No. 18-17436, 18-17274

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT, *et al.*

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, et al.

Defendants-Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF OF PETER KEISLER, STUART GERSON, CARTER PHILLIPS, JOHN BELLINGER III, SAMUEL WITTEN, RAY LAHOOD, BRACKETT DENNISTON, STANLEY TWARDY, AND RICHARD BERNSTEIN AS *AMICI CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

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INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici include lawyers who worked in the executive branch of the Department of Justice during Republican administrations, including two former acting Attorneys General, former Republican elected official, and others. *See* Appendix A. *Amici* have an interest in seeing that, based on plain statutory text and neutral principles of construction, the Attorney General's regulation, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018), is not allowed improperly to shift governmental authority over asylum from Congress to the executive branch. All parties have consented to the filing of this *amici* brief.[1] *Amici* speak only for themselves personally, not for any entity or other person. *Amici* filed a similar brief in the Supreme Court before that Court denied a stay of the preliminary injunction.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici leave to the parties the issue of the binding effect of the Court's prior decision in this case, and write only to explain why

[1] No party's counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or party's counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. No person—other than the *amici curiae*, its members, or its counsel—contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.

Judge Bybee's statutory holding was correct. First, the plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158 bars this asylum ban. The government argues that subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) authorizes the Attorney General by regulation to suspend asylum for aliens who cross the southern border of the United States outside a designated port of arrival. But subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) authorizes a regulation only if it is "consistent with this section." Because of this consistency requirement, the government is simply wrong that 1158(a) and (b) should each be read as "separate subsections." Gov't Br. at 37. Pursuant to the express words of 1158(b)(2)(C), the subsections are intertwined. The entire section of 1158 begins with the command that "[a]ny alien" who crosses any border outside "a designated port of arrival . . . may apply for asylum . . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General's regulation is inconsistent with this statutory mandate that asylum is not categorically precluded by entry outside a designated port of arrival. *See* Section I, *infra*. That should be the end of the matter.

Second, and independently, under the government's interpretation of section 1158, Congress (a) opened the door for potential asylum for those who entered outside a designated port of

arrival, while (b) simultaneously authorizing the Attorney General to weld that door shut at any time—for even the most deserving potential asylees—precisely because entry occurred outside a designated port of arrival. Even assuming that section 1158 were ambiguous, each of three canons of statutory construction renders the government's interpretation wrong and unreasonable: (A) The government's interpretation would use an ancillary provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C), to reverse a fundamental detail of the regulatory scheme. *See* Section II.A, *infra*. (B) The government's interpretation would improperly delegate from Congress to an agency a decision that has been of enormous political significance for decades—what privileges and rights to recognize for aliens who cross the southern border illegally. *See* Section II.B, *infra*. (C) The government's interpretation would extraordinarily delegate to the Attorney General an unlimited authority effectively to suspend 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), a part of a duly enacted statute. *See* Section II.C, *infra*.

The plain statutory text and applicable canons of statutory construction independently render the government's interpretation untenable. Accordingly, there is no need for any judicial evaluation of

the wisdom or efficacy of this administration's asylum policy choices, or whether they would abate or cause a "crisis."

ARGUMENT

Amici leave to the parties the issue of the binding effect of the Court's prior decision in this case, and write only to explain why Judge Bybee's statutory holding was correct.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) provides that "[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum." Subsection 1158(b) addresses "conditions for granting asylum." In particular, subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) provides the Attorney General with the limited authority to "by regulation establish additional limitations and conditions, *consistent with this section*, under which an alien shall be ineligible for asylum under paragraph [(b)](1)." (Emphasis added.) The issue addressed by this brief is whether it is "consistent with this section," including 1158(a)(1), for the Attorney General by regulation to ban asylum categorically for all aliens who cross the southern border at a place outside a designated port of arrival.

This Court should affirm based on the plain statutory text and applicable canons of statutory construction. These sources independently confirm that Judge Bybee's opinion for the majority of the Ninth Circuit's motions panel was correct and the government's proposed statutory interpretation is wrong. A preliminary injunction is in the public interest because it prevents the executive branch from violating a duly enacted statute.

