

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

APR 23 2025

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

OLIVIA MORA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BURN AND PLASTIC HAND
CLINIC; KATHERINE CANNON, Nurse,
Harborview Medical
Center; HARBORVIEW MEDICAL
CENTER,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 24-210

D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01008-JLR

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 22, 2025**

Before: GRABER, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Olivia Mora appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in her action
alleging discrimination and retaliation claims under the Americans with

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). *Watison v. Carter*, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Mora’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims because Mora failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she was denied public accommodation because of her disability. *See Ariz. ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc.*, 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the requirements for an ADA discrimination claim); *Zukle v. Regents of Cal.*, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) (“There is no significant difference in the analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.”).

The district court properly dismissed Mora’s ADA retaliation claim because Mora failed to allege facts sufficient to show that there was a causal link between any protected activity she engaged in and any adverse action she experienced. *See T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist.*, 806 F.3d 451, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining the requirements for an ADA retaliation claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Mora’s state law claims after dismissing Mora’s federal claims. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (permitting district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); *Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.*, 627 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying further leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. *See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.*, 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile); *Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc.*, 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Mora’s contentions that the district court discriminated against her or denied her due process.

AFFIRMED.