

NOV 5 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS**JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT****IN RE COMPLAINT OF
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT**

No. 21-90000

ORDER**THOMAS**, Chief Judge:

Complainant, a pro se litigant, has filed a complaint of judicial misconduct against a district judge. Review of this complaint is governed by the Rules for Judicial Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (“Judicial-Conduct Rules”), the federal statutes addressing judicial conduct and disability, 28 U.S.C. § 351 et seq., and relevant prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. In accordance with these authorities, the names of complainant and the subject judge[s] shall not be disclosed in this order. See Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(g)(2).

The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act provides a remedy if a federal judge “has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). A chief judge may dismiss a complaint if, following review, he or she finds it is not cognizable under the statute, is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling, or is frivolous or lacks sufficient evidence to raise an inference of misconduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). Judicial misconduct proceedings are not a

substitute for the normal appellate review process, and may not be used to seek reversal of a judge's decision, to obtain a new trial, or to request reassignment to a different judge.

This complaint arises from a case filed against a government agency. Complainant alleges that the judge improperly denied complainant's motion for entry of default. This allegation directly relates to the merits of the case and must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226, 1227 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1982); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(B).

Complainant next alleges that the judge engaged in ex parte communications. She speculates that the judge denied her motion for entry of default because he might have been influenced by some unidentified law enforcement agents who may have contacted the Attorney General. Additionally, she alleges that the judge engaged in ex parte communications by contacting the defendants in the case to encourage them to respond to the civil complaint, thereby avoiding default judgment. Complainant provides no objectively verifiable evidence in support of these allegations, which are dismissed as unfounded. See 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 569 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009) ("claimant's vague insinuations do not provide

the kind of objectively verifiable proof that we require”); Judicial-Conduct Rule 11(c)(1)(D).

Complainant also alleges that the judge ignored her “motion to squash” and motion to amend. A review of the docket reveals that complainant did not file these motions. Even if she did, this allegation of delay does not concern an improper motive or habitual delay in a significant number of unrelated cases. Because there was no misconduct, no further action is required. See Judicial–Conduct Rule 4(b)(2); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 584 F.3d 1230, 1231 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2009).

DISMISSED.