I. THE PLAIN MEANING OF 8 U.S.C. 1158 RENDERS THE REGULATION INVALID.

The plain meaning of subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) permits the Attorney General to adopt a regulation only if it is "consistent with this section." This ~~"section" means~~ ~~the~~ entirety of section 1158, including subparagraph 1158(a)(1)'s statutory mandate that asylum is not precluded when an alien crosses a border outside "a designated port of arrival." A regulation under subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) cannot countermand that clear policy choice embodied in 1158(a)(1).

The government argues that 1158(b) and 1158(a) are "separate subsections," with (b) being the exclusive provision pertinent to permissible categorical regulations that deny asylum. Gov't Br. at 37. But that position contradicts the express language of 1158(b)(2)(C)'s

requirement that any regulation must be "consistent with this section." The government's argument would rewrite that provision, instead, to require consistency only with "this subsection." But that is not the word used in 1158(b)(2)(C). Congress knew how to say "subsection," which it did in other provisions of the INA. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152(a)(4)(B)(ii), 1152(a)(4)(C)(i)–(ii), 1152(a)(4)(D), 1152(a)(5)(B). *Cf.* 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B) (using "subparagraph"). Neither agencies nor courts may import into one provision of an immigration statute a word used only in other provisions. *Kucana v. Holder*, 558 U.S. 233, 248–49 (2010) (applying this principle to the word "regulations").

Likewise, Congress had many other means if it wanted to delegate to the Attorney General authority to adopt a regulation that suspends asylum for those entering this country outside "a designated port of arrival." For example, it could have readily included a "notwithstanding" clause in subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C), thus indicating that consistency with subparagraph 1158(a)(1) was not required. In stark contrast to the language used here, "[d]rafters often use *notwithstanding* in a catchall provision." A. Scalia & B. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* at 127 (2012)

(emphasis in original). Other INA provisions that are inapplicable to this case begin: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . ." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182e(a), 1182f. Subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) does not. The government's interpretation would improperly rewrite subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) to add the "notwithstanding" language that Congress omitted. *See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 138 S. Ct. 816, 824 (2018) (narrow construction of one provision based, in part, on statute's use of "[n]otwithstanding" only in a different provision).

Alternatively, Congress could have omitted a consistency requirement from subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) altogether. Rather, Congress enacted "consistent with this section" as words that limit the Attorney General's authority to issue a regulation. Such "limiting provisions . . . are no less a reflection of the genuine 'purpose' of the statute than the operative provisions, and it is not the court's function to alter the legislative compromise." Scalia & Garner, *supra*, at 21 (citing Supreme Court cases). Even when a court or agency is understandably "anxi[ous] to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, [a court] must take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop."

F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (quotations and citation omitted).

The government's brief at 36–41 argues that because "the six statutory bars on asylum eligibility set forth in § 1158(b)(2)(A)" apply to applicants for asylum who crossed the border outside a designated port of arrival, a regulation issued under subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) permissibly "operates the same way." Gov't Br. at 38. This argument ignores the critical differences between the text of subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(A) and the text of subparagraph (b)(2)(C). To start, in subparagraph (b)(2)(A), the statute itself "specifies," Gov't Br. at 38, the six statutory bars that preclude an alien from obtaining asylum, such as participation in persecution. None of (b)(2)(A)'s six statutory bars precludes asylum based on the location of arrival.

Most important, there is no limiting language in (b)(2)(A) that any of its six specific bars applies only when "consistent with this section." This omission of this limiting phrase makes sense because in subparagraph (b)(2)(A) it is the statute itself that specifies the particular bars. In contrast, subparagraph (b)(2)(C) confers authority on the Attorney General to "by regulation establish additional

limitations and conditions" but *only if these* are "consistent with this section." Accordingly, the statute's text makes plain that, unlike (b)(2)(A)'s statutory bars, any regulation under subparagraph (b)(2)(C) must be consistent with 1158(a)(1)—including that entry outside a "designated port of arrival" provides no basis for a categorical ban.

The government argues that recent increases in "illegal crossing" justify a regulation categorically barring asylum because the president has proclaimed an "ongoing crisis amidst sensitive diplomatic negotiations." Gov't Br. at 42–43. As noted in *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), however, the Supreme Court has never read a president's statutory authority to bar entry by proclamation to allow the government to "override particular provisions of the INA" that, like §1158(a)(1) and 1158(b)(2)(C), address a given issue. *Id.* at 2411. The proclamation does not and cannot change the limiting language in 1158(a) and (b).

