

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

AUG 28 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

GHAUS MALIK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

G. AND P. MALIK, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

FARHAN MALIK; JOHN MALIK;
ILLIASSER ROBIN ARIAS; WELLS
FARGO CLEARING SERVICES, LLC,
dba Wells Fargo Advisors,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 25-7890

D.C. No. 2:23-cv-01344-CKD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Carolyn K. Delaney, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted August 25, 2026***

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Before: SILVERMAN, N.R. SMITH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Ghaus Malik appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his diversity action alleging various claims connected to his family's limited liability company. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary judgment and questions of standing. *Carroll v. Nakatani*, 342 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ghaus Malik failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was subjected to fraud with regard to the 2018 transfer of his membership interest in G. and P. Malik LLC or had standing to bring his claims arising after the transfer. *See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp.*, 926 P.2d 1061, 1076-77 (Cal. 1996) (explaining that, under California law, fraud or misrepresentation “does not render [a] contract *void* unless the misled party, before making the agreement, lacked a reasonable opportunity to learn its terms”); *see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that, to establish standing, a plaintiff must suffer an “injury in fact,” that is an invasion of a legally protected interest).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. *See Padgett v. Wright*, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.