APPELLATE

 

 

JURISDICTION

 

 

IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 

 

 

 

 

Written March 1999

Updated December 2009

 

 

Lisa B. Fitzgerald

Office of Staff Attorneys

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

 

 

 

 

Corrections and comments should be e-mailed to

Jennifer Rich at jennifer_rich@ca9.uscourts.gov

 

 

          This outline is intended for use as a starting point for research. It is not intended to express the views or opinions of the Ninth Circuit, and it may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit.                                                                         


Table of Contents

 

I.      INTRODUCTION

 

II.     STATUTORY BASES FOR CIVIL APPEALS

          A.     APPEALS FROM FINAL DECISIONS (28 U.S.C. § 1291)

                    1.      FINAL DECISIONS

                              a.      Generally

                                         i.       Need to Consider Finality

                                         ii.      Policy Behind Final Judgment Rule

                              b.      Determining Finality

                                         i.       District Court Intent

                                         ii.      Adjudication of all Claims

                              c.       Manufacturing Finality

                              d.       “Pragmatic” or “Practical” Finality Doctrine

                                         i.        Parameters of Doctrine

                                         ii.       Applications

                    2.       COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Requirements of Collateral Order Doctrine

                              c.       Appealability of Specific Orders under Collateral Order Doctrine

                                         i.        Abstention Orders

                                         ii.       Orders Denying Immunity

                                         iii.      Disqualification of Counsel

                                         iv.      Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Sanctions

                                         v.       Other Orders

                    3.       ORDERS CERTIFIED UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)

                              a.       Generally

                                         i.        District Court Determinations

                                         ii.       Appellate Court Review

                              b.       Contents of Certification Order

                                         i.        “No Just Reason for Delay”

                                         ii.       Reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

                                         iii.      “Specific Findings” Supporting Certification

                              c.       Propriety of Certification

                                         i.        Appellate Review Required

                                         ii.       Standard of Review

                                         iii.      Scrutiny under Morrison-Knudsen

                                         iv.      Trend Toward Greater Deference to District Court

                              d.       Immediate Appeal from Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Order Required

                              e.       Denial of Rule 54(b) Certification

          B.      APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS (28 U.S.C. § 1292)

                    1.       INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIVE ORDERS (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1))

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Order Granting or Denying an Injunction

                                         i.        Explicit Grant or Denial or Injunction

                                         ii.       Implicit Grant or Denial of Injunction

                              c.       Orders Modifying, Continuing, or Dissolving Injunction

                                         i.        Order Modifying Injunction

                                         ii.       Order Continuing Injunction

                                         iii.      Order Dissolving Injunction

                                         iv.      Order Denying Modification or Dissolution of Injunction

                              d.       Examples of Orders Appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

                                         i.        Order Granting Permanent Injunction

                                         ii.       Order Denying Entry of Consent Decree

                                         iii.      Order Granting Injunction Despite Lack of Motion for Interim Relief

                                         iv.     Order Requiring Submission of Remedial Plan

                                         v.       Certain Orders Affecting Assets

                                         vi.      Order Denying Relief in Mandamus Action

                                         vii.     Order Staying Extradition

                                         viii.    Order Denying Stay of Immigration Removal Order

                                         ix.      Order Disapproving Class Settlement

 


                              e.       Examples of Orders Not Appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

                                         i.        Order Denying Motion to Abstain

                                         ii.       Order Denying Motion for Stay

                                         iii.      Order Granting England Reservation of Jurisdiction

                                         iv.      Order Denying Motion to Quash

                                         v.       Order Granting Conditional Permissive Intervention

                                         vi.      Certain Orders Affecting Assets

                                         vii.     Order Remanding to Federal Agency

                                         viii.    Order Denying Summary Judgment Due to Factual Disputes

                                         ix.      Order Denying Entry of Consent Decree Not Appealable by Party Against Whom Injunction Sought

                              f.       Temporary Restraining Order

                                         i.        Order Tantamount to Denial of Preliminary Injunction

                                         ii.       Orders Effectively Deciding Merits of Case

                              g.       Mootness

                    2.       INTERLOCUTORY RECEIVERSHIP ORDERS (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2))

                    3.       INTERLOCUTORY ADMIRALTY ORDERS (§ 1292(a)(3))

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Appealable Admiralty Orders

                              c.       Nonappealable Admiralty Orders

                    4.       INTERLOCUTORY PERMISSIVE APPEALS (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b))

                              a.       Procedure for Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

                                         i.        District Court Certification under § 1292(b)

                                         ii.       Timely Petition from Order Certified under § 1292(b)

                                         iii.      Appellate Court Permission to Appeal under § 1292(b)

                                         iv.      Stay Pending Appeal from Certified Order

                              b.       Standards for Evaluating § 1292(b) Certification Order

                                         i.        Order Raises Controlling Question of Law

                                         ii.       Difference of Opinion Exists as to Controlling Question

                                         iii.     Immediate Appeal Would Materially Advance Litigation

                              c.       Examples of Orders Reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

                              d.       Examples of Orders Not Reviewed under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b)

          C.      APPEALABILITY OF SPECIFIC ORDERS

                    1.       ADMIRALTY

                    2.       AGENCY

                    3.       APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Action

                    4.       ARBITRATION (9 U.S.C. § 16)

                              a.       Cases Governed by the Federal Arbitration Act

                              b.       Arbitration Orders Appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16

                              c.      Arbitration Orders Not Appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16

                              d.       Interlocutory v. Final Decision

                              e.       Other Avenues for Appeal from Arbitration Orders

                    5.      Assets (Liens, Attachments, etc.)

                              a.       Orders Restraining Assets

                              b.       Orders Releasing Assets

                    6.       ATTORNEY’S FEES

                              a.       Interim Attorney’s Fees Order

                              b.       Post-Judgment Attorney’s Fees Order

                    7.       BANKRUPTCY

                    8.       CLASS ACTIONS

                              a.       Interlocutory Appeal from Class Certification Order

                                         i.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

                                         ii.       Decisions Predating Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)

                              b.       Review of Class Certification Order After Final Judgment

                                         i.        Final Order Adjudicating Individual Claim

                                         ii.       Dismissal Following Settlement of Individual Claim

                                         iii.      Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute Individual Claim

                                         iv.      Underlying Judgment Reversed on Appeal

                              c.       Appeal from Orders Allocating Cost of Notifying Class Members

                    9.       Consolidated Actions

                    10.     Contempt and Sanctions

                              a.       Appealability of Contempt or Sanctions Order Issued in the Course of an Underlying District Court Proceeding

                                         i.        Contempt or Sanctions Order Against Party

                                         ii.       Contempt or sanctions Order against Nonparty

                                         iii.      Contempt or Sanctions Order against Party and Nonparty Jointly

                                         iv.      Denial of Motion for Contempt or Sanctions

                              b.       Appealability of Contempt or Sanctions Order Issued After Final Judgment in an Underlying District Court Proceeding

                                         i.        Post-Judgment Contempt or Sanctions Order Generally

                                         ii.       Post-Judgment Continuing Contempt Order

                                         iii.      Order Denying Motion to Vacate Contempt Order

                              c.       Appealability of Contempt or Sanctions Order Issued As Final Judgment in Enforcement or Contempt Proceeding

                                         i.        Contempt Order as Final Judgment in Enforcement

                                         ii.       Contempt Order as Final Judgment in Contempt Proceeding

                    11.     Default

                              a.       Motion for Default Judgment Granted

                              b.       Motion for Default Judgment Denied

                              c.       Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Granted

                              d.       Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Denied

                    12.     Discovery Orders and Subpoenas

                              a.       Appeal by a Person Who is a Party to an Underlying District Court Proceeding

                                         i.        Order Compelling Discovery

                                         ii.       Protective Order

                                         iii.      Pretrial Order to Contribute to Discovery Fund

                                         iv.      Post-Judgment Discovery Orders

                              b.       Appeal by Person Not a Party to An Underlying District Court Proceeding

                                         i.        General Rule: Target of Order Compelling Discovery Cannot Appeal Until Contempt Citation Issues

                                         ii.       Exceptions Permitting Appeal Absent Contempt Citation

                                         iii.      Appeal from Order Denying Motion to Compel

                              c.       Appeal by Person Who is a Party to a Proceeding Limited to Enforcement or Discovery

                                         i.        Discovery Order Issued as Final Judgment in Enforcement Proceeding

                                         ii.       Discovery Order Issued as Final Judgment in Discovery Proceeding

                    13.     DISMISSAL

                              a.       Dismissal Denied

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Denial of Immunity

                              b.       Dismissal Granted

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Dismissal of Complaint v. Dismissal of Action

                                         iii.      Leave to Amend Complaint

                                         iv.      Involuntary Dismissal

                                         v.       Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice

                                         vi.      Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice

                                         vii.     Dismissal Subject to Condition or Modification

                                         viii.    Dismissal of Fewer Than All Claims

                    14.     DISQUALIFICATION

                              a.       Disqualification of Counsel

                              b.       Disqualification of District Judge

                    15.     IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

                    16.     IMMIGRATION

                    17.     IMMUNITY

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Absolute Presidential or Legislative Immunity

                              c.       State Sovereign Immunity

                              d.       Foreign Sovereign Immunity

                              e.       Federal Sovereign Immunity

                              f.       Military Service Immunity (Feres doctrine)

                              g.       Qualified Immunity of Government Employees

                                         i.        Order Denying Dismissal or Summary Judgment

                                         ii.       Only Legal Determinations Subject to Review

                                         iii.      Successive Appeals from Orders Denying Immunity

                              h.       Municipal Liability

                              i.        Immunity from Service (“Specialty Doctrine”)

                              j.        Settlement Agreement (Contractual Immunity)

                              k.       Absolute Judicial Immunity

                              l.        Absolute Political Immunity

                              m.      Absolute Witness Immunity

                              n.       Tribal Sovereign Immunity

                    18.     INJUNCTION

                    19.     INTERVENTION

                              a.       Intervention as of Right

                                         i.        Order Denying Intervention Altogether

                                         ii.       Order Denying Intervention in Part

                              b.       Permissive Intervention

                              c.       Must Appeal Denial of Intervention Immediately

 


                    20.     MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISIONS (28 U.S.C. § 636(c))

                              a.       Final Judgment by Magistrate Appealed Directly to Court of Appeals

                              b.       No Appellate Jurisdiction if Magistrate Lacked Authority

                              c.       Parties’ Consent to Entry of Final Judgment by Magistrate

                    21.     POST-JUDGMENT ORDERS

                              a.       Post-Judgment Orders Generally Final

                              b.       Separate Notice of Appeal Generally Required

                              c.       Appealability of Specific Post-Judgment Orders

                                         i.        Post-Judgment Order Granting or Denying Attorney’s Fees

                                         ii.       Post-Judgment Order Granting or Denying Costs

                                         iii.      Post-Judgment Order Granting or Denying New Trial

                                         iv.      Post-Judgment Orders Related to Discovery

                                         v.       Post-Judgment Contempt Orders

                                         vi.      Orders Granting or Denying Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Relief

                                         vii.     Other Post-Judgment Orders

                    22.     PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDER

                    23.     RECEIVERSHIP

                    24.     REMAND

                              a.       Order Remanding to State Court

                                         i.        Remand Due to Defect in Removal Procedure

                                         ii.       Remand Due to Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

                                         iii.      Remand for Reasons Other than Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Defect in Removal Procedure

                              b.       Order Remanding to Federal Agency

                                         i.        Remand to Federal Agency on Factual Grounds

 


                                         ii.       Remand to Federal Agency on Legal Grounds

                              c.       Order Denying Petition for Removal from State Court

                              d.       Order Denying Motion to Remand to State Court

                    25.     SANCTIONS

                    26.     STAYS

                              a.       Stay Granted

                                         i.        Abstention-Based Stays

                                         ii.       Other Stays

                              b.       Stay Denied

                    27.     SUMMARY JUDGMENT

                              a.       Order Denying Summary Judgment

                              b.       Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment

                    28.     TAX

                    29.     TRANSFER

                              a.       Transfer from District Court to District Court

                              b.       Transfer from District Court to Court of Appeals

          D.      PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                    1.       GENERALLY

                    2.       BAUMAN FACTORS

                              a.       Alternative Relief Unavailable

                              b.       Possibility of Irreparable Damage or Prejudice

                              c.       Clear Error by District Court

                              d.       Potential for Error to Recur

                              e.       Important Question of First Impression

                    3.       NOTICE OF APPEAL CONSTRUED AS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                              a.       Appeal Construed as Petition for Writ of Mandamus

                              b.       Appeal Not Construed as Petition for Writ of Mandamus

                    4.       AVAILABILITY OF MANDAMUS RELIEF FROM SPECIFIC ORDERS

                              a.       Class Certification Orders

                                         i.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

                                         ii.       Decisions Predating Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)

                              b.       Contempt Orders

                              c.       Discovery Orders

                                         i.        Mandamus Relief Available

                                         ii.       Mandamus Relief Not Available

                              d.       Disqualification Orders

                                         i.        Disqualification of Judge

                                         ii.       Disqualification of Counsel

                              e.       Jury Demand Orders

                              f.       Media Access Orders

                              g.       Remand Orders

                                         i.        Mandamus Relief Available

                                         ii.       Mandamus Relief Not Available

                              h.       Transfer Orders

                              i.        Other Orders

                                         i.        Mandamus Relief Available

                                         ii.       Mandamus Relief Not Available

 

III.     TIMELINESS

          A.      TIME PERIOD FOR APPEAL

                    1.       TIMELY NOTICE REQUIRED FOR JURISDICTION

                    2.       DEADLINE FOR FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    3.       WHETHER UNITED STATES IS A PARTY

                              a.       Liberal Construction of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)

                              b.       Determining Party Status

                                         i.        Federal Official as Defendant

                                         ii.       United States as Nominal Plaintiff

                                         iii.      United States Dismissed Prior to Appeal

                                         iv.      United States as Party in Bifurcated Proceedings

                                         v.       United States as Party to Consolidated Action

                                         vi.      Foreign Government Not Treated Like United States

                                         vii.     United States Not a Party to Attorney Discipline Proceeding

                              c.       Defining Agency

                                         i.        Relevant Factors

                                         ii.       Factors Applied

                    4.       COMPUTATION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

                              a.       Days Counted in Determining Deadline for Filing Notice of Appeal

                              b.       Date Notice of Appeal Deemed “Filed”

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Pro Se Prisoners

                    5.       APPLICABILITY OF FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) TIME LIMITS

                              a.       Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) Time Limits Applicable

                              b.       Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) Time Limits Not Applicable

                    6.      CROSS-APPEALS

          B.      ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

                    1.       GENERALLY

                    2.      150-DAY RULE

                              a.      Application of the 150-Day Rule

                    3.       SEPARATE DOCUMENT REQUIREMENT

                              a.       Document Distinct from Memorandum

                                         i.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 Requirements Not Satisfied

                                         ii.       Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 Requirements Satisfied

                              b.       Lack of Opinion or Memorandum

                              c.       Minute Orders

                              d.       Lack of Separate Judgment Does Not Render Appeal Premature

                                         i.        Waiver of Separate Document Requirement by Appellee

                                         ii.       Waiver of Separate Document Requirement by Appellant

                                         iii.      Objection by Appellee to Lack of Separate Judgment

                    4.       MANNER OF ENTERING JUDGMENT

                    5.       JUDGMENT SIGNED BY CLERK

                    6.       NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

          C.      PREMATURE NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    1.       GENERALLY

                    2.       NOTICE FILED BEFORE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

                              a.       Premature Notice Effective

                              b.       Premature Notice Not Effective

                    3.       REMAINING CLAIMS FINALIZED AFTER NOTICE OF APPEAL

                              a.       Compare Rule 54(b) Certification

                              b.       Premature Notice of Appeal Cured

                              c.       Premature Notice of Appeal Not Cured

          D.      EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL

                    1.       GENERALLY

                              a.       Extension of Time to Appeal by Court of Appeals

                              b.       Extension of Time to Appeal by District Court

                    2.       EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)

                              a.       Timeliness of Motion for Extension

                              b.       Form of Motion for Extension

                                         i.        Formal Motion Required

                                         ii.       When Notice Required

                              c.       Standard for Granting Motion for Extension

                                         i.        Good Cause

                                         ii.        Excusable Neglect

                              d.       Length of Extension

                              e.       Appealability of Extension Order

                    3.       EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6)

                              a.       Timeliness of Motion for Extension

                              b.       Form of Motion for Extension

                              c.       Standard for Granting Motion for Extension

                                         i.        Entitlement to Notice of Entry of Judgment

                                         ii.       Failure to Receive Notice of Entry of Judgment

                                         iii.      Absence of Prejudice to Any Party

                              d.       Length of Extension

                              e.       Appealability of Extension Order

                    4.       EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)

                              a.       Timeliness of Motion for Extension

                              b.       Factors Considered in Evaluating Motion for Extension

          E.      UNTIMELY FILING NOT EXCUSED BY UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE

                    1.       OSTERNECK STANDARD

                    2.       PRE-OSTERNECK DECISIONS

                    3.       UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCE DOCTRINE ILLEGITIMATE

          F.       EFFECT OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

                    1.       GENERALLY

                    2.       POST-JUDGMENT TOLLING MOTIONS

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Tolling Motion Must Be Specifically Enumerated

                              c.       Tolling Motion Must Be Timely Filed

                                         i.        Time Period for Filing Tolling Motion

                                         ii.       Days Counted in Calculating Deadline for Filing Tolling Motion

                                         iii.      Classification of Motion Filed Prior to Entry of Judgment as “Post-Judgment”

                                         iv.      Effect of Premature Tolling Motion

                                         v.       Effect of Untimely Tolling Motion

                              d.       Tolling Motion Must Be Written or Recorded

                              e.       Tolling Motion Need Not Be Properly Labeled

                                         i.        Motion to Amend or Vacate Judgment

                                         ii.       Motion for Clarification

                                         iii.      Motion for Attorney’s Fees

                                         iv.      Motion for Costs

                                         v.       Motion for Prejudgment Interest

                              f.       Effect of Motion That Lacks Merit or is Procedurally Defective

                              g.       Tolling Motion May Address Any Appealable Order

                    3.       NON-TOLLING POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

                    4.       MULTIPLE POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

 

 


 

IV.     NOTICE OF APPEAL (Form, Content and Effect on District Court Jurisdiction)

          A.      GENERALLY

          B.      DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    1.       GENERALLY

                    2.       PRO SE APPELLANTS

                    3.       DOCUMENTS CONSTRUED AS NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    4.       DOCUMENTS NOT CONSTRUED AS NOTICE OF APPEAL

          C.      CONTENTS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    1.       DESIGNATION OF PARTIES APPEALING

                              a.       Fed. R. App. P. 3 Requirements

                              b.       Parties Inadequately Designated

                              c.       Parties Adequately Designated

                    2.       DESIGNATION OF ORDER BEING APPEALED

                              a.       Notice of Appeal Effective Even Though Order Mistakenly or Vaguely Designated

                              b.       Notice of Appeal from One Part of Order Deemed to Encompass Other Part of Order

                              c.       Notice of Appeal from Final Judgment Deemed to Encompass Prior Rulings

                              d.       Notice of Appeal from Post-Judgment Order Deemed to Encompass Final Judgment

                              e.       Effect of Second Notice of Appeal

                    3.       SIGNATURE OF APPEALING PARTY OR ATTORNEY

          D.      AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    1.       PERMISSIBLE AMENDMENTS

                    2.       IMPERMISSIBLE AMENDMENTS

          E.      CROSS-APPEAL

                    1.       ARGUMENT SUPPORTING JUDGMENT

                    2.       ARGUMENT ATTACKING JUDGMENT

                    3.       JURISDICTION OR COMITY ARGUMENT

          F.       EFFECT OF NOTICE OF APPEAL ON DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION

                    1.       APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT

                    2.       APPEAL FROM POST-JUDGMENT ORDER

                    3.       APPEAL FROM PARTIAL JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b)

                    4.       APPEAL FROM COLLATERAL ORDER

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Qualified Immunity Appeal

                    5.       APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

                    6.       EXCEPTIONS TO DIVESTITURE RULE

                              a.       Ineffective Notice of Appeal

                              b.       Jurisdiction to Clarify Order or Correct Error

                              c.       Jurisdiction to Maintain Status Quo

                                         i.        Jurisdiction to Modify Injunction

                                         ii.       Jurisdiction to Award Sanctions

                                         iii.      Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Substantive Rights

 

V.      SCOPE OF APPEAL (Which Orders and Issues Are Considered on Appeal)

          A.      ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL

                    1.       ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL FROM FINAL DECISION

                              a.       Rulings That Merge into a Final Judgment

                                         i.        Partial Dismissal

                                         ii.       Partial Summary Judgment

                                         iii.      Denial of Immunity

                                         iv.      New Trial Order

                                         v.       Class Certification Order

                                         vi.      Transfer Order

                                         vii.     Disqualification Order

                                         viii.    Contempt Order

                                         ix.      Interlocutory Injunctive Order

                                         x.       Order Certified for Permissive Interlocutory Appeal

                                         xi.      Refusal to Rule on Motion

                              b.       Rulings That Do Not Merge into Final Judgment

                                         i.        Interlocutory Orders Not Affecting Outcome

                                         ii.       Certain Collateral Orders

                                         iii.      Orders Certified under Rule 54(b)

                                         iv.      Certain Orders Denying Summary Judgment

                                         v.       Certain Orders Denying Remand

                                         vi.      Orders Preceding Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute

                                         vii.     Post-Judgment Orders

                    2.       ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL FROM AN INJUNCTIVE ORDER UNDER § 1292(a)(1)

                              a.       Order Granting or Denying Summary Judgment

                              b.       Order Denying Remand

                              c.       Order Granting or Denying Sanctions

                              d.       Entry of Default

                              e.       Order Certifying Class

                              f.       Order Modifying Or Refusing to Modify Injunction

                              g.       Order Compelling Arbitration

                              h.       Entry of Final Judgment

                    3.       ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER CERTIFIED UNDER § 1292(b)

                              a.       Only Certified Order May Be Reviewed

                              b.       Any Ruling Contained in Certified Order May Be Reviewed

                    4.       ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER CERTIFIED UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)

                    5.       ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL FROM A COLLATERAL ORDER

                              a.       Review of Related Rulings Permitted

                              b.       Review of Related Rulings Not Permitted

                    6.       ORDERS CONSIDERED ON APPEAL FROM A POST-JUDGMENT ORDER

                              a.       Order Denying Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion

                              b.       Order Denying Motion to Intervene

          B.      ISSUES CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (WAIVER)

                    1.       WAIVER OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

                              a.       Appellate Jurisdiction

                              b.       District Court Jurisdiction

                                         i.        Issue Not Waived

                                         ii.       Issue Partially Waived

                                         iii.      Issue Waived

                    2.       WAIVER OF ISSUE IN DISTRICT COURT

                              a.       General Rule

                                         i.        Rule of Discretion

                                         ii.       Waivable Issues

                                         iii.      Waiver by Failure to Adequately Raise Issue

                                         iv.      Waiver by Stipulation or Concession

                              b.       Exceptions and Exemptions to Rule of Waiver

                                         i.        Preventing Manifest Injustice

                                         ii.       Intervening Change in Law

                                         iii.      Intervening Change in Circumstance

                                         iv.      Pure Question of Law

                                         v.       Issue Considered by District Court

                                         vi.      Alternative Basis for Affirming

                                         vii.     Additional Citations

                              c.       Waiver and Pleadings

                                         i.        Factual Allegations

                                         ii.       Causes of Action

                                         iii.      Affirmative Defenses

                                         iv.      Request for Relief

                                         v.       Repleading Dismissed Claims in Amended Complaint

                              d.       Waiver and Pretrial Motions

                                         i.        Motion to Dismiss

                                         ii.       Motion for Summary Judgment

                              e.       Waiver of Trial Issues

                                         i.        Peremptory Challenges

                                         ii.       Admissibility of Evidence

                                         iii.      Legal Theory

                                         iv.      Jury Instructions

                                         v.       Consistency of Jury Findings

                                         vi.      Sufficiency of Evidence

                                         vii.     Specificity of Court Findings

                                         viii.    Waiver and Post-Trial/Post-Judgment Submissions

                              f.       Waiver of Magistrate/Special Master Issues

                                         i.        Waiver of Objections to Order of Reference

                                         ii.       Waiver of Objection to Magistrate’s Findings & Recommendations

                                         iii.      Waiver of Objection to Special Master’s Findings & Conclusions

                    3.       WAIVER OF ISSUE IN COURT OF APPEALS

                              a.       Failure to Raise Issue in Earlier Appeal

                              b.       Failure to Adequately Brief Issue

                                         i.        Issue Waived

                                         ii.       Issue Not Waived

                              c.       Failure to Provide Adequate Record on Appeal

                              d.       Explicit Abandonment of Issue on Appeal

 

VI.     BANKRUPTCY APPEALS

          A.      OVERVIEW

                    1.       BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PROCESS

                    2.       ORIGINS OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS

                              a.       Allocation of Original Bankruptcy Jurisdiction

                              b.       Determining Origin of Bankruptcy Decision

                                         i.        Cases Involving District Courts

                                         ii.       Cases Involving the BAP

          B.      STATUTORY BASES FOR APPEAL TO NINTH CIRCUIT

                    1.       APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF BAP OR DISTRICT COURT ACTING IN APPELLATE CAPACITY

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Finality under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)

                                         i.        Standard for Finality

                                         ii.       Finality of Orders that Affirm or Reverse Outright

                                         iii.      Finality of Orders Involving Remand

                                         iv.      Finality of Other BAP and District Court Orders

                                         v.       Determining Finality of Underlying Bankruptcy Court Order

                              c.       Other Bases for Ninth Circuit Review

                                         i.        28 U.S.C. § 1292

                                         ii.       Mandamus

 


                    2.       APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF DISTRICT COURT EXERCISING ORIGINAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION

                              a.       Direct Appeal to the Ninth Circuit

                              b.       Standards for Finality

                                         i.        General Rule

                                         ii.       “Special Exceptions”

                                         iii.      Collateral Order Doctrine & Forgay-Conrad Rule

                              c.       Appealability of Specific Orders

                                         i.        Appealable District Court Decisions

                                         ii.       Non-Appealable District Court Decisions

                              d.       Effect of Appeal on District Court Jurisdiction

          C.      TIMELINESS OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS

                    1.       APPEAL FROM DECISION OF BAP OR DISTRICT COURT ACTING IN APPELLATE CAPACITY

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Time to Appeal BAP or District Court Appellate Decision

                                         i.        Basic Time Period

                                         ii.       United States as a Party to a Bankruptcy Case

                                         iii.      “Filing” of Notice of Appeal

                                         iv.      Commencement of Time Period

                                         v.       Computation of Appeal Deadline

                              c.       Extensions of Time to Appeal

                              d.       Tolling Motions

                                         i.        Motion for Rehearing

                                         ii.       Time in Which to File Motion

                                         iii.      Restarting Time to Appeal

                                         iv.      Need for New or Amended Notice of Appeal

                              e.       Determining Timeliness of Underlying Appeal from Bankruptcy Court to BAP or District Court

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Time Period for Filing Appeal

                                         iii.      Procedure for Filing Notice

                                         iv.      Entry of Judgment

                                         v.       Effect of Notice Filed Before Entry of Judgment

                                         vi.      Extension of Time to Appeal

                                         vii.     Motions that Toll Time Period for Appeal

                    2.       APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF DISTRICT COURT EXERCISING ORIGINAL BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION

          D.      SCOPE OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS

                    1.       MERGER OF INTERLOCUTORY RULINGS INTO FINAL JUDGMENT

                              a.       General Rule

                              b.       Rulings that Merge

                              c.       Rulings that Do Not Merge

                              d.       Issues Undecided Below

                    2.       WAIVER OF ISSUES

          E.      DECISIONS BARRED FROM REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS

                    1.       DECISIONS WHETHER TO REMAND TO STATE COURT

                    2.       DECISIONS WHETHER TO ABSTAIN

                    3.       DECISIONS WHETHER TO DISMISS OR STAY

                    4.       DECISIONS NOT APPEALABLE BY CERTAIN ENTITIES

                              a.       Securities and Exchange Commission

                              b.       Federal Transportation Agencies

                              c.       Labor Unions

                              d.       State and Local Commissions

                              e.       State Attorneys General

          F.       CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN BANKRUPTCY APPEALS

                    1.       STANDING TO APPEAL

                              a.       General Rule

                              b.       Examples of Standing to Appeal

                              c.       Examples of No Standing to Appeal

                    2.       MOOTNESS

                              a.       Appeals Concerning Property Transactions

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Broad Application of Stay Requirement

                                         iii.      Good Faith Requirement

                                         iv.      Need for Transaction Participants to Be Present on Appeal to Avoid Mootness

                                         v.       Exceptions to Mootness

                                         vi.      Rejected Theories for Avoiding Mootness

                                         vii.     Scope of Mootness

                              b.       Appeals Concerning Loan Transactions

                              c.       Appeals Concerning Reorganization Plans

                              d.       Payment of, or Inability to Pay, Judgments, Settlements or Fees

                                         i.        Payment

                                         ii.       Inability to Pay

                              e.       Dismissal of Bankruptcy Case While Appeal is Pending

                              f.       Nature of Stay Needed to Prevent Mootness

                                         i.        Stay Must Be Issued by Court with Jurisdiction

                                         ii.       Stay Must Pertain to Affected Transactions

                                         iii.      Stay Must Cover Time of Affected Transactions

 

VII.   AGENCY AND TAX COURT APPEALS

          A.      AGENCY DECISIONS GENERALLY

                    1.       INITIATING APPELLATE REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONS

                    2.       AGENCY DECISIONS FOR WHICH DIRECT REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AUTHORIZED

                              a.       Specific Agencies

                              b.       Venue

                              c.        Time in Which to Petition for Review

          B.      IMMIGRATION CASES

          C.      TAX COURT DECISIONS

                    1.       INITIATING APPELLATE REVIEW OF TAX COURT DECISIONS

                    2.       VENUE

                    3.       TIME IN WHICH TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

 


VIII.DIRECT CRIMINAL APPEALS

          A.      APPEAL BY DEFENDANT (28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1292(a)(1))

                    1.       STATUTORY AUTHORITY

                              a.       Final Judgment (Sentence)

                              b.       Interlocutory Order (Injunction)

                              c.       Collateral Order

                                         i.        Collateral Order Doctrine

                                         ii.       Pendent Jurisdiction

                    2.       ASSETS SEIZURE OR RESTRAINT

                    3.       BAIL DECISION

                              a.       Pretrial Bail

                              b.       Bail Pending Appeal by Federal Defendants

                              c.       Bail in Habeas Cases Brought by State Prisoners

                              d.       Bail in Extradition Cases

                              e.       Bail in Cases Concerning Revocation of Supervised Release or Probation

                                         i.        Bail Pending Disposition in District Court

                                         ii.       Bail Pending Appeal

                    4.       COMMITMENT ORDER

                    5.       CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTY STATUTE

                    6.       DANGEROUSNESS HEARING UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 4246

                    7.       DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION

                    8.       DISCOVERY REQUESTS

                    9.       DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT

                    10.     DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL

                    11.     DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Double Punishment

                              c.       Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

                              d.       Successive Prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 5032

                    12.     GRAND JURY IRREGULARITIES

                    13.     IMMUNITY

                    14.     INDICTMENT CLAUSE VIOLATION

                    15.     JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT

                    16.     JUVENILE PROSECUTED AS ADULT

                    17.     JUVENILE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

                    18.     LACK OF FAIR WARNING

                    19.     PLEA AGREEMENTS

                    20.     PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE

                    21.     PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION

                    22.     PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Vindictive or Selective Prosecution

                    23.     RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

                    24.     RETURN OF PROPERTY

                    25.     SHACKLING ORDER

                    26.     SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS

                              a.       Sixth Amendment

                              b.       Speedy Trial Act

                              c.       Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act

                    27.     STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

                    28.     SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENT

                    29.     SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE OR RETURN OF PROPERTY

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Criminal Proceedings Pending

                    30.     TRANSFER

          B.      APPEAL BY GOVERNMENT (28 U.S.C. § 1291, 18 U.S.C. § 3731)

                    1.       STATUTORY AUTHORITY

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       18 U.S.C. § 3731

                              c.       28 U.S.C. § 1291

                              d.       Appeal by State Government

                                         i.        Order Denying Remand

                                         ii.       Other Orders

                    2.       ORDER GRANTING DISMISSAL, NEW TRIAL, OR ACQUITTAL

                              a.       Generally

                                         i.        Order of Dismissal

                                         ii.       Order Tantamount to Dismissal

                                         iii.      Order Granting New Trial

                                         iv.      Acquittal

                              b.       Double Jeopardy Limitations

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Attachment of Jeopardy

                                         iii.      “Acquittal” of Defendant

                              c.       Further Factual Proceedings Necessary

                                         i.        General Rule

                                         ii.       Need for Formal Finding of Guilt

                              d.       Scope of Double Jeopardy Bar

                                         i.        Alternative Theories of Liability

                                         ii.       Separate Counts

                              e.       Use of Mandamus to Avoid Double Jeopardy Bar

                    3.       ORDER SUPPRESSING/EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OR REQUIRING RETURN OF SEIZED PROPERTY

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Provision Broadly Interpreted

                              c.       Certification Requirement

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       No Purpose of Delay

                                         iii.      “Substantial Proof of a Fact Material”

                                         iv.      Timing of Certification

                              d.       Double Jeopardy Limitation

                              e.       Cross-Appeals by Defendants

                    4.       ORDER IMPOSING SENTENCE

                              a.       Sentence Imposed under Guidelines

                              b.       Other Sentences and Related Orders

                    5.       ORDER RELEASING PERSON CHARGED OR CONVICTED

                    6.       OTHER ORDERS

                              a.       Additional Orders Appealable by the Government

                              b.       Additional Orders Not Appealable by the Government

          C.      APPEALS CONCERNING GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

                    1.       ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH GRAND JURY SUBPOENA

                    2.       ORDER DENYING MOTION TO QUASH GRAND JURY SUBPOENA

                    3.       ORDER CONFINING RECALCITRANT WITNESS (28 U.S.C. § 1826)

                    4.       ORDER DENYING KASTIGAR HEARING

                    5.       ORDER GRANTING OR DENYING DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY MATERIALS

                              a.       Disclosure Motions Made During Criminal Proceedings

                              b.       Independent Actions Seeking Disclosure

          D.      APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES

                    1.       INITIAL APPEAL TO DISTRICT COURT

                              a.       Statutory Authority

                              b.       Time in Which to Appeal

                              c.       Appeals Mistakenly Taken to Ninth Circuit

                    2.       APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURT TO NINTH CIRCUIT

                              a.       Statutory Authority

                                         i.        Government Appeals

                                         ii.       Appeals by Defendants

                                         iii.      Appealability of Non-Final District Court Decisions

          E.      APPEALS CONCERNING DEFENSE FEES AND COMPENSATION

                    1.       DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION OVER FEE APPLICATION

                    2.       AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION

          F.       TIMELINESS OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                    1.       NON-JURISDICTIONAL

                    2.       TIME TO FILE

                              a.       Appeal by Defendant

                              b.       Appeal by Government

                    3.       APPLICABILITY OF FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) TIME LIMITS

                              a.       Cases Governed by Rule 4(b)

                              b.       Cases Not Governed by Rule 4(b)

                    4.       COMPUTATION OF APPEAL DEADLINE

                              a.       Days Counted

                              b.       Date Notice of Appeal “Filed”

                    5.       “ENTRY” OF JUDGMENT

                    6.       DOCUMENTS CONSTRUED AS NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    7.       PREMATURE NOTICE OF APPEAL

                    8.       EXTENSION OF TIME TO APPEAL (EXCUSABLE NEGLECT)

                              a.       Timing of Appeal

                                         i.        Appeal Outside 30-Day Extension Period

                                         ii.       Appeal Within 30-Day Extension Period

                              b.       Express Finding by District Court

                              c.       “Excusable Neglect” Standard under Pioneer

                              d.       Determining Excusable Neglect

                                         i.        Lack of Notice from Clerk

                                         ii.       Mistake of Counsel

                                         iii.      Other Grounds

                    9.       EFFECT OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS

                              a.       Motion for Reconsideration (by Defendant or Government)

                              b.       Other Post-Judgment Motions (by Defendant)

                              c.       Notice of Appeal Filed While Post-Judgment Motion Pending

          G.      SCOPE OF DIRECT CRIMINAL APPEALS

                    1.       ISSUES NOT RAISED BELOW

                              a.       Generally

                              b.       Plain Error

                              c.       Other Grounds

                    2.       SCOPE OF APPEAL BY DEFENDANT

                              a.       Review of Interlocutory Order on Appeal from Final Judgment

                              b.       Ability of Other Defendants to Join in Appeal

                              c.       Appeals from Separate Cases Arising from Same Conduct

                              d.       Appeal Following Unconditional Guilty Plea

                                         i.        General Rule

                                         ii.       Specific Claims Waived by Guilty Plea

                                         iii.      Specific Claims Not Waived by Guilty Plea

                              e.       Appeal Following Conditional Guilty Plea

                              f.       Appeal Following Guilty Plea under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Agreement

                              g.       Waiver of Right to Appeal in Plea Agreement

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Non-Waivable Issues

                                         iii.      Scope of Appeal Waiver

                    3.       SCOPE OF APPEAL BY GOVERNMENT

                              a.       Interlocutory Appeal from Successive Orders

                              b.       Effect of Contents of Notice of Appeal

          H.      EFFECT OF APPEAL ON DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION

                    1.       EFFECT OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

                              a.       Appeal by Defendant

                                         i.        General Rule

                                         ii.       Exceptions

                              b.       Appeal by Government

                    2.       EFFECT OF APPEAL AFTER SENTENCING

                              a.       Effect on Trial of Severed Counts

                              b.       Effect on Motion for New Trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33

                              c.       Effect on Entry of Factual Findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32

                              d.       Effect on Correction of Sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35

                              e.       Effect on Collateral Attack on Proceedings

          I.       MANDAMUS REVIEW

                    1.       GENERAL PRINCIPLES

                              a.       Jurisdictional Basis for Writs

                              b.       General Standards

                    2.       DEFENDANTS’ PETITIONS

                              a.       Appointment of Public Defender

                              b.       Arraignment by Closed-Circuit Television

                              c.       Authority of Government Attorney

                              d.       Bail in Habeas Cases

                              e.       Constitutionality of Death Penalty Provision

                              f.       Dangerousness of Defendant

                              g.       Disqualification of Defense Counsel

                              h.       Grand Jury Irregularities

                              i.        Restraint Order Directed at Counsel

                              j.        Sealing of Defendant’s Financial Information

                              k.       Speedy Trial Act Violation

                              l.        Transfer

                              m.      Urinalysis

                              n.       Venue

                    3.       GOVERNMENT PETITIONS

                              a.       Arrest Warrants

                              b.       Bill of Particulars

                              c.       Defenses

                              d.       Discovery

                              e.       Removal

                              f.       Splitting Elements of Crime for Trial

                    4.       THIRD-PARTY PETITIONS

                              a.       Petition by Media Seeking Access

                              b.       Petition by Material Witness Seeking Release

          J.       MOOTNESS IN CRIMINAL APPEALS

                    1.       LAPSE OF GRAND JURY TERM

                    2.       RETURN OF INDICTMENT

                    3.       ISSUANCE OF SUPERCEDING CHARGES

                    4.       CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT

                    5.       RELEASE OF DEFENDANT FROM CONFINEMENT

                              a.       Bail Issues

                              b.       Defendants’ Challenges to Merits of Conviction

                              c.       Government Challenge to Reversal of Conviction

                              d.       Challenge to Sentences

                                         i.        Initial Sentences

                                         ii.       Additional Sentences Imposed on Revocation of Probation

                              e.       Challenges to Competency Proceedings

                    6.       DEPORTATION OF DEFENDANT

                    7.       DEFENDANTS’ FUGITIVE STATUS

                              a.       Government Appeals

                                         i.        Bail Issues

                                         ii.       Issues Concerning Reversal of Conviction

                              b.       Appeals by Defendants (Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine)

                                         i.        General Rule Regarding Escape While Appeal is Pending

                                         ii.       Dismissal Not Constitutionally Required

                                         iii.      Conditional Dismissals

                                         iv.      Application in Cases Where Defendants Return to Custody Prior to Appeal

                    8.       DEATH OF DEFENDANT (Abatement Doctrine)

 

IX.     CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION

          A.      STANDING

                    1.       GENERAL PRINCIPLES

                              a.       Constitutional Requirements

                              b.       Prudential Limitations

                    2.       STANDING TO APPEAL

                              a.       Party Status

                                         i.        Intervenors

                                         ii.       Non-parties

                              b.       Aggrieved by Order

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Standing of Class Members

                                         iii.      Standing of Attorneys/Clients

                                         iv.      Standing of Prevailing Parties

                                         v.       Remittitur Orders

                                         vi.      Standing to Appeal Voluntary Dismissal

          B.      MOOTNESS

                    1.       JURISDICTIONAL NATURE OF MOOTNESS

                    2.       GENERAL STANDARD FOR ASSESSING MOOTNESS

                              a.       Availability of Effective Relief

                              b.       Kinds of Relief Available to Preclude Mootness

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Focus on Injuries for Which Relief is Sought

 


                                         iii.      Availability of Damages to Preclude Mootness

                              c.       “Speculative Contingencies” Insufficient to Sustain Controversy

                              d.       Controversy Must Continue Throughout Litigation

                    3.       EXCEPTIONS TO MOOTNESS

                              a.       “Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review”

                                         i.        General Standard

                                         ii.       Events Capable of Being Stayed Pending Appeal

                                         iii.      Particular Cases Found Justiciable

                                         iv.      Particular Cases Found Not Justiciable

                              b.       Voluntary Cessation

                                         i.        General Standard

                                         ii.       Particular Cases Found Justiciable

                                         iii.      Particular Cases Not Justiciable

                    4.       MOOTNESS PRINCIPLES IN PARTICULAR CONTEXTS

                              a.       Cases Involving Changes to Legislation or Regulations

                                         i.        Generally

                                         ii.       Cases Not Mooted

                                         iii.      Cases Mooted

                              b.       Declaratory Relief Cases

                              c.       Cases Involving Property

                                         i.        Cases Not Mooted

                                         ii.       Cases Mooted

                              d.       In Rem and Civil Forfeiture Cases

                              e.       Preliminary Injunction Cases

                              f.       Cases Regarding Summons and Subpoenas

                              g.       Class Actions

                              h.       Cases Concerning Intervention

                              i.        Insurance Cases

                              j.        Environmental Cases

                    5.       SCOPE OF MOOTING EVENT’S EFFECT

                              a.       Relationship Among Claims for Retrospective and Prospective Relief

                              b.       Relationship between Merits and Claims for Attorney’s Fees

                    6.       PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MOOTNESS

                              a.       Duty of Counsel to Notify Court

                              b.       Burden of Proof

                              c.       Disposition of Moot Appeals


I.      INTRODUCTION 

 

          This outline of appellate jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit synthesizes the statutes, cases and rules relevant to determining whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction over a given case.

 

          Two basic questions to be answered in any appeal are: (1) whether there is a statute that confers appellate jurisdiction over the order being appealed, and (2) whether a timely notice of appeal from the order was filed.

 

          The statutory bases for appellate jurisdiction in civil cases are discussed in Part II, p. 1; and timeliness considerations are discussed in Part III, p. 136. In other types of appeals, both statutory bases and timeliness are covered in a single section. See VI, p. 246 (bankruptcy appeals), VII, p. 301 (agency and tax court appeals), and VIII, p. 310 (direct criminal appeals).

 

          This outline covers additional issues related to appellate jurisdiction, including the form and content of a notice of appeal and its effect on district court jurisdiction (see IV, p. 178), the scope of an appeal, i.e. the orders and issues that will be considered on appeal once it is determined there is a basis for exercising jurisdiction (see V, p. 200), and the constitutional limitations on appellate jurisdiction, such as the doctrines of standing and mootness (see IX, p. 391). The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, and issues particular to appeals from Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are not covered here.

 

II.     STATUTORY BASES FOR CIVIL APPEALS

 

          The court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal only when a federal statute confers jurisdiction. See United States v. Pedroza, 355 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Vylene Enters., Inc. v. Naugles, Inc. (In re Vylene Enters., Inc.), 968 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1992). In civil appeals, the court has jurisdiction over final decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and over certain interlocutory decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292.

 

          Jurisdiction is at issue in all stages of the case. See Moe v. United States, 326 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding government was not estopped from arguing district court lacked jurisdiction), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 877 (2003). Even if the court of appeals has filed an opinion, the court can withdraw the opinion to ask for supplemental briefing on the issue of jurisdiction. See Televisa S.A. De C.V. v. DTVLA WC Inc., 366 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2004) (order).

 

Cross-reference: II.C (regarding the appealability of specific types of orders); VI (regarding bankruptcy appeals); VII (regarding agency and tax court appeals); IX (regarding constitutional limitations on federal jurisdiction).

 

          A.     APPEALS FROM FINAL DECISIONS (28 U.S.C. § 1291)

 

                    1.      FINAL DECISIONS

 

                              a.      Generally

 

          Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court of appeals has jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981). Section 1291 has been interpreted to confer appellate jurisdiction over a district court decision that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (citations omitted). A district court decision may also be considered final where its result is that appellant is “effectively out of court.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (citations omitted); see also Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Unity Outpatient Surgery Center, Inc., 490 F.3d 718, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “Moses H. Cone applies whenever there is a possibility that proceedings in another court could moot a suit or an issue, even if there is no guarantee that they will do so” and holding that “lengthy and indefinite stays place a plaintiff effectively out of court.”).

 

          The finality rule is to be given a “practical rather than a technical construction.” Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); see also Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he requirement of finality is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 n.9 (1974) (“[I]t is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the ‘twilight zone’ of finality.” (citations omitted)). For example, an order that does not end the litigation on the merits may nevertheless be appealable under § 1291 if it satisfies the collateral order doctrine or is certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

 

Cross-reference: II.A.2 (regarding the collateral order doctrine); II.A.3 (regarding orders certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).

 

                                         i.       Need to Consider Finality

 

          The court of appeals must consider sua sponte whether an order is final and thus appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Symantec Corp. v. Global Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (order) (considering jurisdiction sua sponte and dismissing appeal where district court had only entered a default, and not a default judgment); Gupta v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Appellate jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, and objections to jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Fiester v. Turner, 783 F.2d 1474, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1074 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that merits panel has independent duty to determine appellate jurisdiction, even where motions panel has previously denied motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds); Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 990 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).

 

                                         ii.      Policy Behind Final Judgment Rule

 

          The foundation of the final judgment rule is the policy against piecemeal litigation. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945). Piecemeal appeals present the dangers of undermining the independence of the district judge, exposing litigants with just claims to the harassment and cost of successive appeals, and obstructing judicial efficiency. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). Finality determinations require a balancing of “the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.” Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).

 

          The rules of finality are designed to create more certainty as to when an order is appealable. See National Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (“The time of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear.”).

 

                              b.      Determining Finality

 

          A district court’s decision is final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 “if it (1) is a full adjudication of the issues, and (2) ‘clearly evidences the judge’s intention that it be the court’s final act in the matter.’” Nat’l Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2009); Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008); Way v. County of Ventura, 348 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of § 1291 is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete.” Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

          Appealability under § 1291 “is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs,” rather than according to the particular facts of a given case. Digital Equip Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439-40 (1985) (concluding that “orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases, as a class, are not sufficiently separate from the merits to qualify for interlocutory appeal”).

 

                                         i.       District Court Intent

 

          A district court order is final only when it is clear that the judge intended it to be final. See Nat’l Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1997). “Evidence of intent consists of the [o]rder’s content and the judge’s and parties[’] conduct.” Slimick v. Silva (In re Slimick), 928 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding, based on the procedural history leading up to order, that the district court intended order to be final even though some of the claims were dismissed without prejudice). The focus is on the intended effect of the order, not the terminology used by the district court. See Montes v. United States, 37 F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that order dismissing “action” rather than “complaint” is not final if court’s words and actions indicate an intent to grant plaintiff leave to amend). If it is clear that the district court intended to dispose of all the claims before it, abandoned claims will not compromise the finality of the judgment. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

          If a district court judgment is conditional or modifiable, the requisite intent to issue a final order is lacking. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding dismissal order not final where no final judgment was entered, the district court reconsidered the dismissal order, and amended it after a motion to modify was filed; however, notice of appeal filed after subsequent dismissal order encompassed earlier non-final judgment); Way v. County of Ventura, 348 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding order not final where district court invited party to file motions addressing qualified immunity); Nat’l Distrib. Agency, 117 F.3d at 433-34. (concluding order was not final where it stated “the [c]ourt may amend or amplify this order with a more specific statement of the grounds for its decision”); Zucker v. Maxicare Health Plans, Inc., 14 F.3d 477, 483 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding judgment was not final where it stated it would become final only after parties filed a joint notice of the decision rendered in related state court action).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13 (regarding the appealability of dismissal orders generally).

 

                                         ii.      Adjudication of all Claims

 

          An order disposing of fewer than all claims is generally not final and appealable unless it is certified for appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Chacon V. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir. 1981). But where a district court “obviously was not trying to adjudicate fewer than all the pleaded claims,” the order may be treated as final. Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding judgment was final where order granting summary judgment disposed of defendant’s counterclaim, even though judgment did not mention the counterclaim).

 

Cross-reference: II.A.3 (regarding certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) of order disposing of fewer than all claims); III.C.3 (regarding when finalization of remaining claims cures a premature notice of appeal from fewer than all claims).

 

                                                   (a)     Precise Damages Undetermined

 

          Under certain circumstances, a judgment clearly establishing the rights and liabilities of the parties will be deemed final and appealable even though the precise amount of damages is not yet settled. See Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that foreclosure judgments conclusively determining liability for defaulted loans and identifying the property to be sold were final and appealable even though district court retained jurisdiction to hold defendants personally liable for any deficiency remaining after judicial foreclosure sale); see also Pauly v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 348 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that district court order was final despite partial remand to Department of Agriculture for mechanical recalculation of recapture amount); Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 467 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that post-judgment contempt order imposing sanctions for each day order violated was appealable even though amount of sanctions undetermined and ongoing); Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10.b.ii (regarding a continuing contempt order issued after entry of judgment in underlying proceeding).

 

                                                   (b)    Implicit Rejection of Claim or Motion

 

          Under the “common sense” approach to finality, the court of appeals may in appropriate cases infer rejection of a claim or motion. See Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1979) (inferring rejection of claim where judgment did not expressly deny plaintiff’s request for permanent injunctive relief, but prior court orders indicated that plaintiff’s request had been denied); see also Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002) (inferring rejection of claims where the claims were abandoned and it was clear the trial court intended to dispose of all claims before it); Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., Inc., 931 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1991) (inferring rejection of claims where they remained technically undecided, but decision “resolved all issues necessary to establish the legal rights and duties of the parties”); United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 893 F.2d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 1990) (inferring denial of motion where district court’s ruling on certain motions necessarily dictated outcome of others because “[a]ll parties had a clear understanding of the practical effects of the judgment, and no prejudice results from construing the judgment as a final judgment” disposing of all motions).

 

                                                   (c)     Apparent Attempt to Dispose of All Claims

 

          Finality may also be found where a district court judgment appears to be “an attempt to dispose of all claims in the action” and “no practical benefits would accrue from a dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.” Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding order was final where district court entered summary judgment for plaintiff on state law grounds, apparently believing it unnecessary to dispose of federal claims in light of well-established rule that courts should not reach federal constitutional issues where state law issues are dispositive); see also French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 905 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding order was final where district court confirmed in part and struck in part arbitrator’s award of damages; construing order as “an attempt to dispose of all claims in the action” because plaintiff did not assert the right to have overturned damages award tried by district court).

 

                                                   (d)     Discrepancy between Order and Judgment

 

          A “technical variance between the judgment and order” does not render the order non-final. Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding judgment was final where court stated in summary judgment order that counterclaim was barred, but neglected to mention counterclaim in judgment); see also Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding judgment was final even though it omitted party’s name where body of order clearly revealed court’s intent to include party in its grant of summary judgment); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 680 F.2d 669, 670-71 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding judgment was final where district court entered judgment referring only to infringement following jury verdict on both patent infringement and validity).

 

                                                   (e)     Scope of Underlying Action

 

          Finality depends in part on the scope of the underlying action:

 

                                                             (1)     Consolidated Actions

 

          An order adjudicating all claims in one action is not final and appealable if consolidated actions remain undecided, absent a Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification. See Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

                    Cross-reference: II.C.9 (regarding consolidated actions).

 

                                                             (2)     Actions to Enforce or Compel

 

          An order that would not be immediately appealable if issued in the course of an ongoing proceeding may be an appealable final judgment if it disposes of the only issue before the court. For example:

 

                  In a proceeding to enforce an attorney’s fee award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, an order dismissing without prejudice the petition to enforce is final and appealable. See Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co., 812 F.2d 574, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

                  In a proceeding to compel arbitration, an order dismissing the petition to enforce is final and appealable. See Americana Fabrics, Inc. v. L & L Textiles, Inc., 754 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.4 (regarding arbitration orders).

 

                  In a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) action, an order requiring the government to release documents, or denying plaintiff access to documents, is a final appealable order. See United States v. Steele (In re Steele), 799 F.2d 461, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (stating that the order represents the “full, complete and final relief available” in FOIA action); cf. Church of Scientology Int’l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that an order holding that a particular document is not exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege is not a final appealable order if it does not also order the government to produce the documents).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12.c.ii (regarding final judgment in discovery proceedings).

 

                  In a proceeding involving the death of a prisoner, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the mortality review. The district court overruled claim of privilege and ordered the production of the document. Although the court did not decide “whether a discovery order disposing of an asserted claim of privilege could be independently appealed under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen[,]” the court determined that given the nature and importance of the privilege at issue the court had jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision. Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

 

                              c.       Manufacturing Finality

 

          “A significant concern in assessing finality is whether the parties have attempted to manipulate [] appellate jurisdiction.” American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2003); see also James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). Litigants ordinarily may not manipulate jurisdiction by manufacturing finality “without fully relinquishing the ability to further litigate unresolved claims.” Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1994). Permitting an appeal without prejudice to unresolved claims would lead to inefficient use of judicial resources. See Cheng v. Commissioner, 878 F.2d 306, 310 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that court of appeals may have to unnecessarily decide an issue or refamiliarize itself with a case in the event of multiple appeals).