1158(a)(1)'s all-encompassing words—"any alien who . . . arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) . . . may apply for asylum"—leave no room for a categorical exception based on heightened entry outside designated ports of arrival,

whether or not the President proclaims that the heightened illegal entry is a "crisis." When Congress enacted section 1158 in 1996 as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-691 to 692, Congress knew how to enact a provision that expressly allowed additional and different executive actions in response to "high illegal entry." *See* IIRIRA § 102(a) (authorizing "additional physical barriers and roads . . . in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States"). 110 Stat. 3009-554. *See also id.* § 101(a) (authorizing deployment of additional border patrol agents among INS sectors "in proportion to the level of illegal crossing of the borders of the United States measured in each sector . . . ."). In contrast, section 1158(a)(1) comprehensively rejects using arrival outside a designated port of arrival as the basis for a categorical ban on asylum in all circumstances, which include high illegal entry. Section 1158(b)(2)(C) in turn requires consistency with 1158(a)(1).

Congress also limited when diplomacy enables a ban on a category of asylum applicants. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) permits a ban only for aliens removable "pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral

agreement" with another country or countries, and even then only when several additional requirements are met. (Emphasis added). "[D]iplomatic negotiations," Gov't Br. at 42–43, are not the "agreement" that 1158(a)(2) requires. Subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) cannot be the basis for a regulation that bans asylum for those entering outside a designated port of arrival during "diplomatic negotiations." This is because that subparagraph requires that any valid regulation must be "consistent with this section," including the limits in 1158(a)(1) *and* (2).[2]

The government cites two cases from before the IIRIRA's enactment of section 1158. Neither provides any basis to depart from the plain text of section 1158. The regulation in *Komarenko v. I.N.S.*, 35 F.3d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1994) denied "asylum to all aliens who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes," *id.*—in that case, assault with a deadly weapon. *Komarenko* had nothing to do with the location of an alien's entry.

[2] The Government's isolated, undeveloped reference to 8 U.S.C § 1158(d)(5)(B), Gov't Br. at 35, adds nothing. 1158(d)(5)(B) permits only a regulation that is "not inconsistent with this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) is part of "this chapter."

In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987), actually undermines the government's position. In *Pula*, the alien arrived at a designated port of arrival, an airport in New York City, but "attempted to enter the United States with a fraudulent document"—an illegally purchased visa. *Id.* at 469, 475. Although *this* fraudulent "manner of entry" was "a proper and relevant discretionary factor," *Pula* rejected the government's argument that this "circumvention of orderly refugee procedures alone is sufficient" to deny asylum. *Id.* at 473. Rather, "the totality of circumstances and actions of an alien in his flight from the country where he fears persecution should be examined in determining whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted." *Id.* One circumstance favoring asylum was when the specific alien "did not know" of a way to enter the United States legally. *Id.* at 475. Ultimately, "the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors." *Id. at 474.*

The government's categorical asylum ban based solely on one factor—arrival outside a designated port of arrival—is the antithesis of *Pula*'s alien-specific "totality of the circumstances and actions" approach. Indeed, the Government's one-dimensional ban would apply

even to aliens who would merit asylum had they arrived at a designated port of arrival, and who either did not know of the President's proclamation and Attorney General's regulation, did not know the location of a designated port of arrival, or did not know how to reach one without additional risk to health or safety. Such a ban contradicts both section 1158's plain text and *Pula*.

II. EVEN IF THE TEXT OF 8 U.S.C. § 1158 WERE AMBIGUOUS, THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION WOULD FAIL BECAUSE OF THREE APPLICABLE CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

As the founders knew, "executives throughout history had sought to exploit ambiguous laws as license for their own prerogative." *Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch*, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (citation omitted). To prevent this from recurring, courts have employed at least three canons of construction to reject agency interpretations of arguably ambiguous text in a statute. If section 1158 were ambiguous, each of these canons independently confirms that the Attorney General's regulation violates the statute.

