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	Date: 11/20/2008 _____
	Time: 9:00 a.m.
	Judge/Calendar: Hon. Chris Wickham _____

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR THURSTON COUNTY

DAROLD R. J. STENSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELDON VAIL, Secretary of Washington
Department of Corrections (in his official
capacity); *et al.*,

Defendants.

No. 08-2-02080-8

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

68695-0001/LEGAL14686575.3

COPY

Perkins Coie LLP
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4800
Seattle, WA 98101-3099
Phone: 206.359.8000
Fax: 206.359.9000

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I. RELIEF REQUESTED

Plaintiff Darold R. J. Stenson moves the Court under Washington Rule of Civil Procedure 65 for a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his execution while this litigation remains pending.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED

Mr. Stenson is incarcerated at the Washington State Penitentiary and has been sentenced to death. Mr. Stenson's execution was recently set for December 3, 2008.

Under Washington law, death sentences are carried out by "intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until the defendant is dead." RCW § 10.95.180(1). An inmate may elect death by hanging. *Id.* The statute prescribes no specific drugs, dosages, drug combinations or the manner of intravenous line access to be used in the execution process. In addition, the statute fails to prescribe any certification, training, or licensure required for those individuals who participate in the execution process.

In April 2008, the United States Supreme Court decided *Baze v. Rees*, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 170 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2008), in which the Court recognized for the first time that an inmate under a sentence of death can, under certain circumstances, prove that a state's lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. *Baze* requires courts to conduct a fact-based review of lethal-injection challenges under the Eighth Amendment. *Id.* at 1526 (Roberts, C.J., plurality); *id.* at 1556 (Stevens, J., concurring).¹

¹The Supreme Court recognized that the determination of whether a state's lethal injection protocol withstands constitutional scrutiny requires the trial court to conduct "extensive hearings" and fact-finding to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. *Id.* at 1526 (Roberts, C.J., plurality); *id.* at 1556 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts, writing the plurality opinion, phrased the

1 Though the Supreme Court found that Kentucky's procedures for carrying out lethal
2 injection survived constitutional scrutiny, the three-Justice plurality made clear that that
3 determination was reached only after (1) requiring discovery of Kentucky's procedure, both
4 as to its policy and how, in practice, Kentucky actually carried out lethal injection
5 executions; (2) examining Kentucky's procedure and hearing factual and expert testimony,
6 and (3) finding that Kentucky employed specific safeguards that minimized the risk of
7 maladministration of the death-causing drugs. These safeguards included, for example, a
8 minimum level of professional experience for individuals who insert intravenous ("IV")
9 catheters, a requirement that the lethal injection team regularly practice, a requirement of
10 backup IV lines and other redundancies, and the warden's presence in the execution
11 chamber to watch for signs of consciousness and IV problems, and to redirect, as necessary,
12 the flow of chemicals to the backup IV site if the inmate does not lose consciousness. *Id.* at
13 1533-34. Whether Washington's lethal injection statute, policy and procedures meet
14 minimum constitutional requirements set forth in *Baze* has never been fully litigated in
15 Washington, nor has the sufficiency of the same been tested against the Washington
16 Constitution, which affords greater protections than its federal counterpart.²

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33 Less than three weeks ago, on the eve of this Court's first scheduled hearing in this
34 action and evidently in response to this litigation, Defendants hurriedly modified their
35 execution policy (the twice such revision in the past sixteen months). DOC 490.200 ("2008
36 Policy"), filed as Attachment 1 to Reply to Resp. to Defs. Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs. Reply").
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42 inquiry as a determination of whether the "risk of pain from maladministration" of a lethal injection
43 protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. *Id.* at 1526.
44 ²Washington's prohibition on "cruel punishment" found in Article I, § 14 of the Washington
45 Constitution, provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment to the United States
46 Constitution. *E.g., State v. Morin*, 100 Wn. App. 25, 995 P.2d 113 (2000), *review denied*, 142 Wn.
47 2d 1010, 16 P.3d 1264.