 

          An agreement between the parties that grants the appellant the right to resurrect his remaining claims at a later point in time may evidence an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction. See Adonican v City of Los Angeles, 297 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (order). The court has also found attempted manipulation of jurisdiction where the record showed the parties discussed their attempts to create appellate jurisdiction and the parties dismissed the remaining claims, even though there was no explicit agreement to allow revival of the claims or waiver of the statute of limitations. See American States Ins. Co., 318 F.3d at 885.

 

          Note that where an appeal is dismissed as a result of the parties’ attempt to manufacture finality in a partial summary judgment order by dismissing other claims without prejudice, the appellant is not divested of the right to appeal. Rather, the appellant may seek the district court’s permission to refile his claims as allowed under the agreement and proceed to trial, file a motion to dismiss the claims not covered by the partial summary judgment, or file a Rule 54(b) motion for the district court’s determination. The parties will be able to seek appellate review once all the claims have been decided or the district court enters a Rule 54(b) final judgment. See Adonican, 297 F.3d at 1108.

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13.a.vi (regarding impact of voluntary dismissal of unresolved claims on appealability of order adjudicating certain claims).

 

                              d.       “Pragmatic” or “Practical” Finality Doctrine

 

                                         i.        Parameters of Doctrine

 

          In rare cases, appellate jurisdiction has been found proper despite a lack of a final order where: (1) the order was “marginally final;” (2) it disposed of “an unsettled issue of national significance,” (3) review of the order implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); and (4) judicial economy would not be served by remand. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (In re Subpoena Served on Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n), 813 F.2d 1473, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Nehmer v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 494 F.3d 846, 856 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court’s order involved an unsettled issue of national significance, was marginally final, furthered the policy underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and prevented harm further delay would cause).

 

Cross-reference: II.B.4 (regarding interlocutory permissive appeals under § 1292(b)).

 

          This “pragmatic finality” doctrine is a “narrow” exception to the finality requirement, All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. M/V Sea Producer, 882 F.2d 425, 428 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989), to be used “sparingly,” Southern Cal. Edison Co., 813 F.2d at 1479.

 

                                         ii.       Applications

 

          The court has applied the pragmatic finality doctrine in exercising jurisdiction over an appeal from a partial summary judgment for county employees in an action alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that although damages issue was not yet resolved, jurisdiction was proper because partial summary judgment orders were marginally final, disposed of unsettled issues of national significance, and remand would not promote judicial efficiency); see also Pauly v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 348 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that district court order was final despite its partial remand to the United States Department of Agriculture for the mechanical recalculation of recapture amount).

 

          The court has also applied the practical finality doctrine to exercise jurisdiction over appeal by Department of Veterans Affairs from two orders in which the district court, in a class action brought by veterans of the Vietnam War exposed to Agent Orange, granted motion for clarification and enforcement of consent decree and established procedure for processing claims of veterans with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. See Nehmer v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 494 F.3d 846, 856 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district court’s order involved an unsettled issue of national significance, was marginally final, furthered the policy underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and prevented harm further delay would cause).

 

          But see Way v. County of Ventura, 348 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to apply “practical finality doctrine” where district court had not completed its qualified immunity analysis); Sierra Club v. Department of Transp., 948 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to apply “practical finality doctrine” in environmental action); Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 160 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1998) (declining to apply “practical finality doctrine” in insurance action).

 

                    2.       COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE

 

                              a.       Generally

 

          Under the collateral order doctrine, a litigant may appeal from a “narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678, — S. Ct. —, 2009 WL 4573276 (Dec. 8 2009) (the collateral order doctrine includes only decisions that are conclusive, resolve important questions separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment); Englert v. MacDonnell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) ( “The doctrine ... applies to a small class of decisions, which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Copley Press, Inc. v. Higuera-Guerrero (In re Copley Press, Inc.), 518 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). The conditions for meeting the collateral order doctrine are “stringent.” Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868. Though often referred to as an exception, the collateral order doctrine is “best understood” as a “practical construction” of the final judgment rule. Id. at 867.

 

Cross-reference: II.A.3 (regarding certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) of an order disposing of fewer than all claims).

 

                    b.       Requirements of Collateral Order Doctrine

 

          To be immediately appealable, a collateral order must “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citations omitted); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678, — S. Ct. —, 2009 WL 4573276 (Dec. 8 2009); Englert v. MacDonnell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 2008); Copley Press, Inc. v. Higuera-Guerrero (In re Copley Press, Inc.), 518 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002); Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2004); Stevens v. Brinks Home Security, Inc., 378 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that collateral order doctrine did not apply where the order did not resolve an “important” question). All three requirements must be satisfied to qualify as collateral order for the purpose of appeal. See Cordoza v. Pacific States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Truckstop.net, LLC v. Sprint Corp., 547 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the court lacks jurisdiction if even one element is not met). The appealability of a collateral order should be determined “for the entire category to which a claim belongs.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994) (citations omitted); see also Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678, — S. Ct. —, 2009 WL 4573276 (Dec. 8 2009) (the court does not engage in an individualized jurisdictional inquiry, but rather focuses on the entire category to which the claim belongs).

 

                              c.       Appealability of Specific Orders under Collateral Order Doctrine

 

                                         i.        Abstention Orders

 

          A district court’s refusal to abstain is generally not appealable as a collateral order. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278 (1988) (Colorado River doctrine). However, a district court’s decision to abstain is appealable where the effect is to send the parties out of federal court. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (Burford doctrine); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10-11 & n.11 (1983) (Colorado River doctrine).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13 (regarding abstention-based dismissals); II.C.24 (regarding abstention-based remands); II.C.26 (regarding abstention-based stays).

 

                                         ii.       Orders Denying Immunity

 

          Orders denying claims of immunity are immediately appealable as collateral orders where the asserted immunity is an immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability, see Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1995), and the appeal raises a question of law, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528-30 (1985). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945-46 (2009); Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2009); Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

          A district court’s order deferring a motion to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds pending further discovery is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. However, the court can “treat the notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus and consider the issues under the factors set forth in Bauman.” See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.17 (regarding orders denying immunity).

 

                                         iii.      Disqualification of Counsel

 

          An order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is generally not appealable as a collateral order. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440 (1985). An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is also generally unappealable as a collateral order. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369-70 (1981). See also Aguon-Schulte v. Guam Election Com’n, 469 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2006) (no jurisdiction to review denial of motions to strike appearances of private counsel).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.14 (regarding disqualification orders).

 

                                         iv.      Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Sanctions

 

          An order denying a motion for sanctions brought by a party to ongoing litigation is generally not appealable as a collateral order. See McCright v. Santoki, 976 F.2d 568, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (observing the order can be effectively reviewed after final judgment). An order awarding sanctions against a party to ongoing litigation is similarly unappealable as a collateral order. See Riverhead Sav. Bank v. National Mortgage Equity Corp., 893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1055-56

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “pre-filing orders entered against vexatious litigants are [] not immediately appealable”); Stanley v. Woodford, 449 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (order awarding sanctions against attorney was not “final decision” for purposes of appeal).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10 (regarding contempt and sanctions orders generally).

 

                                         v.       Other Orders

 

                                                   (a)     Appealable Collateral Orders

 

          Appeal from the following orders has been permitted under the collateral order doctrine:

 

                  Order denying defendant’s motion to require plaintiffs in shareholder derivative action to post security for costs of suit. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).

 

                  Protective order in habeas corpus proceedings limiting respondent’s communications with certain witnesses. See Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

 

                  Order requiring warden to transport prisoner for medical tests. See Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F.3d 885, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

                  Order granting motion for certificate of reasonable cause prior to dismissal of forfeiture action. See United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

 

                  A district court order denying the state’s motion for reconsideration of a magistrate judge order that permitted discovery by the state of certain privileged materials, in connection with a habeas petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but limited the state’s use of such materials, was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                  A district court order dismissing with leave to amend a complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failure to include the employees’ true names is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000).

 

                  Dismissal of claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Fontana Empire Ctr. v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                  A district court decision overruling a claim of privilege and ordering the production of materials, based on the specific circumstances of the case. The court determined that “significant strategic decisions turn on [the decision’s] validity and review after final judgment may therefore come too late.” See Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

 

                  A denial of a claim of tribal sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1089-91 (9th Cir. 2007).

 

                  An order that unseals previously sealed documents may be reviewable as a collateral final order. See United States v. Higuera-Guerrero (In re Copley Press, Inc.), 518 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); but see United States v. Hickey, 185 F.3d 1064, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 1999) (order sealing documents is probably not appealable).

 

 


                                                   (b)     Orders Not Appealable as Collateral Orders

 

          Appeal from the following orders has not been permitted under the collateral order doctrine:

 

                  Order expunging lis pendens in forfeiture proceeding. See Orange County v Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 52 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.5 (regarding appeal from orders related to assets).

 

                  Order refusing to certify or decertifying a class. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1978).; see also Hunt v. Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009) (class certification orders are generally not immediately appealable).

Cross-reference: II.C.8.a (regarding permissive interlocutory appeal from class certification orders under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)).

 

                  Order granting motion to vacate dismissal entered pursuant to settlement agreement. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 869 (1994).

 

                  Pretrial order requiring parties to deposit money into a fund to share costs of discovery. See Lopez v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (In re Baxter Healthcare Corp.), 151 F.3d 1148, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (observing that order was subject to ongoing modification by district court and even contained a refund provision).

 

                  A district court order denying motion to issue a notice of collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007).

 

                  District court’s order concerning inadvertently disclosed document is generally not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Truckstop.net, LLC v. Sprint Corp., 547 F.3d 1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2008).

 

                  District court order denying in part defendant’s special motion to strike under Oregon’s anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) statute was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Englert v. MacDonnell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

                  Disclosure order adverse to the attorney-client privilege did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678, — S. Ct. —, 2009 WL 4573276 (Dec. 8, 2009).

 

                    3.       ORDERS CERTIFIED UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)

 

                              a.       Generally

 

When an action presents more than one claim for relief – whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim – or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.

 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

 

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) does not relax the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; it simply authorizes entry of judgment as to an individual claim or party, within a multi-claim or multi-party action, where the action as to an individual claim or party is finally determined. See Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2005). An order adjudicating fewer than all claims against all parties is not subject to immediate review absent Rule 54(b) certification unless it satisfies the collateral order doctrine, see II.A.2, is an appealable interlocutory order, see II.B, or is inextricably intertwined with an order that is immediately appealable, see V.A (Scope of Appeal).

                                         i.        District Court Determinations

 

          In determining whether to certify an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the district court must first determine whether the order is a final judgment. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980). “It must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’” Id. (citation omitted).

 

          The district court must then determine whether there is any just reason for delay. See id. at 8. The court should consider: (1) the interrelationship of the certified claims and the remaining claims in light of the policy against piecemeal review; and (2) equitable factors such as prejudice and delay. See id. at 8-10; Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1518-20 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2009) (the court of appeals must scrutinize the district court’s evaluation of factors such as “the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units”); Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878-89 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

          The district court may sua sponte reconsider, rescind or modify a certified order under 54(b) until the appellate court grants a party permission to appeal. See City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

                                         ii.       Appellate Court Review

 

          In determining whether jurisdiction exists under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), the court of appeals examines the contents of the certification order, see II.A.3.b (below), and the propriety of certification, see II.A.3.c.

 

                              b.       Contents of Certification Order

 

                                         i.        “No Just Reason for Delay”

 

          A certification order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) must expressly determine there is “no just reason for delay.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 325 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) (order) (concluding the district court’s initial certification was deficient because it failed to make the requisite express determination that there was “no just reason for delay”); Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where certification order referred to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and directed entry of judgment, but did not expressly determine there was “no just reason for delay”).

 

          However, “Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) does not require that the district court use the rule’s precise wording.” AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503, 505 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining Rule 54(b)’s “no just reason for delay” requirement was satisfied where certification order stated that defendant would not be prejudiced by entry of judgment under Rule 54(b), that certified claims were “substantially different” from remaining claims, and that defendant would not be subject to conflicting orders).

 

                                         ii.       Reference to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

 

          It is not mandatory that a certification order expressly refer to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) where the order finds no just reason for delay and directs entry of judgment. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981).

 

                                         iii.      “Specific Findings” Supporting Certification

 

          A certification order should also contain “specific findings setting forth the reason for [certification].” Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the lack of specific findings is not a jurisdictional defect as long as the court of appeals can determine the propriety of certification without such findings. See also Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009); Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Carlsberg Fin. Corp., 689 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding certification order valid where posture of case “readily obtainable from the briefs and records”); see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the court may “hear an interlocutory appeal under Rule 54(b) if it will aid in the efficient resolution of the action.”); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 732 n.1 (1987) (noting that remand due to lack of Rule 54(b) findings would be a waste of judicial resources because parties briefed merits).

 

                              c.       Propriety of Certification

 

                                         i.        Appellate Review Required

 

          Where a district court certifies a decision for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), the court of appeals must independently determine whether the decision is final. See Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1991). “The partial adjudication of a single claim is not appealable, despite a Rule 54(b) certification.” Id. at 1040 (citation omitted) (concluding that order dismissing punitive damages claim was not certifiable under Rule 54(b) because the damages claim was not separate and distinct from the remaining counts); see also Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 883 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification).

 

                                         ii.       Standard of Review

 

          The court of appeals reviews de novo the district court’s evaluation of judicial concerns, such as the interrelationship of certified claims and remaining claims, and the possibility of piecemeal review. See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1518-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (mixed question of law and fact); see also AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The district court’s Rule 54(b) certification of the judgment is reviewed de novo to determine if it will lead to ‘piecemeal appeals’ and for ‘clear unreasonableness’ on the issue of equities.”); Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that judicial concerns are reviewed de novo). The court of appeals reviews for abuse of discretion the district court’s assessment of equitable factors, such as prejudice and delay. See Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1519; cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Gregorian for the single proposition that the court reviews a Rule 54(b) certification for abuse of discretion).

 

Cross-reference: II.A.3.a.i (regarding determinations by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).

 

                                         iii.      Scrutiny under Morrison-Knudsen

 

          The traditional view is that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is to be “reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.” Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). Where there exists a similarity of legal or factual issues between claims to be certified and claims remaining, certification is proper “only where necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result.” Id. at 965-66 (finding certification improper because certified claims were legally and factually inseverable from unadjudicated claims, and compelling circumstances were not present).

 

                                         iv.      Trend Toward Greater Deference to District Court

 

          “The present trend is toward greater deference to a district court’s decision to certify under Rule 54(b).” Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir.

1991) (noting that Morrison-Knudsen is “outdated and overly restrictive”); see also Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2009) ( the court of appeals accords substantial deference to the district court’s assessment of equitable factors such as prejudice and delay); Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 942 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the court grants deference to a district court’s decision to grant a motion for entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b)); James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A court of appeals may, of course, review such judgments for compliance with the requirements of finality, but accords a great deference to the district court.”). Under the more recent standard, certified claims need not be separate and independent from remaining claims; rather, a certification is appropriate if it will aid “expeditious decision” of the case. See Texaco, Inc., 939 F.2d at 798 (stating that even under this more lenient standard, the court of appeals still must scrutinize certification to prevent piecemeal review).  

 

                                                   (a)     Orders Properly Certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

 

          The court of appeals has determined that the district court did not err in certifying the following orders for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b):

 

                  Order granting partial summary judgment to defendants properly certified even though the order eliminated no parties and left open possibility of full recovery by plaintiff for both property damage and liability to third parties. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[G]iven the size and complexity of this case, we cannot condemn the district court’s effort to carve out threshold claims and thus streamline further litigation.”).

 

                  Order granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’ claims seeking invalidation of settlement agreement properly certified even though defendants’ counterclaim for breach of settlement agreement still pending. See Sheehan v. Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that certified claims need not be separate and independent).

 

                  Order granting summary judgment for defendant on grounds that settlement agreement unenforceable properly certified even though defendant’s counterclaim for breach of contract, which formed the basis for the purported settlement, was still pending. See Texaco v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that although certified claims require proof of same facts as unadjudicated claims, resolution of legal issues on appeal will streamline ensuing litigation).

 

                  Order granting partial summary judgment to defendants as to certain theories of recovery properly certified even though the order did not eliminate any parties or limit possible recovery by plaintiff. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1987) (observing that Rule 54(b) demands “pragmatic approach focusing on severability and efficient judicial administration”).

                  Order setting aside default as to libel claim properly certified even though civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims still pending. See Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1518-20 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding libel claim to be distinct legally and factually from conspiracy claim, and “substantially different” legally and factually from emotional distress claim even though distress claim premised in part on libel).

 

                  Order dismissing certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction properly certified even though claims against remaining defendants still pending. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (observing that jurisdictional issue was “unrelated” to other issues in case and immediate appeal would aid “expeditious decision”).

 

                  Order granting summary judgment to third party defendants on contribution claim properly certified even though multiple claims against multiple parties were still pending in Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) action. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 564 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting trend toward greater deference to district court certification under Rule 54(b)).

 

                  Jury verdict for defendants on plaintiffs’ claims in complex anti-trust action properly certified even though defendants’ counterclaims still pending because district court ordered separate trials on claims and counterclaims. See Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1499 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997).

 

                  Order granting summary judgment to one of the defendants in the action was properly certified, where the judgment disposed of the case between the plaintiff and that defendant, despite similar pending claims that remained against other defendants. See Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 747 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

                                                   (b)     Orders Not Properly Certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

 

          The court of appeals has determined that the following orders were not properly certified for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b):

 

                  Order dismissing punitive damages claim not certifiable because not separate and distinct from remaining counts. See Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[C]omplaint asserting only one legal right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that right, states a single claim for relief.” (citations omitted)).

 

                  Orders granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial as to issues relating to plaintiffs’ respiratory and neurological injuries not certifiable because claims for negligence not finally determined. See Schudel v. General Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing that plaintiffs alleged single claims for negligence, not separate claims for respiratory and neurological injuries), abrogated on other grounds by Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).

                  Order granting summary judgment on state common law claim and statutory claim to the extent the claims were based on constructive discharge theory because the case was routine, the facts on all claims and issues overlapped and successive appeals were inevitable. See Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 883 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the interests of “judicial administration counsel against certifying claims or related issues in remaining claims that are based on interlocking facts, in a routine case, that will likely lead to successive appeals.”).

 

                              d.       Immediate Appeal from Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Order Required

 

          An order certified under Rule 54(b) must be appealed immediately; it is not reviewable on appeal from final judgment. See Williams v. Boeing Co., 681 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (stating that time to appeal begins to run upon entry of judgment under Rule 54(b)); see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 102 F.3d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that where notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of partial summary judgment certified under Rule 54(b), later appeal from modified partial summary judgment order was untimely because modification did not adversely affect appellant’s interest in a material matter).

 

Cross-reference: II.A.3.b.iii (regarding specific findings required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); III.C.3.a (regarding effectiveness of notice of appeal filed after grant of partial summary judgment but before entry of Rule 54(b) certification); III.F.2.g (regarding impact of tolling motion on time to appeal from order certified under Rule 54(b)).

 

                              e.       Denial of Rule 54(b) Certification

 

          An order denying a request for certification under Rule 54(b) is not itself an appealable order. See McCall v. Deeds, 849 F.2d 1259, 1259 (9th Cir. 1988) (order). However, an order denying certification may be reviewed on appeal from final judgment. See Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1522 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to certify order granting plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment that statute was unconstitutional).

 

          B.      APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS (28 U.S.C. § 1292)

 

                    1.       INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIVE ORDERS (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1))

 

                              a.       Generally

 

          The court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

 

          Section 1292(a)(1) is to be construed narrowly to encompass only appeals that “further the statutory purpose of permitting litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable consequence.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Buckingham v. Gannon (In re Touch America Holdings, Inc. ERISA Litig.), 563 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

 

          Note that the court of appeals’ denial of permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) does not preclude appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) is by permission while interlocutory appeal under § 1292(a) is by right); see also Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 465 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When [the court has] jurisdiction pursuant to § 1229(a), litigants need not also meet the requirements of § 1229(b).”).

 

                              b.       Order Granting or Denying an Injunction

 

                                         i.        Explicit Grant or Denial or Injunction

 

          An interlocutory order specifically granting or denying an injunction is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) without a showing of irreparable harm. See Paige v. California, 102 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving appeal from grant of preliminary injunction); Shee Atika v. Sealaska Corp., 39 F.3d 247, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving appeal from denial of permanent injunction).

 

                                         ii.       Implicit Grant or Denial of Injunction

 

          An order that does not expressly grant or deny an injunction may nevertheless be appealable under § 1292(a)(1) if it: (1) has the practical effect of denying an injunction; (2) could cause serious or irreparable harm; and (3) can only be “effectually challenged” by immediate appeal. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981); see also Buckingham v. Gannon (In re Touch America Holdings, Inc. ERISA Litig.), 563 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of North America, 523 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 137 F.3d 1420, 1422 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting inconsistent decisions as to whether Carson requirements should apply only to orders denying injunctive relief, or to both orders denying injunctive relief and orders granting injunctive relief).

 

          The substantial effect of the order, not its terminology, is determinative. See Tagupa v. East-West Ctr., Inc., 642 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding denial of mandamus appealable where substantial effect was to refuse an injunction); see also Negrete, 523 F.3d at 1097; United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 391 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 400 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding stay order appealable where it was the functional equivalent of a preliminary injunction).

 

                                                   (a)     Practical Effect of Order

 

          To determine an order’s practical effect, the court evaluates the order “in light of the essential attributes of an injunction.” See Orange County v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 52 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1995). An injunction is an order that is: “(1) directed to a party, (2) enforceable by contempt, and (3) designed to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief sought by a complaint in more than preliminary fashion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

          Applying the above standard, the court of appeals has held an order expunging a lis pendens to be unappealable under § 1292(a)(1) because although a lis pendens may prevent transfer of property by clouding its title, it is not directed at a party and its not enforceable by contempt. See Orange County, 52 F.3d at 825-26. The court of appeals has also held that a district court’s remand order vacating a final rule published by the National Marine Fisheries Service did not have the practical effect of entering an injunction because the order was subject to interlocutory appeal and did not compel the service to take any action, but rather only prohibited the service from enforcing the rule as it was written. See Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dept. of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184-86 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the court of appeals has held that an order denying exclusion of female state inmates from a plaintiff class action did not have the practical effect of an injunction where the order did not grant or deny injunctive relief, even though it modified the composition of the plaintiff class. See Plata v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1101, 1105-07 (9th Cir. 2003). The denial of an ex parte seizure order has also been held not to have the practical effect of an injunction and thus was not appealable. See In Re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 981-89 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

          In contrast, the court has permitted appeal from an order directing a party to place assessments mistakenly paid to it by defendant in escrow pending resolution of the underlying lawsuit, see United States v. Cal-Almond, Inc., 102 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1996), and an order granting summary judgment to the federal government where the district court’s ruling that the government had until a certain date to publish regulations effectively denied plaintiff environmental groups’ request for an injunction requiring publication by an earlier date, see Oregon Natural Resources Council, Inc., v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 336-37 (9th Cir. 1996). Jurisdiction has been also found over an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s order to continue for the duration of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) securities fraud action, the temporary escrow of termination payments because the order was analogous to a preliminary injunction. See SEC v. Gemstar TV Guide Intern., Inc., 401 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2005). The court also determined that an order not denominated an injunction, but that barred the defendant from discussing settlement in parallel class litigation, was in substance an injunction and thus immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1). See Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of North America, 523 F.3d 1091, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 2008).

 

                                                   (b)     Potential for Serious or Irreparable Harm

 

          An order that has the practical effect of denying injunctive relief is not immediately appealable unless appellant demonstrates that serious or irreparable harm would otherwise result. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 87-89 (1981) (concluding order that had effect of denying injunction was appealable where order deprived parties of right to compromise on mutually agreeable terms, including immediate restructuring of appellee’s employment policies, potentially causing irreparable harm). 

 

                                                   (c)     Effective Challenge Not Possible after Final Judgment

 

          An order that has the effect of granting or denying injunctive relief is not immediately appealable if it can be effectively challenged after final judgment. See Gamboa v. Chandler, 101 F.3d 90, 91 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (concluding orders that did not expressly grant or deny injunctive relief were not appealable despite injunctive effect because they could be effectively challenged following entry of final judgment).

 

                              c.       Orders Modifying, Continuing, or Dissolving Injunction

 

                                         i.        Order Modifying Injunction

 

          An order that substantially changes the terms of an injunction or alters the legal relations between the parties is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as an order modifying an injunction. See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1989); cf. Public Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Batt, 67 F.3d 234, 236-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing appeal from order that enforced but did not modify injunction).

 

          For example, the following orders are appealable under § 1292(a)(1) as orders modifying an injunction:

 

                  Order directing insurance company to pay all legal defense costs as incurred modified prior injunction ordering payment of all legal defense costs except as to claims and claimants clearly not covered. See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

                  Order requiring law firm to submit invoices for legal services to court for in camera review modified prior preliminary injunction freezing all client’s assets except for purposes of paying reasonable attorney’s fees. See FSLIC v. Ferm, 909 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).

 

                  Order denying motion to modify consent decree, by eliminating special master provision and substituting magistrate judge, had injunctive effect of requiring defendants to continue paying special master fees or face contempt. See Hook v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 107 F.3d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Thompson v. Enomoto, 815 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that order appointing special master did not modify consent decree because appointment of master was implicitly contemplated by court’s retention of jurisdiction to establish procedures for compliance).

                  Order denying motion based on changed circumstances that occurred after the injunction was entered to modify or dissolve preliminary injunction that barred former employee from arbitrating his employment dispute before the American Arbitration Association. See Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1123-25 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

                  Order where district court modified preliminary injunction after remand from prior appeal forcing Napster to disable its file transferring service until conditions were met that would achieve full compliance with the modified preliminary injunction. See A&M Records, Inc. v, Napster, 284 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                                         ii.       Order Continuing Injunction

 

          An order continues an injunction if the injunction would otherwise dissolve by its own terms. See Public Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Batt, 67 F.3d 234, 236-37 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an order “continuing” in force an existing injunction was not appealable as a modification or continuation order because the original injunction would have remained in effect by its own terms even without the order).

 

                                         iii.      Order Dissolving Injunction

 

          An order that has the effect of dissolving a prior injunction is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 486-87 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that order granting summary judgment that had the effect of vacating a modification to a prior injunction was appealable as an order dissolving an injunction).

 

                                         iv.      Order Denying Modification or Dissolution of Injunction

 

          An order denying a motion to modify or dissolve an injunction is appealable only if the motion raised new matter not considered at the time of the original injunction. See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1989); Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1419 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984). The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) is “to permit review of orders made in response to claims of changed circumstances, not to extend indefinitely the time for appeal from preliminary injunction by the simple device of seeking to vacate it or modify it.” Sierra On-Li9ne, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1419 n.4 (citations omitted).

 

          Review of an order denying a motion to modify or dissolve an injunction is generally limited to “new matter” presented by the motion. See Gon, 871 F.2d at 866. However, an order granting a modification may bring up for review the original injunction if the court of appeals “perceives a substantial abuse of discretion or when the new issues raised on reconsideration are inextricably intertwined with merits of the underlying order.” Id. at 867. (citation omitted).

 

          Cross-reference: V (regarding the inextricably intertwined standard).