A. Congress Does Not Reverse a Fundamental Detail of a Regulatory Scheme in Vague Terms Or an Ancillary Provision.

"Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in *vague terms or ancillary provisions*—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn's*, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (emphasis added). In 1996, when Congress enacted section 1158, Congress enacted a core provision in 1158(a)(1) that allowed migrants who arrive outside a designated port of arrival to apply for asylum. It is implausible that Congress simultaneously would use a residual clause like subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C)—a classic ancillary provision—to give the Attorney General unfettered discretion to bar categorically asylum for aliens based on arriving that exact way.

B. Congress Is Presumed Not to Delegate Ambiguously a Decision of Substantial Political Significance to an Agency.

When Congress "delegate[s] a decision of" substantial "political significance" to an agency, it does so clearly and expressly. *Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. at 159–60. Absent such textual clarity, statutes are construed narrowly to avoid conferring upon agency heads, including the Attorney General, the power to make

such fundamental political choices. *Id.*; *accord Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A.*, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).

What legal consequences the federal government should impose on migrants who entered our country from Mexico outside a designated port of arrival has been a decision of enormous political significance since decades before section 1158 was enacted in 1996. The legal consequences previously had been addressed multiple times, including by the mass deportation of the lamentably named Operation Wetback in 1954, Eyder Peralta, *It Came Up In The Debate: Here Are 3 Things To Know About "Operation Wetback"* (Nov. 11, 2015 3:54 PM ET), https://n.pr/2DRwIz5, the Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102, and the amnesty in the Immigration and Control Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3359. Nothing in section 1158 clearly and expressly delegates to the Attorney General authority to add an automatic asylum ban to the legal consequences for arriving from Mexico outside a designated port of arrival. The President and Attorney General remain free to propose such a legislative change to Congress.[3]

[3] Indeed, in the 2018 midterm elections, the President asked voters to elect Republican senators and representatives so that a new Congress

C. The Government's Interpretation Improperly Would Give Every Attorney General an Extraordinary Delegation of Unlimited Authority to Suspend § 1158(a)(1).

The Court previously has declined to "extract[]" from the IIRIRA an "extraordinary delegation of authority" to the Attorney ~~General un~~der which "the Executive would have a free hand." *Kucana*, 558 U.S. at 252 (describing this as "a paramount factor"). If the government were correct that an Attorney General could categorically suspend asylum under 1158(b)(2)(C) based on a factor that Congress

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would "change our pathetic Immigration Laws" applicable to such migrants. *See, e.g.*, Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 22, 2018 5:49 AM), https://bit.ly/2EtYbrU ("Every time you see a Caravan, or people illegally coming, or attempting to come, into our Country illegally, think of and blame the Democrats for not giving us the votes to change our pathetic Immigration Laws! Remember the Midterms! So unfair to those who come in legally."); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 17, 2018 6:45 AM), https://bit.ly/2rxcyDc ("Hard to believe that with thousands of people from South of the Border, walking unimpeded toward our country in the form of large Caravans, that the Democrats won't approve legislation that will allow laws for the protection of our country. Great Midterm issue for Republicans!"); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 30, 2018 3:38 PM), https://bit.ly/2C87lYx ("The migrant 'caravan' that is openly defying our border shows how weak & ineffective U.S. immigration laws are. Yet Democrats like Jon Tester continue to support the open borders agenda – Tester even voted to protect Sanctuary Cities. We need lawmakers who will put America First."). After the 2018 midterms, the administration instead announced its unilateral asylum ban by regulation.

stated in 1158(a) did not preclude asylum, such as entry outside a designated port of arrival, the Attorney General would have a free hand to suspend all asylum categorically for any reason for any duration. Indeed, under the government's interpretation, any Attorney General could, at any time, indefinitely suspend asylum for all new applicants, including those entering *at* designated ports of arrival, to "reduc[e] the backlog of meritless" asylum claims and provide leverage for "diplomatic negotiations" with other countries. Gov't Br. at 15, 43.

Moreover, "it is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, [a] Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted). Courts "have read significant limitations into . . . immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation." *Id.* (citation omitted). This includes when the Attorney General claims statutory authority that "would generate Constitutional doubts" under separation of powers. *United States v. Witkovich*, 353 U.S. 194, 199, 201–02 (1957).