1 Defendants followed no apparent administrative process, standards, or guidelines in
2 implementing this amended policy. They cited no statute that authorizes their spontaneous
3 policy modification. They gave no notice of their proposed modification—not to
4
5 Mr. Stenson or to anyone else.
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9 DOC's newest policy calls for the sequential administration of three drugs: sodium
10 thiopental (a general anesthetic), followed by pancuronium bromide (a paralytic agent),
11 followed by potassium chloride (a heart-attack-inducing agent). Other than identifying these
12 drugs and the sequence in which they are administered, the 2008 Policy fails to establish
13 requirements for critical components of how the execution process is to be carried out.
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17 Mr. Stenson seeks an order enjoining Defendants from carrying out his execution so
18 that the important and complicated constitutional issues raised by this lawsuit can be
19 thoroughly and adequately reviewed by Washington courts.
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24 25 **III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE**

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27 The following issue is presented for resolution by the Court: whether the Court
28 should grant Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction in order to undertake, for the
29 first time, a thorough review of Washington's execution protocol in light of recent changes
30 in federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent changes to DOC's execution policy
31 and so that the constitutionality of the statute, policy and procedure can be tested under the
32 Washington constitution as well.
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38 39 **IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY**

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41 Mr. Stenson seeks a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his
42 execution while this litigation remains pending. Unless this Court orders otherwise, his
43 execution will occur before a final judgment is issued in this case.
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1 **A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard**

2 The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights
3 of the parties can be fully and fairly litigated. *McLean v. Smith*, 4 Wn. App. 394, 482 P.2d
4 798 (1971); RCW § 7.40.020. To grant Mr. Stenson an injunction, this Court must balance
5 three factors: (1) whether he has a clear legal or equitable right; (2) whether he has a well
6 grounded fear of immediate invasion of his right; and (3) whether Defendants' acts
7 complained of will result in actual and substantial injury. *See, e.g., Nw. Gas Ass'n v. Wash.*
8 *Utils. & Transp. Comm'n*, 141 Wn. App. 98, 168 P.3d 443 (2007). These factors must be
9 balanced on a continuum, and the required showing of each factor varies "according to the
10 circumstances of the particular case." *Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co.*, 188 Wash.
11 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936); *see also Independent Living Ctr. of S. Calif., Inc. v. Shewry*, 543
12 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[i]njunctive relief is warranted when the party
13 requesting such relief demonstrates some combination of probable success on the merits and
14 the possibility of irreparable harm"); *Rabon v. City of Seattle*, 135 Wn. 2d 278, 284, 957
15 P.2d 621 (1998) ("[S]ince injunctions are within the equitable powers of the court, these
16 criteria must be examined in light of equity, including the balancing of the relative interests
17 of the parties and the interests of the public, if appropriate.")

18 Mr. Stenson meets completely the second and third factors. If an injunction is not
19 granted, he will be executed. Thus, the invasion of his right is as complete as it could be in
20 any case. For the same reason, the third factor, "actual and substantial injury," is also
21 certain. Thus, the only remaining factor to be considered is the likelihood of success on the
22 merits. Given that the invasion of rights and injury factors are certain to occur without a
23 preliminary injunction, the showing required for the likelihood of success on the merits is
24 consequentially less.

1 **B. *Baze* and Other Cases Have Recognized the Necessity of Granting Preliminary**
2 **Injunctions to Review State Lethal Injection Policy and Procedures**

3
4 *Baze* began as a state court declaratory action challenging Kentucky's lethal injection
5 protocols under state and federal constitutional provisions. In order to carefully consider the
6 "substantial issue" of the "constitutionality of Kentucky's manner and means of effecting
7 execution by lethal injection," the trial court granted a motion for temporary injunction
8 barring the execution of the plaintiffs in that case. *Baze v. Rees*, No. 04-CI-1094, at 4
9 (Franklin Circuit Court, Nov. 23, 2004) (attached as Exhibit 1). Other courts have similarly
10 issued preliminary injunctions or stays of executions in order to consider the
11 constitutionality of execution protocol. *See Missouri v. Middleton*, No. SC80941 (Mo.
12 Sept. 3, 2008) (attached as Exhibit 2); *Arizona v. Landrigan*, No. CR-90-0323-AP (Ariz.
13 Oct. 11, 2007) (attached as Exhibit 3) (granting Jack Harold Jones's motion to stay
14 execution); *Nooner v. Norris*, No. 5:06CV00110 (8th Cir. Oct. 11, 2007) (attached as
15 Exhibit 4); *Cooley v. Taft*, No. 2:04-cv-1156 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2008) (attached as
16 Exhibit 5) (granting Romell Broom's motion for preliminary injunction and staying his
17 execution) *Cooley v. Strickland*, No. 2:04-cv-1156 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2008) (attached as
18 Exhibit 6) (setting discovery deadlines and hearing for Kenneth Biros); *Jackson v. Taylor*,
19 No. 06-300-SLR (D. Del. May 9, 2006) (attached as Exhibit 7) (granting Robert Jackson's
20 motion for preliminary injunction); *Jackson v. Danberg*, No. 06-300-SLR (D. Del. June 27,
21 2008) (attached as Exhibit 8) (setting discovery deadlines and a hearing date).
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1 **C. Consideration of the Three Preliminary Injunction Factors Establishes the Need**
2 **for an Injunction in This Case**

