

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SEP 22 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

NANCY ALEJANDRA CID ROJAS; I. F.
R. C.,

Petitioners,

v.

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 25-5325

Agency Nos.
A245-192-446
A245-200-308

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 18, 2026**
Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN, R. NELSON, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Nancy Alejandra Cid Rojas and her minor child, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing their appeal from a decision by an Immigration Judge (IJ), which

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

denied Cid’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).¹ We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

“Our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” *Khudaverdyan v. Holder*, 778 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). We review the agency’s conclusions, “both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings[,] for substantial evidence.” *Urias-Orellana v. Bondi*, 607 U.S. 537, 545 (2026). Under this standard, we may reverse only “when any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary based on the evidence in the record.” *Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions*, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (cleaned up) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). This standard applies “to the agency’s conclusion that a given set of undisputed facts does not constitute persecution.” *Urias-Orellana*, 607 U.S. at 539.

In her opening brief, Cid does not “specifically and distinctly” argue that the agency erred by denying her application for withholding of removal or CAT protection. *See Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr*, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020). As a result, Cid forfeits her challenges to the denial of withholding of removal and CAT protection. *See id.* We thus consider only Cid’s arguments regarding the denial of

¹ Cid’s child is a derivative applicant to her application.

her asylum application.

1. An applicant for asylum can demonstrate her eligibility, in part, by establishing she suffered past persecution. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). “Persecution is an extreme concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or harassment.” *Donchev v. Mukasey*, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Cid did not suffer past persecution. She never suffered physical violence, and the sporadic and infrequent encounters over three years did not cumulatively rise to an ongoing pattern of serious maltreatment. *Sharma v. Garland*, 9 F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing persecution as typically involving “significant physical violence” or “ongoing pattern[s] of serious maltreatment”). While Cid suffered anxiety and economic loss because of those encounters, we have held that “unspecified economic harm” and “unsubstantiated psychological harm do not rise to the level of targeted persecution.” *Hussain v. Rosen*, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. *See Bringas-Rodriguez*, 850 F.3d at 1059.²

2. An applicant for asylum can also demonstrate her eligibility by establishing

² We do not consider the BIA’s alternative finding that Cid’s proposed particularized social groups are not cognizable because they lack particularity and social distinction. *See INS v. Bagamasbad*, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“[C]ourts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

she has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). The applicant can do so by showing either an individualized risk of harm or a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).

Although Cid submitted evidence describing widespread crime and gang-related violence in Mexico, that evidence did not show individualized risk of harm or establish a pattern or practice of persecution directed at persons similarly situated. *See, e.g., Sharma*, 9 F.4th at 1063 (holding adverse country conditions were not sufficient evidence of persecution because it did not show that she will be “individually targeted on account of a protected ground rather than simply the victim of generalized violence”); *Wakkary v. Holder*, 558 F.3d 1049, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding evidence of widespread discrimination against particular groups did not compel the conclusion that there was a pattern or practice of persecution). Substantial evidence therefore supports the agency’s finding that Cid failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. *See Bringas-Rodriguez*, 850 F.3d at 1059.

PETITION DENIED.³

³ Petitioners’ motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.