 

                              d.       Examples of Orders Appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

 

          The following interlocutory orders are appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1):

 

                                         i.        Order Granting Permanent Injunction

 

          An order granting a permanent injunction is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) where no final judgment has yet been entered. See Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1986) (reviewing permanent injunction that was not a final judgment because the district court retained jurisdiction to conduct an accounting); see also Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing permanent injunction where district court retained jurisdiction only for an accounting of damages); Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the court of appeals has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal from district court order granting permanent injunction); TWA v. American Coupon Exch., 913 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing permanent injunction that was not a final judgment because the district court retained jurisdiction to determine damages).

 

                                        ii.       Order Denying Entry of Consent Decree

 

          An order denying a joint motion to enter a consent decree is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) where the order has the effect of denying injunctive relief and possibly causing irreparable harm. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 87-90 (1981) (finding possibility of irreparable harm in denial of parties’ right to compromise on mutually agreeable terms, including immediate restructuring of appellee’s employment policies); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).

 

                                         iii.      Order Granting Injunction Despite Lack of Motion for Interim Relief

 

          An order explicitly commanding a party to act or not act at the present time is sufficiently injunctive in character to be appealable under § 1292(a)(1) even though no motion for preliminary injunction is filed. See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing order that specifically directed a party to allow river water to flow undiverted). 

 

                                        iv.     Order Requiring Submission of Remedial Plan

 

          An order requiring submission of a remedial plan is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) where the order sufficiently specifies the content and scope of the remedial scheme, and the plan ultimately submitted would not materially alter the issues presented to the court of appeals. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that resolution of purely legal question presented would not be altered by details of remedial plan).

 

                                         v.       Certain Orders Affecting Assets

 

          Certain orders affecting assets are appealable under § 1292(a)(1). See, e.g., SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 335 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2003) (exercising jurisdiction over order freezing assets of real estate brokerage); United States v. Cal-Almond, Inc., 102 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction over order directing plaintiff to place assessments in escrow pending resolution of enforcement proceeding); United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction over order freezing assets from sale of property pending trial in forfeiture action); FSLIC v. Ferm, 909 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction over order requiring accounting that modified prior preliminary injunction freezing client’s assets except for payment of reasonable attorney’s fees); Smith v. Eggar, 655 F.2d 181, 183-84 (9th Cir. 1981) (exercising jurisdiction over order specifically commanding compliance with terms of security agreement between IRS and taxpayer that had resulted in consent order discontinuing taxpayer’s motion for preliminary injunction).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.5 (regarding the appealability of assets orders generally).

 

                                         vi.      Order Denying Relief in Mandamus Action

 

          An order denying relief in a mandamus action is appealable where the order has the “substantial effect” of denying injunctive relief. See Tagupa v. East-West Ctr., Inc., 642 F. 2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1981) (reviewing order granting partial summary judgment to federal defendants, thereby denying plaintiff’s request for writ of mandamus directing those defendants to carry out their duties).

 

                                         vii.     Order Staying Extradition

 

          An order staying extradition of a death row inmate to another state is appealable because it has the injunctive effect of restraining a party on penalty of contempt from taking an action it could otherwise take. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 137 F.3d 1420, 1421-22 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

                                         viii.    Order Denying Stay of Immigration Removal Order

 

          A district court order denying a stay of removal pending resolution of a habeas corpus petition was tantamount to denial of interim injunctive relief. See Faruqi v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 360 F.3d 985, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2004) (order).

 

                                         ix.      Order Disapproving Class Settlement

 

          A district court order disapproving of a class settlement is immediately appealable if the following three requirements are met: (1) interlocutory order has the practical effect of denying injunction; (2) the order has serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences, and (3) order can be effectively challenged only by immediate appeal). Buckingham v. Gannon (In re Touch America Holdings, Inc. ERISA Litig.), 563 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 

                              e.       Examples of Orders Not Appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)

 

          An order relating only to “conduct or progress of litigation before th[e] court ordinarily is not considered an injunction” under § 1292(a)(1). Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988) (overruling Enlow-Ettelson doctrine); Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 865-66 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although they are enforceable by contempt, orders that regulate the course of litigation, such as discovery orders, are not immediately appealable as injunctions).

 

          The following orders are not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1):

 

                                         i.        Order Denying Motion to Abstain

 

          An order denying motion to stay or dismiss an action pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or §1292(a)(1). See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277-78 (1988).

 

Cross-reference: II.A.2.c.i (regarding the appealability of abstention orders generally).

 

                                         ii.       Order Denying Motion for Stay

 

          An order denying motion to stay foreclosure proceeding not appealable because it could be effectively reviewed after final judgment in the very proceeding appellant sought to stay. See Federal Land Bank v. L.R. Ranch Co., 926 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.26 (regarding the appealability of stay orders generally).

                                         iii.      Order Granting England Reservation of Jurisdiction

 

          An order granting an England reservation of jurisdiction to decide federal claims in conjunction with a Pullman stay is not appealable because it does not have the practical effect of an injunction. See Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1406 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that order granting stay under Pullman is appealable under § 1291 or § 1292(a)(1)).

 

                                         iv.      Order Denying Motion to Quash

 

          An order denying a motion to quash a subpoena for documents is not appealable. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 534 (1971) (concluding order was not an injunction even though it contained a clause directing subject of subpoena to seek permission from Kenyan authorities to obtain documents).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12.b.ii.(a) (regarding the appealability of orders denying motions to quash subpoena generally).

 

                                         v.       Order Granting Conditional Permissive Intervention

 

          An order granting conditional permissive intervention is not appealable, despite its possible injunctive effect, because the order can be effectively challenged after final judgment. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors In Action, 480 U.S. 370, 379 (1987) (stating order is also unappealable under the collateral order doctrine).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.19 (regarding the appealability of intervention orders generally).

 

                                         vi.      Certain Orders Affecting Assets

 

          Certain orders affecting assets are appealable under § 1292(a)(1). See, e.g., SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1128 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (exercising jurisdiction over order freezing assets of real estate brokerage); United States v. Cal-Almond, Inc., 102 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction over order directing plaintiff to place assessments in escrow pending resolution of enforcement proceeding); United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction over order freezing assets from sale of property pending trial in forfeiture action); FSLIC v. Ferm, 909 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (exercising jurisdiction over order requiring accounting that modified prior preliminary injunction freezing client’s assets except for payment of reasonable attorney’s fees); Smith v. Eggar, 655 F.2d 181, 183-84 (9th Cir. 1981) (exercising jurisdiction over order specifically commanding compliance with terms of security agreement between IRS and taxpayer that had resulted in consent order discontinuing taxpayer’s motion for preliminary injunction).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.5 (regarding the appealability of assets orders generally).

 

                                         vii.     Order Remanding to Federal Agency

 

          An order granting remand to an agency for reconsideration of a consent decree is not appealable because it does not have the practical effect of granting or denying an injunction. See United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 846 F.2d 43, 44-45 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that order was also unappealable under the collateral order doctrine). Moreover, an order denying a motion for partial summary judgment seeking injunctive relief is not appealable where the district court simultaneously remands to an agency to conduct a hearing pursuant to newly enacted regulations that formed the basis for the summary judgment motion. See Eluska v. Andrus, 587 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 1978).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.24.b (regarding the appealability of orders remanding to federal agencies generally).

 

                                         viii.    Order Denying Summary Judgment Due to Factual Disputes

 

          An order denying a motion for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction is not appealable where the motion was denied because of unresolved issues of fact. See Switzerland Cheese Assoc. v. E. Horne’s Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966). 

 

                                         ix.      Order Denying Entry of Consent Decree Not Appealable by Party Against Whom Injunction Sought

 

          An order denying a joint motion for entry of a consent decree awarding injunctive relief is not appealable by the party against whom the injunction had been sought. See EEOC v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 796 F.2d 314, 316-17 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).

 

                              f.       Temporary Restraining Order

 

          An order denying a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is generally not appealable because of the policy against piecemeal review. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

          However, an order denying a TRO may be appealable if it is tantamount to denial of a preliminary injunction, see id., or if it “effectively decide[s] the merits of the case,” Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). “The terminology used to characterize the order does not control whether appeal is permissible under § 1292.” Northern Stevedoring & Handling Corp. v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 685 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

                                         i.        Order Tantamount to Denial of Preliminary Injunction

 

          Appeal from the following orders has been permitted under § 1292(a)(1) because the orders are tantamount to denial of a preliminary injunction:

 

                  Order denying a TRO after a full adversary hearing appealable where without review appellants would be foreclosed from pursuing further interlocutory relief. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 625 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1980) (order) (containing no reference to § 1292(a)(1)).

 

                  Order denying a TRO after a non-evidentiary adversary hearing appealable where the judge determined that prior case law precluded the requested relief. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The futility of any further hearing was . . . patent.”).

 

                  Order denying a TRO despite showing of irreparable harm appealable where parties had stipulated that order be treated as denial of preliminary injunction for appeal purposes. See Contract Serv. Network, Inc. v. Aubry, 62 F.3d 294, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving an order denying a TRO based on lack of federal preemption).

 

                  Order dissolving a TRO appealable where TRO had extended beyond 20-day limit set by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and was imposed after adversary hearing. See Bowoon Sangsa Co. v. Micronesian Indus. Corp. (In re Bowoon Sangsa Co.), 720 F.2d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 1983).

 

                  Order labeled as a TRO precluding employer from seeking to enforce non-compete agreement was appealable preliminary injunction, rather than unappealable TRO, because order was issued for 30 days, three times the limit set by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 and both parties had opportunity to argue the merits of the order. See Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                                         ii.       Orders Effectively Deciding Merits of Case

 

          Appeal from the following orders has been permitted under § 1292(a)(1) because the orders effectively decide the merits of the case:

 

                  Order denying a TRO appealable where application for permanent relief would be futile and, absent an injunction, controversy would become moot. See Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors, 805 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding denial of TRO to be a de facto denial of permanent injunction because if the federal agency were allowed to examine engines of crashed planes without observers, the claim that the exam may destroy evidence would be mooted).

 

                  Order denying a TRO appealable where “denial of all relief was implied in the trial judge’s denial of a temporary restraining order.” See Miller v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 1268, 1269 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (reviewing denial of TRO based on district court’s erroneous application of claim preclusion).

 

                  Order denying a TRO to stay execution of inmate immediately appealable as de facto denial of permanent injunction. See Woratzeck v. Arizona Bd. of Executive Clemency, 117 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

 

                  Order granting a TRO to enforce an arbitrator’s decision appealable where TRO definitively stated rights of parties. See Northern Stevedoring & Handling Corp. v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 685 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1982) (reviewing TRO premised on determination that union could not honor picket line because, under labor agreement, it was not a bona fide picket line).

 

                              g.       Mootness

 

          An appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction is mooted by entry of final judgment. See SEC v. Mount Vernon Mem’l Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

          An appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction is similarly mooted by entry of permanent injunction. See Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 949 (9th Cir. 1983).

 

                    Cross-reference: IX.B (regarding mootness generally).

 

                    2.       INTERLOCUTORY RECEIVERSHIP ORDERS (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2))

 

          The court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders “appointing receivers or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2).

 

          Section 1292(a)(2) is to be strictly construed to permit interlocutory appeals only from orders that fall within one of the three categories specifically set forth. See Canada Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding turnover order that was included in an order appointing a receiver was subject to interlocutory review under § 1292(a)(2)); FTC v. Overseas Unlimited Agency, Inc., 873 F.2d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989); SEC v. American Principals Holdings, Inc., 817 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the statute was intended to cover orders that refuse to take steps to accomplish purpose of receivership). See also SEC v. Capital Consultants, LLC, 453 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

 

          Appeal from the following orders has not been permitted under § 1292(a)(2):

 

                  Order directing that funds be turned over to receiver pursuant to previous unappealed order appointing receiver. See Overseas Unlimited Agency, Inc., 873 F.2d at 1235 (noting that a simple “turnover” order is also not appealable as an injunction under § 1292(a)(1)); but see Canada Life Assurance Co., 563 F.3d at 841 (concluding turnover order that was included in an order appointing a receiver was subject to interlocutory review under § 1292(a)(2)).

 

                  Order affirming compensation payments to receiver and authorizing spinoff of some partnerships not appealable because it took steps towards winding up receivership rather than refusing to take such steps. See American Principals Holdings, Inc., 817 F.2d at 1350-51.

 

                  Order denying motion to dismiss receivership. See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

                    3.       INTERLOCUTORY ADMIRALTY ORDERS (§ 1292(a)(3))

 

                              a.       Generally

 

          The court of appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders “determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).

 

          Section 1292(a)(3) is to be construed narrowly to confer jurisdiction “only when the order appealed from determines the rights and liabilities of the parties.” Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Bluewater Partnership, 772 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1985) (observing that the statute was intended to permit appeal from an admiralty court’s determination of liability before action was referred to commissioner for damages determination); see also Southwest Marine Inc. v. Danzig, 217 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000).

 

          To be appealable, an interlocutory admiralty order need not determine rights and liabilities as to all parties. See All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. M/V Sea Producer, 882 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1989) (exercising jurisdiction even though claims between other parties unresolved); see also Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 772 F.2d at 568 (stating that certification under Fed R. Civ. P. 54(b) is not necessary to appeal an interlocutory admiralty order).

 

                              b.       Appealable Admiralty Orders

 

          Appeal from the following orders has been permitted under § 1292(a)(3):

 

                  Order limiting cargo carrier’s liability to set dollar amount pursuant to bill of lading and federal statute. See Vision Air Flight Serv., Inc. v. M/V Nat’l Pride, 155 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

                  Order determining that crewmen held preferred wage liens on maritime equipment appealable because it eliminated any possibility of recovery by equipment owner. See Kesselring v. F/T Arctic Hero, 30 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting it was undisputed that proceeds of sale of vessel were insufficient to satisfy all claims).

                  Order determining that one claimant’s lien had priority over another appealable because it precluded possibility of recovery by subordinate lien holder where unpaid balance of preferred lien exceeded sale proceeds of vessel. See All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. M/V Sea Producer, 882 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Bluewater Partnership, 772 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1985)).

                     

                  Order confirming sale of vessel appealable. See Ghezzi v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 321 F.2d 421, 422 (9th Cir. 1963) (§ 1292(a)(3) not specifically mentioned).

 

                  Order holding that contract relating to a written employment agreement that was not signed by the vessel’s master was invalid. See Harper v. United States Seafoods LP, 278 F.3d 971, 973 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                  Order granting partial summary judgment limiting cruise line’s liability in wrongful death action. See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2002).   

 

                                         c.       Nonappealable Admiralty Orders

 

          Appeal from the following orders has not been permitted under § 1292(a)(3):

 

                  Order determining priority of certain liens not appealable because challenge to trustee status of priority lien holder still pending, thereby precluding finality of lien priority determination as to any claimant. See Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Bluewater Partnership, 772 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

                  Order staying action pending arbitration not appealable under § 1292(a)(3) because it did not determine rights and liabilities of parties. See Gave Shipping Co., S.A. v. Parcel Tankers, Inc., 634 F.2d 1156, 1157 (9th Cir. 1980).

                    4.       INTERLOCUTORY PERMISSIVE APPEALS (28 U.S.C. § 1292(b))

 

          A district judge may certify a nonappealable order in a civil action if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and . . . an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

 

          The court of appeals has discretion to permit an appeal from a certified order if a petition for permission to appeal is filed within 10 days after entry of the order in district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also Fed. R. App. P. 5(a)(3) (stating that if the district court amends its order “to include the required permission or statement . . . the time to petition runs from entry of the amended order”).

 

                              a.       Procedure for Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

 

                                         i.        District Court Certification under § 1292(b)

 

          The district court must certify an order for immediate appeal before the court of appeals has discretion to accept jurisdiction under § 1292(b). See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978); Pride Shipping Corp. v. Tafu Lumber Co., 898 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding no appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(b) where district court refused to certify order). “[M]andamus to direct the district judge to exercise his discretion to certify [a] question is not an appropriate remedy.” Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 698 (9th Cir. 1977).

 

                                         ii.       Timely Petition from Order Certified under § 1292(b)

 

          The requirement that a petition be filed with the court of appeals within ten days of entry of a certified order in district court is jurisdictional. See Benny v. England (In re Benny), 791 F.2d 712, 719 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissing appeal because petition untimely). However, if an appeal is dismissed as untimely under § 1292(b), the district court may recertify the order. See Bush v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. (In re All Asbestos Cases), 849 F.2d 452, 453 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing initial appeal without prejudice to refiling following recertification).

                                         iii.      Appellate Court Permission to Appeal under § 1292(b)

 

          Once an order is certified, the petitioner “has the burden of persuading the court of appeals that exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) (citation omitted).

 

          The court of appeals may decline to review an order certified under § 1292(b) for any reason, including docket congestion. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 475. For example, the court of appeals has discretion to consider tactical use of certain motions as grounds for declining jurisdiction under § 1292(b). See Shurance v. Planning Control Int’l Inc., 839 F.2d 1347, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (order) (remarking that permitting appeal from order denying motion to disqualify opposing counsel “would greatly enhance [its] usefulness as a tactical ploy”).

 

          Once the court of appeals has granted permission to appeal under § 1292(b), it may subsequently determine that permission was improvidently granted and dismiss the appeal. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 969 F.2d 848, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1992) (order) (dismissing appeal after permission granted because sole issue raised on appeal had been addressed by court in prior decision); Bush v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. (In re All Asbestos Cases), 849 F.2d 452, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing appeal after permission granted because intervening Supreme Court decision clarified that appellate jurisdiction rested in the Federal Circuit).

 

          Note that “a denial of permission to appeal under § 1292(b) does not foreclose appeal under § 1292(a), where a litigant can meet the requirements of § 1292(a).” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b) is by permission while interlocutory appeal under § 1292(a) is by right).

 

                                         iv.      Stay Pending Appeal from Certified Order

 

          An application for permissive appeal “shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

 

                              b.       Standards for Evaluating § 1292(b) Certification Order

 

          The court of appeals must determine whether the district court properly found that the statutory requirements for certification had been met, and if so, whether the court wishes to accept jurisdiction. See Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus. (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 522 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[O]nce the district judge opens the gate to this court, we exercise complete, undeferential review to determine whether the court properly found that § 1292(b)’s certification requirements were satisfied.”).

 

                                         i.        Order Raises Controlling Question of Law

 

          To be appealable under § 1292(b), an order must involve a controlling question of law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A question of law is controlling if its resolution on appeal “could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.” Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus. (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

          A question may be controlling even though its resolution does not determine who will prevail on the merits. See Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 318-19 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding order involved controlling question of law where “it could cause the needless expense and delay of litigating an entire case in a forum that has no power to decide the matter”). However, a question is not controlling simply because its immediate resolution may promote judicial economy. See Ideal Basic Indus., 673 F.2d at 1027.

 

                                         ii.       Difference of Opinion Exists as to Controlling Question

 

          To permit appeal under § 1292(b), there must be substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the question raised. See Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus.

(In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Englert v. MacDonnell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 969 F.2d 848, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1992) (order) (concluding permission to appeal was improvidently granted where question raised was clearly answered in prior decision).

 

                                         iii.     Immediate Appeal Would Materially Advance Litigation

 

          An order is not reviewable under § 1292(b) unless its immediate review may materially advance the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also Englert v. MacDonnell, 551 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009). Although “material advancement” has not been expressly defined, in one case the court determined that immediate appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation where the appeal might postpone the scheduled trial date. See Shurance v. Planning Control Int’l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

                              c.       Examples of Orders Reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

 

          The court of appeals has permitted appeal from the following orders under § 1292(b):

 

                  Order denying motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that court of appeals had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction under federal statute. See Owner-Operators Indep. Drivers Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 582, 584 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

                  Order denying motion to remand for judgment on the pleadings contending that district court lacked jurisdiction due to untimely complaint. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 801 F.2d 1170, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by 815 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1987).

                  Order denying motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Goldberg v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 678 F.2d 1365, 1366 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

                  Order denying summary judgment based on choice of law determination. See Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A., 930 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

                  Orders determining liability in a bifurcated, multidistrict, multiparty action. See Steering Comm. v. United States, 6 F.3d 572, 575 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding mixed questions of law and fact to be within scope of appeal).

 

                  Order granting motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration based on determination that employment contract contained enforceable arbitration provision. See Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1996).

 

                  Order requiring attorney to answer deposition questions despite assertion of privilege. See Tennenbaum v. Deloitte & Touche, 77 F.3d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1996).           

                  Order denying motion to dismiss in breach of contract action on grounds that guarantees made within the contract were illegal due to an executive order that prohibits United States citizens from investing in and trading with Iran. See Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

                              d.       Examples of Orders Not Reviewed under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b)

 

          The court of appeals has not permitted appeal under § 1292(b) from the following orders:

 

                  Order denying motion to disqualify opposing counsel for ethical violations. See Shurance v. Planning Control Int’l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) (order) (observing that review would not affect outcome of litigation because if attorney tried to use evidence unethically obtained, appellant could seek protective order or exclusion of evidence). But see Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir. 1983) (permitting review of order denying motion to disqualify counsel).

 

                  Order granting motion to recuse presiding judge based on interpretation of conflict in interest statute. See Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus. (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that reversal of such an order would not materially advance outcome of case because issue was collateral).

 

                  Order remanding action to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction; review barred by § 1447(d). See Krangel v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 914, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that a discretionary remand order may be reviewable under §1292(b)). But see Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862 (2009) (holding that a district court’s order remanding a case to state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims is not a remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for which appellate review is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d)).

 

                  Order dismissing one of several defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction was not appealable because the district court did not indicate in the order that immediate appeal would advance termination of litigation. See Special Investments, Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 993 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

          C.      APPEALABILITY OF SPECIFIC ORDERS

 

                    1.       ADMIRALTY

 

          See II.B.3.

 

                    2.       AGENCY

 

          See VII.

                    3.       APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

 

                              a.       Generally

 

          An order denying a motion for appointment of counsel is generally not an appealable final order. See Kuster v. Block, 773 F.2d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that order denying appointment of counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action was not appealable); see also Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1332 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (reviewing denial of appointed counsel after final judgment). Such an order does not satisfy the collateral order doctrine because it raises issues enmeshed with the merits of the underlying action. See Kuster, 773 F.2d at 1049 (reasoning that entitlement to counsel depends on merit of claim and litigant’s ability to articulate claim in light of complexity of issues).

 

                              b.       Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Action

 

          An order denying appointment of counsel in a Title VII action is an appealable collateral order. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc’y of San Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981) (observing that denial of counsel in a Title VII case is not ‘inherently tentative,’ the court can avoid delving into the merits by relying on an agency determination of reasonable cause, and immediate review is necessary to prevent plaintiff from becoming bound in a future action by prejudicial errors). “Congress has made explicit findings that Title VII litigants are presumptively incapable of handling properly the complexities involved in Title VII cases.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1332 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (harmonizing Kuster and Bradshaw).

 

          However, an order denying an interim award of attorney’s fees to pay appointed counsel in a Title VII action is not immediately appealable. See Morgan v. Kopecky Charter Bus Co., 760 F.2d 919, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing Bradshaw).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.6 (regarding attorney’s fees); II.C.15 (regarding forma pauperis status); II.C.22 (regarding pre-filing review orders).

 

                    4.       ARBITRATION (9 U.S.C. § 16)

 

          In cases governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), the appealability of arbitration orders is established by 9 U.S.C. § 16 (formerly 9 U.S.C. § 15). See Nichols v. Stapleton, 877 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (applying provisions retroactively).

 

          Under 9 U.S.C. § 16, decisions disfavoring arbitration (e.g. orders denying motions to compel arbitration) are generally immediately appealable, while decisions favoring arbitration (e.g. orders compelling arbitration) are generally not appealable until after arbitration proceedings have concluded. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 9 U.S.C. § 16; see also Sanford v. Memberworks, Inc., 483 F.3d 956, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2007); Dees v. Billy, 394 F.3d 1290, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 2005); Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994). However, dismissal in favor of arbitration is an appealable final decision, notwithstanding that the dismissal is in favor of arbitration and the parties could later return to court to enter judgment on an arbitration award. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randalph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000); see also Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction over district court order dismissing plaintiffs claims pending arbitration); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).

 

                              a.       Cases Governed by the Federal Arbitration Act

 

          “The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., authorize[s] courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.” Kummetz v. Tech Mold, Inc., 152 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

          A provision of the Federal Arbitration Act excluding from its reach “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in interstate commerce” did not exclude all employment contracts, but rather exempted from the FAA only contracts of employment law that restricted the ability of non-transportation employees and employers to enter into an arbitration agreement. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001), abrogating Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998).

          Regarding the coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act, see also 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

 

                              b.       Arbitration Orders Appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16

 

          The following orders (interlocutory orders disfavoring arbitration and final arbitration orders) are appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16:

 

                  Order refusing to stay an action pending arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

                  Order denying a petition to order arbitration to proceed under 9 U.S.C. § 4. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008); Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist., 925 F.2d at 1138.

 

                  Order dismissing plaintiffs claims pending arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 

                  Order denying an application to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C); Mundi v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d 1042, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009); Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998); Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 4 F.3d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

                  Order confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(D).

 

                  Order modifying, correcting, or vacating an award. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(E).

 

                  Interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying injunction against arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(2); Southeast Resource Recovery Facility Auth. v. Montenay Int’l Corp., 973 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1992) (exercising jurisdiction over order staying arbitration).                     

                  Final decision with respect to an arbitration subject to Title 9. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3); United States v. Park Place Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2009); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

                              c.      Arbitration Orders Not Appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16

 

          Whether an order favoring arbitration is interlocutory, and thus not immediately appealable, depends on the scope of the proceeding in which the order is issued. See below (“Interlocutory v. Final Arbitration Decision”). The following orders favoring arbitration are not immediately appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16 when they are interlocutory:

 

                  Interlocutory order staying action pending arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1); Delta Computer Corp. v. Samsung Semiconductor & Telecomm. Co., 879 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007); Dees v. Billy, 394 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a district court order staying judicial proceedings and compelling arbitration is not appealable even if accompanied by an administrative closing. An order administratively closing a case is a docket management tool that has no jurisdictional effect.”).

 

                  Interlocutory order directing arbitration to proceed under 9 U.S.C. § 4. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(2); Nichols v. Stapleton, 877 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

 

                  Interlocutory order compelling arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3); Delta Computer Corp., 879 F.2d at 663.

 

                  Interlocutory order refusing to enjoin an arbitration subject to Title 9. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(4); Pacific Reinsurance Mgt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

                              d.       Interlocutory v. Final Decision

 

          Whether an order favorable to arbitration is immediately appealable depends on whether the order is an interlocutory or a final order. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 9 U.S.C. § 16.

 

          For example, an order appointing an arbitrator is unappealable if issued in the course of an ongoing proceeding. See O.P.C. Farms Inc. v. Conopco Inc., 154 F.3d 1047, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

          In contrast, an order compelling arbitration is a final decision appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) if the motion to compel arbitration was the only claim before the district court. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994) (referring to a proceeding solely to compel arbitration as an “independent” proceeding). An action solely to compel arbitration is an “independent” proceeding regardless of any related proceeding pending before a state court. See id; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).

 

          An order dismissing an action remains a “final decision” within the traditional understanding of that term, notwithstanding that the dismissal was in favor of arbitration and that the parties could later return to court to enter judgment on an arbitration award. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86-87 (2000); see also Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction over district court order dismissing plaintiffs claims pending arbitration); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 2009) (same).