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4 **1. Mr. Stenson Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits**

5 As part of deciding whether a party has a “clear legal or equitable right,” this Court
6 must examine the “likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits.” *Rabon v.*
7 *City of Seattle*, 135 Wn. 2d 278, 285, 957 P.2d 612, 623 (1998).
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10 For at least five reasons, Mr. Stenson is likely to prevail on his claim that DOC’s
11 2008 Policy is constitutionally inadequate under both the Washington and United States
12 constitutions and that the DOC exceeded its authority under Washington law when it
13 unilaterally promulgated its policy without pre- or post-enactment review: (1) contrary to
14 the command of *In re Powell*, 92 Wn. 2d 882, 891, 602 P.2d 711 (1979), *no* procedural
15 safeguards exist for promulgating or testing the constitutionality of this hastily-enacted
16 policy; (2) the 2008 Policy, as written, violates Article I, § 14 of the Washington
17 Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the 2008
18 Policy, as carried out in practice, poses a significant and constitutionally intolerable risk of
19 violating Article I, § 14 of the Washington Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the
20 United States Constitution; (4) the due process clauses of the Washington and United States
21 constitutions require that Mr. Stenson receive notice of precisely how Washington intends to
22 execute him to ensure that the process does not run afoul of Article I, § 14 of the
23 Washington Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and
24 (5) no statute delegates to DOC the authority to establish and implement Washington’s
25 execution policy.
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a. **The 2008 Policy, as written, violates the Washington and United States constitutions**

Even a cursory comparison of Washington's 2008 Policy with the Kentucky's protocol examined in *Baze* confirms that the Policy contains few of the safeguards the Supreme Court relied on to uphold the Kentucky protocols. *See Baze*, 128 S. Ct. at 1537; *compare* 2008 Policy at 8-9 with 2004 Kentucky Execution Protocol and Revisions, attached as Exhibit 9.

Like Kentucky, Washington administers three drugs sequentially: sodium thiopental (a general anesthetic), followed by pancuronium bromide (a paralytic agent), followed by potassium chloride (a heart-attack-inducing agent). *Baze* acknowledged that maladministration of the first drug would cause constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation and pain: "*It is uncontested that failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental that could render a person unconscious, there is a substantial constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of potassium chloride.*" *Baze*, 128 S. Ct. at 1533. The question then, is whether the state protocol contains sufficient safeguards such that there is not a substantial risk of maladministration. *Id.*

Unlike Kentucky, Washington lacks any substantial safeguards to prevent maladministration of the drugs and has no contingency plan for dealing with the known, foreseeable and serious complications that can arise during a lethal injection execution. For instance, the 2008 Policy does not require that a properly-trained individual monitor Mr. Stenson to ensure that he is properly sedated prior to the administration of the lethal chemicals pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Instead it generally provides that Superintendent, a person not required to possess any medical training, will "observe"

