under California law, sales commissions payable pursuant to  
8 a contract are "wages." CAL. LABOR CODE § 200(a) ("Wages'  
9 includes all amounts for labor performed by employees of every  
10 description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the  
11 standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method  
12 of calculation."). DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC,  
13 207 Cal.App.4th 800, 808 (2012) (citing CAL. LABOR CODE § 200);  
14 Steinhebel v. L.A. Times Commc'ns, LLC, 126 Cal.App.4th 696,  
15 704-05 (2005) (sales commissions are wages).

16 Here, the bankruptcy court found that Jenkins' actions in  
17 withholding the Four Commissions from Mitelhaus were intentional  
18 and malicious because they were "not authorized by contract or  
19 otherwise." Such withholding necessarily caused injury to  
20 Mitelhaus by depriving him of his compensation. Wilfully  
21 depriving Mitelhaus of his compensation, when Nutec had the  
22 ability to pay,<sup>10</sup> was a tortious act. In re Jercich, 238 F.3d at

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23 <sup>10</sup> Ramey testified that Nutec had the ability to pay  
24 Mitelhaus the Four Commissions at the time they were withheld  
25 from him:

26 Question: So there was no financial difficulty in  
27 paying Mr. Mitelhaus. It was being retained as a  
28 result of the lawsuit. . . .

Answer [Ramey]: I'm going to say due to the fact that  
it was 2005 and we were doing well, that yes, we did

(continued...)

1 1207.

2 The bankruptcy court's findings that Jenkins committed a  
3 willful and malicious injury to Mitelhaus by withholding the Four  
4 Commissions from him were not clearly erroneous, and thus, the  
5 bankruptcy court did not err in determining that the debt created  
6 by Jenkins' conduct was excepted from discharge under  
7 § 523(a)(6).

8 **III.**

9 **The arguments raised in the cross-appeal lack merit.**

10 In the cross-appeal, Mitelhaus asks us to review: (1) the  
11 bankruptcy court's refusal to enter a summary judgment; (2) the  
12 First Judgment and Amended Judgment because they did not include  
13 amounts claimed by Mitelhaus for the Nasr Commissions; (3) and  
14 the First Judgment and Amended Judgment because they did not deem  
15 Ramey liable for the debt excepted from discharge.

16 A. The bankruptcy court did not err in denying  
17 Mitelhaus' motion for summary judgment.

18 Mitelhaus appeals the bankruptcy court's denial of his  
19 motion for summary judgment, arguing that he established that the  
20 Award was excepted from discharge by virtue of the preclusive  
21 findings made by the arbitrator. In raising this issue,  
22 Mitelhaus apparently hopes to recover additional postpetition  
23 interest on the nondischargeable debt. Reviewing it de novo, we  
24 decline to disturb the bankruptcy court's decision.

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25 <sup>10</sup>(...continued)  
26 not have a hardship, as far as a money hardship, to  
27 pay.

28 Trial Tr. 151:13-24, October 2, 2013.

1 To determine the preclusive effect of a California state  
2 court's findings in a judgment or order, the bankruptcy court  
3 must first determine if issue preclusion is available under  
4 California preclusion law. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (the Full Faith and  
5 Credit Statute); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons,  
6 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). When state preclusion law controls,  
7 the discretion to apply the doctrine is exercised in accordance  
8 with state and federal law. Khaligh v. Hadegh (In re Khaligh),  
9 338 B.R. 817, 823 (9th Cir. BAP 2006), aff'd, 506 F.3d 956 (9th  
10 Cir. 2007).

11 Under California law, the party asserting issue preclusion  
12 has the burden of establishing the following "threshold"  
13 requirements for its availability:

14 First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation  
15 must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.  
16 Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the  
17 former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided  
18 in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former  
19 proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party  
20 against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in  
21 privity with, the party to the former proceeding.

22 Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.  
23 2001) (the "Harmon" factors). In addition to these five factors,  
24 "[t]here is an equitable component to [issue preclusion]."  
25 Direct Shopping Network v. James, 206 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1562  
26 (2012). In other words, even where the five Harmon factors are  
27 met, the doctrine is to be applied "only where such application  
28 comports with fairness and sound public policy." Smith v.

1 ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 153 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 (2007).