 

          A district court’s order dismissing an action without prejudice after it determines that one of the plaintiff’s causes of action fails to state a claim, and ordering that parties arbitrate the remaining claims, is final and appealable. Interactive Flight Techs., Inc. v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (order), overruling McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 122 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 1997). However, a district court order staying judicial proceedings and compelling arbitration where not all claims are dismissed is not appealable. See Dees v. Billy 394 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 486 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007) (district court’s interlocutory order compelling arbitration was not appealable because the district court stayed the case pending arbitration); Sanford v. Memberworks, Inc., 483 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) (district court order compelling arbitration not final and appealable where the court did not dismiss the claims, but rather said “it would terminate the case” if arbitration not completed in twelve months); Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (district court order compelling arbitration was not final and appealable where the court did not rule upon defendant’s motions to stay and dismiss, effectively staying the action pending the conclusion of arbitration).

 

                              e.       Other Avenues for Appeal from Arbitration Orders

 

          Title 9 does not preclude permissive appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See 9 U.S.C. § 16(b); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1998) (reviewing order compelling arbitration under § 1292(b)), overruled on other grounds by E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

Cross-reference: II.B.4 (regarding interlocutory permissive appeals under § 1292(b) generally).

 

          An order compelling arbitration may also be reviewable if it is “inextricably bound up” with an order over which the court of appeals has jurisdiction. See Tracer Research Corp. v. National Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing order compelling arbitration in appeal from order dissolving injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). But see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372, 1379 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court has yet to affirm validity of exercising appellate jurisdiction over related rulings that are not supported by an independent jurisdictional basis).

 

Cross-reference: V.A.2.g (regarding the reviewability of an order compelling arbitration in an interlocutory injunction appeal).

 

                    5.      Assets (Liens, Attachments, etc.)

 

                              a.       Orders Restraining Assets

 

          Ordinarily, an interlocutory order restraining assets is not immediately appealable because the rights of the parties can be protected during the proceeding. See PMS Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

          For example, the following interlocutory orders restraining assets are not immediately appealable:

 

                  Order granting writ of attachment. See Perpetual Am. Bank, FSB v. Terrestrial Sys., Inc., 811 F.2d 504, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

                  Order denying motion to quash writ of execution. See Steccone v. Morse-Starrett Prods. Co., 191 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1951); see also United States v. Moore, 878 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

 

                  Order granting writ of possession. See PMS Distrib. Co., 863 F.2d at 640.

 

                              b.       Orders Releasing Assets

 

          Ordinarily, an interlocutory order releasing assets is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because review after final judgment would be an “empty rite.” PMS Distrib. Co. v. Huber & Suhner, A.G., 863 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). But see Orange County v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 52 F.3d 821, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that order expunging lis pendens is not an appealable collateral order where “the determination of whether the claimant has established the probable validity of his real property claim will thrust th[e] court into the merits of the dispute”).

 

          For example, the following interlocutory orders releasing assets are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine:

 

                  Order vacating writ of attachment. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1950); Pride Shipping Corp. v. Tafu Lumber Co., 898 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1990); Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

                  Order vacating writ of garnishment. See Stevedoring Serv. of Am. v. Ancora Transp., N.V., 59 F.3d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

                  Order vacating right to attach order. See Interpool Ltd. v. Char Yigh Marine (Panama) S.A., 890 F.2d 1453, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1989), amended by 918 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1990).

 

                    6.       ATTORNEY’S FEES

 

                              a.       Interim Attorney’s Fees Order

 

          Generally, an order granting or denying interim attorney’s fees is not immediately appealable, either as a collateral order or as an injunction. See Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1988); see also In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Litigation, 401 F.3d 143, 156 (9th Cir. 2005); cf. Finnegan v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Progs., 69 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

          For example, the following orders granting or denying interim attorney’s fees are not immediately appealable:

 

                  Order awarding interim attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Hillery v. Rushen, 702 F.2d 848, 848 (9th Cir. 1983) (order).

 

                  Order denying interim attorney’s fees under Title VII. See Morgan v. Kopecky Charter Bus Co., 760 F.2d 919, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no jurisdiction over order that denied motion for reasonable fee from public fund to pay involuntarily appointed counsel).

Cross-reference: II.C.3.b (regarding appointment of counsel in Title VII actions).

 

                  Order awarding interim attorney’s fees under the Freedom of Information Act. See Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720.

 

                  Order awarding interim attorney’s fees after class action settlement. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/ Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Litigation, 401 F.3d at 156-61.

 

                              b.       Post-Judgment Attorney’s Fees Order

 

          An order granting or denying a post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees is generally an appealable final order. See II.C.21.c.i (Post-Judgment Orders).

 

                    7.       BANKRUPTCY

 

                    See VI.

 

                    8.       CLASS ACTIONS

 

                              a.       Interlocutory Appeal from Class Certification Order

 

          “Class certification orders generally are not immediately appealable.” Hunt v. Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, a district court order designating a lead plaintiff in a securities fraud class action brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was not subject to interlocutory review. Z-Seven Fund, Inc. v. Motorcar Parts & Accessories, 231 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000).

However, the court has “discretion to permit interlocutory appeals of class certification orders under Rule 23(f).” Hunt, 560 F.3d at 1140.

 

                                         i.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

 

A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.

 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).

 

          Regarding the procedure for seeking permissive appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 5.

 

                                         ii.       Decisions Predating Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)

 

          An order refusing to certify, or decertifying, a class is generally not an appealable collateral order. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1978) (reasoning that such an order is subject to revision, enmeshed with the merits, and effectively reviewable after final judgment). Moreover, an order denying class certification was deemed unappealable as a denial of an injunction where plaintiff sought only a permanent injunction, not a preliminary injunction. See Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 479-81 & n.3 (1978) (distinguishing case where class certification denied in conjunction with denial of preliminary injunction).

 

Cross-reference: II.D.4.a (regarding mandamus relief from class certification orders).

 

                              b.       Review of Class Certification Order After Final Judgment

 

Cross-reference: V.A.1 (regarding decisions that are reviewable on appeal from final judgment under the merger doctrine).

 

                                         i.        Final Order Adjudicating Individual Claim

 

          Ordinarily, an order decertifying a class, or declining to certify a class, is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment as to individual claims. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978).

 

                                         ii.       Dismissal Following Settlement of Individual Claim

 

          However, an interlocutory order denying class certification is not reviewable after final judgment where the named plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the entire action with prejudice after settling his individual claims. See Seidman v. Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing in dictum that “[h]ad the stipulation narrowly provided for dismissal of [plaintiff’s] individual claims, and then had the district court, having earlier denied class certification, entered an adverse judgment dismissing the entire action, an entirely different scenario would be before us”).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13.a.vi (regarding voluntary dismissal with prejudice).

 

                                         iii.      Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute Individual Claim

 

          An order denying class certification does not merge in the final judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute where the denial of certification led to abandonment of suit. See Huey v. Teledyne, Inc., 608 F.2d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 1979).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13.b.a (regarding dismissal for failure to prosecute).

 

                                         iv.      Underlying Judgment Reversed on Appeal

 

          As a general rule, “interlocutory orders regarding certification and decertification of class actions should not be reviewed [by the court of appeals] . . . when the judgment pursuant to which appeal was taken is reversed or vacated and the case remanded.” Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 27 (9th Cir. 1981).

 

                              c.       Appeal from Orders Allocating Cost of Notifying Class Members

 

          Orders allocating costs of notifying class members are generally appealable collateral orders. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 & n.10 (1974) (order imposing costs of notification on defendants appealable); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 348 n.8 (1978) (order requiring defendants, partially in their own expense, to compile a list of members of the plaintiff class appealable); Hunt v. Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009) (order placing class notice costs on defendant in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act appealable); Harris v. Peddle (In re Victor Tech. Sec. Litig.), 792 F.2d 862, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1986) (order requiring plaintiffs to offer to reimburse record owners of stock for costs of forwarding notice to beneficial owners appealable).

 

                    9.       Consolidated Actions

 

          A decision adjudicating all claims in an action is not final and appealable if consolidated actions remain undecided, unless the order is certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984).

 

Cross-reference: II.A.3 (regarding orders certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).

 

          However, if after a notice to appeal is filed in a consolidated action the remaining actions are resolved, or proper Rule 54(b) certification is obtained, the court of appeals has jurisdiction over the appealed action. See Fadem v. United States, 42 F.3d 533, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1994) (order).

 

Cross-reference: III.C (regarding premature notices of appeal).

 

                    10.     Contempt and Sanctions

 

          The appealability of a contempt or sanctions order depends on whether the order is issued: (1) in the course of an underlying district court proceeding, see II.C.10.a; (2) after final judgment in an underlying district court proceeding, see II.C.10.b; or (3) as the final judgment in an enforcement or contempt proceeding, see II.C.10.c.

 

          In addition to these procedural considerations, which are explicated below, an order of contempt is generally not appealable until sanctions are imposed, see Blalock Eddy Ranch v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 982 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1992), and an order awarding sanctions is not appealable until the amount of sanctions is determined, see Jensen Elec. Co. v. Moore, Caldwell, Rowland & Dodd, Inc., 873 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2009) (civil contempt order not appealable until district court had adjudicated the contempt motion and applied sanctions). But see II.C.10.b.ii (regarding continuing contempt orders).

 

                              a.       Appealability of Contempt or Sanctions Order Issued in the Course of an Underlying District Court Proceeding

 

          The appealability of a contempt or sanctions order issued in the course of an underlying district court proceeding depends on whether the order issued against: (1) a party, see II.C.10.a.i; (2) a nonparty, see II.C.10.a.ii; or (3) a party and nonparty jointly, see II.C.10.a.iii.

 

                                         i.        Contempt or Sanctions Order Against Party

 

          The appealability of a contempt or sanctions order issued against a party to ongoing proceedings depends on whether the order is civil or criminal, see below.

 

                                                   (a)     Appealability of Civil v. Criminal Contempt Orders

 

          An order of civil contempt entered against a party to ongoing litigation is generally not immediately appealable. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KSD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008); Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Portland Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681, 687 (9th Cir. 1988) (order of civil contempt against parties for violating preliminary injunction not reviewable even during appeal under § 1292(a)(1) challenging constitutionality of preliminary injunction). But see Kirkland v. Legion Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that civil contempt order was appealable because it was based on district court’s prior order which was sufficiently final to be appealable); Dollar Rent A Car of Washington, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A]n appeal of a civil contempt order is permissible when it is incident to an appeal from a final order or judgment, including an underlying preliminary injunction order.”).

 

          However, an order of criminal contempt entered against a party to ongoing litigation is immediately appealable. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 539 F.3d at 1042; Bingman, 100 F.3d at 655 (monetary sanctions against defendant prison officials).

 

          In determining whether a contempt sanction is civil or criminal, the court of appeals looks to the character of the relief granted, not the terminology used by the district court. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 539 F.3d at 1042; Bingman, 100 F.3d at 656. 

 

                                                   (b)     Criminal Contempt Defined

 

          An unconditional penalty is generally criminal because it is designed to punish. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KSD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008); Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 1996).

 

          A fine is generally deemed punitive only when paid to the court, but where the purpose is clearly not compensatory, even a fine paid to complainant should be considered criminal. See Bingman, 100 F.3d at 655-56 (fine against defendant prison officials, payable in part to the plaintiff prisoner and in part to clerk of court, deemed criminal where judge stated purpose was to punish prison officials and did not indicate fines were compensatory or could be expunged; clause stating one purpose of order was “to encourage adherence to this or other orders of [the] Court” did not alone convert sanctions into civil).

 

                                                   (c)     Civil Contempt Defined

 

          A fine is deemed civil if its purpose is to compensate the complainant for losses sustained, or to compel the contemnor to comply with the court’s order by affording an opportunity to purge. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. KSD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (order was civil where attorney’s fees, lost royalties, and storage costs were assessed in order to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained); Union of Prof’l Airmen v. Alaska Aeronautical Indus., 625 F2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1980) (fine deemed civil, even though it was a substantial round sum payable immediately, where it included damages and attorney’s fees payable to opposing party for purposes of compensation and compliance); see also Hoffman v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen’s Local Union, 536 F.2d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 1976) (order assessing fines against party and then suspending them to permit purge of contempt was adjudication of civil contempt).

 

          Incarceration for the purpose of coercing compliance is also generally deemed civil, although it may become criminal if it loses its coercive effect due to contemnor’s inability to comply. See SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp., 824 F.2d 732, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1987) (order) (deeming incarceration for failure to account for funds and produce records related to assets civil where purpose was to coerce party to comply); Hughes v. Sharp, 476 F.2d 975, 975 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (deeming incarceration for failure to appear at examination of judgment debtor civil where party given opportunity to purge contempt). It is within the district court’s discretion to determine whether a civil contempt order has lost its coercive effect with regard to a particular contemnor. See Elmas Trading Corp., 824 F.2d at 732-33 (district court did not abuse discretion in finding contemnor able to comply despite his assertion to the contrary).

 

                                                   (d)     Sanctions Order against Party

 

          An order awarding sanctions against a party is generally not an appealable collateral order because it can be effectively reviewed after final judgment. See Riverhead Sav. Bank v. National Mortgage Equity Corp., 893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990) (Rule 11 sanctions); see also Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that pre-filing orders entered against vexatious litigants are generally not immediately appealable).

 

                                         ii.       Contempt or sanctions Order against Nonparty

 

                                                   (a)     Generally

 

          A contempt or sanctions order against a nonparty is final and appealable by the nonparty upon issuance of the order despite lack of a final judgment in the underlying action. See Portland Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 877 F.2d 787, 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1989) (order of civil contempt against nonparty for violation of preliminary injunction appealable); David v. Hooker Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 415-17 (9th Cir. 1977) (sanctions order awarding expenses and attorney’s fees against nonparty officer of corporate defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) for failure to answer interrogatories appealable). But see Jensen Elec. Co. v. Moore, Caldwell, Rowland & Dodd, Inc., 873 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1989) (order awarding sanctions against nonparty attorney for filing frivolous third party complaint not final and appealable where amount of sanctions not yet determined); cf. In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2003) (court of appeals had jurisdiction to review district court decision on merits, as well as further decision that bankruptcy court’s attorney fee award was excessive, even though district court had remanded for additional findings on the appropriate fee award).

 

                                                   (b)     Contempt or Sanctions Order against Nonparty Witness

 

          An order of civil contempt entered against a nonparty witness for failure to comply with a subpoena for documentary evidence is appealable despite lack of a final judgment in the underlying action. See United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988).

 

                                                   (c)     Contempt or Sanctions Order against Nonparty Attorney

 

          Prior to Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999), an order awarding sanctions against a nonparty attorney in an ongoing proceeding was generally immediately appealable by the attorney under the collateral order doctrine. See e.g. Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump Co., 680 F.2d 647, 648 (9th Cir. 1982) (reviewing order sanctioning attorney for filing motion to compel that was not substantially justified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)). However, “Cunningham effectively overruled . . . Ninth Circuit decisions allowing immediate appeal by attorneys from orders imposing sanctions.” Stanley v. Woodford, 449 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

          An order imposing sanctions against a nonparty attorney is not immediately appealable where there is sufficient congruence between the interests of the attorney and his or her client in the ongoing litigation that in effect the order is jointly against a party and nonparty. See Washington v. Standard Oil Co. of California (In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Litig.), 747 F.2d 1303, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1984) (order of contempt imposing sanctions against state attorney general representing state in ongoing proceedings not immediately appealable by attorney general because state ultimately responsible for paying sanctions at issue and attorney general is not merely state’s attorney, but also the official responsible for initiating and directing course of litigation).

 

          An order imposing sanctions on an attorney for her discovery abuses, not on a contempt theory, but solely pursuant of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was not a “final decision” from which an appeal would lie, even though the attorney no longer represented any party in the case and might well have a personal interest in pursuing an immediate appeal. Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 210; see also American Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. North American Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “an interlocutory order granting attorney’s fees as a condition of substituting counsel is not immediately appealable” like an interlocutory order imposing Rule 37(a) sanctions); see also Stanley v. Woodford, 449 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2006) (district court’s order affirming sanctions ordered by magistrate judge was not a final decision).

 

          A district court order, stating that an Assistant United States Attorney had made an improper ex parte contact with a represented party in violation of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, constitutes a sanction and is appealable. United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).

 

          An order imposing sanctions against a party’s attorney for failing to obey a scheduling or pretrial order is appealable only after a final judgment has been entered in the underlying action. Cato v. City of Fresno, 220 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10.a.iii (regarding a contempt or sanctions order issued against an attorney and client jointly, rather than solely against the attorney).

 

                                                   (d)     Contempt or Sanctions Order against Nonparty Journalist

 

          An order of contempt issued against a nonparty journalist for refusing to comply with a discovery order directing him to produce certain materials in an ongoing defamation suit was a final appealable order. See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1995) (journalist ordered incarcerated until he complied or litigation terminated).

 

                                         iii.      Contempt or Sanctions Order against Party and Nonparty Jointly

 

          Generally, an order awarding sanctions jointly and severally against a party and nonparty is not an appealable collateral order. See Kordich v. Marine Clerks Assoc., 715 F.2d 1392, 1393 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (order imposing sanctions against attorney and client for filing frivolous motion). Because of the congruence of interest between an attorney and client, it is questionable whether the attorney should be considered a nonparty for purposes of determining appealability. See id. (“We see no reason to permit indirectly through the attorney’s appeal what the client could not achieve directly on its own: immediate review of interlocutory orders imposing liability for fees and costs.”)

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10.a.ii (regarding the appealability of an order entered against the attorney only rather than the attorney and client jointly).

 

          An order imposing sanctions on an attorney for her discovery abuses is not immediately appealable, even where the attorney no longer represents the party in the case. See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999); see also Kordich, 715 F.2d at 1393 n.1 (“That appellant withdrew from representation of plaintiffs after the sanctions were imposed is of no moment.”).

 

          An order awarding sanctions jointly and severally against a party and nonparty also may be appealed as a collateral order where the sanctions are to be paid before final judgment and the financial instability of the recipient of the award renders the award effectively unreviewable upon final judgment. See Riverhead Sav. Bank v. National Mortgage Equity Corp., 893 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the award is payable immediately, but the recipient of the award is not financially unstable, however, appellate review must await final judgment. See Hill v. MacMillan/McGraw-Hill Sch. Co., 102 F.3d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that pivotal fact in Riverhead was insolvency of recipient not immediacy of payment).

 

                                         iv.      Denial of Motion for Contempt or Sanctions

 

          A pre-trial order denying a party’s motion to hold opposing party in contempt is not immediately appealable. See Sims v. Falk, 877 F.2d 31, 31 (9th Cir. 1989) (order). But see Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing denial of motion to hold party in contempt in conjunction with an appeal from a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).

 

Cross-reference: V.A.2.c (regarding orders reviewed on appeal from an interlocutory injunctive order).

 

          An order denying a motion for sanctions brought by a party to ongoing litigation is not immediately appealable. See McCright v. Santoki, 976 F.2d 568, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (order denying plaintiff’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions against opposing counsel can be effectively reviewed on appeal from final judgment in underlying action).

 

                              b.       Appealability of Contempt or Sanctions Order Issued After Final Judgment in an Underlying District Court Proceeding

 

                                         i.        Post-Judgment Contempt or Sanctions Order Generally

 

          A post-judgment contempt order imposing sanctions against a party is a final appealable order. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Ray, 375 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). However, such an order is not appealable until sanctions are imposed. See Blalock Eddy Ranch v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 982 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1992) (contempt citation for violating injunction issued in prior action not appealable where sanctions not yet imposed); see also SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding no jurisdiction to review contempt order where district court never imposed sanctions and Hickey appealed before period of time to purge contempt had expired); Donovan v. Mazzola, 761 F.2d 1411, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1985) (post-judgment civil contempt order for failure to post bond not appealable until after a specified date on which sanctions begin accruing).

 

                                         ii.       Post-Judgment Continuing Contempt Order

 

          “[N]either the undetermined total amount of sanctions, nor the fact that the sanctions are conditional, defeats finality of a post-judgment [continuing] contempt order.” Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463, 467 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 855 (9th Cir. 1992) (contempt order imposing sanctions for every day order is violated appealable even though amount of sanctions undetermined and ongoing). The appealability of a continuing contempt order for violation of a consent decree depends on a “pragmatic balancing” of the policy against piecemeal review and the risk of denying justice by delay. See Gates, 98 F.3d at 467; Stone, 968 F.2d at 855.

 

          Moreover, a contempt order imposing sanctions is appealable even though sanctions have not begun to accrue due to a temporary stay pending appeal. See Stone, 968 F.2d at 854 n.4 (noting that defendant was not in compliance with consent decree and therefore would be required to pay fines if stay not in effect); see also Gates, 98 F.3d at 467 (staying monetary sanctions so long as there was compliance).

 

                                         iii.      Order Denying Motion to Vacate Contempt Order

 

          “[A] district court’s order refusing to vacate an underlying contempt order is nonappealable when the ground on which vacatur is sought existed at the time the contempt order was entered and the contemnor failed to appeal timely from that order.” United States v. Wheeler, 952 F.2d 326, 327 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (otherwise contemnor could indefinitely extend time period for appealing issue of ability to comply, thereby undermining time limits of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)).

 

                              c.       Appealability of Contempt or Sanctions Order Issued As Final Judgment in Enforcement or Contempt Proceeding

 

          Where a contempt order disposes of the only matter before the district court, the contempt order is appealable as a final judgment.

 

                                         i.        Contempt Order as Final Judgment in Enforcement

 

          In a judicial proceeding brought by the IRS to enforce an administrative summons, an order of contempt for failure to comply with the summons is a final, appealable order. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-49 (1964).

 

          In a judicial proceeding to enforce a grand jury subpoena, an order of contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena is a final, appealable order. See Garcia-Rosel v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 889 F.2d 220, 221 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (failure to testify before grand jury after grant of immunity); United States v. Horn (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Horn), 976 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusal by attorney to produce privileged documents potentially incriminating to client).

 

                                         ii.       Contempt Order as Final Judgment in Contempt Proceeding

 

          A contempt order imposing sanctions for violation of a prior final judgment is itself a final judgment when it is issued in a contempt proceeding limited to that issue. See Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Even though the size of the sanction . . . depends upon the duration of contumacious behavior occurring after entry of the contempt order, the order is nevertheless final for purposes of § 1291.”).

 

                    11.     Default

 

                              a.       Motion for Default Judgment Granted

 

          A default judgment is a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Trajano v. Marcos (In re Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1992); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 2007). However, an order granting default is not final and appealable until judgment is entered. See Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding appeal premature where damages determination still pending).

 

                              b.       Motion for Default Judgment Denied

 

          An order denying a motion for default judgment is not a final appealable order. See Bird v. Reese, 875 F.2d 256, 256 (9th Cir. 1989) (order).

 

                              c.       Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Granted

 

          An order granting a motion to set aside a default judgment is not a final appealable order where the set-aside permits a trial on the merits. See Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that court of appeals’ decision to hear interlocutory appeal regarding district court’s jurisdiction over defendants does not extend to grant of motion to set aside). 

 

                              d.       Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Denied

 

          An order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment is a final appealable order. See Straub v. AP Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1994). But see Symantec Corp. v. Global Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (order) (dismissing appeal where district court had only entered a default, and not a default judgment, and explaining that the court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside entry of default alone).

 

                    12.     Discovery Orders and Subpoenas

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12.a (regarding an appeal by a person who is a party to an underlying district court proceeding); II.C.12.b (regarding an appeal by a person not a party to an underlying district court proceeding); II.C.12.c (regarding an appeal by a person who is a party to a proceeding limited to enforcement or discovery).

 

                              a.       Appeal by a Person Who is a Party to an Underlying District Court Proceeding

 

          A party to an underlying district court proceeding can appeal an adverse discovery ruling before entry of final judgment only where: (1) the party defies the order and is cited for criminal contempt, see II.C.12.a.i, or (2) an order protecting a nonparty from discovery is issued by a court outside the circuit in which the district court proceedings are ongoing, see II.C.12.a.ii.

 

          Regarding the appealability of a discovery order entered following final judgment in the underlying action, see II.C.12.a.iv.

 

                                         i.        Order Compelling Discovery

 

                                                   (a)     Discovery Order Issued against Party

 

          An order compelling discovery issued against a party to a district court proceeding is generally not appealable by that party until after final judgment. See Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 326 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief).

 

          If the party complies with the discovery order, he or she may challenge “any unfair use of the information or documents produced” on appeal from final judgment, see Bank of Am. v. National Mortgage Equity Corp. (In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Litig.), 857 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), and if the party defies the discovery order, he or she may challenge any ensuing civil contempt citation on appeal from final judgment, see Bingham v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1996) (contrasting criminal contempt citation, which is immediately appealable).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10.a.i (regarding the appealability of civil v. criminal contempt orders).

 

                                                   (b)     Discovery Order Issued against Nonparty

 

          Similarly, an order compelling discovery issued against a nonparty is not immediately appealable by a party who is asserting a privilege regarding the sought-after information until after final judgment. See Bank of Am. v. National Mortgage Equity Corp. (In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certifications Litig.), 857 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

 

          If the nonparty complies with the discovery order, the party may challenge “any unfair use of information or documents produced” on appeal from final judgment. See id.

 

                                         ii.       Protective Order

 

                                                   (a)     Order Protecting Party from Discovery

 

          Generally, a protective order issued in favor of a party to an ongoing proceeding is not appealable by the opposing party until after entry of final judgment. See KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 918 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Truckstop.net, LLC v. Sprint Corp., 547 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the general rule is that discovery orders are interlocutory in nature and nonappealable under § 1291). 

 

                                                   (b)     Order Protecting Nonparty from Discovery

  

          Generally, an order granting a nonparty’s motion to quash a discovery subpoena is not appealable by a party until after the entry of final judgment. See Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1975).

 

          However, where the protective order is issued by a district court in a circuit other than the one where proceedings are ongoing, a party may immediately appeal the order because the court of appeals with jurisdiction over the final judgment will not have jurisdiction over the discovery order. See id. Note that a protective order issued by a different district court in the same circuit is not immediately appealable because the court of appeals with the jurisdiction over the final judgment in the underlying action will also have jurisdiction over the discovery order. See Southern California Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (In re Subpoena Served on the California Pub. Util. Comm’n), 813 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

                                         iii.      Pretrial Order to Contribute to Discovery Fund

 

          A pretrial order requiring parties to deposit money into a fund to share costs of discovery is not an appealable collateral order. See Lopez v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (In re Baxter Healthcare Corp.), 151 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (observing that order was subject to ongoing modification by district court and even contained a refund provision).

 

                                         iv.      Post-Judgment Discovery Orders

 

          An order granting a post-judgment motion to compel production of documents is not appealable until a contempt citation issues. See Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 922 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1991) (treating motion to enforce settlement agreement as analogous to traditional discovery motion), overruled on other grounds by Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).

 

          However, a post-judgment order denying a motion to compel may be immediately appealed because the aggrieved party does not have the option of defying the order and appealing from an ensuing contempt citation. See Hagestad v. Tragresser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

                              b.       Appeal by Person Not a Party to An Underlying District Court Proceeding

 

          A person not a party to an underlying district court proceeding generally cannot appeal a discovery order or subpoena without first defying the order and being cited for contempt. See II.C.12.b.i. However, a nonparty can appeal without a contempt citation where: (1) the order or subpoena in question directs a third party to produce material in which the person appealing claims an interest, and (2) the third party cannot be expected to risk contempt on the appealing person’s behalf. See II.C.12.b.ii.