1 Mr. Stenson “for signs of consciousness.” 2008 Policy at 9. Moreover, the 2008 Policy
2 does not account for the dangers of IV problems, including infiltration, nor provide for
3 certain other protective redundancies that will ensure an adequate dose of sodium pentothal
4 is delivered. If an insufficient dosage of sodium pentothal is delivered—a foreseeable
5 occurrence given the inadequacy of the Policy—Mr. Stenson could regain consciousness
6 and experience both conscious suffocation induced by pancuronium bromide and the
7 excruciatingly painful burning sensation induced by potassium chloride. As the Supreme
8 Court has explained, the risk of this occurring is constitutionally impermissible. *See Baze*,
9 128 S. Ct. at 1523.
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19 Moreover, the Policy does not describe the manner and means by which DOC
20 intends to access Mr. Stenson’s veins. DOC concedes that its policy leaves it free to choose
21 any method of IV access, including the highly invasive “cut down” procedure, *i.e.*,
22 surgically exposing the vein, inserting a catheter and closing the skin with suturing. *See*
23 *Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 641-42, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004)
24 (describing cut down procedure and noting expert testimony that “the cut down is a
25 dangerous and antiquated medical procedure to be performed only by a trained physician in
26 a clinical environment with the patient under deep sedation”). The use of the “cut down”
27 procedure was challenged in *Baze*. During discovery, Kentucky agreed to remove this
28 procedure from its protocol. *Baze v. Rees*, No. 04-CI-1094, at n.7 (Franklin Circuit Court,
29 July 8, 2005); *see also Nelson*, 541 U.S. at 646 (noting that during oral argument the state
30 agreed not to use the cut-down procedure unless actually necessary). The DOC implicitly
31 conceded in its briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that the Policy does not bar this
32 method of IV access or stipulate that, if used, a member of the execution team be medically
33 qualified and capable of performing this painful surgical procedure. *See Defs. Reply* at 5.
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1 In addition, DOC appears free to insert the IV lines into the neck by use of the carotid artery
2 or the jugular vein, a procedure found to cause “substantial and unnecessary risks” by the
3 trial court in *Baze*.³ *Baze v. Rees*, No. 04-CI-1094, at 8 (Franklin Cir. Ct., July 8, 2005).
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6 The Policy gives no details on the flow of drugs through the lines, including whether
7 and how long the injection team will wait before administering each subsequent chemical, or
8 what happens if a malfunction occurs. It fails to describe how Washington will save
9 Mr. Stenson’s life if a last-minute stay is granted and does not require the presence of
10 appropriate equipment or properly-trained personnel who can revive Mr. Stenson between
11 administration of each drug should such a stay be granted.
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18 Washington’s Policy is plainly inadequate when compared to the protocols approved
19 in *Baze*. As described below, these obvious deficiencies unnecessarily increase the risk that
20 lethal injection, as administered, will cause Mr. Stenson to suffer unnecessary and severe
21 pain.
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27 **b. The significant risk of maladministration of DOC’s execution**
28 **protocol violates the Washington and United States constitutions**
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30 Even if Washington’s Policy was similar to the protocol examined by the United
31 States Supreme Court in *Baze*—and it is not—there is an unacceptable likelihood that the
32 Policy will be administered improperly and cause Mr. Stenson to suffer excruciating and
33 constitutionally impermissible pain.
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37 *Baze* requires courts to conduct a fact-based review of lethal-injection challenges
38 under the Eighth Amendment. *Baze*, 128 S. Ct. at 1556. The numerous opinions making up
39 the majority agree that “evidence adduced by [a] petitioner” will in certain circumstances
40 render a state’s protocol unconstitutional. *Id.* Similarly, the plurality observes that in the
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47 ³ Kentucky did not challenge this finding of fact.

1 absence of “extensive hearings,” it will be difficult to determine whether the “risk of pain
2 from maladministration” of lethal-injection protocols is sufficient to trigger Eighth
3 Amendment protections. *Id.* at 1526 (Roberts, C.J., plurality).
4

