NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

OCT 28 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAFFON GLYMPH, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CT CORPORATION SYSTEMS; COMPUCOM SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants - Appellees.	No. 25-1089 D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01704-JHC MEMORANDUM[*]

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 27, 2026[**]

Before: SILVERMAN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

The motion to proceed in forma pauperis, attached to the notice of appeal, is granted.

Laffon Glymph appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment

[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

in her action alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a), and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Xin Liu v. Amway Corp.*, 347 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Glymph's FMLA claims because Glymph failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether CompuCom "interfere[d] with, restrain[ed], or den[ied] the exercise of or the attempt to exercise" any of her rights under the FMLA, or whether her FMLA leave was impermissibly considered as a factor in her termination. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); *Xin Liu*, 347 F.3d at 1132-33, 1136 (describing requirements of a claim for interference with protected leave under the FMLA).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Glymph's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because Glymph failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether CompuCom engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct. *See Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n*, 336 P.3d 1142, 1151 (Wash. 2014) (explaining that under Washington law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requiring proof of conduct that was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community").

AFFIRMED.