

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

OCT 14 2021

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MARIA LEONOR DUBON DE
BUSTAMANTE,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

Respondent.

No. 20-72536

Agency No. A209-988-748

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 12, 2021**

Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Maria Leonor Dubon de Bustamante, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations. *Conde Quevedo v. Barr*, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Id.* at 1241. We deny the petition for review.

The agency did not err in concluding that Dubon de Bustamante failed to establish membership in a cognizable particular social group. *See Reyes v. Lynch*, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting *Matter of M-E-V-G-*, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Dubon de Bustamante otherwise failed to establish she was or would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. *See Zetino v. Holder*, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Thus, Dubon de Bustamante’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency's denial of CAT relief because Dubon de Bustamante failed to show it is more likely than not she will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador. *See Aden v. Holder*, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We reject as unsupported by the record Dubon de Bustamante's contentions that the agency ignored evidence or otherwise erred in its analysis of her CAT claim.

We do not reach Dubon de Bustamante's contentions regarding the IJ's adverse credibility determination. *See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder*, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (review limited to the grounds relied on by the BIA).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.