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6 The Court identified no less than seven safeguards that, taken together, caused the
7 Court to rule that Kentucky’s protocol avoided the risk that persons will suffer severe and
8 unnecessary pain while being executed, including requiring experienced team members,
9 regular practice, primary and backup IV lines, two sets of lethal injection drugs, precise
10 timeframes for establishing IV lines, personal monitoring of the inmate’s condition, and
11 explicit alternative instructions in the event of the failure of the chemicals.
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14 Because of the woeful lack of guidance provided in the written protocol and apparent
15 absence of any other instructions, procedures or requirements to provide guidance and
16 establish minimum standards, it is likely that DOC’s application of the Policy, as applied,
17 will create a substantial risk of severe and unnecessary pain. This is especially true where,
18 as here, the protocol was just recently and hastily assembled and the DOC has had no time
19 to assure that it can meet the few new requirements it has now included in the protocol.
20 Further, as other courts have found when they actually required discovery and examined
21 what was happening in practice, the actual practice did not mirror the written procedures.
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23 *See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton*, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (N. D. Cal. 2006).
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37 **c. DOC exceeded its jurisdiction when it established and modified**
38 **the execution policy without any review or oversight of their**
39 **actions**

40 Defendants’ may not establish and implement a lethal injection policy (1) without a
41 legislative grant of authority, (2) without standards or guidelines from the Legislature to
42 guide their actions and (3) that permits no review or oversight of their actions. *In re Powell*,
43 92 Wn. 2d 882, 891, 602 P.2d 711 (1979). Washington law protects against precisely the
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1 “unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power” by administrative agencies that DOC
2 exercised here. *Id.* In order for the legislature to permissibly delegate authority to a state
3 administrative body, it must satisfy a two-part test:
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7 First, the legislature must provide standards or guidelines
8 which indicate in general terms what is to be done and the
9 administrative body which is to do it Second, adequate
10 procedural safeguards must be provided, in regard to the
11 Procedure for promulgation of the rules *and for testing the*
12 *constitutionality of the rules after promulgation.* Such
13 safeguards can ensure that administratively promulgated rules
14 and standards are as a Subject to public scrutiny and judicial
15 review as are standards established and statues passed by the
16 legislature.

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18 *Id.* at 891 (citation omitted; emphasis added). In *Powell* the court held that a legislative
19 delegation of authority to the State Board of Pharmacy to promulgate emergency regulations
20 without public notice was an unlawful delegation of authority.
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23 Defendants’ policymaking here meets no prong of the *Powell* test. First, there is no
24 statute identifying DOC as “the administrative body” to establish and implement the
25 procedures by which lethal injection will be administered. DOC’s policy cites
26 RCW §§ 10.95.160-190 as the sole authority for its power to establish and implement its
27 policy. 2008 Policy at 2. But RCW § 10.95.180, which authorizes the two modes of
28 execution permitted in this state, only provides that the superintendent will “supervise” the
29 execution. Nor is there any statute providing “standards or guidelines”—even in “general
30 terms”—about “what is to be done.” *Powell*, 92 Wn. 2d at 891. RCW § 10.95.180 provides
31 only that “[t]he punishment of death shall be supervised by the superintendent of the
32 penitentiary . . .” and that the punishment “shall be carried out within the walls of the state
33 penitentiary.”⁴ There is no express delegation to DOC, or to any administrative body, to
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46 ⁴ RCW § 10.95.160 sets out procedures for trial courts to issue death warrants.
47 RCW § 10.95.170 directs where and when a death sentenced prisoner shall be incarcerated. RCW

1 establish execution procedures. There are certainly no standards or guidelines to direct the
2 establishment or implementation of a policy.
3