 

          Regarding the appealability of an order denying a motion to compel, see II.C.12.b.iii.

 

                                         i.        General Rule: Target of Order Compelling Discovery Cannot Appeal Until Contempt Citation Issues

 

          An order compelling production of documents or testimony issued against a nonparty is generally not appealable by the nonparty. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971); David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1977). Rather, the nonparty must choose either to comply with the order to produce or defy the order to produce and face a possible contempt citation. See Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532-33; David, 560 F.2d at 415-16 (observing that aggrieved person does not have option of challenging discovery order on appeal from a final judgment because he or she is not a party to any ongoing litigation).

 

          If a nonparty chooses to comply with a discovery order or subpoena, he or she may appeal from an order denying post-production reimbursement of costs under the collateral order doctrine. See United States v. CBS, Inc., 666 F.2d 364, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1982). The nonparty may also object to the introduction of the materials he or she produced, or the fruits thereof, at any subsequent criminal trial. See Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532 n.3.

 

          If a nonparty chooses to resist, he or she may appeal a subsequent adjudication of contempt. See Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532-33; David, 560 F.2d at 415-16. A contempt order against a nonparty is considered final with regard to the nonparty. See David, 560 F.2d at 416-17 (order equivalent to contempt citation, i.e. order awarding sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), issued against nonparty for failure to comply with court order compelling production of documents in ongoing litigation, appealable by nonparty).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10 (regarding the appealability of contempt orders).

 

                                         ii.       Exceptions Permitting Appeal Absent Contempt Citation

 

          Under certain circumstances, a nonparty may appeal a discovery-related order in the absence of a contempt citation. See Unites States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971) (stating that the exception to the rule of nonappealability is recognized “[o]nly in the limited class of cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual’s claims”).

 

                                                   (a)     Discovery Order or Subpoena Directed against Third Party (Perlman Exception)

 

          Generally, an order denying a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce documents is appealable by the person asserting a privilege as to those documents because the third party “normally will not be expected to risk a contempt citation but will instead surrender the sought-after information, thereby precluding effective appellate review at a later stage.” Alexiou v. United States (In re Subpoena to Testify Before the Grand Jury), 39 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918)). See also United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding Perlman exception applied where district court order was directed at the special master, a disinterested third-party custodian of allegedly privileged documents).

 

          However, once a third party discloses the sought-after information, the Perlman exception is no longer applicable. See Bank of Am. v. Feldman (In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Litig.), 821 F.2d 1422, 1424 (9th Cir. 1987) (observing that the Perlman exception is intended to prevent disclosure of privileged information, not to facilitate a determination of whether previously-disclosed information is subject to a protective order or admissible at trial); see also Truckstop.net, LLC v. Sprint Corp., 547 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court’s decision that e-mail was not protected by attorney-client privilege and was properly disclosed was not appealable where e-mail had already been disclosed).

 

                                                             (1)     Examples of Orders Denying Motions to Quash Subpoenas That Are Appealable

 

          The following orders denying motions to quash subpoenas directing third parties (such as attorneys) to reveal information were appealable under the Perlman exception because the third parties could not be expected to risk a contempt citation:

 

                  Order denying attorney’s motion to quash subpoena directing him to reveal information about a client under investigation. See Alexiou v. United States (In re Subpoena to Testify Before the Grand Jury), 39 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that attorney “cannot be expected to accept a contempt citation and go to jail in order to protect the identity of a client who paid his fee with counterfeit money”).

 

                  Order denying attorney’s motion to quash a subpoena directing him to reveal information about a former client under investigation. See Schofield v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceeding), 721 F.2d 1221, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 1983) (attorney-client relationship was ongoing during time period specified in subpoena, but had ceased by the time the subpoena was issued). Cf. Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated June 5, 1985), 825 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing between present and former clients in concluding order not appealable).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12.b.ii(a)(2) (examples of orders denying motions to quash subpoenas that are not appealable).

 

                  Order denying client’s motion to quash subpoena directing law firm to produce client’s documents immediately appealable by client where law firm complied with subpoena by surrendering documents to court. See Does I-IV v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated December 10, 1987), 926 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that denial of law firm’s motion to quash was an unappealable interlocutory order as to the firm because it had complied with the subpoena).

 

                  Order denying motion to quash subpoena directing third-party psychiatrist to produce movant’s psychiatric record. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (noting that Ninth Circuit had not recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the criminal context), abrogated on other grounds by Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).

 

                  Order denying police officer’s motion to quash grand jury subpoena directing his supervisor to produce an internal affairs report relating to officer. See Kinamon v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 45 F.3d 343, 346 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

                                                             (2)     Examples of Orders Denying Motions to Quash Subpoenas That Are Not Appealable

 

          The following orders denying motions to quash subpoenas directing third parties to reveal privileged information were not appealable under the Perlman exception because the third party could be expected to risk a contempt citation to protect the information:

 

          An order denying a client’s motion to quash an order directing his or her attorney to reveal information purportedly covered by the attorney-client privilege is not appealable by the client because “the attorney is an active participant in the litigation, appealing from the district court’s denial of his motion to quash on his own behalf.” Doe v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated June 5, 1985), 825 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) (attorney was required to act in best interests of client and to assert any applicable privileges, which he did). The Perlman rationale is less compelling in such a case because the third party attorney “is both subject to the control of the person or entity asserting the privilege and is a participant in the relationship out of which the privilege emerges.” Id. (recognizing that in certain cases, immediate appeal has been permitted even though the third party attorney was still arguably representing the client).

 

          Similarly, an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena directed at a third-party accountant, who was an agent of the movant and a party to the relationship upon which the claim of privilege is based, is also unappealable under Perlman. See Silva v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Bailin), 51 F.3d 203, 205-06 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (concluding that under these circumstances, third party can be expected to risk contempt citation to protect the privileged relationship).

 

          Instead, the attorney (or accountant) can appeal from a contempt citation following refusal to comply. See Ralls v. United States, 52 F.3d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Horn (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Horn), 976 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, either attorney (or accountant) or client can move to suppress evidence at any subsequent criminal trial. See Doe, 825 F.2d at 237.

 

                                                   (b)     Order Directed against Head of State

 

          An order denying a motion to quash a subpoena directed at the President of the United States is appealable. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 (1974) (“To require a President of the United States to place himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling would be unseemly, and would present an unnecessary occasion for constitutional confrontation between two branches of the Government.”). But see Estate of Domingo, 808 F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that order denying motion to terminate deposition by former President of the Philippines was not appealable because he is “hardly comparable to . . . the President of the United States”).  

 

          The court of appeals has declined to recognize an exception to nonappealability for governmental entities. See Newton v. NBC, 726 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1984) (order compelling nonparty governmental entity to produce documents despite claim of privilege not appealable by government absent a finding of contempt).

 

                                         iii.      Appeal from Order Denying Motion to Compel

 

          An order denying a motion to compel production of documents, or denying a motion for return of seized property may be immediately appealed by a nonparty because he or she does not have the option of defying the order and appealing from an ensuing contempt citation. See Hagestad v. Tragresser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 922 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1991)) (order denying an intervenor’s post-judgment motion to compel production of documents); see also DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1962) (order denying motion for return of seized property final and appealable where no criminal prosecution pending against movant).

 

                              c.       Appeal by Person Who is a Party to a Proceeding Limited to Enforcement or Discovery

 

                                         i.        Discovery Order Issued as Final Judgment in Enforcement Proceeding

 

          A discovery-related order is immediately appealable where it is entered as the final judgment in a proceeding limited to enforcement of an administrative summons or subpoena. See EEOC v. Federal Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2009) (order enforcing EEOC subpoena); United States v. Vallance, 793 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1986) (order enforcing IRS summons); United States Envtl. Protection Agency v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 836 F.2d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1988) (order enforcing EPA subpoena).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10.c.i (regarding the appealability of contempt orders issued as final judgments in enforcement proceedings).

 

                                         ii.       Discovery Order Issued as Final Judgment in Discovery Proceeding

 

          A discovery order is immediately appealable where it is entered as the final judgment in a proceeding limited to an application for discovery. See United States v. CBS, Inc., 666 F.2d 364, 369 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

          An order compelling production of documents and things is a final appealable order in a proceeding upon a petition to perpetuate certain evidence. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 51 (9th Cir. 1961).

 

          An order appointing commissioners to facilitate gathering of evidence is a final appealable order in an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to assist foreign and international tribunals and litigants before such tribunals. See Okubo v. Reynolds (In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor’s Office), 16 F.3d 1016, 1018 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Sealed 1, Letter of Request for Legal Assistance from the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, 235 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000).

 

          An order requesting government to release documents or denying plaintiff access to documents is a final, appealable order in a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) action. See United States v. Steele (In re Steele), 799 F.2d 461, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (order represents the “full, complete and final relief available” in a FOIA action). But see Church of Scientology Int’l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1993) (order declaring particular document not exempt under attorney-client privilege is not final and appealable if it does not also order government to produce document).  

 

                    13.     DISMISSAL

 

                              a.       Dismissal Denied

 

                                         i.        Generally

 

          Generally, an order denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable because it does not end the litigation on the merits. See Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

          For example, orders denying motions to dismiss on the following grounds are not immediately appealable:

 

                  Contractual forum selection clause. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989).

 

                  Forum non conveniens. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1988).

 

                  Claim of immunity from service of process after extradition. See Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 523-24 (“specialty doctrine” in federal extradition law).

 

                  Lack of venue. See Phaneuf v. Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1997).

 

                  Younger abstention doctrine. See Confederated Salish, 29 F.3d at 1401-02.      

                  Lack of personal jurisdiction. See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

                                        ii.       Denial of Immunity

 

          An order denying a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds may be appealable as a collateral order. See II.C.17 (Immunity); II.A.2 (Collateral Order Doctrine).

 

                              b.       Dismissal Granted

 

                                         i.        Generally

 

          An order granting dismissal is final and appealable “if it (1) is a full adjudication of the issues, and (2) ‘clearly evidences the judge’s intention that it be the court’s final act in the matter.’” National Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see also Elliot v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 2009); Disabled Rights Action Committee v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 870-72 (9th Cir. 2004). The focus is on the intended effect of the order not the label assigned to it. See Montes v. United States, 37 F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Disabled Rights Action Committee, 375 F.3d at 870.

 

                                         ii.       Dismissal of Complaint v. Dismissal of Action

 

          As a general rule, an order dismissing the “complaint” rather than the “action” is not a final appealable order. See California v. Harvier, 700 F.2d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1983). For example, an order dismissing the complaint rather than the action was held to be unappealable where it was unclear whether the district court determined that amendment would be futile, and it appeared from the record that it may not be futile. See id. (observing that, although claims against defendants in their representative capacity were dismissed, plaintiff could amend to name defendants in their individual capacities).

 

          However, the district court’s apparent intent, not the terminology it uses, is determinative. See Montes v. United States, 37 F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Disabled Rights Action Committee v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 870 (9th Cir. 2004). For example, an order dismissing the “action” without prejudice rather than the “complaint” was held to be unappealable where the district court’s words and actions indicated an intent to grant leave to amend. See Montes, 37 F.3d at 1350; see also In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing dismissal of “complaint” because it was clear the district court intended to dismiss the action). Conversely, an order dismissing the “complaint” rather than the “action” was held to be appealable where “circumstances ma[d]e it clear that the court concluded that the action could not be saved by any amendment of the complaint.” Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (reviewing dismissal on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007).

 

                                         iii.      Leave to Amend Complaint

 

                                                   (a)     Leave to Amend Expressly Granted

 

          Where the district court expressly grants leave to amend, the dismissal order is not final and appealable. See Telluride Mgmt. Solutions v. Telluride Inv. Group, 55 F.3d 463, 466 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999). The order is not appealable even where the court grants leave to amend as to only some of the dismissed claims. See Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. v. Kirk, 109 F.3d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

 

          A plaintiff may not simply appeal a dismissal with leave to amend after the period for amendment has elapsed; the plaintiff must seek a final order if the district court does not take further action on its own. See WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).

 

                                                   (b)     Leave to Amend Expressly Denied

 

          Where the district court expressly denies leave to amend, the order is final and appealable. See Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975).

 

                                                   (c)     Leave to Amend Not Expressly Granted or Denied

 

          A district court’s failure to expressly grant (or deny) leave to amend supports an inference that the court determined the complaint could not be cured by amendment. See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007).

 

                                                             (1)     Deficiencies Appear Incurable

 

          An order of dismissal is appealable where it appears from the record that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 741 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (treating the dismissal as final because there was “no way of curing the defect found by the court”); Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) (failure to exhaust claim); Martinez v. Gomez, 137 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (statute of limitations); Ramirez v. Fox Television, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993) (failure to exhaust grievance procedures); Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 855 (9th Cir. 1990) (lack of standing); Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1987) (no state action); Kilkenny v. Arco Marine Inc., 800 F.2d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1986) (proper parties).

 

                                                             (2)     Deficiencies Appear Curable

 

          An order of dismissal is not appealable where it is unclear whether the district court determined amendment would be futile, and it appears from the record that it may not be futile. See California v. Harvier, 700 F.2d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1983) (claims against defendants in their representative capacity dismissed but plaintiff could amend to name defendants in their individual capacities).

 

                                         iv.      Involuntary Dismissal

 

                                                   (a)     Dismissal with Prejudice

 

          A dismissal with prejudice is a final appealable order. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1996).

 

                                                   (b)     Dismissal without Prejudice

 

          Whether a dismissal “without prejudice” is final depends on whether the district court intended to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to filing an amended complaint, or to dismiss the action without prejudice to filing a new action. See Montes v. United States, 37 F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Lopez v. Needles, 95 F.3d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that where record indicates district court anticipated amendment, order is not final and appealable).

 

          A dismissal without prejudice is appealable where leave to amend is not specifically granted and amendment could not cure the defect. See also Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (treating the dismissal as final because there was “no way of curing the defect found by the court”); Martinez v. Gomez, 137 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (treating dismissal without prejudice as final order where statute of limitations bar could not be cured by amendment). A dismissal without prejudice is also appealable where it “effectively sends the party out of [federal] court.” See Ramirez v. Fox Television, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving dismissal for failure to exhaust grievance procedures following finding of preemption); United States v. Henri, 828 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (involving dismissal under primary jurisdiction doctrine).

 

                                                   (c)     Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute

 

          A dismissal for failure to prosecute is a final appealable order. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissal with prejudice); Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1984) (dismissal without prejudice).

 

          However, prior interlocutory rulings are not subject to review by the court of appeals, whether the failure to prosecute was deliberate or due to negligence or mistake. See Al-Torki, 78 F.3d at 1386; Ash, 739 F.2d at 497-98.

 

Cross-reference: V.A.1.b (regarding rulings that do not merge into a final judgment).

 

                                         v.       Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice

 

                                                   (a)     Appealability of Voluntary Dismissal Order

 

          A voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 is presumed to be without prejudice unless under otherwise stated. See Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 dismissal to be with prejudice).

 

          Generally, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not appealable by the plaintiff (the dismissing party) because it is not adverse to the plaintiff’s interests. See Concha, 62 F.3d at 1507 (observing that plaintiff is free to “seek an adjudication of the same issue at another time in the same or another forum”); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice may be appealable by the defendant to the extent the district court denied defendant’s request for fees and costs as a condition of dismissal); overruled in part on other grounds by Moore v. Keegan Mgmt. Co., 78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Stevedoring Serv. of Am. v. Armilla Int’l B.V., 889 F.2d 919, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1989) (reaching the merits).

 

Cross-reference: IX.A (regarding requirements for standing to appeal).

 

                                                   (b)     Impact of Voluntary Dismissal of Unresolved Claims on Appealability of Order Adjudicating Certain Claims

 

          Whether an order adjudicating certain claims is appealable after remaining claims are voluntarily dismissed without prejudice depends on which party voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims.

 

                                                             (1)     Voluntary Dismissal by Losing Party

 

          As a general rule, a losing party may not create appellate jurisdiction over an order adjudicating fewer than all claims by voluntarily dismissing without prejudice any unresolved claims. See Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding there was no jurisdiction where remaining claims dismissed without prejudice pursuant to stipulation); Fletcher v. Gagosian, 604 F.2d 637, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that policy against piecemeal appeals cannot be avoided at “the whim of the plaintiff”). The dismissal of certain claims without prejudice to revival in the event of reversal and remand is not a final order. See Dannenberg, 16 F.3d at 1076-77.

 

          However, an order dismissing without prejudice claims against unserved defendants does not affect the finality of an order dismissing with prejudice claims against all served defendants. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 621-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that dismissal was pursuant to stipulation of the parties).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13.b.viii (regarding dismissal of fewer than all claims).

 

          Moreover, an order dismissing without prejudice a claim for indemnification was held not to affect the finality of a partial summary judgment because the indemnity claim was entirely dependent upon plaintiff’s success on the underlying claim. See Horn v. Berdon, Inc. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 938 F.2d 125, 126-27 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that dismissal was pursuant to stipulation of parties).

 

          “When a party that has suffered an adverse partial judgment subsequently dismisses remaining claims without prejudice with the approval of the district court, and the record reveals no evidence of intent to manipulate [] appellate jurisdiction, the judgment entered after the district court grants the motion to dismiss is final and appealable” as a final decision of the district court. James v. Price Stern Sloan, 283 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002); see also American States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2003); Amadeo v. Principle Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1158 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                                                             (2)     Voluntary Dismissal by Prevailing Party

 

          If after adjudication of fewer than all claims, a prevailing party voluntarily dismisses remaining claims without prejudice, the order adjudicating certain claims is final and appealable. See Local Motion, Inc. v. Niescher, 105 F.3d 1278, 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (prevailing party failed in its attempt to prevent opposing party from appealing grant of summary judgment by dismissing remaining claims without prejudice); cf. United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R & D Latex Corp., 141 F.3d 916, 918 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (prevailing party succeeded in its attempt to facilitate opposing party’s appeal from grant of summary judgment by dismissing remaining claims without prejudice); see also United States v. Community Home & Health Care Servs., Inc., 550 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “A prevailing party’s decision to dismiss its remaining claims without prejudice generally renders a partial grant of summary judgment final.”).

 

                                         vi.      Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice

 

          A voluntary dismissal with prejudice is generally not appealable where it is entered unconditionally pursuant to a settlement agreement. See Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (order) (no jurisdiction over order dismissing entire action with prejudice pursuant to stipulation because order not adverse to appellant).

 

          However, following adjudication of fewer than all claims, a plaintiff may dismiss with prejudice any unresolved claims in order to obtain review of the prior rulings. See Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice precludes possibility of later pursuing the dismissed claims); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1342, corrected by 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

Cross-reference: IX.A (regarding the requirements for standing to appeal).

 

                                         vii.     Dismissal Subject to Condition or Modification

 

          If a district court judgment is conditional or modifiable, the requisite intent to issue a final order is lacking. See Zucker v. Maxicare Health Plans Inc., 14 F.3d 477, 483 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding order was not final where it stated it would become final only after parties filed a joint notice of state court decision); see also Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding order not final where district court granted motion to modify previous order, explaining that, had it intended the order to be final, it would have denied the motion to modify as moot); Nat’l Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding order was not final where it stated “the court may amend or amplify this order with a more specific statement of the grounds for its decision”).

 

                                         viii.    Dismissal of Fewer Than All Claims

 

          As a general rule, an order dismissing fewer than all claims is not final and appealable unless it is certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Chacon v. Babcock, 640 F.2d 221, 222 (9th Cir. 1981). See II.A.1.b.ii (regarding what constitutes dismissal of all claims).

 

          However, an order dismissing an action as to all served defendants, so that only unserved defendants remain, may be final and appealable if the validity of attempted service is not still at issue. See Patchick v. Kensington Publ’g Corp., 743 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding order not appealable because service issue not resolved).

 

          Moreover, an order dismissing fewer than all claims may be treated as a final order where the remaining claims are subsequently finalized. See Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1980) (federal claim dismissed as to remaining defendants and state claim remanded to state court); see also Gallea v. United States, 779 F.2d 1403, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) (action remanded to state court following dismissal of federal claim). 

 

                    14.     DISQUALIFICATION

 

          Disqualification orders are not immediately appealable, but certain disqualification orders may be reviewed on petition for writ of mandamus. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1981). See II.D.4.d (regarding the availability of mandamus relief from disqualification orders).

 

                              a.       Disqualification of Counsel

 

          Orders disqualifying counsel are not immediately appealable collateral orders. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1985).

 

          Orders denying disqualification of counsel are also unappealable. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 369-70 (1981); see also Aguon-Schulte v. Guam Election Com’n, 469 F.3d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 2006) (motion to strike appearances by outside counsel).

 

                              b.       Disqualification of District Judge

 

          An order granting recusal of a district court judge is not an appealable collateral order. See Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus. (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 673 F.2d 1020, 1023-25 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs have no protectable interests in particular judge continuing to preside over action).

 

          An order denying disqualification of a district court judge is also unappealable. See United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1978).

 

                    15.     IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

 

          As a general rule, an order denying a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is an appealable final order. See Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845 (1950) (per curiam) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)); see also Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

          However, a magistrate judge has no authority to enter a final order denying in forma pauperis status absent reference by the district court and consent of litigants in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, an appeal from such an order must be dismissed and the action remanded to the district court judge. See id.

 

          Moreover, where a magistrate judge recommends that the district court deny a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the movant does not have ten days to file written objections. See Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1114 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that objection procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) did not apply to motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and affirming district court judgment denying forma pauperis status).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.3 (regarding appointment of counsel); II.C.22 (regarding pre-filing review orders); IV.B.2 (regarding construing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis as a notice of appeal).

 

                    16.     IMMIGRATION

 

                    See Office of Staff Attorneys’ Immigration Outline.

 

                    17.     IMMUNITY

 

                              a.       Generally

 

          An order denying immunity, whether an order of dismissal or of summary judgment, may be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine if the asserted immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (orders rejecting absolute immunity and qualified immunity are immediately appealable); Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2009) (court lacked jurisdiction “to review the district court’s partial grant of qualified immunity on the search and excessive force claims” but had jurisdiction to “consider [] the denial of qualified immunity on the unconstitutional detention claim”); Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 564 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity was appealable); KRL v. Estate of Moore, 512 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2008) (order denying motion for summary judgment was appealable because the motion was based on qualified immunity); Kohlrautz v. Oilmen Participation Corp., 441 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction where claim of official immunity was asserted as a defense to state-law cause of action); Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (order denying motion for summary judgment was appealable because the motion was based on qualified immunity). Such an order is reviewable to the extent it raises an issue of law. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528; see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 2008); Kohlrautz, 441 F.3d at 830; Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied by 351 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied by 541 U.S. 1085 (2004). A district court order that defers a ruling on immunity for a limited time to determine what relevant functions were performed is generally not appealable. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2009). Also, a district court’s denial of summary judgment in a qualified immunity case where the court’s order implicates a question of evidence sufficiency is not immediately appealable. See Moss, 572 F.3d at 972. Additionally, the court of appeals will not have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where the district court fails to make a complete, final ruling on the issue. See Way v. County of Ventura, 348 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 2003).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.17.g.ii (regarding whether a determination in a qualified immunity case is legal or factual); II.A.2 (regarding the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, generally).

 

 

                              b.       Absolute Presidential or Legislative Immunity

 

          An order denying summary judgment based on assertion of absolute presidential immunity is an appealable collateral order. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982).

 

          Similarly, an order denying a motion to dismiss on absolute legislative immunity grounds is appealable as a collateral order. See Trevino v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480, 1481 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

                              c.       State Sovereign Immunity

 

          An order denying a motion to dismiss based on state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is an appealable collateral order. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-46 (1993) (observing that Eleventh Amendment confers immunity from suit on states and arms of state); Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008); Clark v. State of Cal., 123 F.3d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Alaska v. EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1065 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (agency remand order that turned on claim of sovereign immunity reviewable even though not final agency decision); Phiffer v. Columbia River Correctional, Institute, 384 F.3d 791, 792 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (explaining that the court has never required a showing of a “serious and unsettled question of law” for an interlocutory appeal of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1184 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Thomas v. Nakatani, 309 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the court of appeals will hear a state’s appeal from a decision denying immunity because the “benefit of the immunity is lost or severely eroded once the suit is allowed to proceed past the motion stage of the litigation”).

 

                              d.       Foreign Sovereign Immunity

 

          An order denying a motion to dismiss based on the sovereign immunity of Guam is an appealable collateral order. See Marx v. Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

          Similarly, an order denying foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is appealable as a collateral order. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009); Gupta v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2007); Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) (Australia); In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2002) (Philippines); Holden v. Canadian Consulate,

92 F.3d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1996) (Canada); Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A., 930 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1991) (Mexico); Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. United States Dist. Court, 859 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (Mexico).

 

                              e.       Federal Sovereign Immunity

 

          An order denying a motion to dismiss based on federal sovereign immunity is not an appealable collateral order. See Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (observing that denial can be effectively vindicated following final judgment because federal sovereign immunity is “a right not to be subject to a binding judgment” rather than “a right not to stand trial altogether”).

 

                              f.       Military Service Immunity (Feres doctrine)

 

          An order denying a motion to dismiss based on an assertion of Feres intramilitary immunity is an appealable collateral order. See Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1480-84 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Jackson v. Brigle, 17 F.3d 280, 281-82 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

                              g.       Qualified Immunity of Government Employees

 

                                         i.        Order Denying Dismissal or Summary Judgment

 

          “Parties intending to appeal the determination of qualified immunity must ordinarily appeal before final judgment.” Johnson v. Walton, 558 F.3d 1106, 1108 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (although appeal of qualified immunity must ordinarily be appealed before final judgment, officer lacked opportunity because the district court certified the interlocutory appeal as forfeited). An order denying qualified immunity may be immediately appealable whether the immunity was raised in a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also Rodis v. City, County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2009) (denial of motion for summary judgment); Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009) (order partially denying qualified immunity); Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 564 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity); KRL v. Estate of Moore, 512 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2008) (order denying motion for summary judgment was appealable because the motion was based on qualified immunity); Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). “Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. (citations omitted). “Even if the plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.” Id. (citations omitted).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.17.g.iii (regarding successive appeals from orders denying immunity).

 

                                         ii.       Only Legal Determinations Subject to Review

 

          A pretrial order denying immunity is reviewable only to the extent it raises an issue of law. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 587 (9th Cir. 2008); Kohlrautz v. Oilmen Participation Corp., 441 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 2006); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied by 351 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied by 541 U.S. 1085 (2004). For purposes of resolving a purely legal question, the court may assume disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Kohlrautz, 441 F.3d at 830; Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

          “[A]n order denying qualified immunity on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact exists is not a final, immediately appealable order.” Maropulos v. County of Los Angeles, 560 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995)).

 

 

                                                   (a)     Legal Determinations Defined

 

          Whether governing law was clearly established is a legal determination. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 843 (9th Cir. 1998); Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996); V-1 Oil Co. v. Smith, 114 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1997); Brewster v. Board of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 976-77 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

          Whether specific facts constitute a violation of established law is a legal determination. See Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (operative facts undisputed); see also V-1 Oil Co., 114 F.3d at 856 (assuming facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party). For example, where a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity is denied, it is a legal determination whether the facts as shown by the nonmoving party demonstrate that the official acted reasonably. See Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2003).