2 As discussed above, both § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) require a  
3 showing that a debtor had the intent to commit the wrongful act.  
4 The bankruptcy court reviewed the Award, which was later  
5 confirmed by the State Court Judgment, and determined that the  
6 arbitrator had not made the necessary findings concerning  
7 Jenkins' intent to support an exception to discharge under  
8 § 523(a)(4) or (a)(6). We agree with this conclusion.

9 Mitelhaus argues that the Award found the requisite bad  
10 intent was established when the arbitrator decided that "Jenkins  
11 orchestrated the plan to wrongfully withhold commissions from  
12 Plaintiff as part of a plan or scheme to deprive Plaintiff of  
13 those commissions without a lawful basis for doing so."  
14 Rejecting Mitelhaus' contention, the bankruptcy court determined  
15 that the arbitrator made this statement in the context of  
16 determining Jenkins' liability for the acts of Nutec, and was not  
17 making any determination regarding Jenkins' intent. The  
18 bankruptcy court did not err in interpreting this cryptic finding  
19 in the Award to be inadequate to establish that Jenkins acted  
20 with the kind of intent required to establish larceny,  
21 willfulness or maliciousness.

22 On cross-appeal, Mitelhaus also argues that the bankruptcy  
23 court erred by not giving preclusive effect to the amount of the  
24 State Court Judgment. In this argument, Mitelhaus apparently  
25 misapprehends the function of the bankruptcy judge in applying  
26 issue preclusion in the context of an exception to discharge  
27 action.

28 Bankruptcy courts "have exclusive jurisdiction to determine

1 dischargeability of debts under §§ 523(a)(2) (fraud and  
2 deception); (a)(4) (fiduciary fraud, embezzlement, or larceny);  
3 and (a)(6) (willful and malicious injury to person or property)."  
4 Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.  
5 2012); § 523(c)(1). The effect of this rule is that "the  
6 bankruptcy court is not confined to a review of the judgment and  
7 record in the prior state-court proceedings when considering the  
8 dischargeability of [a creditor's] debt." Brown v. Felsen,  
9 442 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1979). As the Ninth Circuit has  
10 instructed, "final judgments in state courts are not necessarily  
11 preclusive in United States bankruptcy courts." Sasson v.  
12 Sokoloff (In re Sasson), 424 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005). In  
13 other words, while all federal courts have "broad discretion" in  
14 a decision to apply issue preclusion based on a state court  
15 judgment, Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331  
16 (1979), that discretion is particularly expansive in exceptions  
17 to discharge under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4) and (a)(6). Rein v.  
18 Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2001)  
19 ("Bankruptcy Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over  
20 nondischargeability actions brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C.  
21 § 523(a)(2), (4), (6) and (15).").

22 Mitelhaus' position ignores that the Award and State Court  
23 Judgment established that Jenkins was indebted to Mitelhaus for  
24 multiple debts. Some of those debts, such as that for the Four  
25 Commissions, were caused by Jenkins' wrongful conduct that may be  
26 excepted from discharge. Other debts, including Jenkins'  
27 liability for the KS Lawsuit Fees, were not. That the bankruptcy  
28 court excluded the KS Lawsuit Fees awarded to Mitelhaus in the

1 State Court Judgment from the debts excepted from discharge was a  
2 legitimate exercise of its responsibility to examine the nature  
3 of each debt. Comer v. Comer (In re Comer), 723 F.2d 737, 740  
4 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a bankruptcy judge should not "rely  
5 solely on state court judgments when determining the nature of a  
6 debt for purposes of dischargeability, if doing so would prohibit  
7 the bankruptcy court from exercising its exclusive jurisdiction  
8 to determine dischargeability."). Consequently, the bankruptcy  
9 court did not err when it exercised its independent judgment and  
10 determined that the KS Lawsuit Fees were in the nature of a debt  
11 that would not be excepted from discharge.

12 B. The bankruptcy court did not err in excluding the KS  
13 Lawsuit Fees and the Nasr Commissions from the  
exception to discharge award.

14 In addition to arguing that the KS Lawsuit Fees should be  
15 excepted from discharge as part of the Award and State Court  
16 Judgment, on appeal Mitelhaus asserts that the KS Lawsuit Fees  
17 should be excepted from discharge because they were recoverable  
18 damages under the California "doctrine of the tort of another."