4 Nor does DOC meet the second prong of the *Powell* test. RCW § 10.95.180
5 provides *no safeguards*, much less “adequate procedural safeguards,” for how to establish
6 and implement execution procedures. *Powell*, 92 Wn.2d at 891. Nor has the Legislature
7 provided adequate procedural safeguards “for testing the constitutionality of the policy”
8 after promulgation. *Id.* To the contrary, DOC contends that review of its policy is
9 impermissible. Where, as here, a state administrative body issues rules or policy (1) without
10 an express delegation of authority, (2) without legislative guidance on standards and
11 guidelines to be followed, and (3) *with no mechanism for review*, that policy cannot be
12 enforced. It is simply untenable that Defendants would so quickly rush to amend and
13 modify a process that must meet state and federal constitutional standards *without any*
14 *review, oversight or process.*
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27 **d. Stenson has a due process right to discover if DOC’s of execution**
28 **protocols violates the Washington and United States constitutions**
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30 Because *Baze* requires a fact intensive inquiry, Mr. Stenson must have an
31 opportunity to discover precisely how Washington intends to administer its execution
32 Policy. *See, e.g., Stewart v. LaGrand*, 526 U.S. 115, 119, 119 S. Ct. 1018, 143 L.Ed.2d 196
33 (1999) (holding that inmates facing the death penalty are entitled to notice when there has
34 been a post-conviction change in mode of execution).
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39 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s
40 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protect an inmate from being executed based
41 on secret information. *Gardner v. Florida*, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977); *Simmons v. South*
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44 § 10.95.190 directs the persons permitted to attend executions and places specific limits on numbers
45 of persons and timing for designating the same.
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1 *Carolina*, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). Surely, if an inmate cannot be sentenced to death based on
2 secret information, then likewise, he cannot be executed under a secret procedure that the
3 condemned inmate had no notice of or opportunity to challenge.
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6 Mr. Stenson is not in a position to confirm that DOC has the safeguards required
7 under the Eighth Amendment or the Washington Constitution to prevent severe and
8 unnecessary pain. For instance, the Supreme Court acknowledged that an improper dose of
9 sodium thiopental would create a “substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of
10 suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of
11 potassium chloride.” *Baze*, 128 S. Ct. at 1523. Nothing in the Policy or the documents
12 received by plaintiff’s counsel from DOC pursuant to a public disclosure request prevents
13 this risk.
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22 The most that can be discerned from reviewing Washington’s protocols is that it
23 omits many of the safeguards that salvaged Kentucky’s protocols. Discovery will be
24 necessary to determine whether Washington has supplemented its written policy with any
25 informal or oral instruction or training that could provide the meaningful safeguards to
26 reduce the risk of excruciating pain during the administration of lethal injection drugs.
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33 **2. Mr. Stenson Has a Well Grounded-Fear That Defendants Will Schedule
34 and Carry Out His Execution**
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36 Mr. Stenson’s execution has been set for December 3, 2008. He has a well-grounded
37 fear that Defendants will carry out his execution if this Court does not enjoin them from
38 doing so in order to consider the merits of this action.
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42 **3. If Defendants Schedule or Effect Stenson’s Execution, He Will Suffer an
43 Actual and Substantial Injury**
44

45 Mr. Stenson will be executed if an injunction is not granted—quite possibly enduring
46 excruciating agony. Any final judgment that DOC’s Policy is constitutionally deficient
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1 would be rendered completely meaningless should Mr. Stenson be executed before
2 judgment. Mr. Stenson will suffer the ultimate “actual and substantial” injury.
3

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5 In order to preserve the parties’ and the Court’s ability to reach the merits of this
6 claim without a pending execution lurking in the background, and to ensure that any final
7 judgment is not rendered ineffectual by the irreparable injury of Mr. Stenson’s execution,
8 this Court should grant Mr. Stenson a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from
9 carrying out Mr. Stenson’s execution. *See Wainwright v. Booker*, 473 U.S. 935 n.1 (1985)
10 (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that a prisoner facing execution will suffer irreparable
11 injury if the stay is not granted). The hardship to the defendants if an injunction is granted is
12 minimal.
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21 **D. The Public Interest In and Importance Of Evaluating the Constitutionality of**
22 **the Policy Surpass Any Interest in Quickly Scheduling and Carrying Out**
23 **Mr. Stenson’s Execution**
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25 Granting Mr. Stenson a preliminary injunction barring Washington from carrying out
26 his execution during the pendency of this litigation merely preserves the status quo for only
27 as long as necessary to litigate the merits of Mr. Stenson’s substantial claims.
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30 Moreover, an injunction will do no harm to Defendants because if they prevail on the
31 merits of the litigation, they will be able to execute Mr. Stenson as soon as they wish. All
32 Mr. Stenson seeks is a death in “accord with the dignity of man, which is the basic concept
33 underlying the Eighth Amendment.” *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S. Ct. 2909,
34 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976).
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40 This is the first challenge focusing exclusively on lethal injection to be considered by
41 Washington state courts since *Baze* was decided seven months ago. States confronted with
42 challenges to the constitutionality of their execution protocols postponed executions to
43 ensure that death sentences were not carried out in an unconstitutional manner. *See supra*, at
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1 4-5 (identifying cases in which courts stayed executions in order to consider the merits of
2 similar lethal injection challenges). As the court observed in *Baze* when granting a
3 preliminary injunction so the plaintiffs could pursue their lethal injection challenge: “The
4 public interest is best served when the [state] presents and explains its position on the
5 manner and means. Thereafter, the citizens of Kentucky can be assured that their
6 government’s duty and responsibility of enforcing a death sentence is being administered in
7 a constitutionally proper manner.” *Baze v. Rees*, No. 04-CI-1094, at n.7 (Franklin Circuit
8 Court, Nov. 23, 2004).
9