 

          Whether a dispute of fact is material is a legal determination. See Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not always unappealable simply because a district judge has stated that there are material issues of fact in dispute.”); see also Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the court can determine whether the disputed facts simply are not material).

 

          The court of appeals may consider the legal question of whether, taking all facts and inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 903-06 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); see also Bingue, 512 F.3d at 1172; Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 951-952 (9th Cir. 2003).

 

                                                   (b)     Factual Determination Defined

 

          Whether the record raises a genuine issue of fact is a factual determination. See Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The district court’s determination that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is not reviewable on an interlocutory appeal.”); see also Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court’s determination that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically unreviewable on interlocutory appeal.”); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (questions of “evidence sufficiency” or which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial are not reviewable); Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Thomas v. Gomez, 143 F.3d 1246, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

                                         iii.      Successive Appeals from Orders Denying Immunity

 

          There is “no jurisdictional bar to successive interlocutory appeals of orders denying successive pretrial motions on qualified immunity grounds.” Knox v. Southwest Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1997) (appeal from second denial of summary judgment permissible despite failure to appeal first denial of summary judgment); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308-10 (1996) (permitting appeal from denial of summary judgment despite prior appeal from denial of dismissal because “legally relevant factors” differ at summary judgment and dismissal stages).

 

                              h.       Municipal Liability

 

          Unlike an order denying qualified immunity to an individual officer, an order denying a local government’s motion for summary judgment under Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) is not immediately appealable. See Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1366 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996); Henderson v. Mohave County, 54 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 903-904 (9th Cir. 2000) (court of appeals exercised pendent party jurisdiction over city’s appeal from denial of its motion for summary judgment because the city’s motion was inextricably intertwined with issues presented in officials’ appeal).

 

                              i.        Immunity from Service (“Specialty Doctrine”)

 

          An order denying a motion to dismiss based on an extradited person’s claim of immunity from civil service of process under the “principle of specialty” is not immediately appealable. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1988) (claim of immunity under the principle of specialty effectively reviewable following final judgment because not founded on the right not to stand trial).

 

                              j.       Settlement Agreement (Contractual Immunity)

 

          An order vacating a dismissal predicated on litigants’ settlement agreement is not immediately appealable. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 869 (1994) (rejecting contention that “right not to stand trial” created by private settlement agreement could not be effectively vindicated following final judgment).

 

                              k.       Absolute Judicial Immunity

 

          The denial of a claim of absolute judicial immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).

 

                              l.        Absolute Political Immunity

 

          The denial of a claim of absolute political immunity is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 1999).

 

                              m.     Absolute Witness Immunity

 

          An order denying summary judgment based on assertion of absolute witness immunity is an appealable collateral order. Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

                              n.       Tribal Sovereign Immunity

 

          An order denying a tribe’s sovereign immunity claim is an appealable collateral order. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vaughn, 509 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that tribal sovereign immunity is an immunity to suit rather than a mere defense).

 

                    18.     INJUNCTION

 

                    See II.B.1 (Interlocutory Injunctive Orders).

 

                    19.     INTERVENTION

 

          Certain orders denying leave to intervene under Rule 24 are final and appealable because they terminate the litigation as to the putative intervenor. See IX.A.2.a.i (regarding an intervenor’s standing to appeal).

 

                              a.       Intervention as of Right

 

                                         i.        Order Denying Intervention Altogether

 

          An order denying a motion to intervene as of right is a final appealable order where the would-be intervenor is prevented from becoming a party in any respect. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377 (1987); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997); Petrol Stops Northwest v. Continental Oil Co., 647 F.2d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, an order denying a motion to intervene as of right or permissively is immediately appealable even though the would-be intervenors were granted amicus status. See Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1491 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

                                         ii.       Order Denying Intervention in Part

 

          An order denying a motion to intervene as of right is not immediately appealable where permissive intervention is granted. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 375-78 (1987) (observing that litigant granted permissive intervention was party to action and could effectively challenge denial of intervention as of right, and conditions attached to permissive intervention, after litigation of the merits). Similarly, an order granting in part a motion to intervene as of right is not immediately appealable. See Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1998) (order granting intervention as of right as to remedial phase of trial appealable only after final judgment), amended by 158 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 959 n.14 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

                              b.       Permissive Intervention

 

          Although an order denying permissive intervention has traditionally been held nonappealable, or appealable only if the district court has abused its discretion, “jurisdiction to review [such an order] exists as a practical matter because a consideration of the jurisdictional issue necessarily involves a consideration of the merits – whether an abuse of discretion occurred.” Benny v. England (In re Benny), 791 F.2d 712, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2005); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1997).

 

          An order denying permissive intervention is appealable at least in conjunction with denial of intervention as of right. See Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1491 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding appellate jurisdiction existed where intervention as of right and permissive intervention denied, but amicus status granted).

 

                              c.       Must Appeal Denial of Intervention Immediately

 

          An order denying a motion to intervene as of right must be timely appealed following entry of the order. See United States v. Oakland, 958 F.2d 300, 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where appellant failed to appeal from denial of intervention as of right until after final judgment and neglected to move for leave to intervene for purposes of appeal).

 

                    20.     MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISIONS (28 U.S.C. § 636(c))

 

                              a.       Final Judgment by Magistrate Appealed Directly to Court of Appeals

 

          When a magistrate judge enters a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), appeal is directly to the court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(c). “An appeal from a judgment by a magistrate judge in a civil case is taken in the same way as an appeal from any other district court judgment.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(3).

 

Cross-reference: V.B.2.f (regarding reference to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) for findings and recommendations rather than entry of final judgment).

 

                              b.       No Appellate Jurisdiction if Magistrate Lacked Authority

 

          A final judgment entered by a magistrate judge who lacked authority is not an appealable order. See Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548, 548-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); cf. Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 415 n.1 & 418 (9th Cir. 1992) (treating attempted appeal as petition for writ of mandamus).

 

          A magistrate judge lacks authority to enter a final judgment absent special designation by the district court, see Tripati, 847 F.2d at 548-49, and the uncoerced consent of the parties, see Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 690 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F. 3d 1172, 1178 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

          Where a magistrate judge acts without jurisdiction in purporting to enter a final judgment, the magistrate judge’s lack of jurisdiction deprives this court of appellate jurisdiction. Holbert v. Idaho Power Co., 195 F.3d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1999) (order).

 

                              c.       Parties’ Consent to Entry of Final Judgment by Magistrate

 

          If the record does not contain a “clear and unambiguous” statement that the parties consented to a magistrate exercising authority under § 636(c), only the district court has jurisdiction to enter an appealable judgment. Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 690 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that parties’ consent to magistrate exercising authority under § 636(b) was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 636(c)); see also Nasca v. Peoplesoft (In re Marriage of Nasca), 160 F.3d 578, 578 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[G]eneral orders from a district court that allow the court to infer consent from a failure to object are insufficient to manifest consent.”).

 

          A statement of consent should specifically refer to “trial before a magistrate” or “section § 636(c),” or contain equally explicit language. SEC v. American Principals Holdings, Inc. (In re San Vicente Med. Partners, Ltd.), 865 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that stipulation to have dispute heard before a named district court judge or “anyone” that judge deems appropriate was insufficient).

 

          Voluntary consent may be implied in limited, exceptional circumstances. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 589 (2003). In Roell, the parties behavior as reflected in the record “clearly implied their consent” and showed their voluntary participation in the proceedings before the magistrate judge. See id. at 584, cf. Anderson v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 351 F.3d 911, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (even though she signed the consent form, pro se plaintiff’s voluntary consent to proceed before magistrate judge could not be implied where she twice refused to consent, consent form did not advise her that she could withhold consent, and she only consented after the court denied her motion to reject magistrate judge’s jurisdiction).

 

          Clear and unambiguous stipulations on the pretrial statement may constitute consent to proceed before a magistrate judge. Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

          The parties’ express oral consent to a magistrate judge’s authority is sufficient to grant the magistrate judge authority to enter final judgment. Kofoed v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 237 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

          Consent to a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction may also be given by a “virtual representative.” See Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 924, 929-31 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

          A defendant’s lack of proper consent to the magistrate judge’s entry of final judgment cannot not be cured by the defendant expressly consenting on appeal to the magistrate judge’s exercise of authority. Hajek v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999).

 

Cross-reference: V.B.2.f (regarding objections to order of reference and to purposed findings and recommendations in matters referred to a magistrate judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) rather than § 636(c)).

 

                    21.     POST-JUDGMENT ORDERS

 

                              a.       Post-Judgment Orders Generally Final

 

          A post-judgment order may be final and appealable “(1) as an ‘integral part’ of the final judgment on the merits even though not entered concurrently with that judgment; (2) as an independent final order in a single case involving two ‘final’ decisions; or (3) as a collateral interlocutory order subject to immediate review under Cohen, if it is viewed as preliminary to a later proceeding.” United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

 

          The finality rule must be given a practical construction, particularly in the context of post-judgment orders. See United States v. Washington, 761 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). Permitting immediate appeal of post-judgment orders creates little risk of piecemeal review and may be the only opportunity for meaningful review. See One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d at 1184-85; see also Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 861 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that post-judgment order approving student assignment plan pursuant to previously entered desegregation order was appealable); Washington, 761 F.2d at 1406-07 (concluding that post-judgment order adopting interim plan allocating fishing rights was final and appealable).

 

          However, a post-judgment order cannot be final if the underlying judgment is not final. See Branson v. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that denial of motion to alter nonfinal judgment is effectively a reaffirmation of that judgment).

 

                    Cross-reference: II.A.1 (regarding finality generally).

 

                              b.       Separate Notice of Appeal Generally Required

 

          Unless a post-judgment order is appealed at the same time as the judgment on the merits, a separate notice of appeal is generally required to challenge the post-judgment order. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no jurisdiction over order denying attorney’s fees where no separate notice of appeal filed); Farley v. Henderson, 883 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction over order awarding attorney’s fees where no separate notice of appeal filed); Culinary & Serv. Employees Local 555 v. Hawaii Employee Benefit Admin., Inc., 688 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).

 

Cross-reference: III.F.2 (regarding notice of appeal from post- judgment tolling motions), III.F.3 (regarding notice of appeal from non-tolling post-judgment motions).

 

                              c.       Appealability of Specific Post-Judgment Orders

 

                                         i.        Post-Judgment Order Granting or Denying Attorney’s Fees

 

          An order granting or denying a post-judgment motion for attorney’s fees is generally an appealable final order. See United States ex rel. Familian Northwest, Inc. v. RG & B Contractors, Inc., 21 F.3d 952, 954-55 ( 9th Cir. 1994); International Ass’n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, & Reinforcing Ironworkers’ Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., Inc., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984). An order awarding periodic attorney’s fees for monitoring compliance with a consent decree is also a final appealable order. See Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 994 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999), superseding Madrid v. Gomez, 150 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994). A periodic fee award made during the remedial phase of a prisoner civil rights case is appealable if it disposes of the attorney’s fees issue for the work performed during the time period covered by the award. See Madrid, 190 F.3d at 994 n.4.

 

          However, “an award of attorney’s fees does not become final until the amount of the fee award is determined.” Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

                                         ii.       Post-Judgment Order Granting or Denying Costs

 

          A post-judgment order granting or denying a motion for costs is final and appealable. See Burt v. Hennessey, 929 F.2d 457, 458 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

                                         iii.      Post-Judgment Order Granting or Denying New Trial

 

          An order conditionally granting or denying a motion for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c) or (d) is reviewable in conjunction with an appeal from the grant or denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). See Neely v. Martin K. Elby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1967); Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1998); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 190 & n.15 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

          However, an order unconditionally granting a motion for new trial is not appealable. See Schudel v. General Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 995 n.9 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving order granting new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), abrogated on other grounds by Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000); Roy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 781 F.2d 670, 671 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (involving order granting new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59).

 

                                        iv.      Post-Judgment Orders Related to Discovery

 

          An order granting a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and seal court files, and denying a motion to compel production of documents, is final and appealable. See Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

          Similarly, an order granting intervenors’ motion, after settlement and dismissal, to modify a protective order to permit intervenors access to deposition transcripts is appealable. See Beckman Indus. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1992).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12.a.iv (regarding discovery-related orders issued afer entry of judgment in underlying proceeding).

 

                                         v.       Post-Judgment Contempt Orders

 

          An order of contempt for violation of previously entered judgment is final and appealable. See Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1991); Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1992) (consent decree).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10.b (regarding contempt or sanctions order entered after final judgment in underlying action).

 

                                         vi.      Orders Granting or Denying Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Relief

 

          An order granting or denying relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 is final and appealable. See Harman v. Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). But see Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1386 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) (dismissing appeal from denial of 60(b) motion because district court lacked jurisdiction to consider motion). Additionally, the denial of a motion to vacate a consent decree under 60(b) is final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2004).

 

          A vacatur of a judgment in response to a Rule 60(b) order is not a final judgment. Ballard v. Baldridge, 209 F.3d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 2000) (order).

 

                                         vii.     Other Post-Judgment Orders

 

          An order granting or denying a motion for extension of time to appeal is final and appealable. See Corrigan v. Bargala, 140 F.3d 815, 817 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998); Diamond v. United States Dist. Court, 661 F.2d 1198, 1198 (9th Cir. 1981) (order).

 

          An order issuing a certificate of reasonable cause after dismissal of a forfeiture action is also appealable. See United States v. One 1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

                    22.     PRE-FILING REVIEW ORDER

 

          “[P]re-filing orders entered against vexatious litigants are not conclusive and can be reviewed and corrected (if necessary) after final judgment,” and thus are not immediately appealable. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “pre-filing orders entered against vexatious litigants are [] not immediately appealable”). But see Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 469-71 (9th Cir. 1990) (pre-Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999) case that states, “The district court’s order is most aptly characterized as a final order precluding the clerk from accepting papers from [appellant] without leave of court.”).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.3 (regarding appointment of counsel); II.C.15 (regarding forma pauperis status).

 

                    23.     RECEIVERSHIP

 

                    See II.B.2 (Interlocutory Receivership Orders).

 

                    24.     REMAND

 

Cross-reference: II.C.24.a (regarding orders remanding to state court); II.C.24.b (regarding orders remanding to federal agencies); II.C.24.c (regarding orders denying petitions for removal from state court); II.C.24.d (regarding orders denying motions to remand to state court).

 

                              a.       Order Remanding to State Court

 

          Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), an order remanding a removed action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995) (“only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review” under § 1447(d)) (citations omitted); Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1987). Note that the court of appeals does have jurisdiction to determine whether the district court had the authority under § 1447(c) to remand. See Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2006).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.24.a.i (regarding remand due to defect in removal procedure); II.C.24.a.ii (regarding remand due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction); II.C.24.a.iii (regarding remand for reasons other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defect in removal procedure).

 

          Section 1447(d) generally bars review of an order remanding an action to state court regardless of the statutory basis on which the action was originally removed to federal court. See Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 128. For example, § 1447(d) applies to actions removed under the general removal statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Hansen v. Blue Cross of California, 891 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1989), and actions removed under the bankruptcy removal statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a); Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enters., Inc. (In re Conejo Enters., Inc.), 96 F.3d 346, 350-51 (9th Cir. 1996). However, § 1447(d) does not bar review of remand orders in certain civil rights actions, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443 & 1447(d); Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 2006), or in actions involving the FDIC, see 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(C) (stating that the FDIC may appeal any order of remand entered by any United States District Court); Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 784-85 & n.1, n.2 (9th Cir. 1992).

 

          In determining the grounds for remand, the court of appeals looks to the substance of the remand order. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2004) (although the district court did not explicitly identify the specific grounds for remand, the court of appeals examined the “full record before the district court to ascertain the court’s ‘actual reason’ for remanding.”). The district court’s characterization of its authority for remand is not controlling. See Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1991); Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

          Note that “[w]hen a district court remands claims to a state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the remand order is not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d),” as would preclude a court of appeals from reviewing the order. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1867 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

                                         i.        Remand Due to Defect in Removal Procedure

 

          An order of remand premised on a defect in removal procedure is not reviewable if the motion to remand was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995) (holding remand order not reviewable because motion to remand filed within 30 days of removal); see also Kamm v. ITEX Corp., 568 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the court of appeals must determine whether a defect in removal procedure was timely raised. See Northern California Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that if defect in removal procedure not timely raised, district court lacked power under § 1447(c) to order remand).

 

                                         ii.       Remand Due to Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 

          An order of remand premised on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not reviewable. See Levin Metals, Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court’s underlying conclusions regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction are also immune from review. See Hansen v. Blue Cross of California, 891 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1989). However, a substantive determination made prior to, or in conjunction with, remand may be reviewable under the collateral order doctrine if it is separate from any jurisdictional determination. See Gallea v. United States, 779 F.2d 1403, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that pre-remand order dismissing United States was reviewable). For example:

 

                  Review of order remanding due to lack of complete diversity barred by § 1447(d). See Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723 (1977) (per curiam) (mandamus relief not available).

 

                  Review of order remanding due to lack of federal question jurisdiction barred by § 1447(d). See Krangel v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 914, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (order not reviewable despite certification under § 1292(b)); Levin Metals, Corp., 799 F.2d at 1315 (simultaneous order dismissing counterclaim reviewable because counterclaim had independent basis for federal jurisdiction).

 

                  Review of order remanding due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction barred by § 1447(d), but order dismissing party prior to remand reviewable because “[t]o hold otherwise would immunize the dismissal from review.” Gallea, 779 F.2d at 1404 (pre-remand order dismissing United States reviewable); see also Nebraska, ex rel., Department of Soc. Servs. v. Bentson, 146 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1998) (pre-remand order dismissing IRS reviewable).

 

                  Review of order remanding due to lack of complete federal preemption barred by § 1447(d). See Whitman v. Raley’s Inc., 886 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1989) (underlying determination that the LMRA and ERISA did not completely preempt state law also unreviewable); Hansen, 891 F.2d at 1387 (underlying determination that ERISA did not apply, though “clearly wrong,” also unreviewable).

 

                  Review of an order remanding due to violation of the minimum amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). McCauley v. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

                  A district court’s remand order, based on a finding that ERISA did not completely preempt former employee’s state law claims against employer and therefore federal subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, was unreviewable on appeal. Lyons v. Alaska Teamsters Employers Serv. Corp., 188 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1999).

 

                  A district court’s order remanding an administrative forfeiture proceeding to state court, primarily for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, was unreviewable on appeal. Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999).                     

                  A district court’s order remanding to state court a class action suit alleging that stock broker misled investors about its on-line trading system because district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remand was not discretionary, was unreviewable on appeal. Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2002).

 

                                         iii.      Remand for Reasons Other than Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Defect in Removal Procedure

 

          Section 1447(d) does not bar review of an order remanding an action to state court for reasons other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712-15 (1996); see also Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Section 1447(d) also does not bar review of an order remanding state law claims on discretionary grounds despite the existence of supplemental jurisdiction over the claims in federal court. See Scott v. Machinists Auto. Trades Dist. Lodge 190, 827 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

 

          A remand order not based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure is reviewable if it satisfies some basis for appellate jurisdiction. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). A remand order is appealable as a collateral order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if it conclusively determines a disputed question separate from the merits and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment, or if it puts parties “effectively out of court” by depriving them of a federal forum. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712-13; Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1998); Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). An order remanding pendent state law claims is a reviewable order. California Dept. of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1091-96 (9th Cir. 2008), overruling Executive Software N.A., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1549-50 (9th Cir. 1994) and Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

          The following orders (remanding to state court for reasons other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure) were deemed reviewable on the jurisdictional basis specified in each case:

 

                  District court order remanding “claims to a state court after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” was not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d), as would preclude a court of appeals from reviewing the order. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1867 (9th Cir. 2009); see also California Dept. of Water Resources, 533 F.3d at 1096 (district court’s discretionary decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand pendent state claims is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291).

 

                  District court order granting motion to remand to state court based on a forum selection clause in contract was appealable because the forum selection clause was not a “defect” within the meaning of § 1447(c). Kamm v. ITEX Corp., 568 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

                  Remand order based on merits determination that employee handbook authorized plaintiff to choose forum reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1985).

 

                  Remand order premised on merits determination that contractual forum selection clause was valid and enforceable reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Northern California Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1036 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing order of remand premised on forum selection clause without explicitly discussing basis for jurisdiction).

 

                  Remand order premised on abstention doctrine reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712-13 (Burford abstention); Bennett v. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 969, 970 (9th Cir. 1992) (Colorado River abstention).

 

                  Remand order issued pursuant to discretionary jurisdiction provision of Declaratory Judgment Act reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Snodgrass, 147 F.3d at 1165-66.

 

                  Order remanding pendent state law claims, following grant of summary judgment as to federal claims, reviewable. See Scott, 827 F.2d at 592 (basis for appellate jurisdiction not expressly stated).

                  Order remanding pendent state law claims, following amendment deleting grounds for removal to federal court, reviewable under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b) pursuant to district court certification. See National Audubon Soc’y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

                  The court of appeals has jurisdiction to review an award of sanctions upon remand. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

                              b.       Order Remanding to Federal Agency

 

          An order remanding an action to a federal agency is generally not considered a final appealable order. See Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Alaska v. EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1065 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (recognizing that a remand order is not a final agency decision, but exercising jurisdiction to review remand order that turned on claim of sovereign immunity). However, such an order is considered final where: “(1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a practical matter, be forceclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable.” Chugach, 915 F.2d at 457.

 

                                         i.        Remand to Federal Agency on Factual Grounds

 

          A remand order requiring an agency to clarify its decision on a factual issue is not final. See Gilcrist v. Schweiker, 645 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Similarly, a remand order permitting an agency to fully develop the facts is not final. See Eluska v. Andrus, 587 F.2d 996, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 1978).

 

                                         ii.       Remand to Federal Agency on Legal Grounds

 

          A remand order requiring an agency to apply a different legal standard is generally considered a final appealable order. See Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 464, 466-68 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[F]ailure to permit immediate appeal might foreclose review altogether: Should the Secretary lose on remand, there would be no appeal, for the Secretary cannot appeal his own agency’s determinations.”)

 

          Under this principle, the following remand orders have been held appealable:

 

                  Order reversing denial of social security benefits due to application of erroneous legal standard, and remanding to Secretary of Health and Human Services for further proceedings. See Stone, 722 F.2d at 467-68 (permitting Secretary to appeal remand order); Rendleman v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 957, 959 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

                  Order reversing denial of social security benefits because legal conclusion inadequately supported by factual record, and remanding to Secretary of Health and Human Services for further proceedings. See Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 272 (1998) (permitting claimant to appeal remand order).

 

                  Order reversing denial of land conveyance based on interpretation of federal statute, and remanding to Interior Board of Land Appeals. See Chugach Alaska Corp., 915 F.2d at 456-57 (Security permitted to appeal remand order).

 

                  Order reversing denial of fees because agency erroneously concluded the Equal Access of Justice Act did not apply to the proceedings, and remanding to Interior Board of Land Appeals. See Collord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 154 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Aageson Grain & Cattle v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 500 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2007) (order remanding to determine attorney fees and costs under EAJA was reviewable final order because it determined separable legal issue).

 

                  “Unusual remand order” to Provider Reimbursement Review Board for consideration of jurisdiction over potential wage index claim “if [plaintiff] chooses to pursue this avenue” was appealable where plaintiff did not seek, and chose not to pursue, remand. See Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1996) (after vacating partial remand, court of appeals concluded judgment was final and reviewed dismissal of remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

 

                              c.       Order Denying Petition for Removal from State Court

 

          An order denying a petition for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. See Ashland v. Cooper, 863 F.2d 691, 692 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that order requiring litigant who had been granted in forma pauperis status to post a removal bond was reviewable).

 

                              d.       Order Denying Motion to Remand to State Court

 

          An order denying a motion to remand is not a final decision and does not fall under the collateral order doctrine. See Bishop v. Bechtel Power Corp. (Estate of Bishop), 905 F.2d 1272, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that order denying remand could be reviewed on appeal from final judgment). But see San Francisco v. PG&E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the general rule that the denial of a motion to remand is not a final decision, does not apply if a district court’s order effectively ends the litigation or sends a party out of court).

 

Cross-reference: V.A.1.b.v (regarding the reviewability of certain orders denying remand during an appeal from final judgment); V.A.2.b (regarding the reviewability of an order denying remand during an appeal from an injunctive order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).

 

                    25.     SANCTIONS

 

                    See II.C.10 (Contempt and Sanctions).

 

                    26.     STAYS

 

          Generally, orders granting or denying stays are not appealable final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Silberkleit v. Kantrowitz, 713 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1983). However, such orders are appealable under certain circumstances, including where the order places the parties “effectively out of court.” Id. (citation omitted).

 

                              a.       Stay Granted

 

                                         i.        Abstention-Based Stays

 

          The following orders, granting abstention-based stays, are appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because their effect is to deprive the parties of a federal forum:

 

                  Order granting a stay under the Colorado River doctrine. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1983); Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1194 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005) (exercising jurisdiction under the Moses H. Cone doctrine where district court order granting a stay of Attorney General’s Clayton Act suit against Chapter 11 debtor pending resolution of the debtor’s bankruptcy case effectively put the Attorney General out of court).

 

                  Order granting a stay under the Burford abstention doctrine. See Tucker v. First Maryland Sav. & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401, 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that Burford abstention doctrine generally mandates dismissal, not stay).

 

                  Order granting a stay under the Pullman abstention doctrine. See Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that stay order was also appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).

 

                  Order granting a stay under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that when the Younger abstention doctrine is applicable, the district court is required to dismiss the action).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.13 (regarding abstention-based dismissals); II.C.24 (regarding abstention-based remands).

                                         ii.       Other Stays

 

          The following orders, granting stays on grounds other than abstention, are appealable on the grounds stated:

 

                  Order granting stay pending resolution of foreign proceedings. See Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2007).

            

                  Order staying federal claims pending resolution of dismissed pendent state claims in state court is appealable under § 1292(a)(1). See Privitera v. California Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 926 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining stay was appealable because it had effect of denying injunctive relief, without reaching finality issue).

 

Cross-reference: II.B.1 (regarding interlocutory injunctive orders).

 

                  Order by Benefits Review Board staying award of compensation benefits, despite statutory policy that benefits be paid promptly, is appealable under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), which permits review of final decisions by the Board. See Edwards v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 932 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

                  Order staying federal civil rights action indefinitely pending exhaustion of habeas corpus remedies is appealable. See Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1992). But see Alexander v. Arizona, 80 F.3d 376, 376 (9th Cir. 1996) (order) (holding that order staying civil rights action for 90 days to permit exhaustion of prison administrative remedies was not appealable).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.4 (regarding the appealability of a stay pending arbitration in an action governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16).

 

 

                              b.       Stay Denied

 

          The following orders denying stays are not immediately appealable because they do not satisfy the collateral order doctrine:

 

                  Order denying a stay under the Colorado River doctrine. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278 (1988) (observing that order is inherently tentative because “denial of such a motion may indicate nothing more than that the district court is not completely confident of the propriety of a stay. . . at the time”).

 

                  Order denying a stay under the Burford abstention doctrine. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372, 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).

 

                  Order denying a stay under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

                  Order denying motion to stay a removed state law foreclosure proceeding under federal statute. See Federal Land Bank v. L.R. Ranch Co., 926 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that validity of defendant’s statutory defense, which was the basis for the stay motion, could be effectively reviewed after final judgment).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.4 (regarding the appealability of an order denying a stay pending arbitration in an action governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16).

