

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MAR 6 2020

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

JESUS ARMANDO CACERES-LINARES,
AKA Jesus Linares,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 18-72272

Agency No. A070-635-636

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 3, 2020**

Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Jesus Armando Caceres-Linares, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT").

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Garcia-Milian v. Holder*, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Caceres-Linares did not establish past persecution on account of a protected ground. *See Baghdasaryan v. Holder*, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An applicant alleging past persecution has the burden of establishing that (1) his treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”); *see also Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr*, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (“threats alone, particularly anonymous or vague ones, rarely constitute persecution”); *Garcia-Milian*, 755 F.3d at 1033 (evidence did not compel the conclusion that past harms were on account of a protected ground). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Caceres-Linares failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution in El Salvador. *See Nagoulko v. INS*, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (possibility of future persecution “too speculative”). Thus, Caceres-Linares’s asylum claim fails.

In this case, because Caceres-Linares failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. *See Zehatye v. Gonzales*, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence supports the agency's denial of CAT relief because Caceres-Linares failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. *See Aden v. Holder*, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

We lack jurisdiction to consider Caceres-Linares's contentions concerning humanitarian asylum and a newly proposed political opinion because he failed to raise these issues before the agency. *See Barron v. Ashcroft*, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.