10 This is an important issue that the courts of this state should address. If a
11 preliminary injunction is not granted, Mr. Stenson will effectively be precluded from
12 bringing this challenge, the DOC will continue to employ a constitutionally inadequate
13 lethal injection policy, and Washington executions will continue to skirt the Eighth and
14 Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Washington Constitution. The Court should require
15 that Defendants address the concerns raised by Mr. Stenson.
16

17 V. CONCLUSION

18 The factors that the Court considers in determining whether to issue a preliminary
19 injunction weigh heavily in favor of granting an injunction in this matter. In order to give
20 careful scrutiny to the constitutional claims presented, Mr. Stenson respectfully requests that
21 this Court grant a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from scheduling or carrying out
22 his execution until the conclusion of this litigation.
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DATED: November 13th, 2008

PERKINS COIE LLP

By: *Elizabeth D. Gaukroger*
Sherilyn Peterson, WSBA No. 11713
SPeterson@perkinscoie.com
Elizabeth D. Gaukroger, WSBA No. 38896
EGaukroger@perkinscoie.com

1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4800
Seattle, WA 98101-3099
Telephone: 206.359.8000
Facsimile: 206.359.9000

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this the 13th day of November, 2008, I hereby caused a true and correct copy of the above foregoing document PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, NOTE FOR MOTION, and PROPOSED ORDER to be served by hand-delivery on the following counsel of record:

Robert M. McKenna
Attorney General
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
John J. Samson
Sara J. Olson
Assistant Attorneys General
Corrections Division
1125 Washington Street SE
Olympia, WA 98504-0116
Telephone: (360) 586-1145



Tabitha L. Moe

Exhibit 1

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION I
CASE NO. 04-CI-1094

RALPH BAZE
and
THOMAS C. BOWLING

PLAINTIFFS

v.

JOHN D. REES, Commissioner
Kentucky Department of Corrections
and
GLEN HAEBERLIN, Warden
Kentucky State Penitentiary
and
HON. ERNIE FLETCHER, Governor
Commonwealth of Kentucky

DEFENDANTS

ENTERED
NOV 23 2004
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
JANICE MARSHALL, CLERK

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's, Thomas Bowling, motion for a temporary injunction. The Plaintiff and Co-Plaintiff, Ralph Baze, have each been convicted of murder and have been sentenced to death under the laws of the Commonwealth. Plaintiff Bowling's execution by lethal injection is scheduled for November 30, 2004, under a warrant requested by the Attorney General on October 12, 2004, and signed by the Governor on November 8, 2004.

Bowling asks this Court for a temporary injunction barring his execution until his remaining claim in this pending case (filed August 9, 2004) is adjudicated. Plaintiffs'

remaining claim does not ask that their convictions or death sentences be set aside.¹ Rather, the claim challenges the Commonwealth's protocol for executions by lethal injection, saying it is inadequate, lacks appropriate safeguards and execution under the current protocol will subject them to cruel or unusual punishment, prohibited by the Kentucky and United States Constitutions.

The Defendants, the Commissioner of Corrections, the Kentucky State Penitentiary Warden, and the Governor of the Commonwealth, respond with a Motion for Summary Judgment saying there is no genuine issue of material fact which exists, CR 56.02, and the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, CR 12.02(f). In sum, the Defendants are asking this Court to decide this case on its merits or lack of merit as found in the pleadings and proof already taken.