19 The tort of another doctrine holds that a person who  
20 through the tort of another has been required to act in  
21 the protection of his interests by bringing or  
22 defending an action against a third person is entitled  
to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary  
loss of time, attorney's fees, and other expenditures  
thereby suffered or incurred.

23 Prentice v. N. Am. Title Guar. Corp., 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (1963).

24 Mitelhaus reasons that the withholding of insurance premiums  
25 from Mitelhaus' compensation was a tort, and the costs of  
26 defending the KS Lawsuit were therefore recoverable tort damages.  
27 Of course, the sole basis for this conclusion was that the  
28 bankruptcy court found the withholding was a larceny excepted

1 under § 523(a)(4). As explained above, however, we conclude that  
2 the bankruptcy court erred in excepting the Flat Fee from  
3 discharge under § 523(a)(4) because it was not a larceny.

4 The bankruptcy court considered Mitelhaus' tort of another  
5 argument twice. In denying the reconsideration motion, the court  
6 explained its reasoning why the KS Lawsuit Fees were not excepted  
7 from discharge:

8 There was no showing that the KS [Lawsuit] Fees should  
9 be nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(4) or (a)(6).  
10 In making that determination, the Court considered all  
11 the evidence set forth at trial and concluded that  
12 Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the  
13 evidence that the wrongful taking of the errors and  
14 omissions insurance fees occurred prior to the  
15 initiation of the KS Action.

16 Amended Memorandum at 7.

17 The bankruptcy court determined in weighing of the evidence  
18 at trial that Mitelhaus had not established that Jenkins' alleged  
19 wrongful taking of the insurance premiums occurred before the  
20 KS Lawsuit Fees were incurred. We give deference to a trial  
21 court's findings after trial. Rule 8013; Cunning v. Rucker  
22 (In re Rucker), 570 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2009).

23 Consequently, the bankruptcy court did not err in determining  
24 that Mitelhaus had not established the necessary linkage between  
25 the alleged tort and the KS Lawsuit Fees and when it declined to  
26 hold those fees excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4) and  
27 (a)(6).

28 Curiously, the cross-appeal also targets the bankruptcy  
court's refusal to adjudge an exception to discharge for the Nasr  
Commissions. Of course, neither the Award nor the State Court  
Judgment awarded damages to Mitelhaus for the Nasr Commissions.

1 In fact, the Award notes that Mitelhaus had "waived" any right to  
2 payment for those commissions, finding that Mitelhaus "was ready,  
3 willing and able to walk away from the Nasr lease commissions and  
4 [Mitelhaus] never really wanted Nutec to pursue collection of  
5 this commission." Award at 86. Simply put, because Mitelhaus  
6 did not establish that Nutec and Jenkins were liable to him for  
7 the Nasr Commissions, the bankruptcy court could not err in  
8 declining to recognize a claim that Mitelhaus had abandoned  
9 before the bankruptcy was filed. Before a debt can be excepted  
10 from discharge, there must be a debt. In re Perkins, 216 B.R.  
11 220, 224 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).

12 In sum, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err in  
13 excluding from the exception to discharge the KS Lawsuit Fees and  
14 the Nasr Commissions.

15 C. The bankruptcy court did not err in deciding that  
16 Jenkins' bad intent cannot be imputed to Ramey.

17 In the arbitration proceedings, Mitelhaus argued that Ramey  
18 was also liable for his damages because she was the "alter ego"  
19 of Nutec. However, no argument was made that Ramey should be  
20 liable for the wrongful acts of Jenkins. The arbitrator found  
21 that Mitelhaus had not shown that Ramey was the alter ego of  
22 Nutec and declined to award any damages against her.

23 In the adversary proceeding, Mitelhaus shifted his attack on  
24 Ramey by contending that Jenkins' wrongful acts can be imputed to  
25 Ramey on the basis of their agent-principal relationship, relying  
26 on the Panel's decision in Tsurukawa v. Nikon Precision, Inc.  
27 (In re Tsurukawa), 287 B.R. 515 (9th Cir. BAP 2002). In its  
28 First Memorandum, the bankruptcy court correctly observed that

1 Tsurukawa examined the standard for imputation of fraud to a  
2 debtor for acts committed by a spouse for purposes of  
3 establishing fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy court  
4 therefore rejected Mitelhaus' Tsurukawa argument because, in this  
5 case, Mitelhaus had sought an exception to discharge solely under  
6 § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6), not (a)(2)(A).

