

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SEP 24 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROAM SAVAGE CHANDLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 26-1179

D.C. No.

9:16-cr-00040-DWM-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 22, 2026**

Before: OWENS, COLLINS, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Roam Savage Chandler appeals from the district court's judgment and challenges the eight-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Chandler contends the sentence is substantively unreasonable because (1) his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

violations were technical and non-criminal, (2) most of the violations were discovered as a result of his own disclosures, (3) the supervised release conditions with which he was required to comply were “extraordinarily broad,” (4) the district court relied on speculative concerns regarding dangerousness and noncompliance, and (5) there were less restrictive sentences available that would have better served the rehabilitative aims of supervised release. None of these arguments establishes that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the within-Guidelines sentence. *See Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The court considered the facts in the record and Chandler’s testimony and allocution, and it determined that an eight-month sentence was warranted to sanction Chandler’s breach of the court’s trust. *See United States v. Simtob*, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (the primary purpose of a revocation sentence is to sanction the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust). The court did not rely on any improper speculation, and it did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence, which is substantively reasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. *See Gall*, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.