DISCUSSION

I. The Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Injunction

A temporary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy," tempered by the "equities of the situation," determined within the "sound discretion of the court," and by using the elements of CR 65.04. *Maupin v. Stansbury*, Ky. App., 575 S.W.2d 695 (1978). The Court of Appeals, in *Maupin*, said the application for temporary injunctive relief is viewed on three levels (a "three-part test," as restated by the Supreme Court in *Sturgeon Mining Company, Inc. v. Whymore Coal Company, Inc.*, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 591, 592 (1995)). The first level or predicate, also found in CR 65.04, is the showing of

¹ As of the date of this Order, Governor Fletcher has not signed a warrant of execution on the Plaintiff Ralph Baze.

irreparable harm.² The second predicate is weighing the equities involved. The last level requires that a “substantial question is at issue.” *Maupin*, 575 S.W.2d at 699. The Court must find all three predicates before a temporary injunction will be issued.

The “clearest example of irreparable injury is where it appears that the final judgment would be rendered completely meaningless should the probable harm alleged occur” before the determination of the matter in issue. *Id.* at 698. In this case the irreparable injury is death. Obviously a possible remedial final judgment, entered after the execution, is meaningless to the Plaintiff.

The second predicate involves equity. The Plaintiffs argue there is no detriment to the public interest; no harm to the Defendants and the injunction would merely maintain the status quo, not change the conviction or sentence. A brief delay, during which the status quo is maintained and necessitated by the need for this Court to consider this pending constitutional challenge, is not harm to the Commonwealth.

The United States Supreme Court, in the recently decided case of *Nelson v. Campbell*, 124 S.Ct. 2117 (2004), recognized a challenge to a particular aspect of a state’s lethal injection protocol under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but said “the mere fact that an inmate states a cognizable §1983 claim does not warrant the entry of a stay as a matter of right.” *Nelson*, 124 S.Ct. at 2125-26. More particularly the Supreme Court said, “[g]iven the State’s significant interest in enforcing its criminal judgments there is a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.” *Id.* at 2126. This Court does not find that the Plaintiffs filed this action in order to delay

² CR 65.04 provides that a temporary injunction is authorized “if it is clearly shown...that the movant’s rights are violated or will be violated...and the movant will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage pending a final judgment in the action.”

the execution. Before the suit was filed both the Plaintiffs had requested the protocol through Open Records. When this suit was filed there was no signed death warrant and the Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was pending.³ Prior to this action, the Commonwealth had never disclosed its manner or means for lethal injections even though this method of execution had been previously used.⁴ Only during the recent discovery process has the protocol been disclosed and future discovery will reveal if the protocol has been in flux even after this action was filed.

As stated before, the ultimate issue is not if or when the execution will be administered or the method, but how. The public interest is best served when the Commonwealth presents and explains its position on the manner and means. Thereafter, the citizens of Kentucky can be assured that their government's duty and responsibility of enforcing a death sentence is being administered in a constitutionally proper manner. Equity favors the Plaintiffs.

While this Court will not presently render a decision on the merits of Plaintiffs' challenge to the protocol, the Court concludes that the last predicate of the *Maupin* test has been met. The substantial issue is the constitutionality of Kentucky's manner and means of effecting execution by lethal injection.

II. The Defendants' Motion for a Summary Judgment

Defendants' motion for summary Judgment requests this Court decide the matter on the pleadings and record as presented. Even on an expedited basis the requested

³ The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was denied October 4, 2004.


⁴ Interestingly, a number of states' protocols are on the Internet or otherwise publicly available.

decision may possibly still be under consideration after the date scheduled for the Plaintiff's execution. Therefore, in addition to the reasons articulated above, the Defendants' motion for a summary judgment requires additional time past November 30.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff Bowling's motion for a temporary injunction is GRANTED. The Defendant, Warden Glen Haeberlin, is enjoined from enforcing the Governor's order of execution of Plaintiff Thomas Bowling until the issue raised in the Plaintiffs' pleadings has been decided on its merits.

SO ORDERED, this 23 day of November 2004



Roger L. Crittenden, Judge
Franklin Circuit Court

DISTRIBUTION:

Hon. David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204

Hon. Jeff Middendorf
Department of Corrections
Office of Legal Services
Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
2439 Lawrenceburg Road
P.O. Box 2400
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-2400

Hon. Theodore S. Shouse
Assistant Public Advocate
207 Parker Drive, Suite 1
LaGrange, Kentucky 40031

Exhibit 2