 

                    27.     SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

                              a.       Order Denying Summary Judgment

 

          An order denying a motion for summary judgment is generally an unappealable interlocutory order. See Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that order denying summary judgment may in certain instances be reviewed on appeal from final judgment); Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 877 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).

 

          However, an order denying summary judgment on the grounds of immunity may be appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See II.C.17.

 

                              b.       Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment

 

          Generally, an order granting partial summary judgment is not an appealable final order. See Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks, Inc., 16 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1994).

 

          However, an order granting partial summary judgment may be immediately appealable if:

 

                  Order is properly certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1991); II.A.3.

 

                  Order has the effect of denying an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See American Tunaboat Ass’n. v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995); II.B.1.

 

                  Order satisfies the practical finality doctrine. See Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1995); II.A.1.d.

 

          This court has also determined that an order granting partial summary judgment was subject to pendent appellate jurisdiction where the ruling was inextricably intertwined with the district court’s order denying summary judgment on basis of qualified immunity. See Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2009).

 

                    28.     TAX

 

                    See VII.C (Tax Court Decisions).

 

 


                    29.     TRANSFER

 

                              a.       Transfer from District Court to District Court

 

          An order transferring an action from one district court to another is generally not appealable, but may be reviewed upon petition for writ of mandamus. See Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 872 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1989) (issuing writ of mandamus), abrogated on other grounds by Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000).

 

Cross-reference: II.D.4.h (regarding the availability of mandamus relief from transfer orders).

 

                              b.       Transfer from District Court to Court of Appeals

 

          An order transferring an action from the district court to the court of appeals due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Carpenter v. Department of Transp., 13 F.3d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that district court transferred action under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 on the grounds that the court of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to review regulation issued by Federal Highway Administration).

  

          D.      PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

 

                    1.       GENERALLY

 

          “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

 

          The burden is on a petitioner seeking a writ to show that his or her “right to the writ is clear and indisputable.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 103 F.3d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Ordinarily, where a decision is within the district court’s discretion, “it cannot be said that a litigant’s right to a particular result is ‘clear and indisputable.’” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam).

 

                    2.       BAUMAN FACTORS

 

          The court of appeals considers the presence or absence of the following five factors in evaluating a petition for writ of mandamus:

 

(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. (2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal. (This guideline is closely related to the first.) (3) The district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impressions.

 

Credit Suisse v. United States Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)).

 

          “None of these guidelines is determinative and all five guidelines need not be satisfied at once for a writ to issue.” Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d at 1345 (only in rare cases will all guidelines point in the same direction or even be relevant). “[I]ssuance of the writ is in large part a matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed.” Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).

 

          Note that the guidelines for issuing a writ are more flexible when the court of appeals exercises its supervisory mandamus authority, which is invoked in cases “involving questions of law of major importance to the administration of the district courts.” Arizona v. United States Dist. Court (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 688 F.2d 1297, 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (showing of actual injury and ordinary error may suffice).

 

                              a.       Alternative Relief Unavailable

 

          “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is not available when the same review may be obtained through contemporaneous ordinary appeal.” Snodgrass v. Provident Life And Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. United States Dist. Court, 859 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

          The availability of review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as a final or collateral order, precludes review by mandamus. See Snodgrass, 147 F.3d at 1165-66. The availability of review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) also precludes review by mandamus. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 137 F.3d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1998) (order prohibiting California from extraditing defendant to Missouri appealable as an injunction under § 1292(a)(1)). Moreover, failure to file a timely notice of appeal from an appealable order generally precludes mandamus relief. See Demos v. United States Dist. Court, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) (order) (“[M]andamus may not be used as a substitute for an untimely notice of appeal.”).

 

          However, failure to seek certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) does not preclude mandamus relief. See Executive Software North Am., Inc. v. United States Dist Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that permissive appeal under § 1292(b) is not a “contemporaneous ordinary appeal”), overruled on other grounds by California Dep’t of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008).

 

                              b.       Possibility of Irreparable Damage or Prejudice

 

          The second Bauman factor, which is closely related to the first, is satisfied by “severe prejudice that could not be remedied on direct appeal.” Credit Suisse v. United States Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding severe prejudice where an order compelling a bank to respond to discovery requests forced the bank to choose between contempt of court and violation of Swiss banking secrecy and penal laws); see also Philippine Nat’l Bank v. United States Distr. Court, 397 F.3d 768, 774 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding severe prejudice where bank would be forced to choose between violating Philippine law and contempt of court); Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (finding irreparable harm where an order compelled defendants in a securities fraud action to undergo the burden and expense of initial disclosures prior to the district court ruling on a motion to dismiss because the issue would be moot on appeal from final judgment).

 

          In a supervisory mandamus case, the injury requirement may be satisfied by a showing of “actual injury.” See Arizona v. United States Dist. Court (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 688 F.2d 1297, 1303, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that supervisory authority is invoked in cases “involving questions of law of major importance to the administration of the district courts”).

 

                              c.       Clear Error by District Court

 

          A petitioner’s failure to show clear error may be dispositive of a petition for writ of mandamus. See McDaniel v. United States Dist. Court, 127 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

 

          Note that in a supervisory mandamus case, the petitioner only needs to show an ordinary error, not clear error. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 134 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005); Arizona v. United States Dist. Court (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that supervisory authority is invoked in cases “involving questions of law of major importance to the administration of the district courts”).

 

                              d.       Potential for Error to Recur

 

          The fourth and fifth Bauman factors will rarely both be present in a single case because one requires repetition and the other novelty. See Armster v. United States Dist. Court, 806 F.2d 1347, 1352 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Where one of the two is present, the absence of the other is of little or no significance.”). But see Portillo v. United States Dist. Court, 15 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that presentence urine testing raised issue of first impression and that routine testing “will constitute an oft-repeated error”).

 

                              e.       Important Question of First Impression

 

          Mandamus relief may be appropriate to settle an important question of first impression that cannot be effectively reviewed after final judgment. See Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (noting that where the fifth Bauman factor is present, the third and fourth factors generally will not be present).

 

          The court of appeals often relies on its supervisory mandamus authority in cases raising an important question of law of first impression. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 134 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005); Arizona v. United States Dist. Court (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 688 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982).

 

                    3.       NOTICE OF APPEAL CONSTRUED AS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

 

          The court of appeals has discretion to construe an appeal as a petition for writ mandamus. See Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Zone, 403 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e may even construe an appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus sua sponte.”). However, the court will construe an appeal as a writ petition only in an “extraordinary case,” Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by California Dep’t of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008), and “mandamus may not be used as a substitute for an untimely notice of appeal,” Demos v. United States Dist. Court, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

          In determining whether to construe an appeal as a petition, the court generally evaluates the appeal in light of the Bauman factors. See Lee, 12 F.3d at 936, overruled on other grounds by California Dep’t of Water Resources, v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008).

 

                              a.       Appeal Construed as Petition for Writ of Mandamus

 

          An appeal has been construed as a petition where three Bauman factors were clearly present in an appeal from an order appointing a special master to monitor compliance with a previously entered injunction. See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying petition).

 

          An appeal has been construed as a petition where a magistrate judge issued a stay it had no authority to issue and the petitioner was a pro se inmate likely powerless to prevent the invalid stay order from being enforced. See Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting petition without discussing Bauman factors).

 

          An appeal has been construed as a petition where the district court’s order allowed the defendant to disclose to the government communications between the defendant and co-defendants that occurred outside the presence of counsel. United States v. Austin, 416 F.3d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying petition because the order was not clearly erroneous and the Bauman factors did not weigh in favor of granting the writ).

 

                              b.       Appeal Not Construed as Petition for Writ of Mandamus

 

          In California Dep’t of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1091-96 (9th Cir. 2008), the court held that a district court’s discretionary decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction and remand, must be challenged pursuant to an appeal, rather than in a petition for writ of mandamus, overruling Survival Sys. Div. of the Whittaker Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 825 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987), Executive Software N.A., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1549-50 (9th Cir. 1994) and Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1993).

 

          The court of appeals declined to construe an appeal as a petition where no Bauman factors were present in an appeal from a discretionary remand of pendent state claims. See Lee, 12 F.3d at 936-38, overruled on other grounds by California Dep’t of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008).

 

                    4.       AVAILABILITY OF MANDAMUS RELIEF FROM SPECIFIC ORDERS

 

                              a.       Class Certification Orders

 

                                         i.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

 

          Note that the following decisions should be considered in light of Fed. R. Civ. p. 23(f), which provides for permissive interlocutory appeal from class certification orders.

Cross-reference: II.C.8 (regarding the appealability of class certification orders).

 

                                         ii.       Decisions Predating Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f)

 

          An order granting a motion to certify a class, or denying a motion to amend an order certifying a class, may warrant mandamus relief. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1976) (granting petition in part where district court clearly erred in certifying a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975) (same). But see Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-62 (9th Cir. 1977) (denying mandamus relief from order denying motion to delete certain provisions from class certification order).

 

          However, the court of appeals “has not looked favorably upon granting extraordinary relief to vacate a class certification.” Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996).

 

                              b.       Contempt Orders

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is an available avenue for relief from an order of civil contempt against a party to ongoing district court proceedings. See Goldblum v. NBC, 584 F.2d 904, 906 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (granting petition).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.10 (regarding the appealability of civil contempt orders against parties to ongoing district court proceedings).

 

                              c.       Discovery Orders

 

                                        i.        Mandamus Relief Available

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is an available avenue for relief from certain discovery orders. See United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1121-24 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting petition for writ of mandamus from order granting defendants’ motion for pretrial deposition of the government’s expert witnesses); Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 326-27 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (granting petition for writ of mandamus from order compelling defendants to make initial disclosures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) despite statutory provision staying discovery in securities fraud actions pending disposition of motions to dismiss); City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting petition for writ of mandamus from order prohibiting plaintiff from reopening

discovery to depose city officials regarding their motives for enacting the zoning ordinance at issue).

 

          Mandamus is particularly appropriate “for the review of orders compelling discovery in the face of assertions of absolute privilege.” Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting petition for writ of mandamus from order compelling defendant to produce statements purportedly covered by the attorney-client privilege); see also Taiwan v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 712, 717-19 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting petition for writ of mandamus from order compelling deposition of foreign defendants despite claim of testimonial immunity under the Taiwan Relations Act).

 

                                        ii.       Mandamus Relief Not Available

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is not an available avenue for relief from certain discovery orders because other remedies are available. See Bank of Am. v. Feldman (In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates), 821 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding mandamus relief inappropriate where privileged information has already been disclosed and any possible remedy is available on appeal from final judgment); Guerra v. Board of Trustees, 567 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding mandamus relief inappropriate because less drastic remedies appeared available where district court had not shown unwillingness to protect confidentiality of documents by other means); Belfer v. Pence, 435 F.2d 121, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (concluding mandamus relief inappropriate where nonparty has option of defying discovery order and appealing from subsequent contempt citation).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12 (regarding the appealability of discovery-related orders).

 

                              d.       Disqualification Orders

 

                                        i.        Disqualification of Judge

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus may be an appropriate means for seeking the review of an order granting disqualification or recusal of a district court judge because effective review is not available after final judgment. See Arizona v. United States Dist. Court (In re Cement Antitrust Litig.), 688 F.2d 1297, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying petition under supervisory mandamus authority).

 

          However, an order denying disqualification or recusal of a district court judge generally will not warrant mandamus relief because it can be effectively reviewed after final judgment. See id. (dicta). But see King v. United States Dist. Court, 16 F.3d 992, 993 (9th Cir. 1994) (order) (concluding mandamus relief was unavailable because denial of disqualification was not clearly erroneous, but noting in concurrence that petition for writ of mandamus may be appropriate means for seeking review of district court judge’s refusal to recuse himself).

 

                                        ii.       Disqualification of Counsel

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus may be an appropriate means for seeking review of an order denying a motion to disqualify opposing counsel. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (observing that review on appeal from final judgment may not be adequate to remedy any improper use of information by counsel during trial, but denying relief from order denying motion to disqualify opposing counsel due to conflict of interest); see also Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 856 F.2d 98, 100-02 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying petition for writ of mandamus from order denying motion to disqualify opposing counsel due to conflict of interest).

 

          An order granting a motion to disqualify opposing counsel may warrant mandamus relief. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981); Cole v. United States Dist. Court, 366 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that writ of mandamus may be used to review disqualification of counsel, and denying the petition); Christensen v. United States Dist. Court, 844 F.2d 694, 696-99 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing that inability to be represented during trial by chosen counsel cannot be effectively reviewed on appeal from final judgment, and granting petition for writ of mandamus from order disqualifying law firm from representing defendant in action brought by FSLIC, due to prior representation of client with adverse interests).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.14 (regarding the appealability of orders disqualifying or declining to disqualify judge or counsel).

 

                              e.       Jury Demand Orders

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is an available avenue for relief from an order denying trial by jury. See Wilmington Trust v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1991) (right to jury trial occupies “exceptional place” in history of federal mandamus, and showing of “clear and indisputable” right not required). “If the plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial, their right to the writ is clear.” Tushner v. United States Dist. Court, 829 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

 

          A writ of mandamus properly issues where the district court denies trial by jury due to an erroneous conclusion that petitioner has no right to trial by jury or that petitioner failed to timely demand a jury. See Wilmington Trust, 934 F.2d at 1028 (granting petition where district court erroneously concluded that petitioner had no right to trial by jury); Tushner, 829 F.2d at 855-56 (granting petition where district court erroneously concluded that jury demand in original federal action was untimely); Mondor v. United States Dist. Court, 910 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting petition where district court erroneously concluded that petitioner failed to properly demand jury after removal to federal court); Myers v. United States Dist. Court, 620 F.2d 741, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1980) (granting petition where district court erroneously concluded that petitioner failed to properly demand jury prior to removal to federal court).

 

                              f.       Media Access Orders

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is an available avenue for relief from an order denying the media access to court proceedings or documents. See Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that the media does not have standing to appeal because it is not a party to the proceeding, and absent mandamus relief, it faces serious injury to important First Amendment rights). But see Copley Press, Inc. v. Higuera-Guerrero, 518 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine to review an order unsealing documents).

 

          In particular, a writ of mandamus may be appropriate to permit media access to documents filed in criminal proceedings. See Oregonian Publ’g Co., 920 F.2d at 1467-68 (granting petition seeking access to documents relating to plea agreement filed under seal); Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1519 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting petition seeking access to pretrial detention hearings and documents); United States v. Schlette, 842 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th Cir.) (granting petition seeking access to presentence report, psychiatric report, and postsentence probation report), amended by 854 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988); Valley Broad. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1986) (granting petition seeking access to certain exhibits received in evidence in criminal trial); CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting petition seeking access to sealed post-conviction documents); CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting petition seeking dissemination of government surveillance tapes created during criminal investigation).

 

                              g.       Remand Orders

 

          An order granting remand may warrant mandamus relief if appellate review is not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), and the order is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 352-53 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1995).

 

                                         i.        Mandamus Relief Available

 

          A writ of mandamus was deemed appropriate where the district court permitted removal and vacated its prior remand order upon defendant’s second removal. See Seedman v. United States Dist. Court, 837 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (stating that “after certification to the state court a federal court cannot vacate a remand order issued under § 1447(c),” and ordering district court to remand action to state court).

 

                                        ii.       Mandamus Relief Not Available

 

          An order remanding an action to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defect in removal procedure, is not reviewable under § 1447(d), including by mandamus petition. See Allegheny Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989) (order). Moreover, an order remanding an action to state court based on a substantive determination apart from jurisdiction is reviewable as a collateral order, so mandamus relief is inappropriate. See Garamendi v. Allstate Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 353-54 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-15 (1996); Snodgrass v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, a district court’s discretionary decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction is properly challenged pursuant to appeal, rather than in a petition for mandamus relief. See California Dep’t of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2008).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.24 (regarding the appealability of the remand orders).

 

                              h.       Transfer Orders

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is an available avenue for relief from an order transferring an action from one district court to another. See Washington Pub. Util. Group v. United States Dist. Court, 843 F.2d 319, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

          In the following instances, the court of appeals granted mandamus relief from an order of transfer:

 

                  Order transferring action from one district court to another due to improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See Varsic v. United States Dist. Court, 607 F.2d 245, 250-52 (9th Cir. 1979) (granting petition where in forma pauperis plaintiff seeking petition benefits would suffer “peculiar hardship” if forced to await final judgment to challenge transfer).

 

                  Order transferring action from one district court to another for convenience of parties and witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 872 F.2d 310, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting petition where district court improperly failed to consider forum selection clause before ordering discretionary transfer orders), abrogated on other grounds by Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000). But see Washington Pub. Util. Group v. United States Dist. Court, 843 F.2d 319, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying petition where petitioners failed to show severe prejudice would result if transfer order not reviewed until after final judgment).

 

                  Order transferring action from district court to Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See Town of North Bonneville v. United States Dist. Court, 732 F.2d 747, 750-52 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting petition where district court clearly erred in transferring actions to court that had no jurisdiction to entertain them).

 

          Note that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of mandamus challenging an order transferring an action to a district court in another circuit even after the action is docketed in the transferee court. See NBS Imaging Syst., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 841 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1988) (order) (denying mandamus relief where district court did not clearly err and petitioner delayed seeking relief).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.29 (regarding the appealability of transfer orders).

 

                              i.        Other Orders

 

                                         i.        Mandamus Relief Available

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is an available avenue for relief from the following types of orders:

 

                  Order of reference to special master. See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying petition where district court did not clearly err in assigning certain duties to special master and allocating costs to defendants).

 

                  Order directing special master to inspect new prison pursuant to permanent injunction. See Rowland v. United States Dist. Court, 849 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (granting petition where district court acted outside its jurisdiction by ordering inspection of a prison not within the scope of the prior injunction).

 

                  Order denying motion to dismiss counterclaims against qui tam plaintiffs. See Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (granting petition where order clearly erroneous).

 

                  Order holding amended habeas petition in abeyance pending exhaustion in state court of claims deleted from petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 134 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying petition where order circumvented precedent but was not clearly erroneous under law as articulated), abrogated as recognized by Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

                  Order to show cause directing parties to brief issue of district court’s authority to reassign case. See Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (granting petition because district court failed to comply with prior appellate order that case be reassigned upon remand).

 

                  Order prohibiting attorneys in criminal proceeding from communicating with the media. See Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 601 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting petition directing district court to properly define scope of restraining order).

 

                  Order staying civil rights action brought by pro se inmate. See Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting petition where magistrate issued stay it had no authority to issue and petitioner likely powerless to prevent invalid stay order from being enforced).

 

                  Order staying anti-trust action pending outcome of parallel state proceeding. See Selma-Kingsburg-Fowler County Sanitation Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 604 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1979) (order) (granting petition because district court had no authority to stay federal action premised solely on federal law).

 

                  Order requiring attorney to represent indigent litigants in civil action. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 308-10 (1989) (holding that court of appeals should have granted petition because district court acted outside its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) by coercively appointing counsel).

 

                  Order directing attorneys to deposit money into discovery fund. See Hartland v. Alaska Airlines, 544 F.2d 992, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 1976) (granting petition where district court “had not even a semblance of jurisdiction original, ancillary or pendent to order anything or anybody” to pay money into a fund).

 

                                        ii.       Mandamus Relief Not Available

 

          A petition for writ of mandamus is not an available avenue for relief from the following types of orders:

 

                  Order denying motion to quash grand jury subpoena. See Silva v. United States (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Bailin), 51 F.3d 203, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting writ relief generally not available to avoid final judgment rule in the context of motions to quash grand jury subpoenas, and denying petition because district court ruling did not constitute usurpation of judicial power).

 

Cross-reference: II.C.12.b.ii (regarding the appealability of orders denying motions to quash grand jury subpoenas).

 

                  Order granting a new trial. Allied Chem. Corp v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (observing that new trial order “rarely, if ever, will justify the issuance of a writ”).

 

                  Order denying motion to amend pleadings. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Herrald, 434 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).

 

 

 

 

 

 


III.    TIMELINESS 

 

          A.      TIME PERIOD FOR APPEAL

 

                    1.       TIMELY NOTICE REQUIRED FOR JURISDICTION

 

          Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review the judgment. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrs., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating that deadline to file notice of appeal is “mandatory and jurisdictional”); Nguyen v. Southwest Leasing & Rental Inc., 282 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002); Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1981). If neither party objects to an untimely notice of appeal, the court of appeals must raise the issue sua sponte. See Hostler v. Groves, 912 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 1990).

 

                    2.       DEADLINE FOR FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

          Ordinarily, a notice of appeal from a district court decision in a civil case “must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

 

          “When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B).

 

          “If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).

 

                    3.       WHETHER UNITED STATES IS A PARTY

 

                              a.       Liberal Construction of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)

 

          Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) is to be read liberally to avoid uncertainty as to whether the 30-day or 60-day time period for appeal applies. See Wallace v. Chappell, 637 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam). The purpose of the lengthier appeal time in cases in which a federal official or agency is a party is to permit time for routing the case to government officials responsible for deciding whether or not to appeal. See id.; Hoag Ranches v. Stockton Prod. Credit Ass’n (In re Hoag Ranches), 846 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (order) (Rule 4 should be interpreted in light of its purpose).

 

                              b.       Determining Party Status

 

                                         i.        Federal Official as Defendant

 

          For Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) purposes, the United States is considered a party, and therefore the 60-day rule applies, where: (1) defendant officers were acting under color of office or color of law or lawful authority; or (2) any party is represented by a government attorney. See Wallace v. Chappell, 637 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying sixty-day period in race discrimination action against Navy personnel acting in their individual and official capacities).

 

                                         ii.       United States as Nominal Plaintiff

 

          Actions that must be brought in the name of the United States are generally subject to the 60-day time period. See United States ex rel. Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding United States is a party to a qui tam action brought under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)); United States ex rel. Custom Fabricators, Inc. v. Dick Olson Constructors, Inc., 823 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1987) (order) (per curiam) (holding United States is a party to an action brought under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a).

 

Cross-reference: VI.C.1.b.ii (regarding when the United States is considered a party to a bankruptcy proceeding).

 

                                        iii.      United States Dismissed Prior to Appeal

 

          “The United States need not be a party at the time an appeal is taken for the appeal to fit within the 60-day rule.” Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1989) (considering United States a party for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) even though dismissed as a defendant prior to filing of appeal) (citation omitted).

 

                                         iv.      United States as Party in Bifurcated Proceedings

 

          “[W]hen the United States is a named party, participates in the general action and is, or may be, interested in the outcome of an appeal, even though it is not a party to the appeal, then it is a ‘party’ for purposes of F.R.A.P. 4(a) and the 60-day time limit for appeal applies.” Kalinsky v. McDonnell Douglas (In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974), 578 F.2d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters, Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

                                         v.       United States as Party to Consolidated Action

 

          Where the United States is a party to one action, parties to consolidated actions are also entitled to the 60-day time limit. See Burchinal v. Cent. Wash. Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding notices of appeal timely under both Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), (3)).

 

                                         vi.      Foreign Government Not Treated Like United States

 

          An appeal by a foreign government is subject to the 30-day time limit. See Dadesho v. Gov’t of Iraq, 139 F.3d 766, 767 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We find no basis for extending to foreign governments all the procedural protections our laws accord our own government.”).

 

                                         vii.     United States Not a Party to Attorney Discipline Proceeding

 

          The district court is not a party to an attorney discipline proceeding for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), so the 30-day time limit applies. See In re the Suspension of Pipkins, 154 F.3d 1009, 1009 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

 

 


                              c.       Defining Agency

 

                                         i.        Relevant Factors

 

          In determining whether an entity is an agency for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), the court of appeals considers the following factors:

 

                  Extent to which entity performs governmental functions;

 

                  Scope of government involvement in entity’s management;

 

                  Whether entity’s operations are funded by the government;

 

                  Extent to which persons other than the federal government have a proprietary interest in the agency;

 

                  Whether entity is referred to as an agency in other federal statutes;

 

                  Whether entity is treated as an arm of the federal government for other purposes, such as amenability to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

 

See Hoag Ranches v. Stockton Prod. Credit Ass’n (In re Hoag Ranches), 846 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1988) (order).

 

                                         ii.       Factors Applied

 

          The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is considered an agency of the United States for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). See Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1989).

 

          However, the government of Guam is not an agency of the United States for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). See Blas v. Gov’t of Guam, 941 F.2d 778, 779 (9th Cir. 1991). Product Credit Agencies are also not agencies of the United States for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). See Hoag Ranches v. Stockton Prod. Credit Ass’n (In re Hoag Ranches), 846 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988) (order).

 

                    4.       COMPUTATION OF TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

          A notice of appeal must be “filed with the district clerk within [prescribed numbers of] days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The guidelines for computing notice of appeal deadlines are set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 26(a). See III.B (regarding when an order is deemed entered, thus triggering the time period of appeal).

 

                              a.       Days Counted in Determining Deadline for Filing Notice of Appeal

 

          In calculating the deadline for filing a notice of appeal, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are included. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1). The following rules also apply: (1) the day of the event that begins the time to appeal is excluded; and (2) the last day of prescribed time period is included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“When the 30th day falls on a weekend, the deadline for filing the notice of appeal is extended to the following Monday.”).

 

          Legal holidays include: New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Birthday, Washington’s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veteran’s Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, “any day declared a holiday by the President or Congress,” and “any other day declared a holiday by the state where either of the following is located: the district court that rendered the challenged judgment or order, or the circuit clerk’s principal office.” See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(6).

 

          Where the 30th day after the district court’s entry of judgment was a day on which the clerk’s office was officially closed – the day after Thanksgiving – the time for filing a notice of appeal was extended pursuant to the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure providing for such an extension when the last day of the 30-day deadline is a day on which “weather or other conditions make the clerk’s office inaccessible.” Regardless of whether the day after Thanksgiving qualified as a legal holiday, it was a day on which the clerk’s office was “inaccessible,” despite the presence of an after-hours “drop box.” Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 2001).

 

                              b.       Date Notice of Appeal Deemed “Filed”

 

                                         i.        Generally

 

          A notice of appeal is timely “filed” under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) if it is received by the district court within the prescribed time. See Klemm v. Astrue, 543

F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding notice of appeal was timely filed although it was accompanied by a postdated check and mailed in district that had adopted an electronic case filing system); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“[A]n appellant has no control over delays between receipt and filing.”); see also Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F.2d 394, 395 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (arrival of notice of appeal at former address for district court clerk within prescribed time constituted “constructive receipt” and was deemed sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction).

 

Cross-reference: IV (regarding the form and content of a notice of appeal).

 

          A notice of appeal mistakenly submitted to the court of appeals is to be transferred to the district court clerk with a notation of the date of receipt, and “[t]he notice is then considered filed in the district court on the date so noted.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(d); see also Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (exercising jurisdiction when the notice of appeal was mistakenly filed in the bankruptcy court, where it would have been timely had it been filed in the district court); Portland Fed. Employees Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 894 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).

 

          A petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision was timely “received” by the clerk on the day the postal employee put notification slips in the clerk’s Post Office box stating that the petition, which had been sent by overnight express mail, was available for pickup, not on the following day when the petition was brought to the clerk’s office and stamped by the clerk, because the local rule provided that all mail was to be sent to the court’s Post Office box, not to the street address. Sheviakov v. INS, 237 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001).