Under the government's reading of section 1158, the subsections of section 1158 effectively say: "(a) Arriving outside a designated port of arrival does not preclude asylum. (b) The Attorney General may by regulation suspend subsection (a)." The Presentment Clause and the separation of powers invalidate a statutory provision that "in legal and practical effect" authorizes a "*unilateral* Presidential [or executive] action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes." *Clinton v. City of New York*, 524 U.S. 417, 438–39 (1998) (emphasis added). In particular, it is unconstitutional when a statutory provision authorizes the executive branch unilaterally to "reject[] the policy judgment made by Congress [in another enacted statutory provision] and rel[y] on [the executive's] own policy judgment." *Id.* at 444. Such a statute would authorize an unconstitutional, post-enactment, line-item veto by the executive branch. *Id.* To avoid that, the Presentment Clause and separation of powers require *statutory limits* in which "*Congress itself made the decision to suspend* or repeal the particular [other] provisions at issue *upon the occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment*, and it left only the

determination of whether such events occurred up to the President." *Id.* at 445 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

Here, under the government's interpretation of 1158(b)(2)(C), nothing in *the statute* supplies any limit—much less requires an "occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment." Rather, under the government's interpretation of subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C), the Attorney General would be authorized, contrary to *Clinton*, to "rejec[t] the policy judgment made by Congress" in 1158(a)(1) that entry outside a designated port of arrival is not a categorical bar to asylum and instead "rel[y] on [the executive's] own policy judgment," 524 U.S. at 444.

The government argues here that the Attorney General acted only in response to a recent "crisis" in issuing a suspension that applies only to one of our country's borders. Gov't Br. at 43. Even assuming that is a correct description, it provides no substitute for the ~~*statutory* limit~~ that separation of powers ~~requires. As th~~e Supreme Court held in *Whitman*, even "an agency's voluntary self-denial" by promising *never* to exercise its unilateral powers outside certain

parameters is insufficient because separation of powers requires at least some sort of *statutory* limit. 531 U.S. at 472–73.

In his landmark opinion in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1950), Justice Jackson explained that the requirements of separation of powers still apply in a "crisis" because, as the framers understood, "[crises] afford a ready pretext for usurpation" by the executive. *Id.* at 650. Among others, George Washington had explained that no matter how beneficial violating separation of powers seems "in one instance, . . . it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil *any* partial or transient benefit." George Washington, *Farewell Address* (1796), http://bit.ly/1dLozEs (emphasis added). Per Justice Jackson, absent a war, a crisis may not be the basis for Congress to "grant[] extraordinary authorities" to "the Executive" unless, at the least, the statute both (a) requires a Presidential "proclamation of a national emergency" and (b) sets forth meaningful "limitations of the powers that can be asserted" during that emergency. 343 U.S. at 652–53. The government's limitless interpretation of subparagraph 1158(b)(2)(C) does neither.

History confirms that 1158(b)(2)(C) would raise serious constitutional doubts if it had given the executive branch an unconstrained, unilateral power to exclude aliens present in this country who came from countries with which our nation is not at war. The much lamented Act Concerning Aliens of June 25, 1798 ("Alien Act") raised serious separation of powers issues even though it set much clearer statutory limits than would the government's limitless interpretation of subsection 1158(b)(2)(C). The Alien Act was limited to authorizing deporting an individual alien who the President determined was "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States," did not give the executive branch power effectively to suspend any other then existing statutory provision, and expired in two years. 1 Stat. 570–72.

In the Virginia Resolution of 1798, James Madison wrote that the Alien Act, "by uniting legislative and judicial powers to those of the executive, subverts the general principles of free government, as well as *the particular organization and positive provisions of the Federal Constitution*." James Madison, Virginia Resolution (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, 131–36 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), https://bit.ly/2CxO5no (first

emphasis in original). *See also Sessions v. Dimaya*, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (the Alien Act "was widely condemned as unconstitutional by Madison and many others"). Madison's analysis powerfully rebuts the government's argument that, if ambiguous, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 could possibly be read to grant to the Attorney General unlimited authority to suspend categorically what § 1158(a)(1) expressly permits—potential asylum for "[a]ny alien" who enters this country outside "a designated port of arrival."

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.

Dated: May 13, 2019

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APPENDIX A

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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