

**FILED**

OCT 19 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

**JUDICIAL COUNCIL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

**IN RE COMPLAINT OF  
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT**

No. 18-90123

**ORDER**

**THOMAS**, Chief Judge:

Complainant, a pro se prisoner, has filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against a district judge. Review of this complaint is governed by the Rules for Judicial Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (“Judicial-Conduct Rules”), the federal statutes addressing judicial conduct and disability, 28 U.S.C. § 351 et seq., and relevant prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. In accordance with these authorities, the names of complainant and the subject judge shall not be disclosed in this order. See Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(g)(2).

The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act provides a remedy if a federal judge “has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). A chief judge may dismiss a complaint if, following review, he or she finds it is not cognizable under the statute, is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling, or is frivolous or lacks sufficient evidence to raise an inference of misconduct.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 352(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Judicial misconduct proceedings are not a substitute for the normal appellate review process, and may not be used to seek reversal of a judge's decision, to obtain a new trial, or to request reassignment to a different judge.

Complainant filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in April 2018, challenging a 2017 state court conviction for which he had not yet been sentenced. Complainant argued, in part, that his case should be reviewed immediately in federal court, and that he should not have to exhaust state court remedies, because he believes that the state court judges and the prosecutors were conspiring against him. Complainant alleges that the district judge has allowed “an inappropriate amount of time” to pass since filing the habeas petition before taking any action in the case. Delay is not cognizable misconduct “unless the allegation concerns an improper motive in delaying a particular decision or habitual delay in a significant number of unrelated cases.” Judicial-Conduct Rule 3(h)(3)(B); see In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 567 F.3d 429, 431 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009). A review of the docket demonstrates that subject judge dismissed complainant's habeas petition, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust about five months after its filing. Further, complainant has not provided any objective evidence that the alleged delay is habitual or improperly motivated.

Because there is no evidence of misconduct, this charge must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D).

To the extent complainant makes allegations against state judges or prosecutors, such allegations are dismissed because this misconduct complaint procedure applies only to federal judges. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d 1287, 1288 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2011); Judicial-Conduct Rule 4.

**DISMISSED.**