7 On appeal, Mitelhaus contends that the Panel's recent  
8 decision in Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257, 271-72 (9th  
9 Cir. BAP 2014) (en banc) has "clarified" the application of the  
10 Tsurukawa standard. Although Mitelhaus may be correct that  
11 In re Huh refines and explains the standard applicable for  
12 imputation of a spouse's fraudulent acts to the debtor, that  
13 decision is clearly limited to claims for an exception to  
14 discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A):

15 More than a principal/agent relationship is required to  
16 establish a fraud exception to discharge. While the  
17 principal/debtor need not have participated actively in  
18 the fraud for the creditor to obtain an exception to  
19 discharge, the creditor must show that the debtor knew,  
20 or should have known, of the agent's fraud. Because  
this standard focuses on the culpability of the debtor,  
and not solely on the actions of the agent, we think it  
most properly comports with the recent holdings of the  
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit regarding discharge  
exceptions.

21 Id. at 271-72. There is no indication in In re Huh that the  
22 Panel intended its holding to impact the requirements for proving  
23 larceny or willful and malicious conduct under § 523(a)(4) or  
24 (a)(6), nor are we aware that any other court has applied  
25 In re Huh in such a manner.

26 As compared to § 523(a)(2)(A)'s focus on a debt "for fraud,"  
27 the malicious conduct standard in § 523(a)(6) examines only the  
28 debtor's conduct and state of mind. As we have previously held

1 in an unpublished decision cited by the bankruptcy court,

2 The Tsurukawa analysis is thus specific to fraud and to  
3 apply it to willful and malicious conduct is a quantum  
4 leap we are not prepared to make. The plain language  
5 of § 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a willful and  
6 malicious injury by the debtor to another entity. . . .  
7 We harken back to [Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,  
8 61-62 (1998)] where the Supreme Court, in the simplest  
9 terms, said a debtor must intend to injure the creditor  
10 before a claim is excepted from discharge based on  
11 malice. The Ninth Circuit in [Carillo v. Su  
(In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002)] has  
refined the willful prong to require the debtor to  
subjectively intend to inflict injury or to believe  
that injury is substantially certain to occur as a  
result of his conduct. . . . Behaviors and outcomes  
might be imputed, maybe even misrepresentations, but  
subjective thoughts cannot be. Under no accepted legal  
principles can subjective willfulness be rested upon  
Debtor.

12 Luc v. Chien (In re Chien), 2008 WL 8240422, at \*7 (9th Cir. BAP  
13 February 7, 2008). In re Huh did not vary this approach.

14 Here, while Mitelhaus argues that Ramey appeared to  
15 participate in some of Jenkins' decisions,<sup>11</sup> he never established  
16 that Ramey committed the acts with the requisite intent to  
17 inflict injury, or with the belief that injury was substantially  
18 certain to occur. Although under limited circumstances a  
19 spouse's fraud may be imputed to a debtor for § 523(a)(2)(A)  
20 purposes, a spouse's subjective malicious intent cannot be  
21 imputed to the debtor for § 523(a)(6) purposes.

22 The bankruptcy court did not err in deciding that Jenkins'  
23 bad acts could not be imputed to Ramey under § 523(a)(6).

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24  
25 <sup>11</sup> To be precise, there is no evidence in the record that  
26 Ramey significantly participated in Jenkins' decision to withhold  
27 the Four Commissions from Mitelhaus. Rather, as found by the  
28 arbitrator, Jenkins, as the broker, had the sole legal authority  
to supervise the business activities with regard to the payment  
of commissions. Award at 81.

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 We REVERSE the bankruptcy court's determination that  
3 Jenkins' debt to Mitelhaus for withholding the Four Commissions  
4 and the Flat Fee was excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4)  
5 for larceny. However, we AFFIRM the court's decision that these  
6 debts should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). In  
7 the cross-appeal, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court's decisions that  
8 Jenkins' debts for the KS Lawsuit Fees and the Nasr Commissions  
9 were not excepted from discharge, and that Jenkins' bad acts  
10 should not be imputed to Ramey under § 523(a)(6).