

**FILED**

MAY 2 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK  
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

**JUDICIAL COUNCIL  
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

**IN RE COMPLAINT OF  
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT**

No. 19-90051

**ORDER**

**THOMAS**, Chief Judge:

Complainant, a pro se litigant, has filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against a magistrate judge. Review of this complaint is governed by the Rules for Judicial Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (“Judicial-Conduct Rules”), the federal statutes addressing judicial conduct and disability, 28 U.S.C. § 351 et seq., and relevant prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. In accordance with these authorities, the names of complainant and the subject judge shall not be disclosed in this order. See Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(g)(2).

The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act provides a remedy if a federal judge “has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). A chief judge may dismiss a complaint if, following review, he or she finds it is not cognizable under the statute, is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling, or is frivolous or lacks sufficient evidence to raise an inference of misconduct.

See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Judicial misconduct proceedings are not a substitute for the normal appellate review process, and may not be used to seek reversal of a judge's decision, to obtain a new trial, or to request reassignment to a different judge.

Complainant alleges that, in an order denying complainant's in forma pauperis (IFP) application, the judge improperly omitted certain details from the proposed civil complaint, and improperly referenced facts provided in complainant's IFP application. This allegation relates directly to the merits of the judge's rulings and must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1982); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(B).

Complainant also alleges that the judge used "coded" language and citations in order to denigrate complainant, and made derisive comments throughout the order. This allegation is belied by the record, which shows that the judge's order did not include any disparaging or otherwise inappropriate language.

Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed as unfounded and conclusively refuted by objective evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 552 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009).

Finally, complainant alleges that the judge “may have had” ex parte communications with the opposing parties, and has improper knowledge of complainant’s paycheck schedule and certain research conducted by complainant. Complainant provides no objectively verifiable evidence to support these vague and speculative allegations, which are dismissed as unfounded. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 715 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2013) (“As we have frequently held, adverse rulings, standing alone, are not proof of misconduct”); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 569 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009) (“claimant's vague insinuations do not provide the kind of objectively verifiable proof that we require”); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D).

**DISMISSED.**